











the major political, economic and security developments in Europe
– including transatlantic relations – from the end of the Second
World War up until the present time, and looks ahead to how the
continent may evolve in the future.
The book fills a definite lacuna in the current literature on Europe,
as most studies cover only specific aspects, such as the European
Union. Destination Europe by contrast weaves all the different
strands of European events together into a single overall and 
up-to-date picture and gives the reader a deeper understanding 
of the continent and its current and future challenges.
The first chapters trace European reconstruction and political,
economic and security developments – both in the East and in the
West – leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Later chapters examine the European Union’s reform efforts,
enlargement, movement to a single currency and emerging
security role; the political and economic changes in central and
eastern Europe, including Russia; the break-up of Yugoslavia and
the wars that ensued; NATO’s enlargement and search for a new
mission; and the current intricate political relations between
European powers, and between Europe and the US. Final chapters
deal with forces affecting Europe’s future such as terrorism,
nationalism, religion, demographic trends and globalisation.
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For the mystery of human life is not only in living, but in knowing why
one lives. Without a clear idea of what to live for man will not consent
to live and will rather destroy himself than remain on the earth, though
he were surrounded by loaves of bread. (Fyodor Dostoyevski, The
Brothers Karamazov, Book Five, ‘The Great Inquisitor’, 1879)
MUP_Torbion_00_Prelims 22/9/03, 12:27 pm6
In this book I attempt to describe, interpret and interrelate the major political
and economic developments in Europe since the end of World War II to the
present, and to look ahead to see how the continent may evolve in the future.
‘Europe’ is understood to be not only the European Union but the whole of the
continent, from Iceland and Ireland in the west to Russia in the east, from
Norway in the north to Turkey in the south. ‘Developments’ sometimes are dealt
with so broadly as to touch on the ‘Zeitgeist’ of the different periods covered,
and which future generations will no doubt understand better than we do.
It is my hope that this book will fill what I perceive as a definite lacuna in the
current literature on Europe, and that it will give the reader – whether a student
of modern Europe or one interested in European affairs in general – a deeper
understanding of the continent and its current challenges, as well as a more solid
foundation to assess the factors likely to affect its future.
There is no more important task than to ensure that peace, democracy, respect
for human rights and the rule of law survive and flourish in a part of the world
that has known so much of their opposites, nearly destroying itself and the rest
of humanity in the process. These values must be defended anew by each
generation, and this can only occur through an understanding of both past and
present. If this book can contribute toward this goal, my work will not have
been in vain.
An explanation is owed about the title, Destination Europe. It alludes to
Andrew Shonfield’s classic Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, published
in 1973. A fair distance has been covered since, but it would be presumptuous to
claim that the destination has come any nearer. History, as is known, has a
penchant for never ending, and that of Europe is no exception.
Foreword
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History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted
all other alternatives. (Abba Eban, Israeli diplomat)1
Summary
At the end of World War II, Germany – formerly the dominant power in
continental Europe – found itself under the occupation of the victorious
powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and
France.
Although tensions would soon arise between the two emerging super-
powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – and lead to the
division of Europe into two hostile blocs, the new situation also offered
a unique opportunity for reconciliation and budding co-operation
especially between Germany and France, whose rivalry had underlain
both world wars.
The Marshall Plan launched by the United States in 1948 kick-started
economic recovery and co-operation in Western Europe, permitting
democracy and a market economy to take hold. In Central and Eastern
Europe, however, the Soviet political grip hardened and communist regimes
posing as ‘people’s democracies’ were installed, emphasising state owner-
ship of the means of production and central planning of the economy.
Europe’s two halves grew increasingly apart and a ‘Cold War’ ensued.
The establishment of NATO under US leadership in 1949 confirmed this
division and extended it to the security field.
A new departure
The fact that serious European co-operation, even integration, started
shortly after World War II was not self-evident or an automatic result of
what had preceded. If things had gone slightly differently, it might not
have taken place at all.
1
1945: Europe’s ‘zero hour’
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On the other hand, it could hardly have happened before. European
powers largely dominated the world in the eras of colonialism and, later,
imperialism and competed fiercely with one another in what they saw as
a ‘zero-sum game’ in the world at large and within Europe itself. Enemy
images, and national histories, had been formed in centuries of warfare.
Wealth was so scarce that the thought of sharing it with a rival, or trying
to increase it through open trade, was virtually impossible.
Not that these struggles diminished the resourcefulness of European
powers or, seen from the outside, of Europe as a whole. The American
historian Paul Kennedy in his classic The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers2 makes the case that Europe rose to world domination precisely
through its divisions. No power was able to dominate any other – in part
also due to Europe’s inhibiting geography with criss-crossing rivers and
mountains – and so each had to work hard on improving its machinery
and strategies for diplomacy and war. The result was an outburst of
European energy towards the rest of the world, that is to say, that energy
which was not expended in such continent-wide catastrophes as the Thirty
Years’ War of 1618–48. This outburst led to the domination of much of
the rest of the world through competition among the European powers.
Wars were, on the whole, considered as somewhat of a game, for
autocratic rulers to engage in more or less at will – Dieu et mon droit.
There was no aerial bombing, or nuclear weapons promising mutually
assured destruction. Only with the arrival of the sub-machine gun – the
great killer in World War I – the aeroplane, the big guns capable of
distant shelling, such as that of Paris by German guns in 1870, gas
warfare and the like, did rulers (and populations) begin to realise that
wars were not just a few battles to be fought glamorously on horseback
or in infantry attacks, with sons and fiancés back in glory afterwards.
Wars had become something far more terrible and all-encompassing
than in the past, costly in terms of lives lost and destroyed, affecting the
future of generations and whole countries.
The Thirty Years’ War, causing the devastation of wide swaths of
central Europe, had given rise to serious reflection and a certain prudence
against upsetting the European balance of power. The Napoleonic Wars
had a similar, though even more profound effect, and led to over fifty
years of relative peace in Europe following the 1815 Congress of Vienna
(if the Crimean War is excluded, which did not put overall European
peace in jeopardy).
However, the tensions, alliances and counter-alliances were still there,
and Germany’s creation under Prussian domination in the 1860s (in part
a reaction to the Napoleonic Wars) did not help matters, for the
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newcomer filled the Northern European power vacuum on the one hand,
but threatened the established powers on the other – as demonstrated to
France in its defeat against Prussia in the 1870–71 war. The United
Kingdom was still the dominant European and world power, with an
impressive war fleet and an empire upon which ‘the sun never set’.
However, Germany had begun to threaten that power, and soon German
aspirations in Europe and beyond were fundamentally to upset the
power balance until then so delicately upheld among the major Euro-
pean powers. A series of blunders and character faults among leaders
and rulers – paramount among them the foolhardy bellicosity of the
German Kaiser Wilhelm II – was all that was needed to provoke war in
1914. It was a European, and worldwide, conflict that was effectively to
last for thirty years, albeit with a hiatus from 1919 to 1939.
The inter-war period, with its heavy war reparations exacted  especi-
ally on Germany, was characterised by a retreat from the much more
benign climate for trade, investment abroad and freedom of travel that
had characterised a pre-World War I era of ‘Victorian capitalism’ and
stable currencies based on gold. This inter-war period had been domin-
ated by the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany,
with the latter as the economic centre and locomotive of continental
Europe in particular. Suspicion among the major powers was in the air
and protectionism and mercantilism won out over open trade, eventu-
ally leading to a return to rearmament and the pre-war system of
alliances and counter-alliances.3
This is certainly not to belittle the importance of personalities in the
historical events of the first half of the twentieth century. However, and
this is the crucial point, true European co-operation and integration
could scarcely have begun without the completely new reality created by
the fundamental overcoming of the heritage of World War I – without,
in fact, a French–German reconciliation starting from scratch. The out-
come of World War II created such a ‘zero hour’.4
Germany lay prostrate in defeat, occupied by the four victorious
powers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet
Union. Europe was no longer the power centre of the world. That had
moved elsewhere, across the Atlantic, to the United States, which stood
supreme in terms of economic might, military force and political
influence. Only gradually, over the years 1945 to the early 1950s, would
this ‘monopolar world’ become ‘bipolar’ with the rise, at least in military
and nuclear terms, of the other superpower, the Soviet Union.
This evolving bipolar world was nuclear, as from 1945 through the
United States, and from 1949 through the Soviet Union (and later on
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through the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China
and others). This meant that, with Europe as the evolving main battle-
ground between the opposing economic, national, political and ideo-
logical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, European
countries would have to provide stability – as opposed to the kind of
instability that had started two world wars. The only way to do that was
to start to work together.
In this they were, of course, helped by the outside occupying powers –
the United States in Western Europe and the Soviet Union in Central and
Eastern Europe – who were themselves keen on maintaining stability in
Europe, since any confrontation would rapidly risk becoming nuclear.
West Germany’s5 orientation towards the West – Western Europe in
particular, but also North America – was facilitated by the fact that it
was hermetically sealed off from its former neighbouring countries and
markets in the East. An ‘Iron Curtain’ had been lowered in the heart of
Europe, as Winston Churchill put it in May 1945.6 If West Germany
wanted to survive economically and politically, it would therefore have
to seek reconciliation with the West and particularly with France,
which, thanks to de Gaulle’s skilful policies, had gained major-power
status as an occupying power of Germany and a permanent seat on the
newly formed United Nations’ Security Council. Such reconciliation was
all the more easy since demands by France for war reparations from
Germany had been substantially tempered by the other Western war
allies – the United States and the United Kingdom – who were determined
not to repeat the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, in which
enormous (though eventually reduced and abandoned) war reparations
by Germany had added to German resentment vis-à-vis France and the
UK and had facilitated Hitler’s rise to power.
Help from the United States
The major questions that had to be addressed immediately after the war
– and which had formed the core of the negotiations between the leaders
of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union at Yalta
in February 1945 – were firstly the future of Germany and secondly the
dimensions of the ‘sphere of influence’ of guaranteed friendly countries
that the Soviet Union could reasonably demand in order to protect itself
against any German aggression in the future. The Soviet Union was still
considered by many in the West as a country evolving toward demo-
cracy and so it was reasonable to believe that it would permit free and
fair elections in the countries under discussion, such as Poland, the
MUP_Torbion_01_Ch1 22/9/03, 12:29 pm4
1945: Europe’s ‘zero hour’ 5
future of which had taken up most of the time at Yalta.7
The talks among the victorious powers continued in Potsdam near
Berlin in the summer of 1945. At first the United States joined the Soviet
Union in requesting stern punitive measures for Germany for its role in
the war, a demand that would have been all the easier to realise con-
sidering that Germany now, unlike after World War I, had no govern-
ment but was ruled by military governors in the several ‘occupation
zones’ trying to work together in an Allied Control Council. The United
Kingdom, however, was less keen on heavy war reparations, not least
out of fear of an eventual Soviet takeover of the whole of Germany.
Work of the Allied Control Council, now joined by France under de
Gaulle, soon became bogged down as France, which wanted a virtual
break-up of Germany as a country as a safety measure, started vetoing
all important decisions. Furthermore, Russia, insisting on major repara-
tions, stopped supplying food to the starving populations in the western
military zones as had been agreed at Potsdam, whereupon the US in
April 1946 abandoned its commitment to sending war reparations from
its zone to the Soviet Union. Instead it began sending food to Germany
and other countries such as France. More generally, the US now joined
the UK in beginning to fear Soviet intentions and was urged by its ally to
maintain a military presence in Europe instead of withdrawing its troops
as it had after World War I and as it had announced at Potsdam it would
do this time, too.8 Meanwhile, Germany’s food situation continued to
worsen, with no solution in sight.
The problems of Western Europe were so great that it is doubtful
whether reconciliation between West Germany and France, and between
West European countries in general, could have succeeded without the
remedy eventually suggested: the Marshall Plan, announced by the US
Secretary of State, George Marshall in June 1947 and enacted by Congress
in April 1948 as the European Co-operation Act and, at the operational
level, the European Recovery Programme.9
The functioning of the Marshall Plan was straightforward. The flow
of dollars from the United States enabled receiving countries to import
goods and machinery. Each government was to use its own currency to
place the equivalent of the dollar amounts it received in a special fund.
Virtually all the funds transferred into this account were placed at the
disposal of the government, provided they were used for reconstruction
and economic development. A small part could be used to cover adminis-
trative costs and/or technical assistance.10 The assistance was both
material – going to agriculture, basic industries, transportation and the
like – and conceptual, such as in engineering and management advice. It
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was distributed through the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), in which all the recipient countries participated.11
Close to US$13 billion were channelled to seventeen European coun-
tries from 1948 to 1952. All European countries had been invited to
participate, including the Soviet Union, but the latter had declined and
pressured the Central and East European countries under its influence to
do the same, no doubt out of fear of ‘capitalist contagion’ and of losing
political control over its client states.12 The UK, France, Italy and West
Germany were the most important recipients, together accounting for
some 65 per cent of the total. But also countries that had managed to
avoid the war, such as Sweden and Ireland, participated.
The Marshall Plan was a major success, so much so that its name has
been invoked many times since, such as when massive aid has been
sought in support of developing countries or a Central and Eastern Europe
country liberated from communism. One reason for the success of the
Marshall Plan in post-war Europe was the enormous demand in basic
and labour-intensive sectors of the economy at the time. This led to
considerable ‘multiplier effects’ on the economy as a whole – the recon-
struction of railroads, roads, entire cities. Furthermore, populations in
the recipient countries were not only eager to go to work and build up a
normal existence after all the war years, but also equipped with suffi-
cient education and experience of the market economy to ‘make the
Marshall Plan stick’.
There was a huge demand for all kinds of goods. This, together with
relatively low labour costs in comparison with the emerging new trading
partners, the United States and Canada, raised the national product of
most of the recipient countries, and in particular West Germany, to the
pre-1939 level already by the early 1950s. (In West Germany the
increase from 1947 to 1950 was over 300 per cent.13)
Another factor explaining the success of the Marshall Plan was the
near-total absence of competition from areas of the world outside North
America. If today Western Europe fears for the maintenance of its manu-
facturing in the face of competition from emerging economies that were
formerly developing countries, as well as from Central and Eastern
Europe (both with hard working populations and lower labour costs)
then the situation in the post-war years was entirely different, even if
Japan is included, which had yet to emerge as a major economic power.
The United States provided economic stability, permitting both intra-
European and transatlantic trade to grow on a sound footing. The US
dollar was the undisputed world reserve currency, offering a rock-steady
reference value for emerging intra-European trade. The United States
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had also taken the initiative in creating the so called Bretton Woods
Institutions of the World Bank (providing funds for long-term investment
around the world, particularly in infrastructure) and the International
Monetary Fund (for short-term assistance to countries in currency-
exchange-rate difficulties).
Finally, the Americans insisted on more open trade: at European level
through the OEEC as a condition for Marshall Plan money and at world
level through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
concluded in 1947. The International Trade Organisation (ITO) was to
have formed – together with the Bretton Woods Institutions in the
economic field and the United Nations (with its Security Council) in the
political and security domain – the ‘triad’ for a New World Order.
However, in the end the ITO was not ratified by the US Senate and so
had to be turned into a simple ‘agreement’, the GATT, which neverthe-
less achieved a great deal on behalf of freer world trade until it became,
in 1995, the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
A Europe divided in two
Although the division of Europe into two halves assisted West European
co-operation and involved the United States (and Canada) firmly in
European affairs, it also delivered large parts of Central and Eastern
Europe to Soviet hegemony, hindering economic development not only
in the countries concerned but in Europe as a whole. In the years that
followed, the Soviet political grip hardened and communist coups d’état
or takeovers multiplied in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, leading to intense international tension
and fear of a new world war. Stalin, the Soviet leader, increasingly failed
to distinguish between ‘friendly’ and ‘puppet’ governments in the Soviet
sphere of influence.
Especially after the communist coup d’état in Prague in February 1948,
tension rose to new heights. There was intense fear in Western Europe
that the Soviet Union, working through the so-called Cominform estab-
lished in September 1947, would stage similar events in other countries,
notably France and Italy. Efforts to form a German state out of the
British, US and French occupation zones accelerated. This led, in June
1948, to a currency reform in the three Western zones (and in the
Western sectors in Berlin) and to the so-called Frankfurter Decisions,
defining the political steps towards the establishment of a West German
state. The Soviet blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin the same
month – and the Western resolve not to abandon them – in turn hastened
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talks in Washington in August 1948 for what a year later would become
NATO.14
The eastern part of the continent – after the countries there had been
forced to refuse participation in the Marshall Plan – went its own way
economically, cut off from the rest of the world. Diplomatic, trade and
even traffic links with Western Europe were severed. A new economic
system based on state ownership of the means of production was intro-
duced by force, and economics became the ‘servant’ of the political aims
of the ruling communist parties.
A Soviet economic reply to the Marshall Plan, the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (more widely known as Comecon) was established
in 1949, building not on material assistance but on a plan for trade
where each country would specialise in certain types of products, or
even part-components for given products, in a ‘socialist division of
labour’.15 This system was meant to favour the Soviet Union econo-
mically, and to bind Central and Eastern Europe closer to it as a buffer
against a Germany that only a few years earlier had invaded the Soviet
Union, and caused the death of some 20 million of its citizens. In the
end, because of the inefficiency of Soviet communism in general, and the
Comecon system in particular, the latter benefited neither Central nor
Eastern Europe, nor the Soviet Union itself. This is a matter, however, to
which we shall return later.
A new type of human being, a communist one, was to be formed,
reflecting the widespread belief at the time that humans could indeed be
moulded and reformed. All behaviour was due to the environment, none
to innate factors. The new human being would be unselfish and work
for the common weal. Thus would society evolve toward an unparal-
leled state of prosperity and happiness.
The belief in communism – as harboured by the European elites who
had taken over following the thorough purges of the traditional ruling
classes, and even more among many intellectuals in Western Europe
and, to a lesser extent in the United States – was aided by the fact that
this was the golden era of industrialism and large projects. Individual
creativity was considered far less important for economic development
than the planning and mobilisation of capital and people joining
together in the realisation of large enterprises, such as steelworks, dams
or construction plants.
The acquisition by the Soviet Union of a nuclear weapons capacity,
whether by its own effort or assisted by espionage in the United States,
seemed to confirm the strength of the communist system in general and
the Soviet Union in particular. The huge scale of Soviet and East
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European projects; the belief in massive resources and in the malleability
of humans; and the vastness of the Soviet Union’s land mass awed the
West and led many there to despair of the future of capitalism and
democracy. In this, the post-war years resembled the 1930s, when the
United Kingdom had stood virtually alone in Europe in defence of those
principles against fascist Italy and Germany and the communist Soviet
Union. The crucial difference between the two periods was of course the
United States – the strength of its economy and military and its increas-
ing commitment to Western Europe. The post-World War II era thus
continued, from the inter-war period, to be one of ideological division
and confrontation – no longer mainly between fascism and communism,
but between communism on the one hand, and capitalism and demo-
cracy on the other.
The United States’ creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) in 1949 together with eleven West European countries merely
confirmed the American commitment to the old continent as manifested
through the Marshall Plan. Based on the Washington agreement, NATO
committed the participating countries to consider ‘an attack on one of
them as an attack against them all’. It supplemented agreements among
in particular France and the United Kingdom (the Dunkirk Treaty of
1947), but also Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (the 1948
Brussels Treaty, eventually leading, in 1955, to the creation of the
Western European Union), by giving them a transatlantic dimension,
and hence greater credibility vis-à-vis a Soviet Union increasingly con-
sidered as being hostile to Western Europe, after having been a doughty
ally in defeating the Axis powers.16
However, in what was known at the time as ‘double containment’,
NATO had the added aim to allay the fear of the Brussels Treaty parties
of a revanchist Germany, encouraging countries like France and the
United Kingdom to start co-operating with that country and eventually,
in 1955, allowing it to become a NATO member. (The radical impor-
tance for Europe as a whole of bringing Germany into formal co-
operation with France and the United Kingdom – of in fact turning those
potentially quarrelsome rivals into a trio playing the same tune – would
not be apparent for some time.)
In conclusion, the end of the 1940s saw a Europe as fundamentally
reshaped as in the 1840–80 period. The United States was firmly in
charge of the western half, the Soviet Union of the eastern half. Even
Germany, indeed Berlin itself, were equally divided up. Western Europe
was well on the way to recover economically, if not emotionally, from
the ravages of war. There was embryonic co-operation, and an overcoming
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of enmity, among Western European countries under American prodding.
Central and Eastern Europe were facing a more uncertain future under
complete Soviet domination and a forced economic interdependence in
the East based on state communism and Soviet economic and political
interests.
It was a historically unique situation, which was to prove particularly
propitious to economic, and later political, co-operation and integration
among a number of major European powers, prominent among them
France, Germany and Italy.
Today all these circumstances have been overturned. Germany is re-
united (minus the eastern part of the country, ceded to Poland after the
war, and that part of the former East Prussia which is now the Kalinin-
grad region of Russia). Europe is no longer divided but increasingly
united within an enlarging European Union. The Soviet Union no longer
exists, with a resurrected Russia and many other equally reinstalled coun-
tries succeeding it. Comecon is gone. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union’s
riposte to NATO, has been dissolved, with NATO itself enlarging rapidly
into Central and Eastern Europe and Russia being a close partner to it.
One question that will occupy us in later chapters will be whether there
is any risk that Europe may slide back to a geopolitical situation similar
to that prevailing before the two world wars, or whether European co-
operation and integration – notably through the European Union but
also at a transatlantic security level through NATO – have made such a
regression impossible.
Notes
1 Speech in London on 16 December 1970; as reported in The Times the
following day.
2 Kennedy, P. (1987).
3 See e.g. Keynes (1920, Ch. 2).
4 However, Grosser (1980, pp. 3–4) does not consider 1945 as Europe’s ‘zero
hour’ or ‘year zero’, as he calls it, but only as a gradual transition from arms
to politics. In US–Soviet relations he rather sees ‘year zero’ as either 1941
(when the US entered the anti-Hitler alliance) or 1949 (the establishment of
NATO). Nor did 1945 mark a break, he says, in European colonial ambi-
tions or in de Gaulle’s political struggle against his American ally and for a
greater role for France in Europe and the world.
5 The Federal Republic of Germany as from 1949.
6 Quoted in McCullough (1992, p. 383), in a cable by Churchill to President
Truman, and (p. 489) in a speech in March 1946 at Westminster College in
Fulton, Ohio.
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7 The Moscow-based British diplomat Clark Kerr in a colourful cable to London
expressed the optimistic sentiments at the time concerning Soviet intentions.
He wrote: ‘The Soviet Union is now in a state of high buoyancy and utterly
confident of her strength. The manifestations of this confidence are often rough
and boisterous. The Soviet Union tends to disport herself like a wet retriever
puppy in somebody else’s drawing room, shaking herself and swishing her
tail in adolescent disregard for all except herself. We must expect her thus to
rampage until she feels that she is secure from any unpleasant surprises in
neighbouring countries, and then we may, I think, foresee that she will
emerge from her puppydom and settle down to the serious and respectable
business of collaboration with her major allies’ (Ross, 1984, p. 198).
8 Instrumental in raising US suspicions of Soviet intentions was the famous
‘long telegram’ sent by George Kennan, the scholarly US chargé d’affaires in
Moscow, to the State Department in early 1946. The Kremlin, Kennan
wrote, had a neurotic view of the world, stemming from an atavistic sense of
insecurity. The Soviet regime was ‘committed fanatically’ to the notion that
no peaceful co-existence was possible with the US and that ‘it is desirable
and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our
traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state
broken’. Marxism, Kennan continued, was just a ‘fig leaf’ for the ambitions
of the country’s leaders, who were ‘only the last of a long session of cruel
and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced their country on to
ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security
for their internally weak regime’ (McCullough, 1992, pp. 490–1).
9 The Marshall Plan was in fact the result of a year-long effort on the part of a
group of visionary men in the US State Department, in particular Dean
Acheson and Clark Clifford. President Truman declined to have it named
after himself, arguing: ‘Anything that is sent up the Senate and House with
my name on it will quiver and die’. For a detailed account of the genesis of
the Marshall Plan, see Jones (1955). The main purpose of the Marshall Plan
was to assist economic development and thereby political stability in Ger-
many, but it was also meant to do the same in especially France and Italy,
where the communist parties were strong and seen as subservient to the
Soviet Union.
10 For a comprehensive account of the functioning of the Marshall Plan, see
e.g. Gimbel (1968).
11 As from 1960, the OEEC was transformed into the OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) and made, with extended
membership such as Japan, into a world policy-formulating institution in
the economic field.
12 This was in fact what the United States had hoped for, not least to enable the
Marshall Plan to pass through Congress. Especially contemptible to Stalin
were conditions such as having the Plan form part of a multilateral co-
operation programme, including the German occupation zones in it; and
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obliging recipient countries to account for their use of funds. Molotov called
the Marshall Plan ‘nothing but a vicious American scheme for using dollars
to buy its way’ into the affairs of Europe. After meeting in Paris with the
French and British Foreign Ministers in late June 1947 to discuss the
European response to the Marshall proposal, Molotov left in anger on 2 July
1947, refusing Soviet participation. This cleared the way for the Plan’s
realisation in accordance with US intentions. See e.g. Bohlen (1973, p. 264).
13 As given in von Csernatony (1973, pp. 159–60).
14 The government functions of the three Western occupation zones in April
1949 were transferred from the military governors of each zone to an Allied
High Commission with its seat in Petersberg near Bonn. The Commission –
with the American John Jay McCloy as the driving force – oversaw the
creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and was dissolved, its mission
accomplished, in 1955.
15 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was buried without
fanfare in 1991, at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It never
achieved much except trying to fix prices in trade between socialist countries
on a bilateral basis, co-ordinating national economic plans and organising
economic, scientific and technical co-operation. Still, as Bideleux (1996, p.
174) notes, ‘by 1984 its member states purportedly accounted for one-third
of the world’s industrial production and, with 455 million inhabitants (385
million within European states), 10 per cent of its population’.
16 However, the Dunkirk Treaty was primarily directed against the possibility
of German aggression. In its preamble it stated that it was designed to
prevent the eventuality ‘that Germany should again become a danger to
peace’. The Brussels Treaty, by contrast, already held out the possibility of a
democratic Germany (and Spain) joining it. See e. g. Ellwood(1992, p. 102).





If … the European Defence Community should not become effective; if France
and Germany remain apart … That would compel an agonising reappraisal of
basic United States policy. (John Foster Dulles)1
Summary
Reconstruction in Western Europe, completed by the early 1950s, led to
unbounded optimism about future economic growth and to a strong
desire for closer integration. Following the creation of the Council of
Europe in 1949 among ten West European countries, six went further in
1951 by founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
After attempts to set up a European Defence Community and a
European Political Community failed in 1954, negotiations between the
‘Six’ (belonging to the overall successful ECSC) in 1957 led to the creation
of the European Economic Community (EEC).
However, West European integration projects and Central and East-
ern European adaptation to Soviet communism were overshadowed
(and intensified) by pronounced East–West tensions, as expressed in the
1950–53 Korean War, the formal division of Germany into two states
with a divided Berlin deep in East German territory, and the Soviet
Union’s rise to nuclear power status together with the United States.
Ideology took over from (dormant) nationalism as the prominent geo-
political force, even though tensions were reduced in the mid-1950s
following Stalin’s death. There was an agreement on Austrian independ-
ence and neutrality in 1955, and ‘de-Stalinisation’ began in the Soviet
Union under Khrushchev.
Neither the Hungarian uprising against Soviet rule nor the Suez crisis
the same year could tempt the Soviet Union and the United States into
open confrontation or the abandonment of a slowly achieved, bipolar
stability, which guaranteed them both a dominant influence over events
in their respective ‘spheres of interest’. Major Western European countries
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such as West Germany, France and the United Kingdom also saw certain
advantages in the situation.
Europe between the superpowers
By the early 1950s, post-war reconstruction in Western Europe was
virtually complete. In the Soviet-controlled part it would take much
longer due to the poor economic performance of the centrally planned
economies, but also due to their being cut off from Marshall aid and
deprived of their traditional trading partners on the other side of the
Iron Curtain.
Regions such as the Ruhr area in West Germany, which lost much of
their industrial machinery as war reparations, found themselves with a
head start over the UK and France, thanks to Marshall Aid allowing
them to rebuild with the latest equipment. The port of Rotterdam, for
example, heavily bombed during the war, owed its new prominence as a
gateway to Europe to the fact that it could expand on adjacent waste
land and invest in the latest cargo-handling facilities. The Soviet Union,
which exacted more war reparations on its occupation zone in Germany
(as from 1949 the German Democratic Republic) and Austria than the
Western victorious powers, by contrast found itself in possession of older
industrial plant.
Reconciliation in Western Europe – as opposed to the sub-surface
hostility and suspicion that prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe
between the ‘Soviet satellites’ and the Soviet Union itself – was greatly
helped by the success of reconstruction. Similarly, reconciliation between
former enemies, especially France and West Germany, made possible
further reconstruction and economic development.2 Italy and West
Germany had become democratic and were eager to join a European
family of democracies – in Germany’s case even more so to counteract a
perceived Soviet threat and to compensate for the virtually complete loss
of markets in the East (including East Germany). A ‘virtuous circle’ had
begun. Conversely, the geopolitical forces that propelled Western
European countries to varying degrees of political co-operation or even
integration also turned Europe into a focal point for US–Soviet super-
power rivalry.
From August 1949 the US–Soviet confrontation became dramatically
more worrisome for Europe when the Soviet Union’s nuclear capability
was revealed and the Chinese civil war ended in victory for the com-
munist side two months later. Tension rose to new heights in June 1950
when North Korea invaded South Korea, leading to US military
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intervention under United Nations (UN) authority and to an even more
confrontational US stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.3 Any military con-
flict between the two blocs had the potential to escalate to a nuclear
conflict, with Europe likely to serve as the nuclear battlefield. ‘Better
dead than red?’ or ‘Better red than dead?’ was the agonising potential
choice for Europeans. The fear promoted the quest for political and
economic integration in Western Europe.
The post-war era was focused on ideology rather than nationalism –
almost the very opposite of today – and it was one of great fear for the
survival of European (and world) civilisation, even though the full, long-
term health effects of nuclear weapons were largely unknown and
nuclear tests were conducted with disregard for the risks to soldiers and
civilians alike. Nationalism was not dead, but dormant, as Western
Europe grouped together to escape communism and Soviet domination,
and as the latter suppressed nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe
in the name of a ‘new age of mankind’.
European colonial powers at this time also began to grow tired of
their overseas possessions. The United Kingdom granted India independ-
ence in 1947, and the following decades would see the near dismantling
of European imperialism. The reasons were not only a growing realisa-
tion that it was ‘immoral’ to refuse independence to peoples far from
Europe’s shores, and of the sheer economic and political costs of main-
taining colonies, but also an increasing national consciousness among
colonised peoples whose nationhood often preceded those of European
nations, leading, for instance, to French defeat in Indo-China in 1954.
There was also the shift in the world economy away from raw materials
as a source of wealth for industrialised countries, and towards an
emphasis on ‘value-added’ – finished products of greater and greater
sophistication. In other words, the brain was becoming a more import-
ant lever of the world economy than the arm (and eventually the hand),
a process that has accelerated ever since.4 Especially in a world of freer
and freer world trade in raw materials under GATT, the ‘mother
countries’ no longer had to hold on to colonies at ever greater cost. To
grasp this fact the European colonial powers only had to look at West
Germany, which had no colonies but which surged ahead past much of
the rest of Europe during the 1950s; or at Portugal, which refused to see
the writing on the wall and paid for its stubborn clinging to Angola and
Mozambique well into the 1970s with a painfully slow rate of economic
growth.
If we add all the factors together, it is not surprising that the 1950s
became the decade of integrative will in Western Europe: ideology
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replacing nationalism, relentless political and military pressure from the
East, optimism about a joint economic future fuelled by annual growth
rates that today seem unreachable, the still vivid memories of the war –
and fears of a coming one.
Co-operation: how far?
Europe would not, however, be Europe if all these things were felt with
the same intensity everywhere. The European Movement was able to
unite some 750 prominent Europeans around its call for the nations of
Europe to create a political and economic European Union – a ‘United
States of Europe’. But by the time this led to an international treaty in
1949 it had been watered down considerably by the governments con-
cerned. The Congress of Europe held at The Hague in May 1948 was a
grand rally of ‘Europeans’ attended by leading statesmen, including
Winston Churchill, who in a famous speech in Zurich in 1946 had even
called (uncharacteristically for a Briton) for a ‘United States of Europe’.
However, Churchill had taken the lead in this movement in part to
ensure that it would lead not to unbridled supranationalism, but rather
to a structure where countries, including the United Kingdom, would
maintain their individual identity.5
The Congress adopted a resolution that called for the giving up of
some national sovereignty prior to the accomplishment of economic and
political union in Europe. Subsequently a proposal was put forward,
with the support of the Belgian and French governments, calling for a
‘United Europe’ and the creation of a European parliamentary assembly
in which resolutions would be passed by majority vote. This was, of
course, contrary to the unanimity rule, which was then characteristic of
international organisations.
A Committee of Ministers of a Council of Europe was to prepare and
implement these resolutions. Needless to say, the United Kingdom was
opposed to this form of supranationalism and in the end the British view
largely prevailed. The Committee of Ministers, which is the executive
organ of the Council of Europe, alone has the power of decision and
generally decisions are taken on the unanimity principle. The
Consultative Assembly (today called the Parliamentary Assembly) is a
forum for debate, pressure and influence on the European public, and
not a legislature.
In short, the British and Scandinavian ‘functionalists’ – who believed
that European union, in so far as it was desirable, was to be attained by
intergovernmental co-operation and be essentially restricted to economic
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integration – triumphed over the ‘federalists’, who sought unity by the
more radical method of creating European institutions to which national
governments would surrender some of their sovereignty.6
The statute of the Council of Europe is telling of this development. Its
Article I states:
The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its
members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles
which are their common heritage and facilitate their economic and social
progress.
This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussions of
questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in
economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and the
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The European Movement’s ‘United Europe’ had become the Council
of Europe’s ‘greater unity’, highlighting the continent’s continuing un-
certainty about where it wanted to go. Countries like the United King-
dom and Sweden were among those hesitating most, feeling perhaps that
if God had really wanted them to be part of Europe He would not have
made the English Channel or the Baltic. But others were also ambivalent
to different degrees. France, for instance, wanted European unification
provided it could itself play the leading role in it, especially vis-à-vis
Germany.
Neither France nor smaller countries on Europe’s periphery, such as
Norway and Denmark, wanted to abandon national identity altogether
– a natural reaction considering their recent occupation by Germany.
That latter country – like Italy – was ready to move decisively in the
federalist–integrationist–supranational direction, not least for reasons of
guilt on account of the war.
In the smaller countries of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg, there was a genuine will across the political spectrum in favour of
the same process. These countries were too small to be able satisfactorily
to develop their economies on their own. They had been occupied by
Germany and sought protection from it by embracing it and their neigh-
bours. They had no ambition to lead, only to co-manage. In addition,
they were already, since 1948, working together within the Benelux
customs union (with antecedents from the inter-war period), which
functioned much in the way the European Economic Community would
do later.7
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Integration through coal and steel?
It is not surprising that the next step in the economic and political
unification of Western Europe would be taken without the British and
the Scandinavians. In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was established by the ‘Six’ (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, France, West Germany and Italy).8 The direct precipitating factor
was the renaissance of the West German economy. The rebuilding efforts
of the German people and the aid made available by the United States
both contributed to the ‘economic miracle’ or Wirtschaftswunder that
was about to unfold. It was generally admitted that the German econ-
omy would have to be allowed to regain a stature in the world com-
mensurate with its size and strength, and that Allied control of coal and
steel could not go on forever. 9
Concerns remained however, about how the German steel, iron and
coal sectors (the basic materials of a war effort in those days) could be
allowed to regain their previous powerful position without therefore
endangering future peace on the continent.
One suggestion came in the form of a French plan, conceived by Jean
Monnet and presented by Robert Schuman in May 1950. The Schuman
Plan was highly political in character. It attempted to end the historic
rivalry of France and Germany by making a war between them not only
inconceivable but physically impossible in practical terms. In this way, a
‘European federation’, considered indispensable to peace, would
ultimately come about. The means would not be the nationalisation – or
indeed the internationalisation – of coal, iron and steel production, but
rather the creation, through the elimination of quotas, customs duties
and so forth, of a ‘common market’ in these products. Every participant
in this common market would have the same access to the products of
these industries wherever they might be made. Discrimination on grounds
of nationality would not be tolerated.
The Schuman Plan had a number of appealing characteristics. Firstly,
it could help solve the Saar problem. The return of the Saar (north of
French Lorraine) to West Germany was likely to be more acceptable to
the French if West Germany became a full partner in such a coal and
steel community. It also appealed to the Germans since membership of
such a community would help it re-attain international respectability,
and thereby speed up the ending of occupation and avoid the imposition
of various measures to impede German economic expansion, such as
those that had been in force after World War I.
The Plan was also supported by the federalists, who were as
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disappointed with the OEEC as they were with the Council of Europe.
The OEEC observed the unanimity rule and did not foresee any powers
to be delegated to an independent commission or commissariat. If this
was frustrating, so were the prospects for the OEEC as such, for by 1952
the four-year period of the Marshall Plan would end. The UK and other
countries wanted the OEEC budget to be cut thereafter, with some of its
work handed over to NATO. (In the end, the OEEC would live on with
the same limited powers as at its creation, becoming, in 1960, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and equipped
with a more global economic role.)
The ECSC’s proposed structure was also very much in line with
federalist, supranationalist thinking. It was to have as its supreme organ
a High Authority – a name that would be difficult for Europeans to
accept today – endowed with direct political powers to be exercised, in
periods of crisis for either steel or coal (due to, say, overproduction),
independently of a Council of Ministers, i.e. the representatives of the
governments of the Six. A Common Assembly consisting of delegations
from national parliaments was thrown in almost as an afterthought,
reflecting the weak power of parliaments vis-à-vis executives at the time.
Finally, a Court of Justice was to ensure compliance with the ECSC
Treaty.
If the Schuman Plan was welcomed by the Six, it was rejected by the
British. The British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, for instance, told the
House of Commons: ‘We on this side are not prepared to accept the
principle that the most vital economic forces of this country should be
handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and is respon-
sible to nobody’.10 However, the Six went ahead, and in April 1951 the
corresponding Treaty of Paris was signed. The ECSC came into being,
and the Community took its first step along the road to economic
integration. With the British absent and the Germans leaving the leading
role to France, the ECSC developed its institutions in line with French
bureaucratic thinking, a legacy felt to the present day.
Integration through defence?
The next event in European co-operation concerned the military and
security field, again with Germany at the centre of attention. When the
Korean war erupted in 1950, the United States proposed the rearmament
of West Germany. France was against, just as it had objected to West
Germany becoming a member of NATO. Through its Prime Minister,
Pleven, it instead suggested that, rather than there being a German army,
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a European army should be established, to which each participating
country, including West Germany, could contribute.
The United Kingdom, while not opposed to the project, said it would
not be party to it. However, the Six were positive and started negotia-
tions in 1951 for a European Defence Community (EDC). It would
include a Joint Defence Commission and a Council of Ministers. A Parlia-
mentary Assembly and a Court of Justice would also be established,
similar to those within the ECSC. Rapid progress was made and the
EDC Treaty was signed in May 1952.
The ambitions of the Six did not stop there. If military capabilities
were pooled, then this would leave little room for independent foreign
policies. Political integration would be a necessary further step, since the
proposed European Army would have to stand under effective political
control.
The Benelux countries in particular felt that progress in the military
field, to be viable, had to have its counterpart in that of political inte-
gration. The governments of the Six therefore asked the ECSC Assembly
to propose ways of establishing a European Political Authority. In 1953,
an outline for a European Political Community (EPC) was presented. It
proposed that, following a transition period, the institutions of the
ECSC and the proposed EDC be merged within a new framework. One
European Executive would be answerable before a European Parliament
(to consist of a Peoples’ Chamber elected by direct universal suffrage
and a Senate appointed by national parliaments). Finally, one Council of
Ministers and one European Court would replace the corresponding
bodies created under the ECSC and EDC treaties.
 The European Movement seemed close to its goal. The Six had already
successfully started limited economic integration in the sectors of coal
and steel. They had signed a treaty to merge their defences and were set
to create a political community. Moreover, the draft treaty called for
economic integration to progress still further, through the establishment
of a common market based on the free movement of goods and factors
of production.
To understand how all this was politically possible and close to being
realised, we have to understand the Zeitgeist of that era. The memories
of the fratricidal European war were still vivid. There was a strong belief
in ‘big is beautiful’, quite unlike today’s economic reality, where the
limitations of huge projects and of centralised control have become more
apparent and given rise to opposite trends towards smaller economic
units, decentralisation and ‘subsidiarity’. Keynesian thinking was still in
vogue, with its belief in state intervention in economic life to counter
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heartless market forces, not least through deficit spending to counter
any recession, and ‘social engineering’ that was capable of creating a
more perfect society. Faith in central planning was gaining ground, in
France, for example, through extensive state planning and dirigisme, but
especially in the Soviet Union where Stalin created what seemed like an
economic juggernaut based on heavy industry. (This was long before
any but a few had any doubts about the economic impossibility of state
communism.) And the fear was not far below the surface that an
economically reawakened Germany might try to exact revenge for its
loss of the war.
The French plan for an EDC, a European Defence Community, was,
however, stopped by the French themselves. The parliaments of the other
five countries in line for membership approved the EDC Treaty, but a
succession of French governments did not muster the courage to ask the
National Assembly to ratify it. Efforts were made by the government
under Mendès-France to modify the treaty in order to make it more
palatable to the National Assembly, but the other five refused to go along.
The treaty as it stood was in the end presented to the French Assembly
which, by refusing to consider it, killed both it and the EPC. Among the
reasons were the fear of rearming Germany; the loss of French sovereign
control of its military forces; doubts about the workability of an
integrated army; unease that the strongest European military power, the
United Kingdom, remained outside; and a belief that the end of the
Korean War and the death of Stalin (in early 1953) would make the case
for an EDC less urgent.
The failure of the EDC was followed by a British initiative in part
aimed at dealing with the problem of rearming West Germany in a way
that the French could accept. Several agreements were concluded in
1954 between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the
Six. As part of these agreements, the Brussels Treaty Organisation was
modified and extended. West Germany and Italy were accepted as mem-
bers and a new intergovernmental organisation – the Western European
Union (WEU) – was created. The agreements foresaw the termination of
the occupation of West Germany and that country’s admission to NATO.
As a counterbalance to the West German army, the United Kingdom
agreed to station forces in the country. The basic aim of the agreements
was to establish a European framework in which Germany could be
rearmed and join NATO, while having the British ease French apprehen-
sions about a possible German military predominance. When Germany
was admitted as a member of the WEU in October 1954 and of NATO
in May 1955, the Soviet response the same month was the establishment
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of the Warsaw Pact. With the French decision at about this time to
create an independent nuclear force de frappe, the ‘German question’
seemed, if not solved, then at least stabilised.
Whether the European Defence Community would have worked is
unclear. The problems to overcome would have been formidable. What
would have been the common language, necessary in combat? Would
German soldiers have accepted, let alone understood, French commands?
Would it have been possible to integrate national military structures and
traditions to create an efficient, effective and united fighting force, or
would that force have suffered the same fate in battle as, say, the
combined Russian and Austrian armies against Napoleon at Austerlitz
in 1805, where utter confusion, rivalry and vanity led to total defeat?
Finally, how much would British rejection and American coolness to the
idea have affected its viability over time? NATO was already in exist-
ence, and the United States was determined to have an important say
over West European security affairs. An EDC, especially one without the
United States’ most important ally, the United Kingdom, risked creating
a ‘decoupling’ of the old world from the new – an unattractive possi-
bility given the growing US–Soviet rivalry with Europe as its main focus.
Integration through trade? The birth of the EEC
1954 had been a poor year for European unity. The supranationalist
cause had suffered a serious setback and the establishment of the WEU –
a purely intergovernmental as opposed to supranational organisation –
now held centre stage. However, the European Movement already by
1955 came up with new ideas to bring unification forward.
The initiative came from the Benelux countries. They called for a
general common market and for particular action in the fields of energy
and transport. The Benelux approach was that political unity would not
come easily. It remained the final objective, but it could only come about
over time. The more immediate objective should be economic integration.
As the countries worked closely together in the economic field, political
integration would follow naturally. The Benelux initiative called for the
creation of a European Economic Community. In other words, a change
from EDC to EEC.
The Six met at Messina in Italy in June 1955 and gave the project their
approval. Work aiming to establish a general common market and an
atomic energy pool was to commence. The United Kingdom, a member
of the WEU and associated with the ECSC, would be invited to partici-
pate in the work in preparing the EEC. However, as work progressed,
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differences between the Six and the United Kingdom became evident.
The latter wanted a free trade arrangement, while the Six were intent on
forming a customs union. Furthermore, the UK felt that little extra
bureaucracy was needed to put the new arrangement into effect. Perhaps
the OEEC would be enough. This view was, however, bound to meet
with the resistance of the federalists, who emphasised the creation of
supranational institutions capable of achieving more than just economic
integration. Eventually, the UK representatives withdrew from the
discussions, in November 1955.
Meanwhile, the Six advanced, although not without problems. The
French, for example, wanted a long transition period for tariff reduc-
tions. They also called for escape clauses, the harmonisation of social
charges and high tariffs around the union, while others, such as the
Benelux states, wanted low ones. The French wanted to see an atomic
energy community established, a field where they were predominant,
but they were less enthusiastic about a general common market. Finally,
in March 1957, the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty were signed in
Rome. They entered into force on 1 January 1958.
The inclusion in the EEC Treaty of topics such as social policy and
agricultural policy is indicative of the many compromises between the
Six, and especially between France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. France feared that Germany would benefit most from the more
open markets of the proposed customs union and wanted compensation
in other fields. Thus France insisted on special protection for agriculture,
which had historically been sheltered from competition from abroad
and from which one in five French workers still earned their livelihood.
Furthermore, France wanted an atomic energy community, which could
in due course give France a leading role in the EEC in energy production.
Finally, France sought especially close relations with the Six for France’s
overseas possessions.
Some of today’s major problems of the European Union were born
out of the Rome Treaty compromises. The Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), originally meant to compensate France for feared German industrial
domination, gave rise to the bloated, inefficient and endlessly compli-
cated CAP of today, still swallowing about half of the European Union’s
expenditure. The Customs Union, foreseeing a common external tariff
between member states, would give rise to a lasting temptation to practise
protectionism and thus delay structural adaptation of the economies of
member states. But more about this later.
The institutions foreseen for the EEC (and for Euratom) were, in brief:
MUP_Torbion_02_Ch2 22/9/03, 12:32 pm23
Destination Europe24
• An appointed Commission, which would take over the role that the
High Authority had under the ECSC. It would be the main policy
initiator, with some decision-making authority. It would have a
number of responsibilities for policy implementation. However, it
would be granted less extensive power than the High Authority when
it came to imposing decisions on member states. The member states
had become aware of the dangerous animal they had created in the
High Authority and were not willing to take the risk of losing too
much national sovereignty. In a way, the Commission reflects the
hybrid nature of what eventually became today’s the European Union,
with a supranational element working in parallel with an intergovern-
mental one.11
• A Council of Ministers, with more powers than its ECSC counter-
part. It would be the main decision-making body. Sometimes its
decisions would have to be unanimous, while at other times majority
and qualified majority votes would be allowed.
• An Assembly would maintain advisory and certain supervisory powers.
In a first stage it would be composed of delegates from national
parliaments. However, in due course it would be elected ‘by direct
universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all
member states’.
• Finally, a Court of Justice would ensure compliance with the treaty.
These institutional arrangements were rather more intergovernmental
in character than the integrationists would have liked. Thus, the Council
of Ministers was considered to have been given too much power, at the
expense of the Commission and the Assembly. At the same time, the
Council was seen as being weakened by the fact that most key decisions
would have to be made unanimously.
However, federalists agreed that the system could pave the way for
later supranationalism, especially if, as expected, majority voting was
introduced in the Council after the Community became more established.
Furthermore, the Assembly might soon be elected by direct suffrage, and
its powers correspondingly increased. Finally, if the Community became a
success, member states would become less preoccupied with their national
prerogatives and would be more willing to yield powers to the EEC.
The East–West split deepens
What of the part of Europe behind the Iron Curtain? With the death of
Stalin in March 1953 and the end of the Korean War in July of that same
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year (indeed obtained through Soviet mediation), world tension had
been reduced. In June 1953 new Soviet leaders Malenkov and Bulganin
suggested German unification along the principles of the 1945 Potsdam
Agreement, including the abandonment of a plan to force socialism on
to East Germany. When the initiative was not heeded by the Western
powers, the effect was to fortify the ‘Two German States Theory’ formu-
lated in 1949. An uprising against the regime by East Berlin workers in
June 1953 was, however, suppressed forcefully by the Soviet Union and
the East German government. Only with the visit to Moscow by German
Chancellor Adenauer in September 1955 could Soviet–West German
relations become more normal.12
Tensions were further reduced in 1955, first with the signing of the
Austrian State Treaty, establishing that country’s sovereignty, neutrality
and the withdrawal of foreign troops from its soil, and subsequently
through the departure of Soviet troops from a base in Finland (Porkala)
and from Chinese Manchuria. Furthermore, a thaw in Soviet relations
with Yugoslavia took place the same year and, in February 1956, Khrush-
chev’s criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party led to further ‘de-Stalinisation’ of the Soviet Union and
lessened tension with the West.
However, the desire of the Soviet Union to pursue political control in
its cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis Germany continued undiminished, as did
its intention to hold firm to the economic tenets of state communism. Its
crushing of the East Berlin uprising in 1953, the Polish unrest in 1956
and the Hungarian revolt the same year made this determination clear
enough. At the same time, the crushing of the Hungarian revolution
deeply discredited the communist ideology in Western Europe. Instead
of being considered the ‘centre of a new religion’, the Soviet Union came
to be perceived as just another imperialist power. The shock created by
‘Budapest’ contributed to the decline of the (once mighty) communist
parties in the western half of the continent.
The refusal of the West – the United States and its NATO allies in
Western Europe – to enter into open conflict with the Soviet Union signi-
fied that a certain acceptance of the post-World War II status quo had
set in. Western Europe was content with its rapid economic progress and
the measure of economic, political and military integration that had
been achieved. It felt less vulnerable, especially under the US nuclear
umbrella. The United States for its part probably welcomed the fact that
Western Europe was uniting economically, perhaps even politically,
while leaving military co-operation in the relatively ineffectual hands of
the Western European Union.
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The United States was determined to remain involved in European
affairs this time around – after all it had done to contribute to the Allied
victory in the World War II – that is, not to repeat the security with-
drawal it had undertaken after World War I. This had, in its view, left
Europe a victim of balance-of-power politics among unstable, shifting
alliances. A lively debate within the US administration pitted those who
actively sought the demise of the Soviet Union in the Wilsonian tradition
of a US universal mission on behalf of democracy, against those more
Realpolitik-oriented, who wanted a more passive ‘containment’ of Soviet
power. In the end, the latter view won out, and the US settled into a long
wait for Soviet strength to ebb, holding on to Western Europe while not
risking war over the parts under Soviet sway.
War had become a particularly perilous prospect since 1953, when
the Soviet Union had exploded its first hydrogen bomb and was ready-
ing an intercontinental system for weapons delivery. US territory could
now be reached, especially as from 1957, when the Soviet launch of the
first satellite, Sputnik, produced a veritable shock in the Western camp.
A nuclear exchange would all of a sudden almost certainly result in
MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction.
This meant a rather rigid alliance system for both sides, but one which
– unlike the situation before and between the world wars – was generally
stable and left little room for the lesser powers to break out on their own
and risk a generalised conflict. It was, after all, a situation that suited
both the US and the Soviet Union rather well, with the latter not
realising that it had overextended itself militarily and politically in a way
that would in due course lead to its disintegration.13
The Soviet Union’s hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe went
unchallenged in reality if not in the rhetoric of the Cold War, thus
providing it with both a buffer zone against Germany (indeed, directly
including one part of that country and indirectly another part which had
been ceded to Poland) and a territory in which to apply central planning
and hence further economic dependency on Moscow.
France felt satisfied with its predominant position in West European
affairs through the Western European Union, the ECSC and the EEC,
and it was not too unhappy about the division of Germany. France had,
so it seemed, managed to rein in Germany by embracing it.14
Maybe even the Federal Republic of Germany preferred a divided
Germany – with its largest part firmly anchored in the West – to the kind
of neutral, disarmed but united Germany suggested by the Soviet Union
in the early 1950s. A new Germany including the eastern part would have
given added weight to the nascent Social Democratic Party and a
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stronger communist role in German politics – and would perhaps even
have carried the risk of a coup d’état along the lines of that in Czecho-
slovakia in 1948.15 The declaration of the day of the East Berlin uprising
– 17 June – as a national day of the Federal Republic, and the 1949
Grundgesetz, which spoke about the country as being the true continua-
tion of Germany as a country, were in a way pointers to the future, while
the country concentrated on being a new, ‘good’ European country com-
mitted to democracy and co-operation with its western neighbours and
allies.16
Finally, the United Kingdom had managed to bind Germany firmly in
a defence context that could both withstand pressure from the Soviet
Union and counteract any risk of too dominant a military role for
France’s sensibilities. The ‘umbilical cord’ with the United States was
intact, both in the United Kingdom’s ‘special relationship’ with it and in
the US commitment to overall European security through NATO. Euro-
pean federalism had been held at bay, at least in the military and
political field. If the Six had been foolish enough to embark on the ECSC
and EEC projects, so be it, and God speed to them! The UK would de-
colonise what had to be decolonised, keep what could be kept and create
a Commonwealth to keep the old Empire together, but in a more
morally and politically acceptable way. The UK believed that it would
show the Six what could and should be done economically with the rest
of free Europe.
Already at the close of the 1950s the British could witness, not with-
out a certain Schadenfreude, the first setback for the European Coal and
Steel Community, which it had refused to join. The High Authority – the
ECSC’s supranational body that would take over if there was a ‘manifest
crisis’ in the coal or steel sector – was not given that authority by the
ECSC’s Council of Ministers in 1958–59, when cheap oil imports and a
fall in energy consumption led to over-capacity in coal production.17
Coal and steel policies over the years remained largely in the hands of
ECSC member states and continue to do so up to this day, despite the
decline in importance of these industries.
However, few people doubted that the ECSC crisis was anything but a
minor incident on the road to a more and more united Six, showing the
way to and eventually including others, and that economic integration
would soon lead to its political counterpart. The ingredients that would
later wither away were all there: the memories of the war; rapid, seem-
ingly painless economic growth; pressure from the East; and a bipolar
world with Europe in the middle.
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Notes
1 In a speech to the NATO Council in Paris, 14 December 1953.
2 The dowry brought by France to Germany following World War II was the
nuclear weapon, which gave Germany added security but also reminded it of
its vulnerability and France’s dominant military position. Germany in com-
pensation contributed strength to what was eventually to become the Euro-
pean Union via the strong Deutschmark. Germany was able to look to France
for political muscle, while France counted on Germany to provide the
economic dynamism and funding it lacked.
3 The policy foundation for the more assertive US policy was the famous NSC
68 report of the National Security Council. It was largely drafted by Paul
Nitze, who would later become chief US negotiator in the Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks (SALT). The report laid out options for fighting inter-
national communism and called for larger US military expenditure. It argued
that conventional US rearmament and strategic superiority were indispensable
to maintain the United States’ preponderant position in the international
system and to prevent the Soviet Union seizing the industrial heartland of
Europe and gaining the upper hand in the developing world. The US rearma-
ment programme would in due course contribute to the rise of the so-called
military–industrial complex. See e.g. Leffler (1992, Ch. 8).
4 Peter Drucker (1993), a leading exponent of the ‘Knowledge Revolution’,
sees the Industrial Revolution as having lasted from around 1750 until around
1880, with knowledge being applied to tools, processes and products. The
‘Productivity Revolution’, ending at about the time of the end of the World
War II, concentrated on the work process as such, as manifested, for instance,
in ‘Taylorism’. The ‘Management Revolution’, in the midst of which we
now find ourselves, is, according to Drucker, based on the notion that every-
thing revolves around knowledge, where ‘knowledge is being applied to know-
ledge’, i.e. by enhancing, combining and using the knowledge of oneself and
others in the joint management of projects.
5 Churchill’s speech has been wrongly interpreted as a British commitment to
forming an integral part of such a ‘United States of Europe’. Churchill in fact
always considered the United Kingdom as being ‘with’ and not ‘of’ Europe
and rather saw his country as forming part of ‘three overlapping circles’:
UK–USA, UK–Commonwealth and UK–Europe (the Labour Party largely
shared this view of things). Churchill in his Zurich speech made this clear
when he said: ‘In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the
lead. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America,
and I trust the Soviet Union – for then all indeed is well – must be friends and
sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.
Therefore I say to you: Let Europe arise!’ (Brugmans, 1965, p. 266).
6 For a discussion of the ‘federalists’ or ‘integrationists’ versus the ‘functional
approach’, see e.g. Urwin (1991, Chs 2 and 3).
7 The Benelux union is an intergovernmental institution that, interestingly
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enough, continues to prosper parallel to the European Union (EU) in matters
concerning Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It started as a mone-
tary agreement in 1943, evolved into a customs union in 1944, and into an
economic union in 1993. The ‘Benelux effect’ has no doubt had an impact
on EU integration and is an example of what smaller countries in Europe
can achieve together. See e.g. Busschaert (1998).
8 The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty had a duration of fifty years.
The ECSC was consequently dissolved in 2002. Its provisions now sort
under the general EU legislation and its functions under various Directorates
General of the European Commission.
9 This was then the very opposite development to that foreseen in the so-called
‘Morgenthau Plan’ floated within the US administration in early 1945, fore-
seeing the dismemberment of Germany and the country’s conversion into ‘a
country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character’. The proposal
was soon buried as it became clear that European peace and development
could not be secured without re-industrialisation and that there was still a
political vacuum in its midst. Various further plans were presented and
subsequently abandoned prior to the finally adopted Schuman Plan (May
1950). One was for Four-Power (the US, the Soviet Union, France and the
United Kingdom) international control of the Ruhr, abandoned after British
objections. Another was for a Ruhr Authority under West European con-
trol, with a weak position for Germany. Only the Schuman Plan could pave
the way for Germany’s eventual integration into the new Western Europe
and hence for the German ‘economic miracle’. For a detailed account see
Gillingham (1991). The perhaps best account of the Wirtschaftswunder is
provided by its architect Ludwig Erhard, who vowed, and managed, to put
‘a refrigerator in every household’. By coincidence or not, when he resigned
as Chancellor in 1966, Germany’s economic boom also came to a halt. See
e.g. Erhard (1963).
10 Quoted in Swann (1995, p. 8).
11 Many of the problems of today’s European Union result directly from Jean
Monnet’s more or less single-handed imposition of an elitist, technocratic
ECSC High Authority, with the Commission as its only slightly weakened
offspring. Although European integration as we know it may not have been
feasible without such a set-up, the question now is whether it is viable in
today’s radically changed context.
12 From this time until the 1970s, the Federal Republic insisted on representing
Germany alone, that is, to the exclusion of the German Democratic Republic,
through the so-called ‘Hallstein doctrine’. The latter signified that only coun-
tries that did not have diplomatic relations with East Germany (excepting
the Soviet Union) could have similar relations with West Germany.
13 See e.g. Kissinger (1994, Ch. 18).
14 Charles de Gaulle’s thinking on Europe evolved remarkably from his wartime
exile to his presidency under the Fifth Republic. During and immediately
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after the war, he worked toward a dismemberment of Germany and the
‘association of the Rhineland with a Western bloc’ and a ‘Federation between
France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland, which Great Britain might join
also’. France would ‘assume a leading role for the benefit of everybody’ in
such a federation. By 1958, when the Federal Republic of Germany was a
well-established European actor, he saw the EEC as a vehicle for French
leadership over Germany and Western Europe, provided the United King-
dom could be kept out, lest it be able to carry out its ‘“Trojan Horse”
mission of transforming the Common Market into an “Atlantic Community”’
(Gladwyn, 1969, pp. 32 and 63).
15 German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was firmly Western-oriented, keen
on German membership of the Council of Europe, NATO, the European
Coal and Steel Community and the EEC. See e.g. Ash (1993, Ch. 1).
16 Even the name the ‘Federal Republic of Germany’ indicated this, just as the
name the ‘German Democratic Republic’ showed an admittance by that
country that it was only German, not Germany.
17 The High Authority, a brainchild of Jean Monnet and chaired by him until
1955, consisted of nine international civil servants and could, by the requested
majority, take decisions binding on the six governments concerned in the
interest of some abstract ‘European General Will’ – detached from the
popular or political will expressed by governments or parliaments. It was a
major reason why the UK felt unable to join both the ECSC and the EEC,
with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declaring that his country ‘could
never allow any supranational authority to close down our pits and steel-
works’. De Gaulle, too, was against the ECSC (established when he was out
of power), calling it an ‘unfortunate project which could injure Europe’ and
an ‘imbroglio of pools’ (Gladwyn, 1969, p. 29).
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1960–75: the new Europe takes shape
The present situation of Europe is abnormal, or absurd. But it is a clear-cut one
and everybody knows where the demarcation line is and nobody is very much
afraid of what could happen. If something happens on the other side of the Iron
Curtain – and we have the experience of a year ago – nothing happens on this
side. So a clear partition of Europe is considered, rightly or wrongly, to be less
dangerous than any other arrangement. (Raymond Aron)1
Summary
Following the second Berlin crisis, which had led to the construction of
the wall in August 1961, and the US–Soviet ‘nuclear brinkmanship’ over
Cuba in October 1962, where the Berlin issue formed an important role,
the two superpowers took various steps to diffuse tensions while con-
tinuing their ideological struggle with undiminished intensity. The new
European Economic Community (EEC) made major progress toward free
trade and a common external customs barrier among its members (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), even though
its Common Agricultural Policy also led to clashes among them.
The United Kingdom, which had not wanted to join the EEC in the
1950s and instead had created a non-political, purely free-trade Euro-
pean Free Trade Association in 1960, now realised that its interests
might instead lie in EEC membership. Following essentially French objec-
tions, the UK was twice refused entry in 1961 and 1967 and could only
join in 1973 (with Denmark and Ireland) after the departure of President
de Gaulle of France. The nine-member EEC from this moment on became
the main vehicle for West European economic and political integration,
forming the ‘rich men’s’ club’ of  (essentially Northern) European countries.
Even a first plan for an EEC Monetary Union was conceived in 1970
in order to counter international currency instability largely occasioned
by US financial strains owing to its Vietnam involvement. Plans for a
single currency never went further, however, due to too great an
MUP_Torbion_03_Ch3 22/9/03, 12:33 pm31
Destination Europe32
economic divergence between EEC members and to the economic effects
of the 1973 oil crisis.
The beginnings of ‘big power détente’ over Europe permitted a coun-
try such as Hungary to engage in limited market-oriented reforms and in
1968 led Czechoslovakia toward an open break, soon suppressed, with
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, West Germany, under Willy Brandt,
could start a cautious Ostpolitik of contacts with the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe (especially Czechoslvakia and Poland) and – last but not
least – East Germany. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act seemed to confirm the
Soviet hold over Central and Eastern Europe in ‘peaceful co-existence’
with the West, although, in reality, it marked the beginning of the end of
that Soviet domination and of the Soviet Union itself.
An emerging prosperity
The Six of the EEC, like the rest of Western Europe, were to enjoy growth
rates of 4–7 per cent per year throughout the 1960s and up until the first
oil crisis of 1973–74. Rapid restructuring of the economy took place as
internal EEC tariffs and quotas gradually disappeared. People left the
countryside in large numbers (largely a result of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy’s encouragement of larger, more viable farms), but plentiful
work could be found in the cities, where wages were higher.
Competition from abroad was essentially restricted to North America,
where US direct investment in particular would lead the French poli-
tician and journalist Jean-Jacques Servan Schreiber to write admiringly,
even despairingly, in his 1968 bestseller The American Challenge about
the risk of Europe becoming a mere economic and political appendage
to the United States. Despite the attention this book received, it did not
lead to any political action to try to counter the phenomenon, for it was
a ‘win–win’ situation for both sides, bringing capital, jobs and increas-
ing transatlantic trade. The US–Soviet bilateral world seemed to have a
US–Western Europe economic counterpart, and increasingly a US–EEC
one as North American firms began to prefer the territory of the Six to
that of the United Kingdom. Central and eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union for their part appeared headed for their own, separate economic
system, with central planning and state-owned means of production.
Political pressure from the East continued unabated. Encouraged by
its sudden, at least apparent atomic weapons parity with the US, the
Soviet Union under Khrushchev increasingly engaged in brinkmanship
‘atomic diplomacy’. An ultimatum to the US, the UK and France in
November 1958 to leave their sectors in Berlin ultimately led to the
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August 1961 Berlin crisis and to the building of the Berlin Wall. It was
followed by the even more dangerous Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
On the cultural scene, pop music through stars like The Beatles, The
Rolling Stones and Bob Dylan provided a certain emotional affinity
between North America and Europe, while the few records that managed
to slip past customs controls in Central and Eastern Europe began to
spread a subversive message of individual freedom, joy and material
wealth.
Meanwhile, the recently formed EEC continued its work. The Council
of Ministers – reassured after the ECSC High Authority crisis of 1958–
59 that it, and not a supranational body, retained ultimate authority –
began to give the Commission greater leeway. Although it wanted to go
further along the road to economic integration, it realised that this could
carry political risk at home, for instance vis-à-vis the still strong
communist parties. It was convenient to have the Commission to do the
handiwork and present the governments with, say, a draft directive
which, after negotiation with the other member countries, could be agreed
to as a sacrifice in the name of Europe, and for which the Commission
could if need be provide a suitable scapegoat.
The Commission – appointed not elected, and with a growing army of
devoted ‘Eurocrats’ in its charge – did this, and nobody had any major
reason to complain. The undergrowth in the EEC’s economic forest was
cleared away, permitting trade to grow and, for the first time, significant
intra-EEC foreign direct investment. Weaker companies, previously
sheltered by protectionism, disappeared, and those that took their place
prospered. National governments could hide behind the Commission in
explaining to their respective parliaments why a given policy was being,
and had to be, pursued in the overall EEC interest, while the national
parliaments hardly cared, recognising they could not do the job individ-
ually. Finally, the general public did not complain, for every year they
earned more and esteem for government and international institutions
was still strong.
When the first clash came, in 1965, it was, significantly enough, with
the French government, which found that ‘vital’ French agricultural
budgetary interests had not been taken into sufficient consideration by
the Commission and other member states. After France left its seat in the
Council of Ministers for over six months, thereby paralysing it, the so
called ‘Luxembourg compromise’ was reached in early 1966, signifying
that unanimity would henceforth be required when ‘very important
interests’ of a member state were at stake – in fact, a step ‘back’ from
supranationalism to intergovernmentalism.2
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To the British, watching all this from across the Channel, the Luxem-
bourg compromise made the EEC method seem less threatening. After
trying in vain to reach an acceptable free-trade area agreement with the
Six in 1957–58 (having failed inter alia due to the United Kingdom’s
Commonwealth Preference System), London formed a free-trade area
among the ‘other six’ in Western Europe – Austria, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland and the UK itself. The differences with the EEC
were stark: no political ambitions, only free trade among the members;
no common customs barrier vis-à-vis third countries; a limited staff with
no executive missions or competencies; and the exclusion of agriculture.3
However, hardly was the ink dry on the 1960 Stockholm Convention
creating the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), when the United
Kingdom began to reconsider. A number of uncomfortable truths were
becoming evident. The United Kingdom was no longer a world power,
neither politically (demonstrated by the Suez crisis), nor economically.
The United States and the Soviet Union increasingly engaged in direct
consultations to the exclusion of the middle-sized European powers,
underlining the trend toward bipolarism. The Empire was giving way to
the Commonwealth, but these countries were still developing and could
not provide the same economic and technological boost as the mature
economies in Western Europe. The Six meanwhile sped ahead, growing
more quickly than the UK, and the EEC was gaining increasing promin-
ence as the economic and political spokesperson of Europe. More and
more US foreign direct investment bypassed the United Kingdom, up
until then the preferred location, in favour of the Six. At once the
English Channel seemed both narrower and too wide to the pragmatic
British. ‘If you can’t beat them, join them’, the thinking seemed to go.
However, ‘they’ included France, and France was governed, since 1958,
by Charles de Gaulle.  He was adamantly opposed to UK membership,
for reasons both personal and national. He bore a grudge to the British
for having treated him with what he perceived as disdain during the war,
when he had been the leader of the ‘Free French’. He feared that the
United Kingdom would rival and try to thwart his desire to place France
at the centre of the European stage. He believed the UK would unsettle the
developing Franco–German alliance that in 1963 had led to a Friendship
Treaty between the two countries. He was afraid of a British Trojan horse
with the United States inside, adding to the threat depicted by Jean-
Jacques Servan Schreiber. Neither did he wish to see NATO – whose inte-
grated military command France left in 1966 – as the only defence option
for Western Europe, when French interests might require the development
of an independent European defence identity with a strong French role.
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Two UK applications were made – in 1961 and in 1967 – and both
were rejected by France. It took de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 (and his
death in 1970) and Pompidou’s election as his successor to achieve a
change of heart in France. By now, Paris saw things differently: the UK
might serve as a useful counterweight to an increasingly strong and self-
confident Germany; it would lend support to the French opposition to
pressures within the Community for increased supranationalism; and
France would probably gain economically by virtue of having better
access to UK markets and as a result of the UK’s being a net contributor
to the Community budget.
In December 1969 accession negotiations were opened with the UK –
as well as with three other EFTA-members whose economic and poli-
tical fate were closely tied up with that country: Ireland, Denmark and
Norway (Sweden did not apply for membership, ostensibly for reasons
of neutrality but in reality probably as much for those of economic and
political sovereignty).
Meanwhile, behind the Iron Curtain the Soviet grip over its satellites
had if anything hardened after the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises.
State communism was relentlessly pursued, and Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev could boast that the Soviet Union would overtake the United
States by the end of the decade, an altogether plausible bet in the eyes of
many, especially since the country had put an astronaut, Yuri Gagarin,
in orbit in 1961 – before the Americans.
These achievements in space, however, displayed as much the many
weaknesses of the Soviet economic system as it did its few strengths.
Although unable to enhance wealth for the large majority of its citizens –
those outside the nomenklatura – it could, nevertheless, mobilise
resources for giant, specific projects, such as steelworks, chemical plants
and space. They were good for statistics – the number of tons of steel
produced – but not for the well-being of citizens, and they were on the
whole based on yesterday’s technology.
In 1963 the Soviet Union was for the first time in peacetime compelled
to import grain from the West to cover its needs. This tangibly
illustrated the limits of Soviet economic policy. (Russia had been major
wheat exporter to Europe throughout the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century until the Bolshevik revolution.) This effectively marked
the end to Soviet efforts pursued until the 1950s to achieve economic
autarchy. It also became more difficult for the Soviet Union to forbid its
satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe to make contacts with
the West, when it itself did so. The new openness also showed up in the
security field. Negotiations for an agreement with the United States to
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limit strategic nuclear weapons was started in1964 (leading, in 1972, to
the signature and ratification of the SALT I Treaty).4 It was preceded by
the Partial Nuclear Test Ban in 1963 forbidding atmospheric nuclear
tests (though not under water).
The Soviet economy, and those bound up with it in Central and
Eastern Europe, fell helplessly behind those other market economies,
including the Six of the EEC and the EFTA countries. However, this was
not evident to many in the West, due to Soviet propaganda and the
paucity of information spreading past the Iron Curtain about the true
conditions. Paradoxically, the first major rebellion against Soviet rule in
the 1960s, the Prague Spring of 1968, was to coincide with the first youth
revolution against state and authority in the West. The ‘1968’ events in
France, Germany, the United States and elsewhere were largely in reac-
tion to the US involvement in Vietnam, and they showed the frailty of
many a European government as they soon took the form of a rebellion
against state authority as such.
To the youth of the early 2000s – perhaps intimidated by a lack of job
prospects and caught up in a major shift of world economic activity
away from the developed to the developing world – their parents’ revolt
some thirty-five years before may seem a bit strange. The youth of the
1960s lived in economies growing by 5–6 per cent a year on average,
and they were sure of having well-paid jobs, especially if they had any
education. They could ‘afford’ to rebel without risking their golden
future. However, their concern – if perceived as misguided and ill-
informed by some of their contemporaries – was genuine. Many were
angry with multinational corporations and their alleged role in develop-
ing countries (this was before the same multinationals, with subsidiaries
in the same developing countries, began to move jobs away from the
industrialised world). In Europe, fear of military conflict with the East
created a strong pacifist sentiment, accentuated by aversion to the
United States’ role in Vietnam.
East and West: the calm after the storm
Following the Cuban crisis in 1962 came the beginnings of détente. Both
the United States and the Soviet Union realised they had come within
hours of a nuclear showdown. The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of August
1963 – forbidding tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under
water – marked the start of a long process of diminishing tension that
would include the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (and later
conventional ones) and, eventually, startling events such as the 1989 fall
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of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and, in
2002, Russia’s close partnership with NATO.
A certain stability established itself in Europe in the latter half of the
1960s, as the United States became increasingly engulfed in the war in
Vietnam. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in
preserving the status quo. As President Nixon began his disengagement
from Vietnam in the early 1970s and ‘played the China card’ by visiting
Mao-Tse-Tung in 1972, he revealed not only a desire to play that
country out against the Soviet Union, but also a realisation that the
‘Communist threat’ was far from monolithic, and that nationalism was
also a force to be reckoned with (even though few at the time would
have predicted that it would ultimately become a main driving force in
world affairs).
If détente had a price for the United States – withdrawal from
Vietnam – it also meant complications for the Soviet Union. Growing
emancipation in Central and Eastern Europe – as exemplified by the
Prague Spring in 1968 and Polish unrest in 1970 –was one, and greater
exposure to the Western media, especially television, was another.
Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the German Democratic Republic at this
time, used to say that the enemy of the people was on the rooftops in the
form of television antennae.
The Soviet Union felt that it had to gain Western, including American,
recognition of its post-World War II borders, even if the price to be paid
– as in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe) – meant the pro forma guarantee of human
rights and the free flow of information. However, formal recognition of
borders or regimes matters little in comparison with the yearnings of
people. The human rights provisions were to eat like a cancer on the
body of the Soviet Empire, leading to its dissolution within twenty years,
and along with it the solemnly guaranteed borders.
In the meantime, West Germany began to show impatience with its
‘economic giant, political dwarf’ status (over time economic power and
political power tend to equalise). It wanted to strengthen contacts with
the sixteen million German citizens living under the communist yoke in
the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany. Lucrative business
beckoned on the other side of the Iron Curtain, if only the latter could be
made more porous (over time it is difficult to stop trade between conti-
guous regions, however stringent the political separation).
As the German Chancellor Willy Brandt embarked on his Ostpolitik
in 1969 – in contacts first with the Soviet Union and, after securing its
acquiescence, with countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and especially
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East Germany – it was for the above reasons that he was ready to pursue
it, in spite of grave misgivings held by France and other countries. Yet
the policy worked, both commercially and among domestic political
opinion. Separated families could establish contact and even see each
other. Dissidents were brought to West Germany against government
payment. Détente was given a first, tangible expression.
At this time, the question could be asked: who was and would be
strongest, the Six of EFTA led by the United Kingdom, or the Six of the
EEC led by France and the Federal Republic of Germany?
The decisive factor was West Germany. With West Germany in the
EEC – at the heart of Western Europe – the EEC had to win out. Economic
Europe had to form around an ‘oval’ stretching from the Rhine Estuary
in the Netherlands to south of the Rhine sources in northern Italy, and
West Germany was that oval’s indispensable heartland. Furthermore,
West Germany had been led, at the insistence of the other EEC five, and
in particular France, to join a Customs Union, instead of a free trade
area, which would have been more in line with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, formed in 1947.5
To the Customs Union was added a powerful executive machinery –
the Council of Ministers and the Commission – built very much on
French bureaucratic tradition and with large financial resources at its
disposal, especially through the Common Agricultural Policy obligations.
Finally, because of a special French–West German relationship bequeathed
from World War II and its aftermath, the EEC was given a push in the
political direction, essentially to rein in West Germany within a wider
European fold.
Here, then, is the post-war European crossroads: between, on the one
hand, a non-political, non-bureaucratic EFTA-type of economic co-
operation surging ahead of GATT in trade liberalisation but clearly
conforming to it; and on the other hand, an EEC-type arrangement -
economic but with political aims, ahead of GATT among its members
yet otherwise protectionist in an increasing number of fields such as
agriculture and steel, and with executive power (with both bureaucratic
and centralising tendencies).
For the United Kingdom the die was cast. Precisely because the EEC
was protectionist – not necessarily vis-à-vis GATT but because it obliged
all its members to observe the same tariffs for given types of goods (often
in the direction of the more protectionist members) – the United King-
dom could not afford to stay out. With the UK in, how could Ireland
and Denmark stay out and still hope to garnish British breakfast tables
with their food? For Ireland, its outlying location made the UK an even
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more vital trading partner. For the Danes, who voted ‘yes’ to entry into
the EEC in 1973 by a 60–40 margin, it was bad enough to face the EEC-
wall at Flensburg. Another one at Harwich could spell serious economic
trouble, forcing them to look exclusively north at peripheral Scandinavia.
The Norwegians, however, said ‘no’ in the 1972 referendum by a 53
per cent to 47 per cent margin, for a number of reasons. These included
a fear of losing fishing rights to a budding EEC Common Fisheries
Policy promising the right to all EEC members to fish anywhere in the
EEC area; anxiety on the part of farmers to lose out in the competition
with continental agriculture; newly discovered oil fields holding out the
prospect of new prosperity; and suspicion vis-à-vis the Brussels bureau-
cracy.
Sweden had not even applied for membership, instead seeking
associate membership in order to preserve existing trade benefits with
the three new entrants and not be left completely in the cold. (A bid in
1971 to persuade the Danes to remain outside the EEC by forming a
Nordic Economic Union had failed, mainly due to Finnish and Danish
misgivings.)6  With Finland prevented by its eastern neighbour from
contemplating anything but the most limited contacts with the EEC;
with Spain and Portugal still under dictatorship (obsolete and on their
last legs, but still standing); and with Central and Eastern Europe still
sealed off, the Nine were not to increase the membership of their club
for another seven years.
Integration through a single currency?
Meanwhile, the international currency situation had begun to stir, causing
the EEC to react. The Vietnam War had lead to an overheating of the US
economy, with growing budget deficits and inflation as the main con-
sequences.  The US balance of payments steadily deteriorated, exacer-
bated by large-scale investments by US companies abroad.  In 1971
President Nixon, threatened with a run on Fort Knox by dollar bearers
around the world, was forced to take the dollar off the gold standard.
European currencies, and business people, suddenly found themselves
without a reference point, with competitive devaluations and general
trade uncertainty as unwelcome results. Even with tariffs this would
have been a problem; but with no tariffs between EEC-members since
1968, the internal market was under acute threat. In addition, the
Common Agricultural Policy, which had by this time grown to absorb
about half of the EEC budget, was being calculated in a theoretical EEC
European Currency Unit (ECU), meaning that farmers in countries
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whose currencies appreciated (with respect to others) lost out and vice
versa.7
The EEC Council of Ministers had sensed the approaching storm
already in 1970, creating the so called Werner Committee. In June of
that year, the Werner Committee presented its ideas for a European
Monetary Union which, although soon abandoned, were uncannily
similar to those of the Economic and Monetary Union today (EMU).
The Werner Plan proposed a economic and monetary union by 1980.
Community currencies would be freely convertible against one another,
with their parities fixed.  In due course they would be replaced by a
Community currency. A single monetary and credit policy would apply
to the whole Community and a common monetary policy would be
followed vis-à-vis the rest of the world. National policies would be
harmonised and capital markets integrated. The chief aspects of budget-
ary policies would be agreed at Community level. The Werner Plan
recognised that, for this to happen, significant institutional changes
would have to come about. A central decision-making body would super-
vise national budgets and currency parities. A Community central bank-
ing system was to determine monetary conditions for the Community as
a whole.
The path towards economic and monetary union set out in the Werner
Plan proposed action on both exchange rates and the co-ordination of
economic policies, within an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). When
one Community currency was exchanged for another, only a relatively
narrow band of fluctuation around previously established ‘central
parities’ would be allowed – narrower than that between Community
currencies and the dollar.  This was the famous ‘snake in the tunnel’
scheme. The ‘snake’ was the narrower band of fluctuation permitted for
intra-Community exchanges, while the ‘tunnel’ was the wider band
allowed in respect of exchanges against the dollar. All this presupposed
major harmonisation of national economic policies.
The dollar crisis of 1971, leading towards the end of that year to an 8
per cent devaluation against gold, had caused confusion and disagree-
ment among EEC members – especially between Germany, which wanted
a ‘joint float’ of European currencies, and France, which favoured
curbing inflows from the dollar to EEC currencies that were threatened
by revaluation. Another problem was making the ‘snake’ behave, whether
inside or outside the ‘tunnel’. In June 1972 the United Kingdom – which
together with Ireland and Denmark had joined the ERM in anticipation
of membership – allowed the pound to float out of the ‘snake’ and the
‘tunnel’, and Denmark and Ireland followed suit.  By early 1973 Italy
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was out, followed by France in 1974, leaving Germany, the Benelux
countries and Denmark as the only remaining members of the system.
At the Paris Summit in December 1974, the EMU scheme was
effectively abandoned.  The heads of state and government noted the
difficulties which in 1973 and 1974 had combined to frustrate the
Werner Plan. They reiterated their desire to achieve an EMU but did not
give any deadline. The 1972 Paris Summit declaration that the EMU
would be reached by 1980 was not repeated. A ‘mini-snake’ continued
to exist between Germany and a few other countries closely aligned with
it economically, but that was of course a far cry from the Community-
wide ambition at the outset.
One reason for the collapse of the EMU attempt in the 1970s was that
the EEC member states did not take seriously enough the need to co-
ordinate their policies. Without a convergence of economic performance
on matters such as price levels, exchange rates would have to be
adjusted.  Many people blamed the oil crisis. However, the first oil price
increase did not take place until October 1973, that is, about three years
after the launching of the Werner Plan, and its impact was not felt until
some time thereafter. By then the EMU was already essentially aban-
doned. As the oil crisis soon added to inflation and budget deficits, any
thought of reviving the EMU became illusory. Finally, the EMU was
launched at an unfortunate moment. The international monetary system
was highly unsettled, not least by the dollar leaving the gold standard.
Lack of confidence in the dollar caused great strain on the ‘snake’ and
the ‘tunnel’ arrangement.
Leaving Europe for a moment, and turning to Asia, we find that Japan
by the 1970s had surreptitiously joined the long-static club of indus-
trialised countries. With labour costs still considerably lower than those
in Western countries, and with efficient protectionist barriers still  around
its no-longer-so-‘infant’ industries, Japan was by this time beginning to
be a serious competitor. However, the general feeling in the West was
that Japan could at best copy, and possibly produce, certain products
more cheaply at the lower end of the technology range, but not take the
lead at the top, where true wealth was created. In addition, Japanese
investments were still mainly in neighbouring regions, essentially there
to extract raw materials for Japanese industry and to escape stiff
environmental legislation at home. In spite of increasing trade surpluses
with Western Europe and North America, Japan was therefore still not
seen as a major competitor, but rather as assisting in the economic
development of South-East Asia. In addition, it was still faithfully
following the US lead in the foreign policy arena.
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Meanwhile, by the mid–1970s the student revolt was dying down.
With the Vietnam war coming to a close and the 1973 oil crisis showing
the West’s vulnerability in the area of a critical raw material, there was
nothing tangible to protest against, and the economic future of the
young seemed less secure, making many more politically cautious.
The oil crisis did not cause the countries of the EEC and EFTA to call
into question the social foundations that had begun to be laid in the
1960s, for instance through the Council of Europe’s European Social
Charter of 1961. Budget deficits soared, as did inflation, but with accu-
mulated public debts still relatively limited this was not yet a source of
major concern. Many people began to have doubts, however, about the
virtues of Keynesian recipes to fight economic downturns through
deficit spending and a bigger role for the state in the economy, and
instead argued for ‘structural reform’ to increase competition and give
freer rein to ‘market forces’.
The EEC of the Six had become the EEC of the Nine, and had adapted
rather well to its new size. The UK did not turn out to be such a
‘wrecker’ of the EEC as in particular the French had feared.  The British
revolt against its excess contribution to the EEC was a few years into the
future. True, the cosy Paris–Bonn relationship, with Rome as a bene-
volent bystander, had become a ménage à trois.  However, Paris could
also flirt with London if there was a quarrel with Bonn, for instance over
the allocation of CAP money, and Bonn with London if Paris started
calling into question the transatlantic security link or adherence to
GATT principles. In brief, a breath of fresh air entered the at times
rather tense French–German marriage, and economic Europe had begun
to overlap more with the Europe of security and defence. Free trade
agreements with the, by now, reduced EFTA (Denmark and the United
Kingdom had left for the EEC, although Iceland had joined) brought
further impetus to West European economic co-operation and allayed
British and Danish fears that their links with EFTA countries would be
impaired. The ‘yes’ in the British referendum of 1975 on continued
membership in the EEC, by a margin of 67 per cent to 33 per cent,
confirmed that country’s basic satisfaction with the gains made through
the 1973 adhesion, and calmed fears in Europe and the rest of the world
of a disruption of the new status quo.
The ‘rich men’s club’ aspect of the EEC had been reinforced by the
move from Six to Nine, if the still comparatively poor Ireland is excluded.
The EEC had also become a decidedly Northern European institution, a
fact which started to reflect itself in the type of agricultural commodities
supported by the Common Agricultural Policy. Italy, and the split ‘North–
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South Europe’ personality of France, did not fully appreciate this northern
bias, but at this period there were no serious candidates for accession in
the South – with Spain, Portugal and Greece being not only too econo-
mically underdeveloped but dictatorships as well (until the mid 1970s).
Finally, the pressure from the East was still there as an impetus to
further EEC integration. The Soviet Union and the Central and East
European countries within its orbit were responding to the Helsinki
Final Act – and the thirty-five-nation Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe set up through it – with a clamp-down on dissident
groups established to monitor its human rights provisions such as the
Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. In the absence of anything beyond verbal
commiseration from the West, these dissident groups seemed no match
for the state apparatuses. The ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’, as brought to bear in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and seemingly sanctioned through the Helsinki
Final Act, made the Soviet Empire look unassailable.8 The fact that this
was a chimera would only become clear some fifteen years later: that
indeed the inertia brought on by apparent Soviet victories at Helsinki –
and the ‘cancerous’, long-term effect of dissident groups encouraged by
the West – were combining slowly to erode that empire.9
Notes
1 French philosopher and sociologist, 1905–83; quoted in Kennan (1972, p. 253).
2 The ‘Luxembourg compromise’ was the conclusion of a rift over whether the
income from agricultural levies and customs duties should, as had been the
case up to then, be considered as belonging to the member states for sub-
sequent distribution to the EEC budget, or as directly forming part of the
Community’s ‘own resources’. France insisted on the status quo, while the
other member states were more positive regarding the reform proposed by
the Commission. The compromise was phrased in such a way as to permit
all parties to ‘save face’. Thus, when ‘very important interests’ were involved,
the Council of Ministers would ‘endeavour, within a reasonable time, to
reach solutions which can be adopted by all’. The Six member states noted
that there was a ‘divergence of views on what should be done in the event of
a failure to reach complete agreement’ but that it should not ‘prevent the
Community’s work being resumed’. See e.g. Nicoll and Salmon (1990, pp.
25–7).
3 The British in 1958 had suggested a European Industrial Free Trade Area,
which was meant to include the EEC and perhaps in due course render it
unnecessary. The proposal was promptly vetoed by de Gaulle.
4 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) was signed and ratified by the
Soviet Union and the United States in 1972 . It consisted of both the ABM
(Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, which limited nuclear defence capabilities,
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and an Interim Agreement limiting offensive strategic nuclear arms. The
Interim Agreement, as the name implies, was not a treaty but an agreement.
President Carter’s signature was authorised by the US Congress in 1972. See
Talbott (1979, pp. 21–3).
5 Germany’s choice in the mid–1950s of the EEC over a wider free-trade
agreement (such as the British-proposed European Industrial Free Trade
Area) was, in the words of Denman (1996, p. 103) ‘largely political. Ludwig
Erhard, West Germany’s Economics Minister, strongly opposed a common
market on economic grounds. He preferred a free trade area in which
German industry would flourish. It was Konrad Adenauer who persuaded
Erhard to acquiesce in the arrangements for a common market. Adenauer’s
main aim was to achieve a  reconciliation between West Germany and its
west European neighbours; France was crucial to this. Adenauer, just as
with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence
Community, was determined to continue his west-oriented policy of embed-
ding the Federal Republic in Western Europe. Very similar reasoning would
apply nearly forty years later in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty.’
6 Preceding Denmark’s and Norway’s application for EEC membership, these
countries had, together with Sweden and Finland, tried to form a Nordic
customs union, NORDEK. It never saw the light of day, however, as the
parties could not agree on a common external tariff, Denmark and Norway
were already eyeing the EEC, and the Finns were worried about the Soviet
reaction. Nordic co-operation between Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden
and Finland had already for some time been pursued within the Nordic
Council, while at no time aiming at supranationality. As af Malmborg (1994,
p. 391) points out: ‘Nordic co-operation was established in full respect of
national sovereignty … [It] therefore often became ‘shapeless’ … even though
in many concrete cases it was both more efficient and intimate than that at
European level, and even though the rest of the world became accustomed to
considering Norden [the Nordic countries] as a political and cultural entity
… This difference largely explains why  Norden has never assumed any  per-
manent shape, while the European Community/Union has survived its various
crises and has been able both to deepen and to widen geographically.’
(Translation from the Swedish original.)
7 The problem with artificially set, or ‘green’, currencies within the CAP
would become acute with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the
early 1970s and the resulting widely fluctuating currencies among EEC
members. The Monetary Compensation Amounts (MCAs) set in place to
correct for this would continue to bedevil the EU up until the introduction of
the euro in 1999, when the problem ceased to exist at least among the eleven
(and in 2002 twelve) countries participating in the EMU.
8 The Brezhnev Doctrine signified the duty, as during the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, of all countries in the ‘socialist camp’ to come to
the rescue of socialism if it was under threat in any one socialist country. It
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would eventually, under Gorbachev, give way, as the joke went, to the ‘Sinatra
Doctrine’ (‘I did it my way’), permitting socialist countries to choose their
own political and economic system.
9 Hurlburt (1995, p. 5) sees the Soviet goals for the Helsinki Final Act as
having been: ‘Western acceptance of the division of Europe, and specifically
of Germany, and development of freer economic, trade and aid linkages’.
Less concrete goals included ‘drawing Europe closer to Russia and further
from the United States, and some nostalgia for the 19th century Concert of
Europe and Russia’s decisive voice in European architecture’. However,
these ambitions were frustrated by the corrosive effect that the links with the
West created by Helsinki had on the rigid command economies of the East
and their growing dependence on Western credits. This in turn limited the
room for action of communist decision-makers. Finally, Helsinki brought
the issue of human rights to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
created new momentum for civil resistance.
MUP_Torbion_03_Ch3 22/9/03, 12:33 pm45
4
1976–89: recovery and hubris;
effervescence in the East
Some of you may ask, when and how will the Cold War end? I think I can answer
that simply. The Communist world has great resources, and it looks strong. But
there is a fatal flaw in their society. Theirs is a godless system, a system of slavery.
There is no freedom in it, no consent. (President Truman)1
Summary
West European economic recovery after the 1973 oil crisis came quickly,
although at the price of high inflation and sizeable government budget
deficits. The US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 did not lead to the
feared ‘domino effect’ of communist takeovers in the region, but instead
exposed rifts among communist powers. In Western Europe, too, com-
munism became more diversified with the rise of more reformist ‘euro-
communist’ movements in Italy and elsewhere.
The nine-member EEC became the ‘Twelve’ as it accepted three new
Mediterranean members: Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in
1986. It thereby became more of a political, and less of a purely econo-
mic, institution, since all the three new members were considerably
poorer than the existing Nine and also members of NATO (showing the
US interest in a politically stronger EEC). However, inner EEC solidarity
became more difficult with a more heterogeneous membership in terms
of economic performance and policy orientations – weakening in the
process the traditional common understanding between France and
Germany. Monetary co-operation was revived through the European
Monetary System, but the latter led an anaemic existence in the coming
years, due to still highly divergent EEC economies.
Economic underdevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union itself due to increasingly ill-adapted central planning
led to unrest in Poland in 1981, followed by a clampdown by domestic
forces. This did not, however, subdue the popular desire for change there
and in neighbouring countries. A last Soviet effort to maintain its hold
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over Central and Eastern Europe (and perhaps even gain one in Western
Europe) through the stationing of intermediate ballistic missiles there in
the early 1980s was met by similar deployment by NATO in 1985,
leading to the scrapping of such weapons on both sides in 1987. A final
Soviet attempt to save the essentials of communism failed as the
contradictory forces released proved superior even to its new, reformist
leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
The EEC, in an effort to overcome the ‘euro-pessimism’ of the early
1980s, in 1987 embarked on its ‘1992 Internal Market project’ to elimin-
ate remaining trade and investment barriers by that date. The prospect
of the deadline released great energy among EEC reformers, shared by
business and the general public, especially since everybody could feel that
reformist change was under way also in Central and Eastern Europe.
The ‘1992 project’ coincided with a major new effort further to liberal-
ise world trade through the so-called Uruguay Round. A sense of new
purpose in the West combined with despair in the East to produce the
events leading up to the fall of the Wall of Berlin in November 1989, and
to the collapse of the Soviet hold over Central and Eastern Europe.
EEC enlargement
The fears of the West – essentially North America, Western Europe and
Japan – of an economic collapse in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis did not
materialise. The price hikes of the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries) oil cartel – termed ‘the moral equivalent of war’ by
the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – were more a healthy
reminder to the industrialised countries that they could not go on
wasting energy in the way they had been up until then. The truth of the
adage ‘a barrel of oil saved is a barrel of oil produced’ began to sink in,
leading to companies and individuals starting to economise on an asset
previously taken as both cheap and inexhaustible – in the form of less
energy-consuming machinery and vehicles and better insulated plants
and houses. Not only did this give rise to new economic activity, but by
the end of the 1970s it had brought down the price of oil to almost pre–
1973 levels, a development aided by the increasing exploration of, and
production from, new oil finds, such as in the North Sea.
Arab countries, the main partners in OPEC, almost immediately began
to ‘recycle’ their petro-dollars into the West’s banking system, leading to
easier credit and lower interest rates. OPEC countries were also eager to
buy from the West everything from new weaponry’ to defend against
neighbours, to communications satellites and industrial installations.
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The latter were seen as particularly important by countries like Iran and
Iraq, which wanted to ensure an economic future after the depletion of
their oil resources. (And as far as the arms bought were concerned they
would soon, at least in the case of these two countries, be used to devas-
tating effect in a war between them that was to last throughout most of
the 1980s.)
As European countries recovered they did not, however, draw all the
lessons they might have from the oil crises; for while they had, overall,
followed Keynesian policies of higher budget deficits to overcome the
recession of 1974–75, they did not reduce them to any noticeable extent
as their economies picked up. They thereby laid the foundation for the
accumulated national debt that today renders any return to Keynesian
economics more difficult. The inflation that followed led employees –
who had suffered real losses in income during the oil crises and were
eager to recoup them – to even higher wage demands. Employers gave in,
not least because labour was still relatively scarce (with unemployment
in the OECD area standing at only about 5 per cent in the mid–1970s).
After its peace agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
or North Vietnam, the United States had, by 1975, withdrawn its troops
from South Vietnam. The feared ‘domino effect’ – that is, the belief that
if one country became communist, its neighbours and eventually the rest
of the world would suffer the same fate – did not materialise. The United
States, and the world in general, began to understand that the struggle in
the world was not principally between ideologies, but between nations
and ethnic groups; and that the ‘ideological period’ in world history –
which had started in earnest in the 1930s with fascism and national
socialism pitted against communism and which had continued during
the Cold War – was perhaps more an interlude and an exception than
the beginning of a new era.
When hostilities flared up in 1979 between the now united Vietnam
and the People’s Republic of China, the rest of the world was amazed to
see two communist brethren nations fight, even though students of the
region’s history knew that this conflict was centuries old. A new under-
standing of what drives history was emerging: less abstract ideas than
passions, less ideology than religion, less the domination of the world
than the fate of one’s own nation or ethnic group or, ultimately, oneself
and one’s family or village. Two decades later Europe would see the
same in the former Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, in Western Europe communism was undergoing change
in the form of ‘euro-communism’. A new generation of communists had
come of age that was less doctrinaire, more reformist, more conciliatory
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and especially less Stalinist after the Soviet Union itself had undergone
‘de-Stalinisation’. Even though communist parties were not yet deemed
trustworthy enough to form or even participate in most governments –
an attempt in Italy in 1978 at a compromiso storico between them and
the Christian Democrats failed and led directly to Prime Minister Aldo
Moro’s murder at the hands of terrorists – ‘euro-communism’ helped to
further defuse Cold War tensions.
At about this time came the breakthrough of the microchip in
computers (preceded by the transistor a few years earlier), an innovation
which within a few years would have as much economic, social and
cultural impact on the world as Gutenberg’s printing press. Prior to the
chip, computers and technology in general had been electromechanical,
with punch cards and valves reacting to pressure, temperature and the
like. With the first transistors, radios and electronic calculators, a revo-
lution was set in motion which today has brought us the laptop computer,
CD-ROM and internet. We are still only at the beginning of this trans-
formation.
Meanwhile, on Europe’s southern fringe important events were under
way. Greece’s dictatorship, having existed since 1967, foundered under
both the weight of international isolation and the political and economic
stagnancy of its policies. Portugal discovered what other European coun-
tries had realised long before, namely, that colonies make the mother
country poorer, not richer, in an era of advanced industrialisation and
depressed raw material prices – especially if one is a small nation and has
to send one’s sons across the oceans to fight highly motivated insurgents,
as in Mozambique and Angola. Portugal was impoverished by its colonial
struggle; retarded in its development due to its concentration on over-
seas, even more underdeveloped, territories; and internationally isolated
by Europe and the rest of the Western world. The overthrow of the
Caetano dictatorship (succeeding that of Salazar) in 1974 and the estab-
lishment of democracy the following year seemed long-overdue events.
Spain had little left in the way of colonies, but it had turned inward
under Franco, trying to heal the wounds after the 1936–39 civil war. It
was, like Portugal, underdeveloped and considered an international
‘pariah’, especially by Western Europe. When democracy was re-intro-
duced in Spain in 1976 (following Franco’s death the year before), this
also seemed an event as belated as it was welcome.
Greece immediately cast about to join the EEC, following its 1962
Association Agreement, which had been virtually suspended during the
dictatorship years. There were several reasons for Greek interest in the
EEC: it would, it was hoped, reinforce the newly re-established democracy;
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it would help Greece economically, in particular through the expected
largesse of the Common Agricultural Policy (about 30 per cent of the
Greek workforce was in farming) and regional aid; it would shield
Greece against its eastern neighbour Turkey, with which it had uneasy
relations; and it could assist in a badly needed modernisation of the
Greek economy through competition with other EEC members.
However, if Greece were admitted this would mean a fundamental
change in the nature of the EEC. The EEC had essentially been com-
posed of rich, developed and geographically contiguous economies of
the North-Western European type. Now a comparatively underdeveloped
country would join, separated from the nearest EEC member, Italy, by a
sea (the Adriatic) and from the others by the entire Balkans. Yet how
could anyone deny that it was a Western country, indeed a wellspring –
together with ancient Rome – of Western civilisation? Had not the West
fought for Greece’s liberation from the Ottoman Empire? Had not
western allies done so in World War II to free it from Nazi occupation?
And had not the Truman doctrine of containment of Soviet communism
been drawn at the country’s northern border in the 1946–49 civil war?
Was it at this time that the European Economic Community became
fully political as well as economic in character? Possibly, for the concerns
about EEC finances and the state of the Greek economy felt by several
EEC members (especially in Northern Europe) as well as the Commission
(which indeed suggested a pre-accession transition of unspecified dura-
tion) were soon overshadowed by political considerations of the same
kind as those harboured by the Greeks themselves: fear for the future of
the newly reconquered Greek democracy; and a wish (strongly sup-
ported by the United States) to consolidate Greece’s West European and
NATO bonds. In brief, the EEC’s Council of Ministers overruled the
objections raised by the Commission, and membership negotiations
were opened in 1976.
Concern for the future of democracy and political stability was para-
mount also in the consideration of Portuguese and Spanish requests for
membership presented the same year (even though there was no require-
ment in the Rome EEC Treaty that a member would have to be a liberal
democracy). The United States weighed in with defence arguments, for
Portugal had been a NATO member since the organisation’s foundation
in 1949 and Spain, although it was not to join NATO’s integrated
military command until the mid 1980s, was host to important Alliance
bases. Binding the Iberian peninsula more strongly to Western Europe
politically and economically would also tie it more closely to NATO and
hence help Western European defence in the event of a Soviet attack – by
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offering a larger territory on which, possibly, to retreat and additional
ports and supply bases for a counter-offensive.
On the other hand, the economic reservations against having Spain as
an EEC member were less strong than in the case of Greece, for Franco
had allowed a continuous and ‘technocratic’ modernisation of the country
in his later years. Portugal was also at this time arguably more developed
than Greece, so much so that it had been able to join EFTA already in
1960.
Yet the Spain–EEC preferential trade agreement of 1970, like the
Portugal–EEC one in 1973 (forming part of a deal between the EEC and
EFTA) proved trickier than in the case of Greece. EEC governments,
burdened by large budget deficits since the 1973–74 oil crisis, began to
feel the pinch in their financial calculations from soaring EEC expendi-
ture, in particular for the CAP. Perhaps Greece could be absorbed, but
could Portugal and Spain as well?
The ‘southern’ European countries – Italy and France – were torn. On
the one hand the three newcomers would correct the, in their eyes, exces-
sive northern bias which the EEC had suffered since the 1973 enlarge-
ment through Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, especially
when it came to CAP support for temperate zone commodities like beef,
dairy products and cereals. With the new candidates inside, it would be
possible to exert political pressure more effectively for similar support to
be given also on behalf of such products as wine, olive oil and fruit.2
However, with Greece, Portugal and Spain as members, Italy and France
would by the same token lose their privileged ‘Community preference’
position as producers of wine and other Mediterranean products.
The negotiations proved hard and lengthy, and they were further
complicated by the prospect of labour migrating to northern members
(the free movement of labour being one of the ‘four freedoms’ under the
EEC) and by that of Iberian fishing vessels operating in northern waters
under the emerging ‘Blue Europe’ principle of sharing fish resources
communally.
When Greece finally joined the EEC in 1981, and Portugal and Spain
followed in 1986, it looked as if the EEC had more or less come of age.
Some 340 million people inhabited the Twelve’s territory and would
presumably give rise to more trade, investment and prosperity. The EEC
included all the larger and more influential countries in western Europe.
It had become the world’s principal commercial power – indeed one
political area in the sense that it spoke with one voice under the Common
External Tariff Policy in fora like the GATT or in trade negotiations
with the USA. It accounted for a fifth of world exports and imports.
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However, the EEC’s original raison d’être – the Franco–German axis
which had guided developments in the 1960s and 1970s – had become
even less prominent than following the British entry. Even though the
larger countries were given preponderance in EEC decisions, they could
not always prevail when a ‘vital interest’ of a small country was invoked,
or when small countries banded together, sometimes even gaining the
support of a larger one. Nor could any ménage à trois among the
French, the Germans and the British – which had by now often become a
ménage à cinq with Italy and Spain asserting themselves more strongly –
be taken for granted.
Reaching decisions had become trickier with twelve around the table
instead of nine (which had in turn been more difficult than with six). A
much wider range of national and political interests had to be recon-
ciled, underscored by the growing heterogeneity of members. However,
with money always available to smooth over differences – the EEC could
since the early 1970s rely on an annual budgetary mechanism, some-
times referred to as ‘own resources’, instead of national contributions à
la United Nations – the institution could often advance by offering
financial compensation to recalcitrant partners.
Thus, at about this time, if not earlier, began a process whereby
decisions became less ‘pure’, less uniform and more political. The
‘common market’ had eliminated all tariffs and many non-tariff barriers
to trade, leading to greater competition among countries, regions and
companies, and to a situation where some of them were losing out. It
seemed only natural that they should in some way be compensated
through various forms of EEC financial support. This contributed,
however, to the development of a mentality of assistance-seeking rather
than relying on one’s own national resources – not only on the part of
the poorer countries but also on the part of ‘special interests’ who felt
their position threatened, whether it be sugar beet growers, cattle raisers
or shipyard owners. Today, as the EU is trying to rein in its expenditure
in a much harsher economic climate, these sentiments come out all the
stronger in the streets and in the meeting rooms.
Turning momentarily from Europe to the world in general, the Carter
presidency in the United States from 1976 to 1980 had a strong ideolo-
gical component – not so much anti-communist or anti-Soviet as emphasi-
sing human rights and democracy. Coming on the heels of the 1975 Helsinki
Act, this message had a strong appeal in Central and Eastern Europe, and
even in the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, the combination of human rights/
democracy and nationalist sentiments were proving more potent a potion
than the Molotov cocktails that had been thrown in Budapest in 1956.
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East–West: a new cold war?
The economic and social backwardness of the Soviet Union and its depen-
dent countries as a result of the inherent shortcomings of communism
was becoming apparent amongst both their youth and their elite. Why,
they increasingly asked themselves, did economic conditions not im-
prove, when those in the West seemed to do so constantly? Why could
one not speak freely, criticise one’s government or read what one wished?
Why did the Soviet Union keep Central and Eastern Europe under semi-
colonial rule when it criticised Western powers for colonialism or, after
decolonisation, neocolonialism?
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was to be the
last expression of the Brezhnev doctrine – i.e. that Soviet domination had
to be maintained at all costs wherever it had been established – and it
marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire and the Soviet
Union itself. Certain Western commentators saw the invasion as a sign
of the Soviet Union’s desire to push southwards, to the oil of the Middle
East and to the warm seas, just as they warned of a Soviet naval build-up
in South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean. Politically such an interpreta-
tion served the interests of political hawks in the West who sought larger
defence budgets, not least in the Reagan administration. However, there
are indications from the crucial discussions in the Kremlin in the autumn
of 1979 that the Soviet Politburo was very much divided on whether to
invade or not, and that there was little strategic reasoning behind the
final decision to go ahead. It was a process perhaps not too dissimilar
from the one by which the United States had sunk into the Vietnam
morass some twenty years earlier.
The Afghanistan adventure – which was to take the lives of some
15,000 Russian soldiers and would end in February 1989 with the with-
drawal of the last Soviet troops – was indeed the Vietnam of the Soviet
Union. The terrain was different – no jungles – but there were inhospi-
table mountains for the rebels to hide in and ambush from, and the
insurgents, though internally divided, were fighting for their Muslim
faith and their country’s liberation from the ‘infidels’.
The West, in particular the United States, supplied weapons (especially
highly effective anti-aircraft missiles) and financed bases in neighbour-
ing Pakistan – just as the Soviet Union and China had supported North
Vietnam a decade earlier.3 In brief, the Russians, like the Americans in
Vietnam, gravely underestimated the force of nationalism, and exag-
gerated the importance of ideology. The corrosion of morale was not
confined to the Soviet armed forces. It spread to the Soviet people with
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every body bag sent home. The boycott of the Moscow Olympics in
1980 by many countries brought home the message of the country’s
international isolation even more clearly.
When a young electrician at a Gdansk (Poland) shipyard, Lech Walesa,
helped form an independent trade union, Solidarnosc, he would set in
motion events that would ultimately lead to the liberation of the whole
of Central and Eastern Europe. Solidarnosc’s demands were first for
better pay in the face of food and other shortages, but soon included
demands for true national independence and an end to communism.
This development was seen as highly worrying by the Soviet Union
leadership, for at stake was the main corridor for the defence of East
Germany and a principal buffer against any threat from the West. In
addition, unless suppressed it could provide the impetus for a general
popular uprising in the satellite countries. However, the Soviet leader-
ship, marked by the Afghanistan experience, showed less inclination to
have Warsaw Pact troops intervene in Poland in ‘socialist solidarity’
than they had done in earlier decades in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
New archival evidence even indicates that Moscow might have been
ready to ‘lose’ Poland in recognition of Russia’s growing weaknesses
and dependency on good relations with the West under ‘détente’.4
The clampdown by General Jaruzelski in December 1981 – he would
later, somewhat disingenuously, claim it was the only way to save Poland
from a Soviet intervention – did not solve anything. The imposition of
martial law only enhanced the inertia in Poland and elsewhere in the
region, adding fear to the general discontent of the population. (How-
ever, it may have facilitated the eventual peaceful break-up of the Soviet
Empire by giving it a few years’ extra time to realise the extent of its
weaknesses and need of reform.5)
The situation in the Soviet Union was becoming precarious. Econo-
mically weakened by communism, it added to its economic woes not
only by continuing to engage its armed forces in Afghanistan but more
generally by overspending on its military. Whole secret cities were built
in the Urals and Siberia for military purposes alone. Nuclear weapons
were produced en masse, as were rockets to deliver them, as well as
tanks and ships.
To its south, the Soviet Union faced religious fundamentalism in Iran,
which could well spread to the Soviet republics in central Asia. In the
west, there was a broadly prosperous Western Europe. To the south-east
there was an equally wealthy Japan, with which the Soviet Union had a
territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands (taken by the Soviet Union in
the last days of World War II). Next to Japan was China, which was
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overcoming the wounds of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s and
which was now developing both economically and militarily. Finally,
the Soviet Union seemed headed for a costly arms race, especially in
missiles, with the United States, as President Carter abandoned efforts to
have the US Senate ratify the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitations
Treaty), which built on the earlier SALT I.6
In this situation the Soviet leadership presumably decided to play
what was to be its last card: the effort to achieve the political subjuga-
tion of Western Europe and its ‘decoupling’ from the United States and
Canada. The means to this end was the stationing on a large scale, as
from the early 1980s, of intermediate-range (as opposed to intercontin-
ental) ballistic missiles (termed SS–20s) deep in Soviet territory, capable
of hitting Western Europe (but not North America), and the deployment
of a new powerful nuclear bomber aircraft, referred to in the West as the
‘Backfire’.
The Soviet leadership was counting on the fear of the West Europeans
of having a nuclear confrontation confined to Europe alone, and on the
growth in size and influence of the already strong anti-nuclear peace
movements, often calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Pressure
on the West European governments would mount, so the Soviet leaders
thought, to have the Americans reduce their short-range, tactical ‘battle-
field’ nuclear weapons (and possibly their conventional forces as well),
and thereby to soften West European resolve in the political field. This
would limit the security risk to the Soviets opened up by the Solidarnosc
movement in the ‘strategic corridor’ of Poland, and generally widen
Soviet policy options in its relations with Western Europe and the West
as a whole. It would also counter the threat to Soviet territory posed by
British and French medium-range nuclear weapons, which were less
significant than the US ones but nevertheless awesome.
It is not certain that Soviet aims were ultimately military, especially
when considering the country’s stake in the Helsinki Act’s provisions on
the inviolability of borders, its weak geopolitical position, the dubious
loyalty of its Warsaw Pact partners if it ever came to war, and the ques-
tionable quality of its own troops and conventional arms. It is equally
likely that military muscle was being flexed for the sake of political gains.
The United States reacted swiftly to the Soviet move by offering to fill
the gap in its NATO partners’ European nuclear deterrent, through the
construction and deployment of medium-range missiles aimed at the
Soviet Union heartland (i.e. supplementing the short-range, Europe-
based battlefield missiles and the US-based intercontinental ones). The
question was only whether the Europeans would accept the offer.
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For five years, from 1979 to 1984, the outcome was uncertain, as the
Soviet Union mixed threats, promises and channelled considerable
money to numerous peace movements in Western Europe that opposed
the US response. However, it had underestimated both the US resolve
not to abandon its NATO commitments and the alliance’s capacity to
react. France’s President, François Mitterrand, even went to the German
Bundestag in 1983, fervently pleading with it to accept the US offer, an
act which is generally recognised to have contributed to swinging the
balance at a crucial moment.7
In the end, by 1985, over 100 medium-range missiles of the ballistic
Pershing type and over 400 terrain-hugging cruise missiles had been
deployed in the several NATO countries that accepted stationing –
sometimes, as in Germany, over considerable domestic opposition. (A
US offer of neutron-bomb missiles, which have the characteristic of
killing people through radiation while leaving buildings relatively
undamaged, was rejected on ethical grounds, but also because they were
perceived by many as lowering the ‘nuclear threshold’.)
At the same time, NATO offered the Soviet Union negotiations for a
return to the status quo ante, i.e. the dismantling of all intermediate-
range missiles in Europe – Pershings, cruise and SS–20s – that is, a return
to the situation before Soviet missiles were installed. This so-called ‘two-
track’ decision by NATO held up a stick and a carrot, satisfying both
‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ in the West and struck a cord with European popu-
lations (including parts of the peace movement) as being reasonable. In
due course, by 1987, the two-track strategy was to prove successful, in
that both sides agreed on the complete dismantling of their medium-
range missiles under verified conditions – a process that would be com-
pleted over the next few years and that would also be accompanied by
agreements on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of
strategic missiles.
What might have happened had the Soviet design been successful? It
could indeed have led to at least a degree of North American ‘decoupling’
from Western Europe. Why, the Americans might have argued, should we
defend NATO partners who so easily succumb to pressure? Do they really
want to defend themselves? Isolationist feelings were not pronounced in
the United States at this time, not least because the Pacific Rim with
South-East Asia at its centre was still economically insignificant in com-
parison with Western Europe. But they might nevertheless have taken hold.
There would probably, at least initially, have been a mobilisation of
defence efforts among the West Europeans, in particular efforts to revive
a Western European Union that over the years had become lethargic.
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However, it is also likely that there would have been splits within the
WEU, with the British especially, but also with other more Atlanticist-
oriented countries such as West Germany, Denmark, Norway and the
Netherlands trying to avoid having any strengthening of the Western
European Union take place to the detriment of NATO. For France it
could have been the opportunity for a stronger Western European
defence, which was more independent of North America and under
more of a French leadership. However, was France ready for this,
especially if it meant the United Kingdom and Germany drifting out into
the Atlantic? And did France really wish to see the US disengage from
Europe? Presumably not, since President Mitterrand went to Bonn to
plead the opposite course.
Thus the Soviet strategy, had it worked, could have led to serious
disputes within NATO, the WEU and within the European Community,
which latter would have been called upon to take up more of a political
and security role to match that of the WEU in defence. Soviet control
over Central and Eastern Europe could have continued beyond 1989.
But the Soviet Union had run out of means. As Pershing and cruise
missiles were being deployed, Western Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance
seemed to have overcome their divisions. Economically the Soviet Empire
had long ago stopped growing, losing ground to all the neighbouring
regions as well as popular support at home. Fewer and fewer intellectuals
in Western Europe and elsewhere were seduced by the Soviet system.
In addition, in 1980 Ronald Reagan had been elected President of the
United States on a platform built on the need to fight the ‘evil empire’
(the term was not used until some time later) through vastly increased
military spending, including a plan – later abandoned (but revived in
2002 under President George W. Bush) – to counter the Soviet nuclear
threat through a Star Wars system of interception of incoming enemy
missiles. It was clear that the Soviet Union, in spite of its own efforts to
build a ‘Star Wars’ defence, could not match the US defence build-up,
which was itself made possible largely through government borrowing,
thus exacerbating the decline of the Soviets.
Upon the death of the Dalai Lama, the high priests of Lhasa start a
search for his successor – a boy with a birthmark behind his right ear
and living in a house by a fork in a river below a cherry tree with an
owl’s nest. In a similar way the Soviet establishment must have searched
for the right man to succeed the ailing Chernenko. (Chernenko, a con-
servative, had succeeded the more, but not sufficiently, reform-minded
Andropov in 1984.) Find us a man, the Politburo and the military might
well have said upon Chernenko’s death in 1985, who can reform the
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Soviet Union and still preserve it; someone who can make the centrally
planned economy grow and develop while maintaining state ownership;
someone who can start a democratic dialogue in society without jeopard-
ising the leading role of the communist party (and the Politburo itself).
Mikhail Gorbachev, already a member of the Politburo, was about
the only person, it was thought, who might be able to do all this. But
even for him, this was ultimately to prove to be one miracle too many.
The call for reform was as likely to have come from the military as
from the Communist Party. After all, the party formed an elite in Soviet
society and had an intrinsic interest in preserving its own privileges. Nor
would it be particularly prone to noticing the system’s shortcomings
from its ivory tower. The military, on the other hand, saw how the
quality of its equipment had declined due to the drop in overall quality
in production, the latter largely owing to dwindling overall investment,
resources and sagging morale among workers. And we have already
referred to the perceived threats from the rising powers all around the
Soviet Union. The only way to defend the country, the military must
have argued, lay in civilian reform.8
Overcoming euro-pessimism: the 1992 Internal Market project
The Soviet Union was not, however, the only power searching for new
solutions. To the West, the European Economic Community of the Ten
(through Greece’s adhesion in 1981) at the beginning of the decade was
hit by ‘euro-pessimism’ which in turn, it was argued, was caused by the
severe ‘euro-sclerosis’ afflicting its economy. The 1979 oil crisis (with
prices rising from some $12 to over $40) had dealt Western Europe a
second blow, especially since the region had barely recovered from the
crisis of the mid-1970s. Yet the United States under the stewardship of
Ronald Reagan continued to grow much faster and attract more invest-
ment than the EEC area, while Japan’s rise seemed unstoppable. What
was the EEC doing wrong?
There were three main reasons for the EEC’s relative decline. Firstly,
most of the rigidities that had crept in as a result of the building of the
welfare state in the 1960s and early 1970s – and which had been ‘papered
over’ through deficit spending in the years after the 1973 oil crisis – were
still there, and they had to compete not only with the laissez-faire US
economy under Reagan, but also against the virtually impenetrable pro-
tectionist walls of Japan and of other rising economies in South-East Asia,
such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. These latter countries
now started to flood Western Europe with their exports.
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Secondly, trade among the EEC countries (as with the EFTA coun-
tries, with which a wide-ranging co-operation agreement had been
concluded in 1984 following the free-trade agreement of 1972) had not
grown as quickly as expected, and had failed to turn the EEC area into
the world economic powerhouse it had been expected to become follow-
ing a quarter-century of integration. Although intra-EC tariffs had
disappeared by the late 1960s, non-tariff obstacles – red tape, safety
regulations, technical specifications and the like – turned out to be much
more difficult to eradicate, and indeed had a tendency to appear after
the introduction of (some would say in reaction to) free trade. The EC’s
supposedly ‘common market’ had not been fully realised and was often
fragmented, rendering it the more vulnerable to increasingly fierce over-
seas competition. Cartels had formed both within countries and among
them, restricting competition and driving up prices.
In addition, many EEC countries stood by their pet industries, which
were often in government hands or under government control. Indeed,
the struggle against such practices had been rendered more difficult
through the adhesion of comparatively less developed Greece, Portugal
and Spain.
In brief, the EEC was perceived as having lost much of its momentum,
not least because the far-flung plans to pursue a common foreign policy
had been thrown to the winds following the failure to forge a common
energy policy after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises. The EEC was also increas-
ingly bedevilled by internal conflicts over that most mundane of issues:
money. Poorer EEC members were expecting more, received more and,
understandably enough, came to regard this state of affairs as the natural
one – especially when it came to agriculture and regional support. Richer
members, on the other hand, were net contributors to the EEC budget,
and while some, such as Germany, did not yet object, others, in parti-
cular the United Kingdom, began to complain that their contributions
were excessive.
The main reason for the ‘problem of the UK budget’ as it came to be
known, was that British farmers were (and still are) far fewer than in
most other EC countries. The country had, ever since the nineteenth
century, relied largely on imports from the rest of the world, especially
the Empire and then the Commonwealth. Since the bulk of Common
Agricultural Policy funds was being paid according to the volume of
agricultural production, and to some extent (in the case of structural
aid) by the number of farmers, the UK received less.
In addition, imports from non-EEC countries were subjected to levies
that were earmarked, not for the UK, but for the EEC. In spite of a
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‘correction mechanism’ introduced already in the 1970s to compensate
the UK, its excess payment in 1979 still amounted to well over £1 billion.
Only several years later – and after much anti-British sentiment in other
EC countries and much anti-EC rhetoric in the UK – could a compro-
mise be found (namely, paying the UK more regional aid money) which
satisfied all parties. However, it highlighted one EEC weakness: how
one bureaucratic procedure (the CAP) led to unforeseen consequences,
which had to be corrected through further bureaucratic corrections.
European Community summits in the early to mid–1980s – held at the
level of heads of government, and, in the case of France, heads of state
and government – in this situation started to call for the ‘completion of
the EEC’s Internal Market’.9 The EC Commission – at the origin of this
initiative through its new and dynamic President Jacques Delors (since
1984) and Commissioner Lord Cockfield – followed up this call with a
White Paper entitled Completing the Internal Market, which was pre-
sented at an EC summit in Milan in June 1985. It led to the Single Euro-
pean Act (SEA), adopted in 1986, which entered into force in 1987.
The Single European Act is a complicated treaty (although less so than
its successor, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union). The most
important parts are not those by which the competencies of, and inter-
play among, the EC’s organs were being modified.10 Rather, it was this
one article, 8.A, which was incorporated so as to amend the founding
EEC Rome Treaty: ‘The Community shall adopt measures with the aim
of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring
on 31 December 1992 … The internal market shall comprise an area
without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of goods, per-
sons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of
this [the EEC] Treaty’.
For the realisation of the SEA, the EC’s member states came to rely
mainly on the Commission’s White Paper, and the project became known
popularly as the ‘1992 project’. The White Paper sought to give new
impetus to a basic treaty objective which had advanced far too hesitantly
and, indeed, in some respects, had steered off course. It specified three
sorts of barriers that needed to be removed if a true common market
were to be realised: physical, technical and fiscal. In the Single European
Act these were covered by four main ‘pillars’. The first pillar was the
guarantee of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between
the member states. The second pillar dealt with the approximation, or
harmonisation, of legal provisions in the member states which directly
affected the establishment or functioning of the common market. It
included the elimination of non-tariff, non-quantitative barriers.
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Competition policy formed the third pillar. It aimed to eliminate
cartels, monopolies, state subsidies considered excessive or as negatively
affecting EC trade, and mergers having the same effect. The fourth pillar
was the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) or the Common External Tariff
(CET). Since the EC was a customs union, it had to have all member
states observe the same conditions for imports from non-EC countries.
The ‘1992 project’ may not have led to all that had been hoped for at
the time, but it energised a number of audiences near and far: company
managers, for example. Those within the EC thought they had to jockey
themselves into stronger positions for the ‘post-1992’ period through
mergers of all kinds, in order to withstand the supposedly fiercer compe-
tition that would result. Those outside the EC area – EFTA countries,
North America, Japan and the ‘emerging economies’ – thought they had
at all costs to be inside lest they be excluded from a suddenly closed
‘Fortress Europe’. Thus, ‘1992’ had a cathartic effect.
The ‘Fortress Europe’ fear was of course unfounded, not only given
the EC’s obligation to respect GATT principles but also because of the
presence of many multinationals in an increasingly interdependent world
economy. Yet the anxiety was widespread, sometimes leading to ill thought-
out and overly expensive mergers, takeovers or green-field ventures.
Another effect was in a region seemingly not involved, namely the
Central and Eastern European countries under Soviet domination. As
these countries were already far behind in economic development as a
result of communism, the reaction among intellectuals and government
officials was one of near panic. The ‘1992 project’ formed a major
impetus to political, and later economic, reform in several of the coun-
tries concerned – including, of course, the Baltic countries and hence
influenced the eventual break-up of the Soviet Union itself.
The ‘1992 project’ was a psychological masterpiece and almost every-
body in Europe became infatuated with it.11 Suddenly there was a con-
crete deadline, within which concrete goals had to be reached. National
bureaucrats worked hard with their EC counterparts to shape some 300
measures – usually in the form of directives – to enable the Internal
Market to be completed. A ‘new approach’ was even adopted as regards
harmonisation, whereby countries could choose different standards and
specifications and yet have to accept products from other EC members,
provided the latter met certain essential requirements. This sped up the
work of removing non-tariff barriers considerably.
The enthusiasm over ‘1992’ is somewhat difficult to explain, for ‘1992’
was (and still is, for it has yet to be fully realised) a business project
aiming to open national markets to competition from other EC
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countries. Workers employed in less efficient companies, which up until
then might have been sheltered by more or less visible intra-EC trade
barriers, would now risk falling by the wayside, leading, at least temp-
orarily, to more unemployment. Furthermore, there were hardly any
social provisions in the European Single Act, a politically embarrassing
fact that was eventually to be remedied in the Maastricht Treaty (1993).
In sum, ‘1992’ was a rather cold-hearted project, with precious little in it
in the way of federalism and supranationalism. This latter fact probably
explains why even an initially sceptical United Kingdom under a Tory
government went along with it so enthusiastically.12
This was also the golden era of the ‘yuppies’, Europe-style. With stock
markets and property prices booming as a result of the general optim-
ism, everybody wanted a piece of the pie. Ronald Reagan’s laissez-faire
policy in the United States, with Margaret Thatcher adopting similar
policies in the United Kingdom, left no doubt that capitalism was the
answer and communism was ready to be thrown, as President Reagan
put it, on the ‘trash heap of history’.
Unemployment in Western Europe stopped rising and even declined a
little, though few noticed that jobs in the private sector showed only
modest net gains as it started to ‘downsize’ personnel, or that the public
sector was the one that really grew. Even fewer noticed that little was
done domestically in the EC, or EFTA, countries to tackle what the
OECD was already labelling as ‘structural adjustment’, that is, a funda-
mental liberalisation of national economic life making it more inter-
nationally competitive.
Furthermore, few noticed that the world economy was starting to
change fundamentally, away from the Atlantic seaboard – eastern North
America and Western Europe – towards a host of emerging economies in
South-East Asia and Latin America, which were dynamic, with little or
no social welfare, and with drastically lower labour costs.
In 1986 the world community began a new round of trade liberalisa-
tion talks under the auspices of the GATT and known as the Uruguay
Round. As a result primarily of US prodding, the Round took on not only
hitherto ‘taboo’ issues such as agriculture and textiles (so far heavily
protected in most of Western Europe), but also attempted liberalisation
in new areas like services, intellectual property, telecommunications and
maritime transport. Liberalisation was coupled with the breakthrough
of the high-capacity personal computer; satellite link-ups permitting larger
and larger volumes of data to be transmitted anywhere at ever lower
cost; and more and more economical means of transport. Together these
developments had eventually to spell trouble for a high-wage, high-tax,
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high-welfare region such as Western Europe. But few saw it coming.
Western Europe marched on, with the European Community in the
lead, heading for that great day of 1 January 1993 when the Internal
Market would be ‘completed’. Governments in EFTA countries like
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria were becoming fidgety, frightened
of being left out in the cold on the wrong side of the lowered portcullis
of a ‘Fortress Europe’. However, with the Soviet Union still intact, the
room for manoeuvre of at least Finland and Austria was limited. Over
the next few years these countries would try to be within the ‘Fortress’ as
far as trading regulations were concerned, while they would attempt to
stay outside it in matters affecting national sovereignty, foreign security
policies, the EC budget and agriculture.
For EC members, however, foreign policy co-operation was again
attempted. The EC had to show that the label ‘economic giant, political
dwarf’ was unmerited. Thus, the 1986 Single European Act formally
recognised European political co-operation as one of the twin pillars of
European unity, together with the European Communities (EEC, ECSE
and Euratom). It declared that the high contracting parties would en-
deavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy,
with the European Council providing regular guidance.
This seemed entirely credible. Pressure, though weaker than before,
still came from the Soviet Union in the East, and that country still had
troops in Afghanistan, not to speak of Poland, the German Democratic
Republic and several other countries in the region. The Yugoslav tragedy
still lay some three years ahead, and few of those who looked at that
country could imagine that ethnic hostility, dormant since World War
II, could again rent asunder what forty years of economic and political
integration under Tito and his successors had achieved. Indeed, for the
European Community itself it seemed unthinkable that political integra-
tion would not follow naturally from the ‘1992 project’ of a completed
Internal Market.
Another natural concomitant to the ‘1992’ Internal Market seemed to
be a single currency, or at least close currency co-ordination within the
European Monetary System (EMS), set up in 1979. Indeed, a depreci-
ation of the currency of EC country A vis-à-vis EC country B of, say 10
per cent, would have the effect of a 10 per cent tariff for B and a 10 per
cent export subsidy for A. There was a widespread fear that less scrupu-
lous member states might resort to ‘competitive devaluations’.
It is useful here to look briefly at monetary co-operation within the
EC. As the preceding chapter described, the first EMU attempt in the early
1970s collapsed rapidly because of insufficient commitment to convergence.
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In 1977 the then President of the EC Commission, Roy Jenkins, again
took up the idea. However, the European Council would only agree to a
less grandiose scheme. Conceived principally by German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1978,
the aim was not a common currency or even immutable exchange rates,
but instead a zone of relative monetary stability in Europe.
There were several reasons for both the ambition and its being modest
in scope. The system of floating exchange rates that had replaced the
fixed rates of Bretton Woods made trade both with the United States
and within Europe less predictable. Business leaders complained that
they could not give companies a full European dimension because the
value of imports and exports could not be forecast with any certainty. In
addition, when the dollar weakened, capital was moved to European
currencies, overwhelmingly into the Deutschmark rather than other less
reliable currencies, causing further imbalances.
The European Monetary System of 1979 was based on the European
Currency Unit (ECU). The ECU served not only as a denominator of
currency transactions (like its more rudimentary predecessors the Unit
of Account of the 1960s and the European Unit of Account) but also as
the central feature of the EMS. It was a ‘cocktail’ of the national curren-
cies of the participating countries, with the Deutschmark making up
about a third of the value, the French franc about a fifth and a small
currency like the Danish krona about 3 per cent. The different currencies
would not be allowed to fluctuate more than ±2.25 per cent against each
other and against the ECU (±6 per cent in the case of Italy), and if they
came close to that floor or ceiling, national central banks would prop up
a weakened currency by buying it up, or weaken a currency that was too
strong by selling it.
The EMS suffered difficulties similar to the Exchange Rate Mechanism.
The United Kingdom did not join, and neither did Greece nor the new
EC members (as from 1986) Portugal and Spain. Between 1979 and
1987 the EMS collapsed no less than eleven times (the collapses were
euphemistically termed ‘realignments’), either through revaluations of
the stronger currencies (mainly the Deutschmark and the Dutch guilder)
or devaluations of the weaker ones (mainly the Italian lira, but some-
times also the French franc and the Irish punt). One reason were the
different rates of inflation in the participating countries, largely reflect-
ing different standards of economic performance and the lack of what
under Maastricht would be called ‘convergence’ of national economies.
In sum, speculators had a field day during this period, whilst central
banks became poorer and governments more humbled.
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With the ‘1992’ Internal Market in place, EC member states agreed,
this state of affairs could not continue. In consequence, the 1986 Single
European Act, though not containing any blueprint for a single currency
project (this would come in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty), never-
theless added an Article 102A, under a section headed ‘Co-operation in
Economic and Monetary Policy (Economic and Monetary Union)’, calling
for measures to ensure the convergence of economic and monetary policy.
Collapse in the East
The Soviet Empire continued to crumble. Gorbachev, after becoming the
leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, set in motion changes that at first
seemed to satisfy all domestic camps. Central planning was modestly
reduced, while certain forms of private initiative – shops, services, private
plots of farmers on collective farms – were tolerated and even encour-
aged. It was becoming easier to breathe both in the Soviet Union and in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe dominated by it. Citizens
were able to question the political system privately and even in the
media. Gorbachev was openly searching for ways to withdraw from the
Afghanistan imbroglio, meeting the wishes of both a bleeding Soviet
military and the families of soldiers.
But the process was impossible to stop, like a river following its course
towards the sea – a flow of spiritual, intellectual, national and material
frustration seeking satisfaction at long last. In October 1989 Gorbachev
went to East Berlin to attend the fortieth anniversary of the German
Democratic Republic. The East German leader, Erich Honecker, had
hoped that Gorbachev would rein in the people, and the reformist mem-
bers of the East German Politburo. Instead, Gorbachev effectively under-
mined Honecker by telling the leadership to change while there was still
time, and by engaging in spontaneous street conversations with demon-
strators calling for reform.13
Beamed by West German television that same night into East Ger-
many, these exchanges helped sealed the fate of communism and Soviet
control over events in that country, and in Central and Eastern Europe
as a whole. If the leader of the Soviet Union had spoken of the need for
democracy, human rights and economic reform, then how could a
Honecker – and after him a Krenz or a Modrow – resist?
In the summer of 1989 Gorbachev went to speak before a European
assembly. He chose not the twelve-nation European Community’s Euro-
pean Parliament, but rather the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe, which had been in existence since 1949 and which had
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pursued a more prudent, intergovernmental, agenda than the European
Community, seeking only ‘greater unity’ among sovereign member coun-
tries. (In other words, ‘intergovernmentalism’ and ‘interparliamentarian-
ism’ instead of ‘supranationalism’.)
The Council of Europe turned out to be the ‘hidden card’ of Western
Europe in accelerating the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe.
Countries joining would not feel threatened in their new-found sover-
eignty, since ‘supranationalism’ (except via conventions) was beyond the
Council of Europe’s remit. Quite to the contrary, their flags would be
hoisted alongside those of all other Council of Europe members, signify-
ing the official recognition of their statehood by as many countries and a
place in the ‘European family’. In addition, the Council of Europe’s
emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law held out the
promise that those values would be more secure – being internationally
supported and shared – against any communist backlash. Thus started a
long period of expansion for the Council of Europe (from twenty-three
member states in 1989 to forty-five in 2003), with the accession of
Russia, Ukraine and a host of other countries, large and small.
Gorbachev’s speech before a packed hemicycle in Council of Europe’s
Palais de l’Europe in July 1989 was truly memorable, marking a
startling departure from an old era to a new:
Now that the twentieth century is entering a concluding phase and both the post-
war period and the cold war are becoming a thing of the past, the Europeans have
a truly unique chance – to play a role in building a new world, one that would be
worthy of their past, of their economic and spiritual potential … As far as the
‘common European home’ is concerned, we regard as a realistic prospect –
though not a close one – the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic
to the Urals, where eastern and western parts would be strongly interlocked …
Europeans can meet the challenges of the coming century only by pooling their
efforts. We are convinced that what they need is one Europe – peaceful and
democratic, a Europe that maintains all its diversity and common humanistic
ideas, a prosperous Europe that extends its hand to the rest of the world. A
Europe that confidently advances into the future.’14
 Gorbachev oversaw the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe from
an unworkable system and – eventually though unwittingly and to his
own discomfiture – the dissolution of the country he had been appointed
to lead. With such words from him as the leader of the Soviet Union,
how could the process be halted?
In the summer of 1989 an unusual number of East Germans ‘inexpli-
cably’ chose to holiday in Hungary, rather than, say, on the Baltic, at
home or in Poland. Large numbers went on to Prague and beleaguered
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the West German embassy there, seeking visas. Others tried to enter West
Germany from Hungary, and were unexpectedly helped by Hungarian
border guards who simply cut open the barbed wire along the border.
The river broke all dams along its path. Street demonstrations in more
and more East German cities followed in the early autumn of that year.
The Berlin Wall started to look ridiculous. The East German Politburo
hesitated between a clampdown which could have led to civil war and
demonstrations which could only lead to the country’s disappearance
and unification with West Germany.
By October 1989 the pressure was becoming irresistible. A simple
misunderstanding of orders led East German border guards to hesitate
when, on 9 November 1989, the first East Berliners defied the guns and
crossed to the West. As a crane, surrounded by ecstatic crowds on both
sides of the Brandenburger Tor, opened a first breach in that monstro-
sity which had stood since 1961, the Berlin Wall, the whole world
watched in disbelief, fascination and tears of joy. The river had reached
the sea. Freedom had won. The market economy had triumphed. Western
resolve, coupled with offers of co-operation since the Cold War and over
the many Berlin crises that had followed, had finally paid off. All those
people who had spent most or all of their lives under the Damoclean
sword of East–West confrontation, from the Cuban missile crisis on-
wards, would have a new world to consider as from that night. A world
of black and white would soon be one of a more confusing appearance,
much more difficult to comprehend, and to master, not least for Europe.
However, in this night of jubilation, 9 November 1989, the Berlin
crowd sang: ‘So ein Tag, so wunderschön wie heute, So ein Tag, der
dürfte nie vergehen!’ (‘A wonderful day like today. Such a day should
never end!’).
Notes
1 Radio address to the American people, 15 January 1953; quoted in Leffler
(1992, p. 495).
2 The principle here, as in so much other Community financing, is that of the
so-called ‘Brussels lunch’: ‘Since we all share the bill, I shall have lobster!’.
3 The United States would regret its support some twenty years later, when
Osama bin Laden, who fought in the war against the Soviets, would be the
leader behind the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on 11
September 2001. The Mujahiddin resistance against the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan contributed significantly to the radicalisation of this move-
ment in the 1990s and their increasingly hostile attitude to the United States
and its allies.
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4 For archival support in favour of the thesis that the Soviet Union tried at all
costs to avoid intervening militarily in Poland in 1980–81, see Mastny
(1998).
5 See Westlake (2000).
6 SALT II was in due course to be superseded by the START I (Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks) Treaty, which entered into force in 1994. A START II
Treaty was concluded, committing both sides to cutting the number of long-
range missiles from 6,000 to around 3,000 on each side by 2007 and
banning multiple-warhead land-based missiles. It was ratified by the US
Senate, but not by the Russian Duma and therefore did not enter into force.
A planned START III Treaty would eliminate another 1,000 warheads on
each side by the year 2007. Both START II and START III were made
redundant following the signing of the even more far-reaching Treaty of
Moscow by President George W. Bush of the United States and President
Putin of Russia in 2002. This startling development reflects the speed with
which the improvement between the United States and the Soviet Union in
the early 2000s took place.
7 President Mitterrand’s sudden transformation from a comparatively anti-
Atlanticist French socialist to an ardent advocate of the stationing of nuclear
weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany can be explained by a French
fear for France’s own security should Germany turn ‘neutralist’ and US
forces be withdrawn from Europe. A stronger Soviet Union would also be in
a better position to sow discord between France and its principal ally
Germany. See e.g. Alting von Geusau (1992, pp. 95–8).
8 Brown (2000, pp. 6–7), on the other hand, sees Gorbachev as more a fluke
of history than a candidate of design either of the Communist Party or the
military. He portrays Gorbachev as skilfully concealing his reformist
tendencies while moving up the ranks, and even as changing his opinions, in
the course of his reign, from those of a ‘Communist reformer to [those of] a
socialist of an essentially West European social-democratic type’ and a
‘systemic reformer’. Wherever the truth may lie, Gorbachev’s importance in
saving world peace and permitting the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet
Union will no doubt be duly recognised by posterity.
9 The term ‘the EC’, or the European Community, instead of the European
Communities (The European Economic Community, the European Coal and
Steel Community and Euratom), began to gain hold in the 1980s, especially
as the use of a plural for European unification seemed counterproductive for
that purpose and was confusing to many people. As from the Treaty on
European Union in the early 1990s, the European Union, or the EU, became
the commonly used label when talking about the institution as a whole, even
though the various Communities continued to exist and to be named as such
in expert language.
10 These included the official status being given to the European Council;
qualified majority within the Council of Ministers replacing the unanimity
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rule in internal market legislation; and the rebaptising of the organisation as
such to the European Communities (incorporating the European Coal and
Steel Community, the European Economic Community and Euratom).
11 The infatuation with the ‘1992 project’ extended into the world of pop
music. The well-known British pop group The Kinks in 1990 had a hit with
a song called ‘Down All the Days till 1992’. It included passages such as these:
The future waits for me and you
Down all the days till 1992.
Here is hope for all the people
And generations yet to come
And the future’s bright tomorrow
Illuminated by the morning sun.
Here’s for all the working people
And the ordinary man
For assembly workers in the factories
For farmers toiling on the land.
Down all the days till 1992
All nations will unite as one
A new horizon clears the view.
(Quote reproduced by permission of the composer and lyricist, Ray Davies.)
12 By 2002, a decade after the ‘1992 project’ was launched, much had been
done to realise the Internal Market, but much also remained to be done. Some
countries – such as Greece, Italy and France – lagged behind in implemen-
ting certain of the close to 300 directives constituting the Internal Market.
Prices of cars were still much too different in different countries due to
various national taxes. Money transfers between EU countries were more
expensive than those inside each. Public procurement still favoured domestic
companies. Important service sectors, such as electricity, gas and the mail
system were being liberalised only slowly.
13 Fowkes (1997, p. ix) sums up Gorbachev’s quandary in these words: ‘For
whatever reason, he decided to consult the Soviet population, which involved
allowing the people to speak freely. This included the non-Russians. His
reforms, moderate though they were, allowed the accumulated grievances
and resentments to break through; national elites or segments of them either
articulated national demands or were swept aside by more radical forces.
The accelerating process of economic collapse after 1989 led more and more
people to see their salvation outside the Soviet system. Bits of the ‘exploding
Soviet galaxy’ began to fly off in all directions. They did not, in the sequel,
fly very far, but far enough certainly to make it impossible for Gorbachev to
realise his dream of a remodelled Soviet Union.’ A ‘Tocqueville effect’,
referred to in the opening quote in Chapter 5, may also have been at play, as
‘non-negotiable’ demands were progressively abandoned. Thus, the demands
for ‘continuation of Communist Party supremacy’ turned into multi-party
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elections; the ‘immutability of the Berlin Wall’ into the latter’s demise; the
‘permanent reality of the two German States’ into a united Germany; and
the ‘eternal bonds of the Warsaw Pact’ into its dissolution. To the surprise
and relief of the world, the Soviet citizenry and the elites and populations of
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Red Army packed up and
went home.
14 Official Report of the 41st Ordinary Session of the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe, Eighth Sitting, 6 July 1989, pp. 197–205.
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1989–92: Yalta farewell; how new a world?
Only consummate statecraft can enable a king to save his throne, when after a
long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improving the lot of his subjects. Patiently
endured so long as to seem beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear
intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men’s minds. For the mere
fact that certain abuses have been remedied draws attention to the others and
they now appear more galling. People may suffer less, but their sensibility is
exacerbated. (Alexis de Tocqueville)1
Summary
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 led, in rapid succession
over the next two years, to German unification, Baltic state independ-
ence, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its replacement by Russia
and other successor countries, the fall of communist regimes all over
Central and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
Capitalism, liberalised world trade and new electronics technology seemed
to have carried the day.
The West offered massive financial assistance to Central and Eastern
Europe, including Russia, and also gave advice on how to go from a
planned to a market economy ranging from ‘shock therapy’ to more
gradual reform. Western international organisations – including the EU,
the Council of Europe and NATO – followed suit with various co-oper-
ation and association agreements. The hope of the countries concerned
for a new Marshall Plan was not met, but a new European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development was meant to fulfil a similar function.
The European Union in 1993 concluded a European Economic Area
(EEA) agreement with various EFTA countries, tying them closer to it in
the areas of trade and investment. The EU also agreed, in 1992, on the
ambitious Maastricht Treaty on European Union, foreseeing, especially,
an Economic and Monetary Union (a single currency) by the end of the
decade and a common foreign and security policy.
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The disintegration of Yugoslavia beginning in 1990, and the several
wars it led to, posed serious challenges to the EU and NATO, apart from
signifying a tragedy for the people of the region. A further challenge to the
EU came with an unexpected Danish referendum ‘no’ to the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992 and a surprisingly narrow ‘oui’ in a French referendum
soon after. Even as the 1992 Internal Market was entering into force, a
new sense of uncertainty settled over the continent.
Exit communism
In a political cartoon of the fall of 1989,2 Hitler and Stalin are seen
bidding one another, and the world, farewell, on a stage where the
curtain is coming down and in whose background can be seen a city in
ruins and flames. It is hard to imagine a better illustration of the world
these two men left behind, an era which was to come to a close only on
the night the Berlin Wall came down.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, so heavy in symbolism, came to represent a
series of monumental events that were to follow: the disappearance of
East Germany and its incorporation into the Federal Republic of
Germany on 3 October 1990; the declaration of independence of the
Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the summer of 1991; the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in November 1991 and the country’s
transformation into thirteen successor republics soon after, the biggest
being Russia; the fall of dictatorships across Central and Eastern Europe,
most of them disappearing peacefully but some violently such as the
Ceausescu regime in Romania in December 1989; and the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact in April 1991.
These events were of historic importance, and the historian can only
marvel at their taking place with so little bloodshed. The Soviet Empire
was a ‘tired’ and overstretched empire – politically, militarily, socially,
culturally and above all economically, collapsing under its own weight
and inertia, not unlike the Roman Empire in the fourth century ad or
the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. People, including the
majority of Russians, failed to see the point of it any longer, especially
since it seemed to impoverish them only further.
However, the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union was also due to the
constantly peaceful posture of the West – that is, democratic Western
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance as a whole – during this period, At no
point during the events of 1989 to 1991 did the Soviet Union have
reason to feel threatened, militarily or politically. On the contrary, the
West went out of its way to reassure the Soviets that it wanted to help –
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before, during and after the events.
The importance of the existence of what might be called the ‘inter-
national organisation network’ was fully shown during these momen-
tous times. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the
European Union, the Council of Europe, the World Bank, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the OECD, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe and the several arms limitations negotiations
under way: all in their various ways made contact, issued declarations,
voted financial and expert assistance and tried to include rather than
exclude.
At no point did NATO take on a threatening posture to try somehow
to exploit the weakness of the power which had lain behind its creation.
Indeed, why should it, when it had all along been a purely defensive
organisation? And how could it, when it was composed of democracies,
with peoples who asked for nothing more than an end to the Cold War?
If communist ideology was in agony, nationalism was reawakening,
showing that it had only been forced into a decades-long slumber –
nearly 40 years for the countries of Central Europe and over seventy
years for the nationalities of the Soviet Union. If such relatively abstract
notions of forming a new communist human being, a new society and a
new world of proletarian brotherhood had ignited passions in the
1920s, now a flag free of any sickle and hammer had the same effect.
Communism as an ideology and an economic doctrine seemed to have
reached its nadir. Communist parties previously in power in Central and
Eastern Europe were swept away in elections in the early 1990s, and
have only been able to make a come-back by shedding most of their
communist ideology and remaining as the often only viable and well
organised opposition to the new parties in power. Sometimes reformed
communist parties have come back to power and continued on the reform
path to a more market-oriented economy. Outside Europe, communism
survived only in a handful of places such as the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and Cuba (in somewhat diluted
form), and then only through heavy repression of domestic opinion and
with the aid of that other ideology, the personality cult.
Has communism disappeared forever? On the one hand, mankind will
have learnt from hard-earned experience, at least for some time to come,
that the teachings of Marx, especially as distorted by a Lenin or a Stalin,
do not produce the desired results when tried in reality, and that they in
fact run the overwhelming risk of producing personal oppression and
material impoverishment. On the other hand, one has to account for the
galvanisation of the minds of much of the world in the first half of the
MUP_Torbion_05_Ch5 22/9/03, 12:38 pm73
Destination Europe74
twentieth century, among them the Russian revolutionaries and large
parts of the intelligentsia of Western Europe and in much of the then
developing world (even though in this latter case it was often more a
camouflage for a quest for national liberation). Whatever part of the
human psyche, at least in some people, was impassioned by the call of
communism could, logically, become impassioned again. That part is
the quest for equality – not just of opportunity but also in rewards; and
revolt against privileges, nationalism, religion or superstition.3
However, a revival of communism in the near or medium term future
seems unlikely, not only in Russia but also in China, which embraces
capitalism while holding on to a communist one-party state, largely as a
means of holding the country together.
Communism’s nemeses: capitalism, trade and technology
In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall capitalism enjoyed a new honey-
moon, and so did democracy. The economic boom in Western Europe
carried on into 1990 and much of 1991, spurred and prolonged by
Germany’s vast spending on the ‘new Länder’ of the former East
Germany. Nobody had any doubt that the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe would start growing rapidly once democracy had been
firmly installed, privatisation of state-owned companies carried out, and
trade with the West and other ‘transition’ countries resumed (‘transition’
being the term widely used to describe the transformation from a central
planning system to a market-oriented economy).
Principally, two things brought down the Soviet Union and Empire as
well as world communism: capitalism and world trade, both using the
computer chip. Capitalism’s contribution was that the shortcomings of
communism could only become apparent to people living under either
system through communism’s unfavourable comparison with the econo-
mic success of capitalism. World trade was helpful because capitalism
could then use its tested tools of international division of labour – or
specialisation – creating greater overall wealth (although not necessarily
equally shared) and ever sharper competition, within as well as among
countries. The multinational enterprise – a symbol of both division of
labour and international competition – could not have developed
without capitalism. Nor could it have done so without the open trade
system largely based on the universal rules set up under GATT in 1947.
GATT, it will be remembered, was – until as late as 1995 when its
main work was handed over to the new WTO – only an agreement (as
the name implies), not an institution. As such, it was essentially a ‘tit for
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tat’ set-up: ‘You give me “most-favoured-nation” treatment, I’ll give it
to you; you raise tariffs, I’ll do the same’. Since the United States was the
dominant actor on the world economic scene then, and has remained so
with ups and downs to this day, world trade has developed largely as the
US has wished it to develop, i.e. in a largely open and non-discriminatory
manner. This has been an ideal environment for the growth of multi-
nationals, first predominantly American, then also West European and
eventually from most other parts of the world.
The multinationals not only brought foreign direct investment to the
far corners of the earth, but also know-how in all fields, from organi-
sation to technology. As the process accelerated, they not only enhanced
world trade but they also made any large-scale retreat into protection-
ism by individual countries more costly in terms of trade disruption and
the loss of foreign investment and know-how.
The microchip, for its part, has enhanced competition, which engenders
inventions – the need to transmit information as cheaply and effectively
as possible. Its use has above all been in the transmission of information
over large distances, permitting companies to expand worldwide in a
highly intricate web of co-ordination – internally within the organisa-
tion and externally with consumers and suppliers. The same holds for
researchers and individual users.
Parallel to co-ordination and thereby control, the chip has permitted
decentralisation of decision making. Since a company’s centre knows
better what its far-away subsidiaries are doing – and subsidiaries know
more of what headquarters knows – there is more of a give and take
between them, and greater possibility for adaptation of products and
services to local preferences. Again, this is something a state-owned,
centralised economy cannot muster, apart from the fact that it would
not feel any real need to innovate, enjoying as it does a monopolistic
position in its market (the nation).
Copying the invention of the chip would not have been enough for,
say, the Soviet Union, given the continuous rapid product development
in computer technology in the market economies – a development which
the centrally planned economies simply could not emulate. Indeed, the
Soviet authorities in the late 1980s tried to restrict the sale and use of
personal computers to stem the freer flow of information (just as China
has sought to restrict access to the internet), even though this hurt econo-
mic development. The paradox had come full circle: by trying to halt the
advent of the information revolution in order to save central planning
and the government’s monopoly on opinion, the economic system
collapsed, demonstrating in no uncertain terms the need for reform.
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The microchip rendered possible the explosion in knowledge and the
sharing of data that fuelled world economic growth in the 1980s and up
to this day. To a large extent, however, this growth passed the com-
munist countries in Central and Eastern Europe by. Unable to harness
the chip’s potential under the central planning system, these countries
increasingly realised that they had to change. The chip made trans-
mission of information – through computers or satellite television – into
Central and Eastern Europe all the more easy to achieve, and all the
more difficult to resist.
If communism had thus been rendered possible in the early part of the
twentieth century by the communication possibilities opened up by the
telegraph, the telephone and the radio, it was undermined by further
developments in communications technology – television and the personal
computer fuelled by the chip. The chip revolution is not finished. It has
in fact only just started, with unknown consequences for mankind as a
whole.
To stress the importance of the chip in the downfall of the Soviet
Union and Empire as well as communism is not in any way to belittle
other factors at play. These include the international political system,
the foresight – some would say illusions – and the willingness to reform
of Gorbachev, the message of Christian humanism beaming out from the
Vatican by the first East European Pope – John Paul II – as from 1978,
and the shared wish by reformers and conservatives in the Soviet Union
and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe to avoid civil war. How-
ever, the role of the simple chip merits highlighting for its importance is
rarely recognised.
 The resumption of history: from ideology to nuts and bolts
The disappearance of the Soviet Union and also its hold over other parts
of Central and Eastern Europe left a void, both political and mental, in a
world that had become used to a notion of two blocs and two ideologies
standing against each other. The American historian Francis Fukuyama,
in his book The End of History and the Last Man published in the early
1990s, talked about an ‘end of history’, as the exclusive striving for
larger market shares and profits – was seen as taking exclusive hold of
mankind.4
To others, however, it was more as if the train of world history,
having been shunted on to the side track of ideology for the better part
of the twentieth century, was now returning to its main line of rising and
sinking empires, with international co-operation competing against the
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spectre of national – and nationalist – confrontation. Now the world
would no longer have the luxury of debating such arcane ideas as whether
the means of production ought to be state-owned or private. Instead, it
would be faced with issues of survival such as climate change, environ-
mental deterioration, AIDS, terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. No longer would war be principally a matter for the two super-
powers, of which one no longer existed and whose main successor,
Russia, was in a much weakened state. With that bipolar discipline
gone, the question of war or peace would become more decentralised,
tribal and national. Now the only things keeping humans from war
would be their own survival instinct; the international machinery (in the
widest sense) they had set up for keeping peace and co-operation domin-
ant over war and conflict; and possibly the interdependence that would
come from trade and cross-country investment.
The liberation of Central and Eastern Europe from communism left
the region in a sorry state, but not without hope or potential. If it is
regrettable that change did not come earlier – say, in the 1970s, if the
Prague Spring had been allowed to spread to the whole region – it is as
well that it did not come later than it did, by which time the region
would have suffered even greater environmental destruction, even more
economic backwardness vis-à-vis the surrounding market economies,
even more oppression, despair and humiliation, and even greater
destruction of ‘civil society’ – that myriad of independent associations in
all walks of life, including business, that form the backbone of any free
and thriving society. As the region set about rebuilding that civil society
by re-establishing democracy – or, in a case like Russia’s, establishing it
for the first time – most people, including those in the West, thought that
economic reform and renewal would be as easy.
However, building a functioning market economy on the ruins of a
collapsed central planning system is much more difficult than establish-
ing or re-establishing formal democracy, itself a difficult task. The
expression ‘It is easier to turn an aquarium into a fish soup than to turn
a fish soup into an aquarium’ made the rounds. Today, well over a
decade after reform began, many of the countries in the region have made
spectacular progress and show higher growth rates and degrees of privati-
sation of economic life than many countries in Western Europe. This is
little less than miraculous and a tribute both to the peoples of these coun-
tries and to the international community which assisted in the process.
The differences in the pace of reform, and in its results, were largely
due to the particular policies followed by individual governments and
their experiences of the past. Generally, countries that followed the ‘shock
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therapy’ method – rapid (and fair) privatisation of state-owned industry
and agriculture, a check on inflation through sparse money supply and
clear legislation for economic life – fared better. Proximity to prosperous
Western Europe, favouring Central Europe and the Baltic states in
particular, also played a role, as did the extent of time the countries had
been under communism (seventy years for the Soviet Union’s successor
states, some thirty-five years for the other countries in Central and
Eastern Europe).
Finally, the existence or non-existence of democracy before World
War II, sometimes referred to as the ‘democratic tradition’ may also
have been significant. Democratic tradition is more than just voting to
elect a parliament at national, regional or local level, or making sure that
elections are fair. It is about the give and take among the many different
constituencies that form the electorate. It is about checks and balances
among different authorities, and about free and independent media.
Russia is a case in point. The reforms undertaken in the 1990s were
on the whole haphazard or existed only on paper. A ‘shock therapy’ was
tried, but it was more shock than therapy. Corruption was widespread,
and the vast financial aid given by the West was poorly used or siphoned
to ‘safe havens’ abroad. Democracy had difficulty penetrating into daily
life, since ‘civil society’ had been so utterly destroyed under communism.
When the ‘bubble economy’ burst in August 1998, world financial
stability was shaken and Russia left with a largely unreformed economy
and massive foreign debt.5
The legacy of the communist era weighed heavily upon Central and
Eastern Europe, but the region also had advantages. They included an
educated workforce – even though it was not familiar with market
economy principles, such as its paramount emphasis on efficiency and
ever higher productivity – and, importantly, much lower labour costs
than in Western Europe.
The labour cost issue is worth highlighting. Rarely if ever in history
did two neighbouring regions display such a disparity of wealth between
them. Perhaps Spain and Portugal after the gold discoveries in Latin
America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries showed the same
wealth gap vis-à-vis their European neighbours to the north. However,
they were feudal, not market, economies. Normally a prosperous region
pulls up its neighbours through increased trade, leading over time to
increased prosperity overall. However, the Iron Curtain between Eastern
and Western Europe – plus the fundamentally opposite economic paths
they chose or were compelled to choose – prevented virtually all trade
and other economic contacts for decades.
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When the Berlin Wall fell, a Europe eagerly seeking co-operation
found, on the one side, massive reconstruction needs and pitifully low
wages, and on the other a rebuilt society with an elaborate social welfare
system and overall high labour costs (including extra-salary costs to
employers). Virtually overnight the obstacles to the two sides growing
together economically were gone, threatening the work and conditions
of some through industries moving to or buying in the East, and offering
others the challenges of the market economy but also more and better
paid jobs. The full impact of this development would not be felt for
some time.
Most Russians were delighted to rediscover Russia as a country in its
own right rather than as only one, albeit the main, component of the
Soviet Union (although many Russians in the other successor republics
were distressed at suddenly finding themselves outside). The formerly
dependent countries in Central and Eastern Europe were jubilant over
their newly rediscovered freedom and national independence. The East
Germans eagerly awaited integration into the Federal Republic, which
occurred on 3 October 1990, and in this they were joined by the large
majority of West Germans. (The mutual recriminations between ‘Ossies’
and ‘Wessies’ would come only later.)
Western Europe – whether EU or non-EU, NATO or neutral – was
elated over the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe and the disap-
pearance of the military threat that the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
Union had represented. An ‘implosion’ of the Soviet Union, possibly
leading to an outward ‘explosion’ had been averted. Now the task would
be to help in any way possible: materially with funds, and also with all
kinds of advice, from running a country to running a company.
But there was also a certain apprehension. The first worry had to do
with the abrupt change to the status quo of European and world bi-
polarity to which Western Europe, and the rest of the world (in parti-
cular the United States), had become used over nearly half a century.
Although international politics is driven by the desire of each power to
alter the situation in its favour, there is often general unease when the
status quo is fundamentally upset.
Suddenly, NATO had no counterweight. The very reason for its foun-
dation had ceased to exist. Operation ‘Desert Storm’ – in which an
international coalition of twenty-eight countries led by the United States
and acting under a UN mandate had liberated Kuwait from Iraqi
occupation in early 1991 – had not been a NATO affair, even though
virtually all its members contributed. Even the European Union – whose
integration had largely come about, and had been made possible by, the
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pressure from the East – had lost part of its significance as that pressure
disappeared. At least it would now be more difficult to pursue integra-
tion or even unification, for any such undertaking among states requires
not only the prospect of intrinsic rewards but also a better protection
against an outside threat. Looming world economic hegemony by the
United States or Japan over Europe was invoked by some Europeans as
the new menace that would justify further integration (for instance
toward a common currency). Some cited distant China as the new world
threat, but others saw it as a new marketplace.
Another worry was about what would happen with Germany. During
the Cold War it had been divided – the western one, the Federal Republic,
necessarily turning West. Now it was becoming united with the second
biggest slice, the former East Germany. Would its allegiance still be
exclusively westward – to the Atlantic Alliance, to Western Europe, and
in particular France? Would France and the United Kingdom again have
to worry about a German dominance over Mitteleuropa and over a Europe
where an essential equilibrium had previously existed, in population if
not in economic wealth, between the middle-sized powers of the UK,
France and Germany (to which one might add Italy and Spain)? All of a
sudden, Germany had over eighty million people, not sixty million as
before. Furthermore, would Russia be content with its post-Soviet
borders? After all, it had millions of ethnic Russians in the ‘near abroad’
of successor republics, where they were now a minority. Following the
independence of the Baltic states, the Kaliningrad enclave (now cut off
from the rest of Russian territory) and Saint Petersburg were Russia’s
only outlets to the western seas.
Western assistance
Any concerns the West may have had over the new geopolitical realities
in Central and Eastern Europe did nothing, however, to diminish its
resolve to help. Massive bilateral and multilateral aid poured into the
region, including Russia, as from 1991. The aim was simultaneously to
preserve the newly established democracies by encouraging economic
and other reform, to establish trade links, to invest, and more generally
to tie the region more closely to Western Europe and to the international
economy in general. Virtually the entire set-up of international institu-
tions – the European Community, the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) and its successor, the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for
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Europe, the Council of Europe, the newly created (in 1992) European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and others – enthusiastically
threw themselves into the job of helping Central and Eastern Europe to
get back on to its feet, creating some overlap and confusion in the
process, but also some genuine assistance.6 (For some institutions it even
created a new lease of life as their traditional tasks had started to appear
less relevant.)
In 1990 NATO had concluded an epoch-making treaty on conven-
tional forces in Europe with the Soviet Union and other Central and East
European countries. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
bound both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to far-reaching cuts in conven-
tional forces, thus removing a further threat to European peace. With
the collapse of the Warsaw Pact many of the stipulations of the CFE
Treaty were in fact soon more than met, and the agreement lost some of
its relevance as many countries in Central and Eastern Europe became
de facto western allies.7
The security emphases of individual Western European countries
varied. For the Scandinavian countries and Finland – all relatively small
– it was particularly important to help the equally small Baltic countries
to survive as independent states, and turn the Baltic Sea into an area of
prosperity and co-operation. In this they were joined by Germany.
Germany for its part was eager to help turn Central and Eastern
Europe into a zone of stability rather than instability. Germany between
1989 and 1995 gave over DM100 billion in assistance to Russia and
other countries emerging from the former Soviet Union and another
DM50 billion to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
German unification itself meant a net transfer of some DM880 billion to
the new Länder between 1991 and 1997. The support continues to this
day. Much aid to Eastern Germany and elsewhere was also channelled
through the European Community. Other Western European countries
large and small contributed both bilaterally and through the international
organisations mentioned above.
However, neither the one-to-one exchange rate between the Deutsch-
mark and the East German Mark (rather than the one-to-two rate favoured
by many economists) nor the budgetary transfer that followed had their
full intended effect. The nationwide German trade unions immediately
demanded pay levels in the East that would rapidly approach those in
the West (already by this time among the highest in the world). This had
the unintended effect of preventing the new Länder from using lower
labour costs as a tool for development and drove German and foreign
direct investment on to countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia.
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If official aid to the transition countries was important, of even greater
importance were the direct investment flows beginning in 1990, once it
was clear that the process of democratisation and economic reform was
going to proceed. Such investment went predominantly to countries
closest to Western Europe and to those exhibiting the greatest will to
reform.
Although the reforms would have to vary according to the circum-
stances in each country, a number of areas stood out as particularly
important: stable and democratic political institutions; an efficient and
accountable public administration, including a fair, authoritative and
comprehensive legal and judicial system (which was equally fair to
foreign investors); privatisation of state-owned enterprises; restructuring
of industry; promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises; a modern
tax system including efficient tax collection; and a measure of social
protection, not least to gain public approval of continued and often
painful economic reform.
Many of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe now began to
aspire to becoming members of two clubs: NATO for their external
security, not least vis-à-vis Russia; and the European Community for
their economic development, both in view of funds (e.g. for agriculture
and regional development) and in order not to have to remain outside
any emerging ‘Fortress Europe’.
NATO reacted quickly. In 1992 it created the North Atlantic Cooper-
ation Council as a forum in which NATO and Central and Eastern
European countries could discuss issues of common security. It was soon
followed (in 1994) by the Partnership for Peace programme, aiming to
involve also non-NATO member states in European peacekeeping. Mean-
while, NATO members reduced and reconfigured their armed forces to
achieve better peacekeeping and crisis management. US forces in
Germany, for example, were down to 35 per cent of their pre-1989 level
by the mid-1990s.
The European Community also took speedy action. Association agree-
ments, so-called Europe Agreements, were ultimately concluded with
ten countries in the region, all of which would soon apply to become
Community members: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Between
1989 and 1994 alone, over $12 billion was given in special assistance
programmes or through the European Investment Bank. Efforts were
also made to facilitate market access for Central and Eastern European
exports to the Community, and the Community took it upon itself to co-
ordinate assistance from Western donors in general (the ‘G-24’ group).
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However, even though the European Community was quick to expand
contacts with Central and Eastern Europe, many of its member states
did not yet feel ready to let the institution be enlarged. (Cyprus and
Malta were also candidates, bringing the waiting list to twelve.) For one
thing, how could agricultural expenditure, which already accounted for
over 50 per cent of the EC budget, be kept in check if Central and
Eastern European countries joined – most of them with fertile (if still
underdeveloped) agricultural land? There was in particular great appre-
hension about the possible effects on the Common Agricultural Policy of
Poland’s large agrarian economy.
Moreover, how could regional development aid (through the Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund, the European Investment Bank, the
Cohesion Fund and the Common Agricultural Policy) already account-
ing for over 10 per cent of the budget – be afforded, considering that
potential new Central and Eastern European members were poorer than
most of the current beneficiary regions in the EU? If there were to be no
increase in funds, would previous net beneficiaries, such as southern
regions and countries, receive less as central/eastern regions were given
more?
How would the EC institutional machinery, already bursting at the
seams, be able to accommodate four, five, six or more newcomers? And
should not the EC first ‘deepen’ the integration among its existing
members before going on to ‘widen’ membership to others? More parti-
cularly, if ‘widening’ came before ‘deepening’, would not Germany (this
was a chiefly French concern) risk becoming more attached to Mittel-
europa than to Western Europe, and to France in particular? Could,
perhaps, time be bought to achieve ‘deepening’ before the eventually
inescapable ‘widening’ took place through arrangements short of mem-
bership and by drawing out the accession procedure into the future?
The EC–EFTA European Economic Area
The European Community was already trying the ‘other arrangement’
tack, by proposing, in 1989, a European Economic Area (EEA) to the six
EFTA countries of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland, to come into effect at the beginning of 1993,
that is, in parallel with the completion of the EC’s Internal Market (the
‘1992 project’). The EEA would essentially mean an extension of the
‘1992 project’ to the six EFTA countries, without the latters’ participa-
tion in other aspects of the EC, such as the Common Agricultural Policy.
It also meant that the EFTA–EEA partners, as the incomparably weaker
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side, would be able to make observations but not to participate in the
decision making on an equal footing with EC members. The arrange-
ment suited both sides. The EC was relieved of the complications of
expansion, while EFTA countries were freed from the political compli-
cations of applying, or indeed being granted, membership.8
For a country like Switzerland, such a prospect would indeed have
been a nightmare, a fact borne out in 1992 when even EEA membership
was rejected in a popular referendum. For others as well – Sweden,
Finland and Austria – an important question was whether their constitu-
tionally enshrined or otherwise established neutrality would be com-
patible with an EC membership which, rightly or wrongly, was assumed
also to have far-reaching political ramifications.
However, the EEA agreement came with a price tag for the participant
EFTA countries. The less wealthy European Community member states
called for, and obtained, financial assistance from them in the form of a
financial mechanism, one argument being that these EC industries
would suffer in the EEA market as a result of stronger EFTA economies
joining. One would have thought that, when in the end Switzerland did
not join the EEA, this sum would be reduced. Instead, the remaining
countries had to fill in the missing contribution. By the time Austria,
Finland and Sweden joined in 1995, 110 million ECU had been paid by
the EEA–EFTA countries into the financial mechanism (and the payments
continue to this day for the three EEA members Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway).9
As the EEA was given more concrete form – some 1,400 EC texts
based on over 10,000 pages of EC legislation – it already began to
appear obsolete to the governments of EFTA countries, which in the
wake of the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
started seriously to consider EC membership (afraid of being overtaken
by rapid modernisers such as Hungary, for example). Those interested
included all except Iceland and Liechtenstein. In the 1991–92 period
these governments were all to present applications to join the EC,
although, as will be seen, only Austria, Finland and Sweden eventually
joined, while Norway and Switzerland stayed outside.
Was the EEA, which eventually came into effect in January 1994, a lot
of work for nothing? On the one hand it must be remembered that it
originated at a time when EC membership for countries that were later
to join was not yet under consideration, given that the collapse of the
Soviet Union had not been foreseen. It did give rise to a divisive
referendum in Switzerland, although that country later on incorporated
virtually the entire EEA framework into its domestic legislation.
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On the other hand, the EEA agreement presumably helped those
countries that would ultimately join in 1995 – Austria, Finland and
Sweden – familiarise themselves with the workings of what had by this
time become the European Union. Finally, Iceland, Norway and Liech-
tenstein (and to some extent Switzerland) would have an EEA agreement
tailored to their particular desire to be ‘inside’ the EC economically, yet
‘outside’ it politically.
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
Europe, and in particular the European Community, had an even more
important concern than that of smoothing economic relations with EFTA
members. The challenge was, since November 1989, how to respond to
the political vacuum left by a vanished Berlin Wall and a weakening
Soviet hold over Central and Eastern Europe; and, since November
1991, a Soviet Union that had vanished altogether.10
Other factors were at work. Many of those involved in European
Community decision making were disappointed with a 1986 Single Euro-
pean Act which in their view did not sufficiently advance the process of
integration. The ‘1992 project’ was seen as too down-to-earth and in
need of a loftier vision to supplement it, including a sorely missing ‘social
dimension’. Furthermore, how could an internal market function in the
long run without a single currency (indeed as envisioned in the Single
European Act)? A common currency would make ‘competitive devalua-
tions’ impossible and eliminate the unpredictability caused by fluctu-
ating exchange rates.
Moreover, the Internal Market had given new prominence to such
phenomena as drug trafficking, cross-border crime, international terrorism
and immigration, the latter notably from North Africa but also, it could
be expected, from a newly opened up Central and Eastern Europe.
At the December 1989 Strasbourg meeting of the EC’s European
Council, one month after the Berlin Wall came down, the decision was
taken to set up two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) – one on
political union and another on economic and monetary union. (The IGC
on the EMU was convened against the wishes of the United Kingdom
government.) These two IGCs were formally launched in Rome a year
later, and were able to present their results after an additional year, in
December 1991. Signature by all the Twelve of the new treaty resulting
from these Intergovernmental Conferences – called the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union – took place in the Dutch city of Maastricht in February
1992. 11
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A number of terms in the Treaty on European Union, popularly known
as the Maastricht Treaty, merit attention. Article 1a of its Common
Provisions states: ‘By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish
among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called “the Union”. This
Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as
possible to the citizen.’
‘Union’ would lead one to believe that a federation had been formed,
along the model of, say, the former Soviet Union. However, already the
next sentence went some distance (presumably at the insistence of the
British and others) toward distancing itself from the previous one in
saying that, though a ‘new stage’ had been entered into, this was only a
‘process’ of creating ‘ever closer’ union, that is, something that would
never be fully completed, like an asymptotic curve approaching but
never reaching ‘full’ union.
On the other hand, the treaty went on to talk about the ‘introduction
of a citizenship of the Union’ – citizenship being normally a subject of
international law, that is, citizenship of a country, state, federation or
confederation. Union citizenship does, however, mean something less
than, say, having a passport, which only indicates citizenship of the
European Union (although national passports with an EU cover can
today be obtained in all member states). Rather, it gives every national
of a member state the right to live and work anywhere in the
Community. He or she is further given the right to vote and stand as a
candidate in local elections and elections for the European Parliament.
In Article B of the treaty’s Common Provisions, the Union set itself the
goal of the ‘creation of an area without internal frontiers’. This essen-
tially stood for the completion of the 1992 Internal Market (‘frontiers’
meaning less than ‘borders’ would have). The ‘strengthening of econo-
mic and social cohesion’ was a call for funds to poorer regions and
countries of the Union.
Decisions were to be taken ‘as closely as possible to the citizens’,
reflecting something of a negation of supranationality. This so called
‘subsidiarity principle’, was included especially, but not exclusively, at
British insistence.12 It stipulated that ‘in areas which do not fall within
its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member
states and can therefore, by reason of the scale required of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.’
The Treaty on European Union is based on a number of ‘pillars’. One
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contained some institutional changes designed to improve the EU’s
efficiency and democratic appearance. The Council of Ministers was
empowered to take a greater range of decisions on the basis of qualified
majority votes. The European Parliament was given increased powers
and influence in several respects, in particular regarding legislation.
The so called ‘co-decision procedure’ – subsequently revised under the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty – provided for two readings by the European
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the European
Parliament was given a sort of legislative veto power over legislation
subject to this procedure. Areas covered by the veto power included the
freedom of movement, the freedom of establishment, the Internal Market
(including competition), research and development, the environment,
trans-European network guidelines, education and training, social policy,
public health, culture, consumer protection, development policy, and
implementation of the Regional Development Fund.
The term of office of the members of the European Commission was
extended from four to five years, so as to align the life span of a
Commission with that of a European Parliament. The entire proposed
membership of the Commission was subjected to a vote of approval by
the European Parliament before it was formally appointed by common
accord of national governments.
A Committee of the Regions was established; the Court of Justice was
given the power to impose fines on member states failing in their
obligations; and the European Parliament was empowered to appoint an
ombudsman to receive complaints from citizens ‘covering instances of mala-
dministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies’.
The Maastricht Treaty also defined the main features of an Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), as well as a timetable for its establishment
passing through three different stages. The EMU included the irrevo-
cable fixing of exchange rates, leading to the introduction of a single
currency and to the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB),
which was to operate within the framework of a European System of
Central Banks (ESCB). The main objectives of the ESCB would be to
maintain price stability. It was to define and implement the monetary
policy of the Community, conduct foreign exchange operations, hold and
manage the official foreign reserves of the member states, and promote
the smooth operation of payment systems.
The EMU was to be established in three stages. Stage I, begun in 1990,
and stage II, started in 1994, were essentially concerned with promoting
economic and monetary co-operation, co-ordination and convergence
between the member states. By the end of 1996 (subsequently postponed
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to 1997) the Council of Ministers, acting by qualified majority was to
decide: first, whether a majority of the member states met certain
convergence criteria for the adoption of a single currency (involving low
rates of inflation, low government deficits, currency stability and low
interest rates); and second whether a majority of the member states
wished to enter stage III. If a date for the beginning of stage III had not
been set by the end of 1997, this third stage would start automatically
on 1 January 1999 for those states that had met the convergence criteria.
(All this indeed took place on schedule as will be seen in the next
chapter, with eleven member states participating in the EMU project at
its start in 1999, forming what popularly became known as ‘Euroland’.)
In a protocol to the treaty it was recognised that the United Kingdom
should ‘not be obliged or committed to move to the third stage of
economic and monetary union without a separate decision to do so by
its government and parliament’. In another protocol the Danish govern-
ment reserved the right to hold a national referendum before participa-
ting in the third stage of EMU, and subsequently Finland, Germany and
Sweden declared that their respective parliaments must approve this last
step. (Such approval was subsequently achieved in Finland and Germany.)
In another part of the treaty, the Community’s commitment to help-
ing developing countries was reaffirmed. New policy areas were intro-
duced, although in a rather tentative manner, in the sense that the
Community’s responsibilities were carefully restricted to education,
public health, consumer protection, trans-European networks and com-
petitiveness of industry. A Cohesion Fund was created to provide finan-
cial assistance in the fields of environment and trans-European transport
infrastructures, benefiting mainly peripheral and southern EU regions.
The treaty also contained a commitment to the shaping of a common
foreign and security policy. While the 1987 Single European Act had stated
that member states should ‘endeavour jointly to formulate and implement
European foreign policy’, the Treaty on European Union went much
further. Here, the Union and its member states agreed to ‘define and imple-
ment a common foreign and security policy … covering all areas of foreign
and security policy’. The common policy ‘shall include all questions related
to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’.
The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
were defined in relatively general terms. One was to ‘safeguard the com-
mon values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union’ and
another was to ‘develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law,
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
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The Western European Union was considered ‘an integral part of the
development of the Union’ and should ‘elaborate and implement deci-
sions and actions of the Union which have defence implications’. In a
declaration annexed to the treaty the, at the time, nine EU members
belonging to the WEU stated that it ‘will be developed as a defence
component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’.
The CFSP thus put the already well-established European Political
Co-operation (EPC) within a broader framework. For the first time
foreign policy, although essentially intergovernmental in character,
became at least in theory subject to some qualified majority voting.
Furthermore, defence made its first formal appearance on the Union
agenda, although provisions were couched carefully. Thus there was
talk only about the ‘eventual’ framing of a common defence policy (at
the insistence of more Atlanticist members of the Union anxious to
maintain the strength of NATO). The term ‘common defence’ was there,
but only as something to which a common defence policy ‘might in time
lead’. ‘Might’, ‘in time’ and ‘lead ‘ are all heavy qualifiers, again there at
the insistence of those who did not wish any strengthening of a Euro-
pean security and defence policy to come at the cost of transatlantic ties.
Co-operation in the spheres of justice and home affairs constituted a
separate pillar of the treaty. It comprised such things as asylum policy,
border crossing, crossings by persons, immigration, the fight against drugs
and international fraud, judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters,
co-operation among customs authorities and police co-operation to
combat terrorism. In this pillar it was also said that any measures taken
in regard to these areas must be in compliance with the Council of Europe’s
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The significance of the CFSP and the justice and home affairs pillars
lay in the broader contribution they might make to the integration
process in Europe. A legal base was given to co-operation in areas that in
the past were dealt with purely on a national basis or in loose and
informal co-operation between the member states.
The Maastricht Treaty is long, some seventy pages. It has seventeen
protocols and thirty-three separate declarations, mostly stating reserva-
tions against wordings in the treaty itself. Thus ‘social policy’ is dealt with
in a protocol eventually ratified by all EU member states including the
United Kingdom. Another protocol, previously referred to, exempts the
United Kingdom from the EMU commitment to move to the third stage
of economic and monetary union without a separate decision to do so by
its government and parliament. Other protocols or declarations deal
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with such things as the acquisition of property in Denmark, the
protection of animals, co-operation with charitable institutions and the
hierarchy of Community acts, but also the statutes of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
Interpreting the Maastricht Treaty
To the layman, the language of the Treaty on European Union is fre-
quently impenetrable and sometimes borders on the incomprehensible.
It is a far cry from, say, ‘We, the People of the United States’ or the
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights. One reason is
that the treaty built on and revised the earlier treaties, and therefore had
to indicate numerous references to the changes undertaken. Another is
that it had to specify in great detail all the different modes of consulta-
tion and co-decision among the numerous Community bodies, as these
vary depending on the issue.
The complexity of the treaty also, however, derives from the host of
areas it covers. And these in turn represent not only the reasons just
mentioned for drawing up the treaty in the first place, but also the many
wishes thrown in by different member states and EU institutions as the
negotiations got under way. With so many contributing authors, the
result could hardly be expected to read like high prose; in this the Treaty
on European Union very much resembles, indeed surpasses, the Single
European Act. (There is a joke among bureaucrats that ‘a camel is a
horse designed by a committee’.)
Of greater importance than any exegetic difficulties was the political
significance of the treaty. Generally speaking, it represented a compro-
mise between those who would have liked to go further (such as Germany,
Italy and the Benelux countries) and those who felt it had gone too far
already (in particular the United Kingdom).
The integrationists could rejoice in numerous competencies passing
from the member states to the European level, and a strengthening of the
powers of various EU institutions. Thus there would be more qualified
majority voting in the decision-taking Council of Ministers (implying a
reduction in sovereignty for countries in the minority, but also for those
in the majority to the extent that they would have to compromise with
others to reach that majority).
Furthermore, the European Council (of heads of government, or head
of state in the case of France) was recognised as being the body to define
the ‘general political guidelines’ of the EU. The European Parliament
was given greater powers (without, however, receiving full legislative
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ones like a national parliament), both through the new ‘co-decision
procedure’ and the extension of the so called ‘co-operation’ and ‘assent’
procedures to more policy areas. The European Court of Justice was
given the right to fine member states found in breach of EC legislation.
New policy areas were brought explicitly into the EC framework for the
first time, such as culture, consumer protection, environment, research
and technological development, industrial competitiveness, and econo-
mic and social cohesion. Above all, however, it was the provisions for an
Economic and Monetary Union that would provide the greatest impetus
toward political integration.
Those suspicious of more integration also scored some successes. For
one thing, the ‘F-word’ – federal – did not appear at the insistence of, in
particular, the British. The ‘subsidiarity clause’ was there, although it
would be hard to define when exactly something promises to be better
done by a member state than by the EU (especially in the economic field
under a single currency). The two pillars of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Co-operation in the Spheres of Justice and Home
Affairs, were kept outside the European Community framework, thus
remaining more intergovernmental than communautaire, with less of a
say for, for instance, the European Commission. Furthermore, there
were the virtual ‘opt-outs’ given to the United Kingdom and Denmark
on the EMU and the refusal by one country, the United Kingdom, to
participate in the Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy.
The Treaty on European Union was therefore a flexible treaty, placing
certain activities in the more supranational EC framework and others in
more ad hoc arrangements. In this it followed in the tradition of, say, the
Schengen Agreement – at the time a separate agreement between some of
the member states and concerned with the free movement of persons.
However, flexibility has its price. Nobody at the time of the ECSC or the
EEC Treaties would have dreamt of any opt-out possibilities or ad hoc
arrangements. Uniformity was the order of the day and was possible due
to the relative homogeneity of the member states; to the still relatively
peripheral Community activities, which did not yet touch on the
essentials of national sovereignty; and to the more favourable economic
climate of that time.
First spanner in the works: the Yugoslav crisis
It would not be long before the Treaty on European Union would be put
to the test. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, begun in 1990, continued
in 1991 with declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia,
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followed by an EC-sponsored conference at The Hague to discuss a political
settlement and an offer to consider, within the EC framework, requests
for independence presented by any of the emerging republics before the
year’s end. Such requests did indeed come from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia
and Macedonia (today the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’).
Soon, civil wars erupted in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and Germany
recognised Croatia and Slovenia (in December 1991), prematurely
according to some other EU countries. In the months following the
signing of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht, fighting sub-
sided in Croatia (parts of which were under Serb military control) and
Slovenia – both of which were internationally recognised as independent
states. However, fighting flared up in Bosnia and Herzegovina – which
had been recognised by the EU member countries in April 1992 –
between Serbs who did not want to be citizens in that new country
(aided by the Yugoslav army) and non-Serbs (Croatians and Bosnians).
The revulsion of the rest of Europe and the world at seeing such large-
scale fighting on the continent itself – indeed geographically closer to its
centre than EU member Greece – was manifest, especially since the
atrocities included massacres, rapes, mass expulsions and imprisonment
in camps reminiscent of those seen during the Holocaust.
The situation was further confused by the proclamation, in March
1992, of a Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a constitution
saying it wanted to join Yugoslavia; and by the declaration by the
predominantly Croat region in western Herzegovina that it was now an
autonomous region (prompting international criticism that Croatia, too,
was seeking Bosnia’s partition).
Europeans and others could not understand why a country that had
been in existence since the end of World War I should have to come apart.
Was there a difference between a Serb, a Croat and a Bosnian? Did they
not speak much the same language? Europeans, in brief, underestimated
the force of nationalism and the legacy of history (even fourteenth-
century history such as that invoked by Serbs to claim a right over the
largely Albanian-populated province of Kosovo). Europeans also under-
estimated the forces of disintegration, at a time when Western Europe
lived under the impression that the general trend in history was integra-
tion, as demonstrated through the European Union.
The question was: what could and would Europe, and more particu-
larly, the EU, do? Send young men to die in a country on Europe’s
periphery – with internal conflicts that no outside power could fully
comprehend, in mountainous terrain that is particularly difficult to
conquer? How many body-bags would have to be sent home before
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public opinion would have had enough? (There would, alas, be many
over the years to come, as international forces began to suffer casualties
– but no large-scale pressure to disengage became apparent.)
Furthermore, for what cause would soldiers be sent to die or be
wounded? For keeping belligerents apart, in which case they might be
attacked by either side (as subsequently happened to UN troops)? Or for
helping one side against another? But on what moral or statehood
grounds, since atrocities were carried out by all and statehood con-
siderations also must take into account the wishes of the population
(such as the majority of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina who did not want
to live under a Sarajevo government)? And who would pay for the
dispatch of the, some argued, 100,000 to 200,000 ground troops that
would be necessary, especially if they were dragged into a military adven-
ture from which there was no easy or early retreat?
Moreover, who should send soldiers, if such were to be sent?
Germany could hardly do it in view of Hitler’s occupation of Yugoslavia
during World War II. A contingent from the Western European Union –
of which Germany was a member – thereby became more difficult, apart
from the fact that the institution did not have a direct military mandate,
especially outside its membership area. NATO also experienced diffi-
culties in sending troops for purposes that did not involve the collective
defence of a member state, especially since the United States considered
that this European conflict was something for the Europeans to solve in
the first place. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(later the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), apart
from lacking any military mandate and being hampered by a unanimity
requirement before acting, also included a Russia religiously linked and
historically favourable to the Serb cause.
On the other hand, if nothing was done, would there not be a risk of
the conflict spreading across the Balkans and involving other parts of the
former Yugoslavia and beyond – Serbs in Kosovo against ethnic
Albanians, a civil war in the multi-ethnic ‘former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’, perhaps involving Yugoslavia and Greece? Might Turkey
intervene to help the Moslems in Bosnia? Might Russia do the same on
behalf of the Serbs? Furthermore, might other post-World War I or post-
World War II borders in Europe, in particular in its central and eastern
parts, be called into question by restive minorities? Could Europe, or the
world, stomach daily television images of war and massacre without
doing anything?
Divergences on what to do were becoming apparent among EU
members. Partly they were due to different historical relations with the
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different sides to the conflicts, dating back even to the previous century.
Partly they also arose out of different economic interests in the region, or
because of bickering among EU countries over each other’s action or
non action.
 Second spanner in the works: ratifying Maastricht
The EU could of course argue that the Treaty on European Union had
not yet been ratified and that it could therefore not act with the same
resolve in the foreign policy field. After ratification by all the Twelve –
expected to be easy since all had signed – the provisions in the Common
Foreign and Security Policy pillar could be put into effect.
However, would ratification come so easily? Denmark – where ratifi-
cation was defeated in the Folketing by a narrow margin – submitted the
Treaty on European Union to a referendum in June 1992, and a knife-
edge majority rejected it.13 This sent shock waves through the EC. How
could a small nation like Denmark upset this carefully erected edifice,
upon which the EC’s very future depended? (The Treaty on European
Union would have to be ratified by all EU members to come about at
all.) There was shock that normally well-behaved Danes could rise
against what their entire political elite – five of the eight parties in the
Folketing, business circles, industry and most labour organisations – had
said was best for them, in a campaign raising the spectre of all the
disasters that would occur in the event of a ‘no’.
To understand the Danish ‘no’ – which, it must be remembered, would
have been a ‘yes’ but for a scant 46,000 vote difference – one has to
grasp the mentality of this intensely democratic country. Denmark had
joined the EEC in 1973 largely to preserve trade links with countries like
Germany and the United Kingdom, not believing that its sovereignty
would be in danger. Over the years, however, Danish objections began
to arise against increased bureaucracy in Brussels; depleted fish stocks
allegedly due to the EC’s ‘Blue Europe’ rules of sharing fish resources
among all members; and increasing net payments to the EC as a wealthy
member. Much of the earlier support for the EU started to fade.
We shall later return to this particular issue, namely that the EU is rightly
or wrongly seen as essentially elite-driven – by the Commission and, to
some extent, the governing classes in the capitals of member states – and
hence unable to comprehend the sentiments of member states’ popula-
tions. Suffice it to say at this stage that ‘eurosceptic’ British conservatives
burst out in a jubilant ‘Wonderful, wonderful Copenhagen’ and began to
clamour for a similar popular referendum in the United Kingdom.
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The German government quickly ruled out the possibility of a
referendum, especially since the constitution did not foresee it, and this
in spite of a reluctance on the part of many Germans to lose their
cherished Deutschmark in favour of an EMU single currency. In most
other EU countries referenda were not held and ratification passed
parliaments easily, not only because pro-EC sentiment was stronger in
these countries but also, presumably, because these countries stood to
gain financially as net receivers of EC funds. Only in the United King-
dom did the government have to fight hard and long to achieve
ratification, at the price of several derogations, such as the EMU.
France took a different course. President Mitterrand, who in late 1991
had described the EMU as ‘one of the most important events of the
century’, announced on the very day the Danish ‘no’ was announced
that France, too, would have a referendum on the issue. At first the
matter seemed a foregone conclusion, especially after a joint session of
the National Assembly and the Senate in June 1992 had approved, by a
wide majority, the constitutional reforms necessitated by the ratification
of the Treaty of European Union (all that was formally required under
the constitution).
However, over the summer the French began to reflect, much as the
Danes had done a few months earlier. The main opposition party, the
RPR (Rassemblement Pour la République) became deeply divided, dis-
playing the traditional French ambivalence about, on the one hand,
more integration in order to rein in Germany and to permit France to
play a dominant role in European affairs and, on the other, less integra-
tion to preserve French sovereignty in a Gaullist Europe des patries.
The referendum increasingly became one on the Mitterrand presi-
dency and on various scandals that had begun to rock French society. It
was suspected that Mitterrand had announced the referendum to regain
the domestic initiative and his earlier popularity. Especially after the
Prime Minister said that the President would not resign in the event of a
‘non’, many French people felt they could express general dissatisfaction
with things as they stood – including irritation over US pressure for CAP
reform under the Uruguay Round – without causing a constitutional
crisis. All these things combined to produce a surprisingly narrow ‘yes’
margin of 51.05 per cent (with Alsace, home to the Council of Europe
and the EU’s European Parliament, saving the nationwide result by a 60
per cent vote in favour).
However, it was as if something had snapped with the Danish and
French results. The Treaty on European Union might be ratified, but for
the first time the people in a key country in the European equation had
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expressed serious misgivings about the extent and method of EU
integration.
The autumn of 1992 came, with many EU citizens wondering whether
the Treaty on European Union had been a good thing after all, and with
morale sapped among those who were convinced of its merits. The long-
awaited date of 1 January 1993 arrived – the day when the Single
European Act and the Internal Market would enter into force – but it
was just like any other day, with unemployment in the EU of the Twelve
at 11 per cent and rising. Where was the promised prosperity?
Notes
1 In The Old Regime and the Revolution, 1856.
2 Cartoon ‘The Final Curtain’, in the Independent, 13 September 1990.
3 The ‘Internationale’ (Engstrom, 2000), that favourite battle cry of the socialist
and communist movements of the early decades of the twentieth century,
was perhaps the best known expression of this yearning:
Arise! ye starvelings from your slumbers;
Arise! ye criminals of want.
For reason in revolt now thunders,
And at last ends the age of cant.
Now away with all your superstitions,
Servile masses, arise! Arise!
We’ll change forthwith the old conditions,
And spurn the dust to win the prize.
Then comrades, come rally
And the last fight let us face.
The Internationale
Unites the human race.
4 Fukuyama (1993).
5 The Russian financial crisis was also a crisis for the so-called ‘Washington
consensus’, formulated in 1989 at the beginning of the transition to a market
economy for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It was based on
neo-liberal policies emphasising fiscal discipline, liberalisation, deregulation
and privatisation by countries borrowing from the International Monetary
Fund and other financial institutions. The latter were to impose strict con-
ditions that these precepts were respected. The Russian crisis led to doubts
that this was always the right course for countries in financial difficulties.
Perhaps a more gradual and socially sensitive transition was sometimes
better.
6 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with sixty countries
and two institutions (the European Union and the European Investment
Bank) as members, has been of great assistance to its twenty-seven ‘countries
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of operations’ in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the Com-
munity of Independent States (CIS) area (the countries of the former Soviet
Union, minus Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) since its creation in 1992. It is
the largest single investor in this region and combines lending operations
with a mandate to promote democracy.
7 The importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty can hardly be
overstated. Without the mutual confidence it created, not least through
extensive verification on both sides, German unification would in all likeli-
hood have been much more difficult to bring about, as would have been the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
8 Joint bodies – an EEA Ministerial Council, a Joint Parliamentary Com-
mittee, a Consultative Committee composed of the social partners, an EFTA
Surveillance Authority and an EFTA Court – would oversee the functioning
of this ‘Twelve and Six Common Market’.
9 As the EU enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five states in 2004, the new mem-
bers would also enter into its European Economic Area (EEA) agreement
with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, all members of the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA). They, like Switzerland (an EFTA member but
not part of the EEA), were asked by the EU to increase their payments into
the funds foreseen for the new members (and presumably some old). There
was little the EFTA countries could do other than accept, especially as the
EU pressed for greater access to the fishing waters of Iceland and Norway.
10 President Mitterrand of France at first tried to inhibit or at least delay German
unification in 1990. The Maastricht Treaty with its ‘deepening’ of the EU,
especially through an Economic and Monetary Union, represented France’s
all-out effort to tie Germany closer to it and to the EC in general. Further EC
integration would, in Mitterrand’s words, have to precede ‘changing borders’
(i.e. unification) and the latter would have to ‘take the European balance
into account’. Germany under Chancellor Kohl immediately set out to
assuage French fears by statements such as ‘the German house must be built
under a European roof’, a policy which it has since steadfastly followed. See
e.g. Baun (1996, pp. 41–4).
11 The European Union is an organisation composed of different treaty-based
parts, hence the slightly confusing terminology surrounding its appellation.
The term ‘European Union’ describes the general edifice of ‘unification’
among the member states, and it is also to be used whenever one is referring
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy or Co-operation in the Spheres
of Justice and Home Affairs. Two of the European Communities – the Euro-
pean Economic Community, and Euratom – continue to exist (although the
relevant Treaties are revised in the Treaty on European Union). The Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community disappeared in 2002 when the relevant treaty
reached its fifty-year duration. However, the European Economic Commun-
ity is renamed the ‘European Community’. Therefore, the European
Community is part of the European Communities, which themselves are part
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of the European Union. In this book, the ‘European Union’ is normally used
throughout to describe the institution generally as from 1992.
12 The ‘subsidiarity’ caveat was in fact sought by several of the players. As van
Keersbergen and Verbeek (1994, p 220) point out: ‘Subsidiarity has primar-
ily served to reconcile the conflicting interests of principal actors affected by
the consequences of the common market [i.e. the ‘1992’ Internal Market
project]: the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Commission.
The United Kingdom feared that the completion of the European market
would slowly eat away at portions of national sovereignty. The German
federal government, as well as the European Commission, had met strong
resistance from the German Länder, who feared that the completion of the
Internal Market, based on negotiations between Bonn and Brussels, would
actually lead to a shrinking of their regional competences. The European
Commission, of course, was predominantly interested in playing down the
impression that the ‘1992 programme’ would lead to ever growing power-
wielding by Brussels.’
13 Under the Danish constitution, any change to it, such as would result from
the Maastricht Treaty, would require a qualified majority in parliament.
Since this majority was narrowly missed, a referendum had to be called. The
traditionally democratic Danish government decreed that copies of the draft
Maastricht Treaty should be made available at post offices to all those
requesting them. Presumably the reading did not convince a sufficient
number of citizens. Furthermore, referenda results are frequently bound up
in the popularity of the governments that decide to hold them. Denmark in
1992 was no different. The outcome was 50.7 per cent against and 49.3 per
cent in favour.
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Challenges in waiting
Why didst thou promise such a beauteous day,
And make me travel forth without my cloak,
To let base clouds o’ertake me in my way,
Hiding thy bravery in their rotten smoke? (Shakespeare)1
Summary
While the Russian economy under its new leader, Boris Yeltsin, began to
slide in the early 1990s as a result of an uncertain mix of change and
standstill, economic reform in Central European transition countries
started to bear fruit in the form of higher growth and adaptation to
world markets. Military tensions diminished considerably with the
ratification of the US–Russia START I Treaty reducing intercontinental
nuclear missiles; the entry into force of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty limiting troop levels all over Europe; and NATO’s
Partnership for Peace programme, also including Russia.
The European Union’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) collapsed
in 1993 but was revived in a more flexible form, permitting plans for
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to proceed. The conclusion of
the Uruguay Round and the establishment in 1995 of the World Trade
Organisation meant a major push for Europe toward globalisation and
its being exposed to greater competition from emerging non-European
economies. Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in
1995, increasing its membership to fifteen.
Other institutions, such as the Council of Europe, also included more
and more members in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and
began to form – with NATO, the European Union and the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – a rather complicated
European ‘security architecture’. All these organisations were faced with
immediate challenges, such as successive wars in the former Yugoslavia
and in the southern Russian province of Chechnya. The former led to
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the first ‘out-of-area’ NATO deployment of troops in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as a result of the 1995 Dayton Agreements.
The post-Maastricht blues: recession and confusion
In 1993 the world – and with it Europe – was in its first major recession
since the early 1980s. In 1991 the recession had been delayed by
Germany’s major transfer of funds to the new Länder, leading to export
gains for other European countries, especially in the West. However, by
early 1993 the recession started to bite, as many Western European
governments tried to reduce large public sector deficits and to contain
inflation (not least to meet the still relatively distant, but approaching,
European Monetary Union (EMU) convergence criteria).
The EU countries most committed to the EMU stuck to one of its key
preparatory requirements, namely adherence to a maximum variation
between each other’s currencies of ±2.25 per cent. For the relatively
weaker economies in the group – such as France and Belgium – staying
within this band vis-à-vis the Deutschmark meant, however, having to
raise interest rates to levels such that their economies suffered even more.
In June 1993 the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) collapsed – enriching
speculators and impoverishing some central banks. However, it was
revived after a ±15 per cent widening of the currency bands had been
introduced, reducing the scope for speculators but also taking away some
of the seriousness of the ERM. (In the end it did, however, work rather
well, as governments successfully stuck to fairly narrow fluctuations.)
Nobody seemed really sure any longer where Europe, or the world,
was heading. On the one hand, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had been
repulsed and oil supplies were not in danger. On the other, however,
Europeans knew, in their heart of hearts, that although they had fought
alongside the Americans and other nations in this action, it would not
have come about without US resolve in what was after all a crisis closer
to Europe than to North America.
The economic slide in most Central and East European countries had
given way to modest growth – with Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic in the lead. However, even this growth was seen by some in
Western Europe as reflecting a beginning industrial exodus from West to
East. Would that East – so long neglected, and commiserated with
because of its being on the ‘wrong’ side of the Iron Curtain – now rob
the West of its wealth, until some distant future when both could
prosper together? Would, in the meantime, immigration from the East
add further to unemployment in the West?
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Events in Russia in the autumn of 1993 did nothing to soothe such
fears. A long-simmering dispute between the reformist President Yeltsin
and a conservative parliament came to a head in a ‘second October
revolution’, lasting one day and ending with the (narrow) victory by the
Yeltsin forces (supported by the military, the former KGB and the
Ministry of the Interior) over angry demonstrators barricaded in an
official building and shelled by army tanks.
If the forces of reform appeared to have won the day, the state of the
Russian economy gave rise to concern. Gross domestic product (GDP) in
1993 fell by 12 per cent compared to the year before, after an approx-
imate 20 per cent drop in 1992 from the preceding year (although these
falls also reflected the fact that the economy was undergoing reform
away from a wasteful communist-era production pattern). Problems
were everywhere: a budget deficit of 10 per cent of GDP with continuing
massive aid to state-owned industries; a monthly inflation rate of 20 per
cent; slow privatisation of an agricultural sector whose situation was
further aggravated by poor harvests; absent, confusing or conflicting
legislation; and growing crime and corruption. All this added to the
general feeling of uncertainty over the country’s economic future.
Foreign investors began to have cold feet, including the International
Monetary Fund, which had made aid contingent on economic reform
and stabilisation. It was clear that Russia had enormous potential, but
when would domestic conditions permit that potential to be realised?
Russia’s economic difficulties were upsetting to the rest of Europe.
What would have happened if the forces of reaction had managed to oust
the Yeltsin government? Would the new independence of the Baltic states
have been in danger, together with that of states which many in Russia
would now call the ‘near abroad’, i.e. the other successor republics to
the Soviet Union? (The latter soon joined together in a loosely structured
Community of Independent States as a result of Russian prodding.)
Would Central and East European countries again have risked coming
under Russian sway? Would economic reforms have been undone?
Would the thousands of new private enterprises that had been formed
have been forced into liquidation? Even with Yeltsin winning, would an
economically distressed Russia become politically unpredictable?
Clearly the West, including the EU and other European organisations
such as the Council of Europe, had a strong interest in trying to assist
Russia in every way possible. Even so, a certain shift from financial to
other types of assistance was taking place, and a certain weariness could
be detected among donors as to the wisdom of continuing to fund a
country with such uncertain prospects.
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A new defence context
There was no longer any serious military threat from Russia, at least not
in the NATO area. Russian aircraft were rusting on abandoned airfields.
Warships were being mothballed or scrapped. Morale in the formerly
feared Soviet armed forces was low, because of lack of pay and worsen-
ing material conditions. The threat now was rather the accidental firing
of a missile by a crazed unit in a Siberian silo or due to decay of the
equipment, or the theft of a nuclear warhead or stored fission material
by some rogue nation in, say, the Middle East. (In 1994 the United
States actually paid for the removal of a large stock of bomb-grade
plutonium from Russia to the United States.)
The threat of large-scale military conflict suddenly seemed remote.
The 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty between the
NATO and Warsaw Pact countries – begun already in the 1980s with
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and pains-
takingly pursued through the highs and lows of the détente years –
became binding in November 1995. It obliged the thirty participating
states to much lower force levels than before and to the elimination of
60 per cent of their heavy weapons.
Most countries were already moving to or going beyond these targets
– a natural enough process when one considers that there was no longer
any genuine East–West conflict. Why, indeed, should a country have
large conventional forces when these cost money increasingly needed
elsewhere, and when technological improvements added further advan-
tage for the defender rather than the attacker? Put simply, why invest in
a tank when it could be easily knocked out by an increasingly ‘smart’
anti-tank weapon?
In January 1994 NATO invited all the former members of the Warsaw
Pact and the successor states of the Soviet Union to join the
organisation’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme – allowing them
to develop co-operative military relations with NATO, particularly in
the area of joint planning and training for humanitarian and peace-
keeping operations. By the end of 1994 Russia and all the other
successor states to the Soviet Union except two (Belarus and Tajikistan)
had joined the PfP, as had such countries as Finland, Slovenia and
Sweden. The Western European Union also began to build up contacts
with Central and Eastern Europe.
Finally, at world level, the US–Soviet Union START I Treaty entered
into force in 1994 after nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine were either destroyed or moved to Russia. Efforts to have the
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even more far-reaching START II ratified by both Russia and the United
States were resumed.2 The sword of Damocles hanging over Europe (and
the world) seemed to have been reduced in size, even if it had not
disappeared altogether.
A new trade context: the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organisation
In December 1993 another event of importance to Europe occurred: the
conclusion of seven years of negotiations for a new GATT round to
govern future international relations in trade and investment. The signing
of the Uruguay Round meant that the world’s long march towards more
and more open trade relations – started in 1947 with the setting up of
the GATT – would continue for years if not decades to come.
World trade issues would henceforth be dealt with by a new WTO,
rather than the more or less informal GATT. It would have more
powers, particularly in the settling of disputes and in enforcement
procedures. Moreover, the Uruguay Round was the first agreement to
cover agriculture, textiles, intellectual property rights and certain services
(even though some, such as telecommunications, shipping and audio-
visual and financial services, were left out for want of an agreement). In
this, the treaty went far beyond traditional issues of tariffs, quotas,
dumping and countervailing duties, and into the traditionally domestic
affairs of participating countries, such as competition laws and invest-
ment conditions.
The significance for Europe of the Uruguay Round, and the new
World Trade Organisation to be created, was that the long process of an
increasing ‘division of labour’ between the different regions of the world
that had started with the GATT in the late 1940s would continue. In the
old days that division had been easy for Western Europe. The rich,
industrialised countries produced the advanced products and services
the world needed. The less developed countries continued to produce at
a lower rung of the production ladder, and while they made inroads into
some of the domains of richer countries, the latter made up for that by
developing new domains. It was assumed that the richer countries would
continue to give development assistance to the poorer ones with the aim
of lifting them out of poverty. However, it was never imagined that this
process might some day challenge the wealth or relative position of the
wealthiest countries vis-à-vis the developing world.
The developing countries – at least those that did not become too
dependent on foreign aid – saw it differently. In the 1950s and 1960s the
emphasis had been on replacing industrial imports by domestic
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production and on exporting raw materials and agricultural commodities
to the rich countries. This was the cardinal aim behind the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development formed in 1964, and
behind the much-touted proposals for a New International Economic
Order of the early 1970s. (That ambition collapsed, since the forming of
cartels among producing nations proved impossible in all but a handful
of commodities. Even OPEC rapidly lost ground after its brief heyday in
the 1970s.)
Now, however, more and more developing countries began to concen-
trate on attracting subsidiaries of foreign multinationals and foreign
direct investment generally. While developing countries used to fear free
trade in advanced products and had been generally reluctant partici-
pants in earlier GATT rounds, they now became more and more eager
proponents of open trade. (This did not, however, extend to intellectual
property products, where many did not feel enthusiastic about paying
royalties to, say, a US record company, a Michael Jackson, a Dior or a
Chanel, especially if these could be made through ‘underground’ copy-
cat factories at home.)
By the time of the signing of the Uruguay Round, an impressive
number of ‘emerging economies’ in East and South-East Asia, Latin
America and elsewhere had become major competitors with the ‘old’
industrialised countries. They had the advantage, from a trade competi-
tion point of view, of paying their workers much lower wages and
providing little or no social protection (thus reducing extra-salary costs
to employers). In some countries, child or prison labour was used.
Although the workforce pool was large and labour was permanently
added through migration from countryside to city, rising salaries in
some of the countries had begun to drive out companies to poorer
neighbours, finally engaging virtually the entire world in what had
become known as the ‘global economy’.
Again, this process was accelerated – indeed it could hardly have
occurred – without the technological breakthrough symbolised by the
microchip, making the transfer and sharing of information several
orders of magnitude less expensive as well as instantaneous. Add to this
an increased share of services in world commerce, cheaper and more
efficient means of transport, and a shift toward higher value per weight
unit in trade (giving air cargo a major share in overall transport), and the
growing advantage of developing countries vis-à-vis the traditional
industrialised countries in the trade arena becomes obvious.
Europe, which began to feel the effects of a number of closures of
factories large and small across the whole industrial spectrum, had
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begun to take a more defensive stance in areas like agriculture, textiles,
steel, coal and shipbuilding, while being more open-trade minded in
areas like services and intellectual property. If at long last, after
particularly bitter agricultural negotiations between the US and the EU,
the Uruguay Round could be submitted for signature by the spring of
1994 and set to enter into force by the beginning of 1995, then this was
largely because the two most important parties, the US and the EU, had
been able to agree. Everybody at least believed that they had obtained a
little more and sacrificed a little less than they would have done in the
absence of the Round. However, everybody soon realised that the
Uruguay Round Treaty, even at the time it was to enter into force,
described the past rather than the present or future. A new treaty would
be needed unless all matters could henceforth be dealt with on a
continuous basis within the new World Trade Organisation.
Parallel to the worldwide framework for trade and investment
provided by the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organisation, a
process of trade regionalisation was also under way. To the ‘older’
European Union and EFTA (and about a dozen other, less far-reaching
trade arrangements in different parts of the world), would now have to
be added the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) involving
Canada, Mexico and the United States. In addition, a whole series of
more extensive regional free-trade agreements were concluded: in Latin
America (Mercosur, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common
Market, the Caribbean Community and Common Market), in South-
East Asia (Asian Free Trade Association) and in the Pacific rim including
the United States and Canada (Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, or APEC).
The tide was thus firmly in the direction of freer trade, the prime motor
being technological change and foreign investment, mainly through
multinational companies.
Knocking on the EU’s door: the Austrian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish
candidatures
The Treaty on European Union, commonly known as the Maastricht
Treaty, entered into force in November 1993. However, this was only
after a second, this time positive, Danish referendum (and considerable
concessions to Denmark by the other EU members); a year-long ratifica-
tion battle in the British Parliament; and an extremely thorough and
‘barely passed’ examination by the German Federal Constitutional Court
(following a citizens complaint that the treaty violated the country’s
constitution).
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In December 1993 the so-called Schengen Agreement on free
circulation of people came into force between nine EU member states (all
except Denmark, Ireland and the UK), although France continued to
have reservations owing to alleged Dutch liberalism with regard to its
drugs policy.3 Furthermore, on 1 January 1994 the previously mentioned
European Economic Area came into being, extending the essentials of
the ‘1992 project’ of the Twelve to six of the seven EFTA states (all
except Switzerland).
Hardly was the ink of that treaty dry, when it appeared that within a
short time it would lose much of its significance through the expected
EU membership of the four EFTA countries Austria, Finland, Norway
and Sweden. (Switzerland had withdrawn its application following the
negative referendum on the European Economic Area in December
1992). Iceland had never applied, as it was wary of sharing its main
resource, fish, under a common EU fisheries policy.
Why were the governments of the four EFTA candidates for EU
membership not content with the European Economic Area? There were
two main reasons. Firstly, the disappearance of the Soviet Union had
swept away any apprehensions that Finland in particular, but also Sweden
and Austria as neutral states, might have harboured about joining a
Western political club such as the EU. Secondly, the EEA was essentially
about the participating EFTA countries accepting existing and future EU
legislation on even less than a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. If the Internal
Market was further deepened through a series of EU decisions, how
could the non-EU countries in the EEA say ‘no’, without the risk of
economic loss?
The EU countries for their part, it must be remembered, had suggested
the EEA as a ‘stop-gap’ solution. They wanted to avoid the decision-
making indigestion that would follow with an even greater number of
members, and they needed time to implement the ‘1992’ Internal Market
project. Now that this had been done, and with the four candidate coun-
tries knocking on the door for membership, enlargement was inevitable.
Perhaps it was even desirable considering that the aspirants were com-
paratively wealthy. They were even likely to become net contributors to
an ever more expensive and cash-strapped European Union.
Even if some of the four candidate countries, such as Austria, could
have joined the EU simply through a vote of parliament, a referendum
had become a political must, given the historical significance of joining,
and following the hotly contested Danish and French referenda on the
Treaty on European Union. This was especially so since the candidate coun-
tries, once admitted, were expected to ratify the Treaty as part of the deal.
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Austria went first. On the one hand, Austria needed the closest possible
economic links with Germany. If the country remained outside, these
links might suffer. Austria had also become an important hub for
economic contacts between Western Europe and the transition countries
in Central and Eastern Europe. As an EU member, Austria could
strengthen this role.
On the other hand, the country’s 1955 State Treaty, which had ended
Allied occupation after World War II and restored Austrian sovereignty,
obliged it to remain neutral. Was this compatible with the political
union held out in the Treaty on European Union? To circumvent this
problem the Austrians had their agreement with the EU state that, as an
EU member, the country would not station foreign soldiers on its
territory, take part in a new war or sign any military pact (even though
the question of a later participation in a European defence pact was left
open). In June 1994, despite an early strong showing by the ‘anti’ camp,
Austrians voted two to one in favour of joining the EU.
The governments of all the four candidate countries – naturally
enough eager to join as they had waged the accession negotiations and
called referenda – were counting on a domino effect. The Finns, scheduled
to vote in October, were expected to be swayed by the positive Austrian
vote in the summer, and do likewise. Sweden was to follow in a vote in
November, presumably impressed by a positive Finnish vote, whereupon
the even more sceptical Norwegians could be assumed to toe the line a
week later.
The calculation nearly worked. In October 1994 the Finns voted 57
per cent to 43 per cent in favour, reflecting a widespread fear of a
possible renewed threat in the future from their neighbour to the east,
but also their search for more extensive economic links with the EU area
following the collapse of the considerable barter trade the Finns had
enjoyed with the Soviet Union. Unemployment had risen rapidly over
the past few years, and now affected nearly 20 per cent of the workforce.
For a small, geographically peripheral and exposed country, it is often
important to find protection and support in a continent’s political centre
– in this case the European Union – especially since NATO membership
was not, yet, deemed possible. Opposition came mainly from the
Communist Party that had earlier been closely aligned with that of the
Soviet Union, and from many subsidised farmers who feared competi-
tion from more productive farms in the EU.
Sweden followed the Finnish example in November 1994, through a
52 per cent to 47 per cent vote in favour of joining the EU, thus ending a
nearly forty-year-old tradition of shunning Community membership by
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invoking the latter’s incompatibility with Swedish neutrality. The
political establishment and business leaders had advocated membership,
arguing that the economic crisis that had hit the country in 1991–92
would only deepen as companies would leave and foreign investment
dry up if Sweden did not join (adding to the already, by Swedish
standards, unheard-of 13 per cent unemployment rate). The Social
Democrats, back in power in September 1994 after a three-year absence,
were seriously split over the issue, as many rank-and-file members
feared an erosion of the Swedish welfare state under a supposedly more
capitalistic Brussels regime. The Communist Party was against for the
same reason, while environmentalists feared that similar concessions
would have to be made in their particular field of interest. Even a
number of conservatives were against, fearful that power would move
from a democratic Stockholm to a bureaucratic Brussels.
City – in favour off membership – stood against countryside, which
was mainly opposed to joining. The north, already peripheral in an
oblong Sweden where two-thirds of the population live in the country’s
southern third, was more against, while the south was more in favour.
Even Stockholmers, for now geographically in the centre, were less
enthusiastic than the good people of Malmö who were facing a Copen-
hagen inside the EU across the Öresund straits. Following reports that
snus, a form of chewing tobacco to which over a million Swedish men
(and women) are addicted, would be banned once the country was in the
EU, pro-EU sentiments took a deep dive. As it was, however, following
EU assurances on this point, the ‘yes’ prevailed.
Would the Norwegians, who had said ‘nei’ in the referendum in 1972,
follow? A joke made the rounds that the latest fashion was for nouveaux
riches Norwegians to have a Mercedes and a Swedish chauffeur. Long
the poor cousin of wealthy Sweden, Norway had now become Western
Europe’s biggest oil producer (surpassing the United Kingdom), with
strong economic growth fuelled by that resource and low unemploy-
ment. Why should a country with such wealth join a European Union,
with which it was already linked through a European Economic Area
agreement, to whose budget it would be a major net contributor, and
which promised to take power away from a – for many in the north –
already distant Oslo to an even more remote and impenetrable Brussels?
The new name that the European Community had given itself, the
European Union, evoked negative feelings with many Norwegians,
against the historical background of involuntary ‘unions’, first with
Denmark over 500 years ending in 1814 and then with Sweden nearly
ending in war in 1905.
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More security was scarcely needed than that provided by NATO, of
which Norway was a founding member. Farmers were largely against,
as they feared losing generous government support in exchange for
much tougher competition from EU farmers. Fishermen were also
subsidised. Why should they join an EU which pursued a ‘Blue Europe’
policy of Community sharing of fish resources – especially as they feared
it would deplete stocks? Why risk the country’s precious sovereignty
over its other rich resources: oil, gas and light metals? For these assets as
well as for its important shipping industry, the world – rather than just
the EU – was Norway’s main market. Finally, many women feared EU
membership would undermine Norway’s cradle-to-grave welfare system.
The Social Democratic government under Gro Harlem Bruntland,
who had made the country’s joining the EU a central political goal,
found little response to its warning of an industrial exodus and
economic hardship if the country said ‘no’. This it did indeed do, on 20
November 1994, through a 52.4 per cent against joining the EU, to 47.6
per cent in favour.
The striking thing about the debates in all the four candidate countries
was that they had centred on the self-interests of the particular nation. A
‘what’s-in-it-for-us?’ attitude had settled in, whether it be farmers
worried about EU competition or eager for CAP benefits; regions
expecting money from the EU regional development fund or fearing to
become even more peripheral from the Brussels horizon than they had
been, say, from those of Oslo or Stockholm; or ordinary people worried
about a company exodus in the event of non-membership, or of new
trade barriers arising between, say, a Sweden within and a Norway
without the EU (this was of course unrealistic, since it would risk being
in breach of increasingly free trade GATT/WTO rules, apart from being
unacceptable to the country inside – reduced trade, for example in
Swedish regions bordering Norway, would hurt Swedish as much as
Norwegian interests).4
A materialistic ‘it’s-your-money-we-want’ attitude had also been pre-
valent on the part of certain EU countries during the membership
negotiations, reflecting a departure from the more idealistic approach of
earlier decades. For the poorer EU members it was a question of how
much the new entrants would pay into the Cohesion Fund of regional
aid mainly benefiting them, or how their agricultural produce would
take the place of that which the candidate countries had previously
imported, often at a lower price, from outside Europe. EU countries
with a colonial past sought the same preferences for that nebulous and
ever-growing group of nations gathered under the label of ACP countries
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(African, Caribbean and Pacific) already comprising over seventy states.5
However, there were none of the ‘transition periods’ that had been so
frequent following the accessions of Greece, Portugal and Spain, the
reason being that the new candidates had been part of the EEA (apart
from being so competitive that no transition periods were needed).
On 1 January 1995 the European Union welcomed Austria, Finland
and Sweden as new members – while noting that, for a second time, the
Norwegians had refused the offer of entry. The Twelve were now the
Fifteen, with a new northern bias as two of the newcomers – Finland and
Sweden – were on the EU’s polar flank and a third – Austria – was at any
rate not Mediterranean. They were also comparatively wealthy, thus
contributing to an EU budget beyond which the organisation was
statutorily obliged not to go, and which EU member governments were
increasingly unwilling to augment as spending was increasingly demanded
at home. The EU seemed to have fulfilled a new stage in its geographical
expansion, now having as members all those wealthy Western European
states that desired membership, while maintaining privileged trade
relations with those that did not.
An EU of fifteen;  a NATO at peace?
Another achievement was that Europe now seemed to have a pan-
European security structure which, though it was political rather than
military, included the two transatlantic powers of the United States and
Canada, whose presence, it was widely felt, was needed for future peace.
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the CSCE, had
by 1995 been transformed into a formal institution, the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or the OSCE. As such it was
endowed with a permanent, if small, secretariat and a consultative
Parliamentary Assembly branch.
Meanwhile, NATO had its Partnership for Peace programme and was
postponing the thorny issue of enlargement into Central and Eastern
Europe. The Council of Europe entered a hectic period of enlargement –
culminating in February 1996 with the inclusion of Russia, to be
followed in the coming years by virtually all remaining European states
not yet members.
The ghosts of Stalin and Hitler seemed to be leaving the scene
reluctantly, even though they ought perhaps to have been content with
having so affected Europe and the world half a century after their
deaths. Yet some traces remained. These included the Russian Kaliningrad
enclave on the Baltic (the northern part of the former German East
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Prussia). It was now cut off from the rest of Russia but remained heavily
armed and of continued strategic importance to Russia. There was also
the redrawing of other national frontiers in the aftermath of World War
II, setting the stage, at least potentially, for future conflicts among and
within countries, in addition to those which the post World War I borders
might supply.
However, the situation was far from problem-free for any of the
organisations or countries involved. The European Union was immedi-
ately confronted with the request by numerous Central and East
European countries to join, to which should be added those, of longer or
shorter standing, of Cyprus (supported by Greece) and Turkey (opposed
by Greece). How would EU finances, already strained, be able to cope
with some, most or all of these countries as members? How would EU
institutions cope, under strain from the already considerable divergences
among member states, in what was still, essentially, an intergovern-
mental framework following, in most cases, the ‘one-country-one-vote’
principle?
Finally, how would the previously mentioned ‘deepening’ of EU
integration fare, with so many more – and less economically developed –
newcomers? (Although this was one reason why at least some EU
governments were so eagerly seeking enlargement in the first place.)
Even if enlargement could be delayed, how could ‘deepening’ be achieved
in the wake of the highly divisive process of ratifying the Treaty on
European Union, which had brought to the surface deep-seated popular
scepticism against further integration?
The OSCE was similarly hampered by continued reliance (as under
the CSCE) on the unanimity principle before intervening to defuse a
conflict. Its efforts, for instance, to contribute to a peaceful solution to
the conflict in Chechnya in southern Russia – where separatists had been
waging a bitter war of liberation against Russian troops since the
autumn of 1994 – were largely fruitless.
NATO also faced many challenges. What role would it have after the
disappearance of any threat from the East? On the other hand, many
people felt NATO was needed as a sign of continued US–Canadian
involvement in European security, and the disappearance of any such
major institution would risk upsetting the status quo and leaving a
dangerous void. No longer was anyone shouting ‘Yankees, go home!’ in
Europe. On the contrary, most people were anxious that they stay in
order to provide the stability that Europe had historically not seemed
capable of mustering itself, and to guard against perceived threats from
one or the other neighbour. In some NATO countries, such as Germany,
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the departing troops meant unemployment for thousands of civilians
working on closed, or radically downsized, bases.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, voices were heard in
favour of even more drastic reductions in military strength in Europe
than those foreseen in the various international agreements. Why, many
Americans argued, should the United States supply protection for
Europe, when there was no longer any Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact to
defend it against? Would the Old World never be able to stand on its
own feet? For a younger generation of politicians from the western and
south-western states, the future lay in Asia and along the Pacific Rim –
not in Europe as the now less dominant ‘Eastern Establishment’ from
the county’s eastern seaboard had thought.
Although France was eager to create a more independent European
defence and security identity and therefore wished a less prominent
NATO, it would in that event be left with a Germany – which though a
close, democratic and peaceful EU partner – was perhaps nevertheless
not to be fully trusted. If France thus was both attracted to and repelled
by NATO, the matter appeared for some time to near a solution, at least
temporarily, when the country in 1996 said it wanted to rejoin NATO’s
integrated military command structure (following its departure in 1966
under President de Gaulle). Although continued French hesitations have
since prevented formal reintegration, France apparently concluded that
its own, and Europe’s, interests were after all best served with continued
North American involvement in European security.
One reason for the French change in attitude was doubtless the
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spite of repeated joint European
Union and United Nations initiatives, and a four-month ceasefire in early
1995, the war in the region continued (with Croatian forces retaking
from the Serbs several areas in Krajina and in western Bosnia and
Herzegovina). It was only in October 1995 that a US-sponsored cease-
fire could be proclaimed to give time for peace talks in Dayton, Ohio.
The so-called Dayton Agreements provided for a Bosnia-Herzegovinian
state consisting of two entities: the Muslim-Croatian Federation (approx-
imately 51 per cent of the territory, including the whole of Sarajevo) and
the Serb Republic (Republica Srpska) with about 49 per cent. People
indicted as war criminals would not be allowed to hold public office in
either of the two entities. Bosnia-Herzegovina was to have a constitution
and central institutions. Free elections were to be held within a specified
period, and all refugees were to be allowed to return to their homes or –
if this was not possible – awarded proper compensation. The Agreements
provided for the presence of 60,000 NATO troops (including 20,000
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from the United States) for one year to supervise the implementation of
the Agreements. NATO, whose forces were deployed immediately after
the signing of the Dayton Agreements, took over officially from the UN
in Bosnia in December 1995.
This type of ‘out-of-area’ assignment was new to NATO and unfore-
seen in its 1949 Statute. The rationale – apart from the humanitarian
aspect, which had by this time become an important NATO con-
sideration – was that ‘out-of-area’ conflicts could easily spread to
NATO-Europe and should therefore be seen as compatible with the
organisation’s mandate. (NATO had been involved since 1993 in the
UN-mandated economic embargo against Yugoslavia – Serbia and
Montenegro – and in the monitoring of a ‘no-fly’ rule for military
aircraft in the civil war in the area.) Even though the joint endeavour
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina – initially involving some 60,000
troops and today far fewer – was costly, this was clearly an area where
NATO was assisting European peace.
There remained the thorny issue of NATO enlargement. While it was
clear that Russia would not be able to, or want to, go beyond its special
co-operation agreement with NATO (within the Partnership for Peace
framework) to full membership, numerous Central and East European
countries wanted to join as early as possible, precisely to avoid any
Russian threat in a more or less distant future. Yet how could they join
without having Russia feel frightened or provoked, depending on how
one interpreted that country’s sentiments?
Furthermore, would NATO members be willing to live up to their
commitments under the Washington Treaty of 1949 if, say, a Baltic
country or Poland were attacked from the east? Was not NATO going
beyond its ‘natural’ defence perimeter, biting off more than it could
chew if it did let some of these countries in? In addition, would NATO
perhaps be brought into new territorial quarrels between members of
the type it was already facing between Greece and Turkey?
On the other hand, did these candidate countries – democratic and
constructive European partners – not have the same right as, say, a
Denmark or a Luxembourg to seek collective defence of their freedom
and national independence if they were ever threatened by an outside
power? Besides, if a new status quo was not sought now, when there was
no threat from the East, would that not in itself invite trouble, perhaps
tempting an aggressor in the future?
The method applied by NATO members at the time was based on
caution. Membership was held out as a prospect for the candidate
countries, but the timetable was left vague, in the hope that time would
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make things clearer. Moscow’s reaction to any overture was carefully
registered – especially in Washington, which had the largest say.
Washington also had to take into account the opinions of various ethnic
groups in the US which hailed from Central and Eastern European
countries and which clamoured for NATO membership for their several
countries of origin. When membership was at last offered to the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland – with the other candidates left either in
various antechambers or out in the cold – the joining date was, however,
set early, as will be seen later.
Enlargement of the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe faced a similar dilemma. Founded in 1949 to
achieve European political co-operation (rather than integration), it had
been largely overshadowed by the EEC–EC and EU in subsequent
decades, concentrating mainly on its role as a guardian of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law.6 This role had been easy whilst
communism existed. With the new situation in Central and Eastern
Europe, however, the political mission of the Council again came to the
fore, signifying that certain human rights principles might have to be
compromised in the larger interest of political inclusion.
At the same time, how could an organisation, which had staked so
much of its reputation on its work on behalf of democracy and human
rights, live with certain members in its midst who did not seem fully to
meet these requirements? What impact beyond its moral one did an
organisation like the Council really possess? If it sacrificed its principles,
would its soul survive?
Alternatively, others argued, if it excluded countries rather than include
them, would that not prevent a ‘critical dialogue’ necessary to encourage
improvements in human rights and democracy? If exclusion took place,
that might risk having adverse consequences for many in the country
targeted, and indeed for Europe as a whole, since the country in question
might turn away from Europe towards, say, fundamentalist regimes in the
Middle East. Did not Europe need an ‘agora’ – a forum – where differences
could be aired and ironed out, where faulty behaviour could be criticised,
prejudices overcome and guidelines and general principles agreed on?
The process that followed, especially from 1994 onwards, was largely
dictated by geopolitical considerations and the concern for inclusion and
dialogue. The first Council of Europe summit, held in October 1993
with the participation of almost all European heads of state or
government, gave rise to the so-called Vienna Declaration. It stated that:
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‘The Council of Europe is the pre-eminent European political institution
capable of welcoming, on an equal footing and in permanent structures,
the democracies of Europe freed from communist oppression. For that
reason the accession of those countries to the Council of Europe is a
central factor in the process of European construction based on [the]
Organisation’s values.’ By 2000 the membership of the Council of
Europe had grown to forty-one countries, and more were to join.7
Meanwhile, a pattern of political and economic development was
becoming discernible in the eastern half of the continent. In the foremost
group were countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary
and Slovakia. They had pursued economic reform with determination.
Aided by their proximity to Western European markets, they were
growing at 5 per cent per year or more – that is, faster than the majority
of Western European countries. Institutions were being reformed and
democracy was taking firm root.
In a second group of nations, economic, political and institutional
reform was proceeding more slowly, resulting in slower economic
growth. Countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the ‘former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ – all of which had in addition been
seriously affected by the international embargo against Yugoslavia –
were in this group, as were Latvia and Lithuania.
A third group of countries – such as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia –
seemed to experience the worst of both worlds: the relative, though
ossified, stability of communism was no longer, but the fundamentals of
a market economy were still missing. The contraction of output which
had characterised all the countries in the region following the dis-
mantling of the state economy and the collapse of ‘East–East’ regional
trade seemed never to end. Yet it was generally regarded as a healthy
prerequisite for subsequent growth in an emerging private sector. The
social, political and legal framework which should have assured foreign
investors was slow in the coming. Corruption, mafia-like criminal
organisations exacting ‘protection money’ from foreign or domestic
entrepreneurs; confused and often contradictory legislation in areas such
as property rights, accounting, taxation and repatriation of profits; all
contributed to inhibiting international and locally engendered investment.
Russia had to cope with a festering sore in her southern underbelly:
Chechnya. There, a war that had raged on and off since 1994 had taken
some 30,000 lives among civilians, Chechen rebels and Russian troops.
The effect on the Russian army and public was similar to the case of
Afghanistan a decade earlier: a sapping of morale and a sense that the
nation was sinking into a quagmire. When a fragile peace was reached in
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the summer of 1996, the international community – where general
sympathy with the rebels’ quest for national independence mingled with
worries about the wider ramifications for Russia’s territorial integrity –
drew a sigh of relief, though nobody knew for how long the arms would
remain silent.8
The general trend in the region was, however, one of continuing
integration into the world economy. The fastest growing economies
were setting an example for the rest and, by their very growth, provided
increased trade with the others. None had any real choice but to
continue to move, though sometimes in fits and starts, toward ‘more
market’. Any other course would mean delay vis-à-vis neighbours and a
loss of foreign investment and innovation. Being in the world’s ‘loop of
knowledge’ meant opening up, not closing, society to ideas from the
outside. Thus the Zeitgeist of the 1990s was fundamentally opposite to
that of, say, the 1930s, when most countries in the region had fallen prey
to fascist or communist dictatorships, seen as more conducive to
economic growth through ‘national mobilisation’ and state management
or outright ownership.
If Western Europe, and the world, were on the whole accommodating
in this process, it was in part for moral and in part for more pragmatic
reasons. There was a desire to help peoples who had for so long been
oppressed and deprived of the kind of prosperity that the rich nations
had started to take for granted. Helping them would also assist demo-
cracy, and the latter would assist economic growth, trade, and regional
peace and stability. A pan-European system of co-operation and long-
term peace and stability might even come about, with an as yet undefined
co-ordination among NATO, the OSCE, the European Union, the
Council of Europe, the Western European Union and the United Nations.
An unsettled Western Europe
While these were the priorities of politicians and institutions, the
business world thought primarily in terms of the comparative advantages
of the region, in particular its low cost of labour. And this was becoming
costly politically to the politicians in Western Europe, who for the
reasons stated, wanted to help. When companies started to move pro-
duction to the East – say, from France or Germany to Poland or to the
Czech Republic – unemployment rose in the West, in particular among
the unskilled in the labour force.
Only in part could this be offset by increased exports of, for example,
machinery for new plants in the East – machinery which as likely as not
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would now come from, say, South-East Asia. And only over time would
increased prosperity among, say, Polish or Czech workers give rise to
trade volumes that could benefit wide sectors of West European
economies.
The dilemma was how to reach ‘from here to there’. Increased
unemployment was becoming particularly expensive to Western Euro-
pean states with their elaborate and generous welfare systems. If
unemployment benefits were almost as high as the salaries lost, then tax
levels would have to be raised for those who still worked, and for the
companies that remained. However, higher taxes would mean less
disposable income, and hence less domestic demand, while higher taxes
for companies would mean higher cost of production, and hence an even
greater incentive to move the production to lower-cost parts of the world.
Annual growth already at this time needed to be at least 2.5 per cent
only to halt, let alone reverse, an increase in unemployment. Many
countries in Western Europe therefore felt compelled to reform and
open up their domestic economies for both products and services to
international competition (under pressure to do so also from the EU and
the WTO in particular), or else risk entering a vicious circle where
insufficient growth, and growing unemployment, would sap growth
even more. The conviction was taking hold in many Western European
countries that major elements of the welfare state, built up over decades,
had to be trimmed down. The strikes and social unrest in France in the
autumn of 1995 and 1996 were essentially about that – as was the fierce
opposition in 1999 by EU farmers against any reform of the CAP under
the European Commission’s Agenda 2000 proposal (which sought to
replace price support measures linked to production levels with direct
aid payments decoupled from production and instead related to environ-
mental goals).
Germany – which before its entry into the EMU in 1999 maintained a
strong currency that held down inflation but also inhibited exports –
was faced with a debate about the Standort Deutschland, or the very
future of German industry in Germany (as distinct from German industry
abroad through multinationals). The German economic machine had
become more ossified, conservative and inflexible, causing it to lose out
in competitiveness to many other countries, including in the EU. The
country’s problems were accentuated by the unexpectedly difficult task
of lifting the new Länder (the former East Germany) up to the levels of
prosperity enjoyed by the rest of the country.9 Reasons for this included,
on the one hand, a persistent difference in the work ethic and work
efficiency between ‘Ossies’ and ‘Wessies’, where the former felt that the
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latter were not helping enough and the latter thought that they were
already doing too much; and salary increases insisted upon by the
powerful German trade unions that were so high as to scare away German
and foreign investors, who could now just as easily go to Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia or further afield.10
As Keynesian solutions became an unreachable option due to high
indebtedness and the exigencies of the EMU, the political crisis also
deepened for other reasons. At the time of ‘easy’ growth, in the 1950s
and 1960s, say, the political Left typically argued in favour of a more
generous welfare state, and whenever they came to power they expanded
it a little more. All the political Right could do, when in power, was to
halt or slow down the process but not reverse it, as this would have cost
it the next election. From the oil crises in the 1970s onwards this could
only be done through increased government borrowing, leading by the
mid 1990s to a situation where even the political Left, when in power,
started to have no other option than to reduce the welfare state.
A prime example is Sweden, where the Social Democrats, after three
years in opposition, were voted back into power in 1994 on a promise to
restore the traditional Swedish welfare state. However, once in power
they immediately had to start pursuing the same kind of policies that a
right-of-centre type of government would have conducted.
For the ordinary European citizen the situation had become more
difficult to understand. Had half a century of building an egalitarian,
generous society been in vain? Where was the wealth of yesterday? Where
were left and right in politics? The only consolation was perhaps that
under a left-of-centre government the cuts might come later and affect
fewer areas than under a right-of-centre one. But, if they came later, might
not the country’s finances suffer even further in the meantime, making
eventual cuts even harsher? Was that post-war, unwritten social contract
between the governing and the governed – by which the citizens had sub-
mitted to the rigours of economic change in exchange for social security
and other, normally better paid, jobs – now coming undone? Where
were the jobs anyway, and could one be sure any longer about the social
protection part of the contract? There was less certainty for everyone,
including in public service, to keep their job in the future, as companies
scaled down their workforce to regain competitiveness. If ‘globalisation’,
free trade and the economic development of Central and Eastern Europe
were at fault, then the jobs of many people still depended on these very
phenomena, in the sense that they gave rise to employment in the export
sector and in growing multinational companies, as well as in commerce
where more could be sold due to lower prices for imported goods.11
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Such were the thoughts of millions of people in Western Europe. Their
anxiety was exacerbated by corruption scandals, especially where public
money was concerned, but also in the private sector through insider
deals and excessive pay-offs and ‘parachute’ deals (sometimes kept
secret) for executives. The goal was the welfare state. It had come, and
now it seemed it was going again. Why? What values were there except
money? But money can, in the final analysis, never be happiness itself,
only a means thereto. God had been present during centuries of privation,
but it seemed He had become more distant, as memories of dictatorships
and oppressions started to fade, and recollections of material hardship
with them.
Might the European ideal take the place of nationalism, the way it had
in continental Europe in the first few years after World War II? But with
memories of the war becoming increasingly distant – in spite of the
fiftieth anniversary of D-Day, VE-day and the end of the war – that
enthusiasm had been hard to rekindle in new generations who had had
no direct experience of the horrors of war.
More importantly, as the stages of integration had been passed one
after the other, Europe had become more prosaic than visionary. Europe
had become a matter of milk quotas, regional aid, EU directives and
intermittent squabbles. The Maastricht Treaty had brought home not
only the bureaucratic dimension of the European Union – as exemplified
in the interminable sentences they contained on the interplay among EU
institutions – but also, in the minds of many, that a European super-
structure was nearing completion and might indeed mean a loss of one’s
national identification.
Nationalism had been partly discredited. One variety of nationalism
was still comme il faut, which found its expression in football matches,
whether it was France or England who played, or, at subnational level,
Bayern München or Real Madrid. However, that other brand, which
maintained that one nation was intrinsically superior to another, or
needed to crush another to show that superiority, was fortunately out of
fashion. In that respect, happily, most European relations had come a
long way from past centuries and the first half of the twentieth century.
There still was a belief in democracy. But democracy, for all its
qualities, was still, in the famous words of Churchill, the ‘worst form of
government excepting all the others’. Especially in times of peace and
prosperity, when it was not threatened, democracy could grow ‘tired’.
Nepotism, favouritism and greed could creep in. Vigilance over its
functioning could become more relaxed. Every type of political system
carried the seeds of its own destruction, and democracy was, alas, no
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exception. For democracy to survive, each and every generation must
defend it as its most precious legacy, yet paradoxically the generations
which most benefited from it saw the least reason to defend it.
The West may have cried victory after the demise of communism in
1991–92, but that did not mean it would remain invulnerable to decay
from within. For instance, democracy vitally depended on a free and
independent media, but the media could be bought up by powerful
economic interests, to such an extent that they all conveyed the same
message, thus anaesthetising a public opinion that needed diversity of
opinion to preserve its most precious quality, common sense.
The market economy implied competition, which forced everybody to
be on their toes and produce quality work in all walks of life, thereby
raising overall wealth. Yet even competition in a market economy could,
it was now realised, be reduced by mergers and cartels, the only possible
salvation being that big conglomerates often collapsed under their own
weight, in what the American economist Joseph Schumpeter had called
‘creative destruction’. If competition became so harsh that a majority of
the population were left outside the economic system, while a minority
would have to work so hard to stay on top as to lose their humanism,
then the market economy and the democracy that normally accompany
it might themselves be in danger.
To many Europeans in the mid-1990s, the United States was in such a
danger. On the one hand, they looked in envy at the low American
unemployment level – half that of the European Union – and a net gain
of some 38 million jobs since 1973, against the EU’s zero. On the other
hand, Europeans did not want millions of people abandoned by society
the way they at least perceived the situation to be in the Harlems and the
Wattses of the United States. However, if Europe did not bring down
unemployment more and did not grow faster economically, would its
weakened public finances not eventually lead to such a situation anyway?
An uncertain world
Such, then, was the overall situation in Western Europe by the mid
1990s, as the ghosts of Hitler and Stalin bid a last farewell, hovering
over the bulldozers tearing down the last remnants of the Berlin Wall. A
profound feeling of uncertainty about the future reigned. It was a feeling
that something was needed beyond materialism – even as material needs
became more difficult to satisfy, especially when individuals compared
themselves to the very rich and the very famous appearing on the screen
and on television.
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Central and Eastern Europe were trying to reach the material level of
the West. However, even as they did, they too were realising that
Western materialism was somehow hollow. People who under commun-
ism had nurtured a dream of freedom and prosperity of course welcomed
it when it came. Yet past solidarity with equally oppressed neighbours
and friends had disappeared, as competition for jobs became increas-
ingly harsh, and as materialism started to replace the more immaterial
values which communism had come to engender; there was no longer
any guarantee of a job for life nor of a position and status in society.
A new generation was growing up, desperately depending on their
parents for material support long into late youth. That it was more
moralistic and less spoilt than the previous one – that of the permissive
1960s – was clear, as the menace of AIDS and a largely closed labour
market loomed large. No longer was there any room for revolutionary
visions of the youth of 1968, as everybody tried somehow to find a slot
in the existing system. But then again, not everybody was trying. Many
youths with no or little schooling had largely ‘opted out’ of that system,
as hope of finding a job was becoming slimmer with every passing year
of inactivity, dwindling along with the capacity and desire to meet the
challenges involved.
If the young had perhaps become more moral than their parents under
the threat of AIDS, was the visual onslaught of television and video
leaving them sufficiently literate to argue in the subtle way that demo-
cracy would seem to require in order to prosper? How would dialogue
survive in the era of television and Gameboy?
The picture of a confused Europe in the mid-1990s drawn up here is,
of course, in many respects an oversimplification. Millions of Europeans
tightened their belts and were still happy. Football stadiums were filled
with excited crowds, and beaches were filled with summer tourists. Many
still had secure jobs, took only a scant interest in politics and perhaps
did not know what, say, the Uruguay Round or the WTO stood for.
A country like Switzerland was rumoured to be unhappy and searching
for its identity as it celebrated its 700th anniversary in 1991. However,
with a low unemployment rate it did not seem too perturbed, even
though its male population took to the mountains each year to practise
defence against an enemy that no-one could really identify. Luxembourg
had equally low unemployment and high growth, and questioned
neither its role as a loyal EU member nor its banking secrecy laws, which
so irritated many of its EU neighbours. Norway was in a similar
situation and prided itself on being a good European without being an
EU member. Many a Central and East European country relished its
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new-found freedom from oppression, with people suddenly able to afford
a car and a holiday by the seaside.
Again on the joyful side, there was the major relief from the immediate
nuclear threat, as masses of tactical weapons and intermediate-range
nuclear missiles were being scrapped on all sides, and as even strategic
weaponry was being reduced by most nuclear powers. Europe could
‘breathe’ for the first time since the early 1950s, a palpable sign of which
was that the German ‘Easter Marches’, which during the intermediate-
range missile crisis of the mid-1980s had gathered up to half a million
people, now mobilised far fewer, as worthy objects of protest were more
difficult to find.
Presumably for the Germans, as for Europeans in general, the vision
of war had become less that of a nuclear Armaggedon and more limited
in scope – of the former-Yugoslavia type. It had also become messier, as
in that region – or for that matter in Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda or Sri-
Lanka – it was not quite clear who was fighting whom for what purpose,
and hence who was right and who was wrong. There was surely as much
violence to deplore as during the Vietnam War, but its complexity was
such that, unlike the 1960s, there could be no rallying cry all over
Europe to demonstrate on behalf of any one particular side (with the
possible exception of the Bosnians during the siege of Sarajevo). Besides,
the ‘establishment’ seemed to have the same views as the young in all
these conflicts, making it difficult to present any stand of the young as,
simultaneously, a revolt against their parents, as in the Vietnam days.
In conclusion, Europe in the mid-1990s had become more uncertain –
about itself and about its role in the world. The old, tired East–West
confrontation was gone, and the resulting vacuum posed new challenges
for countries and institutions such as NATO and the European Union.
New technologies waged a head-on assault on economies, closing many
traditional ways of doing things while opening up many new vistas for
countries and individuals ready to embrace them. International economic
competition intensified, with no country or region able to opt out. It is
to Europe’s responses to these challenges that we shall now turn.
Notes
1 From Shakespeare’s ‘Sonnet 34’.
2 The START II Treaty was ratified by the US Senate, but not by the Russian
Duma. It was superseded by the 2002 Treaty of Moscow.
3 The Schengen Agreement by 2002 covered fifteen European states: thirteen
of the fifteen EU member states (that is all except the United Kingdom and
Ireland) and two non-EU countries, Norway and Iceland. The latter have to
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respect all Schengen provisions without having any say in their shaping.
Sweden, Finland and Denmark insisted that Norway and Iceland be allowed
to participate, since all the five Nordic countries abolished mutual passport
controls already in 1957.
4 A very complete analysis of the Austrian, Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian
referenda is given in Luif (1995, Ch. 13).
5 In 1963 eighteen countries signed the Yaoundé Convention with the Euro-
pean Economic Community to promote development co-operation. The
Yaoundé Convention was followed by the signature by seventy countries of
the Lomé Convention in 1975. The Lomé Convention has been followed by
Lomé II, III and IV, which latter expired in 2000. In the meantime over
seventy ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries enjoy privileged
trade and assistance status with the EU and have concluded a new
convention, the Cotonou Agreement, which signifies a reorientation of EU
development co-operation policies in the direction of a greater emphasis on
democratisation and poverty reduction.
6 The Council of Europe in Strasbourg, founded in 1949, is an intergovern-
mental organisation working for ‘greater unity’ between its forty-four
member states ‘for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and
principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic
and social progress’. The Committee of Ministers (composed of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs or their Permanent Representatives) is the Council’s
decision-making body. The Parliamentary Assembly is the organisation’s
deliberative organ, composed of delegations from national parliaments. A
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe is a consultative body
representing local and regional authorities. A particularly well-known part
of the Council of Europe is the European Court of Human Rights, which
bases its judgements on the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
7 Cr0ft, Redmond, Wyn Rees and Webber (1999, Ch. 6) see a ‘mix of idealism
and instrumentalism’ in the attitudes of new and aspiring members to the
Council of Europe. Membership is seen by some as a ‘return to Europe’,
following the long separation from it under communism (especially in
Central Europe and the Baltic states) –  a ‘symbolic acceptance of European-
ness’. In addition, ‘membership of the Council of Europe satisfies an essen-
tial precondition of membership laid down by both the EU and NATO’. The
authors conclude that ‘the Council of Europe has been challenged in some
new fundamental way by the most recent process of [its] enlargement’.
While welcoming the organisation’s ‘proactive’ stance on democracy and
human rights and its suspension of ‘recalcitrant states’ such as Belarus, they
wonder ‘whether such a defence can be sustained in the face of democratic
backsliding elsewhere’, that is, in geopolitically more strategic countries.
This underlines the Council’s dual nature, some would say dilemma, as an
intergovernmental, i.e. political, organisation and one based on funda-
mental, i.e. non-political, human values.
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8 In the event, hostilities were to break out again in the autumn of 1999. In the
war, the Chechnyan capital of Grozny was levelled to the ground, amid
massive carnage among the civilian population.
9 Total transfers to the new Länder since unification in 1990 until 2002 were
estimated at €660 million (DM1.3 billion). (Source: ‘Sozialismus.de: Deutsche
Subventionsmentalität und Bequemlichkeit’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1–2
June 2002.)
10 In discussing the growing dissonance between ‘East’ and ‘West’ Germans,
Knischewski (1996, pp 143–4) says the evolution has gone from the pre-
unification state of ‘united though divided’ (‘Spaltung in der Einheit’) to the
present-day ‘divided by unity’ (‘Spaltung durch die Einheit’) due to a
psychological ‘wall in the heads’ (‘Mauer in den Köpfen’) replacing the
Berlin Wall. ‘Ossies’ call the ‘Wessies’ ‘Besserwessis’ (‘know-alls’) and the
‘Wessies’ retort by calling the ‘Ossies’ ‘Jammerossis’ (‘whinging Easterners’).
11 Sassoon (1997, p 4) summed up the European Left’s dilemma in these words:
Deprived of their pathfinders, the parties of the Left have adopted, more or
less overtly, a defensive strategy. Its basic co-ordinates are an acceptance
that market forces can be regulated but not eliminated; that such regula-
tion must often be co-ordinated with other countries; that the growth of
public spending should be curbed; that the welfare state can be defended
but not extended; that privatisation may be unavoidable and, when it
eradicates monopolies, desirable; that equality, though still appealing as a
goal, may be tempered by the need to preserve incentives and competition;
that the power of international financial institutions – and above all, of
financial markets – may be contained, if at all, only by international
agreement and not by unilateral state policies.
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7
The European Union’s dilemma:
towards a union or not?
From its humble beginnings, [the Roman Empire] has grown so much that it is
now suffering under its own size. (Titus Livius)1
Summary
In March 1999 the European Commission, the European Union’s executive
branch, resigned under accusations of fraud, nepotism and mismanage-
ment, leading to intensive soul-searching as to what could be the right
form of management for the EU. How could the democratic aspects of
the emerging entity be enhanced? How could democracy be improved?
How should power be shared among the governments of the member
states as represented in the Council of Ministers, the peoples of the
Union as represented in the European Parliament, and an appointed but
political bureaucracy, the Commission? How open and transparent
could the EU be, given the many sensitive issues it was now handling,
such as foreign policy, security and defence?
Rendering answers to these questions more urgent was the arrival, in
January 1999, of the Economic and Monetary Union and the single
currency, the euro, among eleven (and soon twelve) EU states. After a
strong start, the new currency weakened successively against the US
dollar and other currencies in 2000 and 2001 – helping exports but also
adding to inflation – before firming again in 2002 and early 2003,
though in a more difficult economic climate of slower growth in the
euro-zone. It was clear that the EU had now taken a major step towards
economic and political integration, begging the question to what extent
formal political unification would follow that in the monetary field.
What is meant by a ‘union’?
Since the European Union is, at present, the main vehicle for European
integration, it seems justified at this point to concentrate on this particular
organisation. The European Union’s fundamental dilemma – thrown
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into relief in virtually everything it does, from institutional reform to
single currency to common transport policy, to name but a few – is
whether it wants to become a true union or not.
The Oxford English Dictionary gives a number of meanings for the
word ‘union’. The most relevant for our purposes are (author’s italics):
• ‘of persons or countries with reference to joint action or policy’;
• ‘the uniting together of the different sections, parties, or individuals
of a nation, people, or other body so as to produce general agreement
or concord; the condition resulting from this; absence of dissension,
discord, or difference in opinion or doctrine; unity’;
• ‘the action of uniting, or the state or fact of being united, into one
political body; especially formation or incorporation into a single state,
kingdom, or political entity, usually with one central legislature’;
• ‘a number, group, or body of persons or states joined or associated
together for some common purpose or action; an association, league,
or society’;
• ‘a number of states or provinces united together or incorporated into
one legislative confederacy, a confederation or federation; especially
the United States of America’.
It will not be altogether easy to determine which of these definitions
most closely fit the European Union. But the reader will agree that they
are all rather far-reaching.
The 1993 Maastricht Treaty on European Union was the first to state
that the institution, at least in part of its endeavours, was to be called a
Union. However, it did not go so far as to say, for example, that it should
be regarded as a new subject of international law, taking the place of the
member states (it should not), as happened when the Soviet Union was
proclaimed in 1922. Nor did it say that the European Council (of heads
of state or government) was to be regarded as the new EU government
(it is not); nor that a confederation or even a federation had been formed
(it had not), with a commensurate reduction in the sovereignty of mem-
ber states.
Maastricht left us with a situation where an ambitious word, ‘union’,
had been chosen to denote something rather less, like ‘close association’.
Was the aim to give Europe and the world the impression that some-
thing had been obtained which in reality had not? Was it the hope that,
once members knew they were in a union, there could be no disunion? A
clue from the drafters’ intentions could be gleaned from the disclaimers
in the preamble, which state that ‘The Treaty marks a new stage in the
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process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in
which the decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens’
(author’s italics). In other words, the European Union created by the
Maastricht Treaty was to be regarded as an ongoing process rather than
a finished state.
It can be dangerous to choose words that go beyond the reality they
aim to describe; thus frequent quarrels in the European Union may cause
the word ‘union’ to lose its original meaning in the minds of EU citizens
– in somewhat the same fashion as the world long ago ceased to regard
the United Nations as consisting of ‘united nations’ (which the world
presumably did shortly after its creation). Yet ‘united’ is something,
perhaps the only stronger word remaining, to which the EC–EEC–EU
process has not yet had recourse. Perhaps this is because of the discredit
the word has suffered in the UN context. Perhaps it is also because its
use in, for example, the United Kingdom, the United States and the
United Arab Emirates indicates that something much further down the
road of political union is required than the EU can hope to achieve at the
present time.
The uphill battle for a union
The European Movement at its Congress in The Hague in May 1948
had called for a ‘united Europe’ in ‘economic and political union’ – but
all it got was a Council of Europe. The European Coal and Steel Com-
munity had its High Authority, but the latter was never allowed to come
into play, as its prime architect and first President, Jean Monnet, had
intended. The European Economic Community was just that – a
community of sovereign states, although equipped with a supranational,
indeed an ‘anational’, Commission. The Benelux countries had already
pooled parts of their sovereignty within the Benelux union (with Belgium
and Luxembourg having also pooled their monetary sovereignty). They
and Germany can be said to have joined the ECSC and the EEC in a
quest for a United Europe. However, it is doubtful whether France at
any stage genuinely contemplated fully giving up its sovereignty, instead
seeing the institution as a way to rein in Germany and to play the leading
role in Europe.
When the United Kingdom joined it was for pragmatic, essentially
economic reasons. The same can be said for the Danes and the Irish. By
the time Greece, Portugal and Spain joined in the 1980s – also in a large
part for economic reasons – resistance by the British and others to further
integration had essentially transformed the European Community into
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an intergovernmental organisation (with the Commission as a last, and
often frustrated, driving force for integration).
The last three members – Austria, Finland and Sweden – faced a partly
new situation. Not that the Internal Market posed any major threat to
sovereignty, for they had all become accustomed to it through the EEA.
However, there was Maastricht. The Treaty on European Union, which
the candidate countries had ratified, was part of the body of normative
texts of the EU established over the decades, the so-called acquis com-
munautaire, and it contained the provisions for economic and monetary
union (as indeed did, although in less committal form, the Single Euro-
pean Act).
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) changed the name of the game.
What had been intergovernmentalism flirting with federalism was
becoming integration espousing it. At stake was much more than the
relatively timid political co-operation foreseen in the Treaties; for once
the EMU had been introduced, the EMU would require an increasingly
common economic policy. In due, but not so distant, course some sort of
body akin to a ‘ministry of economics’ could be foreseen, needed to
settle priorities among EMU participating countries and render possible
in the economic field what the European Central Bank was already
doing in the monetary field.
As a ‘deepening’ of the EMU kind is sought going far beyond the
Internal Market, the quest for ‘widening’ the EU in many respects under-
mines this ambition. This is so not only because a larger number of EU
members makes integration more complicated, but because they become
increasingly divergent. Yet, in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet
Union and of its regional domination, the need for stability in Central
and Eastern Europe is increasingly being felt. Rightly or wrongly the
countries concerned, as well as many EU member states, feel that the EU
is the answer, since it is the only genuinely integrationist force in today’s
Europe (NATO being an organisation purely for collective defence and
security, although with integrative implications). The EU is perceived as
the only organisation able to deliver the results that count most – peace
and prosperity. As a form of exclusive club, it has now reached
gravitational mass.
At the same time, however, because the threat from the Soviet Union –
or from its main successor Russia – is no longer there, the outside
circumstances favouring integration are less pronounced in Western
Europe, and in the Centre and East there is a paradoxical wish to explore
newly found national independence before investing it in the EU, where
it could again be reduced or lost.
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Meanwhile, World War II has become something young people have
to ask their grandparents about for first-hand testimony. This makes
further integration out of fear of a European conflict less of a motive.
France still seems haunted at the prospect of too strong a Germany, but
it is uncertain whether it is out of fear of a long-term threat to France’s
own security unless harnessed, or whether the apprehension is one of a
rival for future leadership in Europe. Other neighbours of Germany may
feel similarly, although with every decade of a peaceful and democratic
Germany that passes, the fear subsides a little more. This also reduces
the motive for integration. Furthermore, the benefits of integration are
soon taken for granted and become the norm, leading people to forget
the hassles of the past and to feel less appreciative of what has been
achieved. Finally, over time additional material gains from further
economic integration are becoming harder to reach than in the early
decades, as countries begin to realise that structural reform will have to
be pursued even more strongly within their own borders. This could also
reduce the will to integrate further.
Today, for as long as it may last, no more general war in Europe
seems likely. Democracies tend not go to war unless they are attacked or
feel under intense threat. With democracies being the rule rather than the
exception in today’s Europe, there is good reason to hope that overall
peace inside the continent will prevail for some time, even though that
may not hold for military action by different European countries in
regions outside Europe, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq or peacemaking
operations in various African countries have shown. No major Euro-
pean power seems bent on imperialist dreams. The large majority of
Europe’s citizens do not seem to have any higher ambitions than the
pursuit of their own prosperity and happiness and that of their families
and friends. For once, history appears to be on their side.
A union with less democracy?
How, given all this, do we explain the continuing quest for EU integra-
tion? Who wants it? The people? The governments? The parliaments?
The EU? But what, then, is the EU? Is integration sought to prepare for
an external threat in some future?
Terrorism, especially since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001
against the United States, no doubt provides a push for increased
integration in the police and security fields, but of a limited nature since
– unlike a threatening foreign power – terrorism can scarcely threaten a
country’s independence or existence.
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The question of who is pushing for integration and why becomes all
the more intriguing when we consider who is giving up power to whom.
It is clear, for instance, that the European Parliament wants to have
more power, both within the EU and vis-à-vis the member states. Within
the EU it would have to come at the cost of the European Commission
and the Council of Ministers. In regard to member states – if we assume
a ‘zero-sum game’ – the European Parliament would have to wrestle it
from the national parliaments in particular (and hence from the national
governments, which execute the will of parliaments). If, on the other
hand, we assume a perfectly functioning subsidiarity, where the Euro-
pean Parliament only deals with truly ‘preter-national’ European issues,
then increased powers for the European Parliament may not have to
infringe overly on those of national parliaments. Past experience shows,
however, that such a clearly defined subsidiarity will be difficult to find,
especially as countries are approaching a ‘pre-federal’ state through, for
instance, the Economic and Monetary Union and the EU’s work on a
constitution via the Convention on the Future of Europe.
The European Commission, which considers itself, rightly or wrongly,
as the ‘guardian of the spirit’ of the EU, also watches over its sphere of
influence between the member states, the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament. However, it is especially squeezed between the
latter two – with the Council of Ministers (the governments of the mem-
ber states) insisting on continued and often increased intergovernmen-
talism (that is, agreements born and concluded within it, with little or no
role for the Commission), and the European Parliament insisting on a
greater say as the only EU body with a direct mandate from the people.
The Commission only has such a popular mandate diluted by a factor
of three, in the sense that (1) the Commissioners are suggested jointly by
the member states’ governments (although, under the Amsterdam Treaty,
appointed by the European Parliament); (2) each of these governments
results from the majority in a national parliament; and (3) the national
parliament is elected by the people. Using the same reasoning, the
Council of Ministers has a popular mandate diluted by a factor of two.
However, the decisions they take are again three steps away from the
people, for when fifteen governments agree on a compromise, there is no
guarantee whatsoever that this represents the will of the component
peoples of the Union. Yet the decision – whether in the form of a
directive or a regulation of some other EU instrument – more often than
not becomes ‘law’ for these countries as it joins the by now massive
quantity of EU legislation known as the acquis communautaire.2
The Council of Ministers is, therefore, not willing to give up any power
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to the Commission, especially as various governments will on any given
occasion feel that the Commission is in error or biased against it. (The
coalitions of discontented and contented member states vary from issue
to issue.) Yet the Council works so closely with the Commission especi-
ally at the COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) level,
that there often evolves a communality of interests paving the way for
agreement (that is, a new directive or regulation).3
The result is highly unsatisfactory from the democratic viewpoint. An
only indirectly democratic body – the Council of Ministers – reaches a
compromise decision on the basis of a proposal from an essentially
undemocratic body – the Commission – which is then often asked to
implement the decision in question throughout the territory of the EU.
Furthermore, the Council of Ministers goes against the Montesquieuian
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the executive
(and judiciary), for it is both the executive (the representation of the
individual EU governments) and the co-legislature together with the
European Parliament in deciding on and giving legal power to directives,
regulations, etc. and, more generally, the whole acquis communautaire.
The Council of Ministers is equally reluctant to cede power to the
European Parliament, for this would reduce ministers’ own say over EU
policies. In this they are, for the same reason, supported by the national
parliaments, for any more power to the Strasbourg–Luxembourg–Brussels
body means a commensurate loss for the French Assemblée Nationale,
the British House of Commons or the Swedish Riksdag.
The problem of the lack of democracy in the EU is particularly acute
for federal or highly decentralised member states such as Germany,
Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain. The German Länder, as repre-
sented in the German parliament’s Bundesrat, have even threatened to
veto any reform of EU institutions and EU enlargement, unless there is a
clear definition of the meaning of ‘subsidiarity’ and respect for the rights
of the Länder to manage their social policy priorities, including subsidies
especially in the social sector.4
True, the powers of the European Parliament have been continuously
expanded ever since the Common Assembly of the European Coal and
Steel Community, the EEC and Euratom of the 1950s and 1960s. The
Single European Act (1987) improved on the earlier ‘consultation pro-
cedure’ by introducing the ‘co-operation procedure’ of a more equal,
‘triangular’ relationship between the European Parliament, the Com-
mission and the Council of Ministers. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) saw
the introduction of the ‘co-decision’ procedure, giving the European
Parliament legislative veto power in several policy areas, and referred to
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a European Parliament–Council of Ministers ‘conciliation committee’ to
reach compromises on difficult issues. The veto areas – fifteen in the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 – were increased to thirty-eight in the
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, including transport, environment, energy,
development co-operation and certain aspects of social affairs. The
Amsterdam Treaty also refined and simplified the co-decision proce-
dure, granting the European Parliament co-legislative status. Today,
therefore, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers can be
considered as equals in the EU’s legislative process in those areas where
the co-decision procedure applies – with the Commission, however, also
retaining considerable power as initiator of the proposals and as executor
of the subsequent legislative decisions.5 This situation is, however, far
from the full and exclusive legislative power of parliament that tradi-
tionally characterises European democratic systems.6
The above situation is unsatisfactory from the democratic viewpoint,
and it becomes even more problematic as the EU under the Maastricht
Treaty has been given increasing competencies in culture, education,
science, research, civil protection and regional policy, to mention but a
few. Many regional governments (and local authorities) have tried to
respond to this by having offices of their own in Brussels through which
they try to influence the national representatives in the Council of Ministers,
members of the European Parliament, members of the Committee of the
Regions, Commissioners, Commission employees or members of the
European Parliament. However, this is not accountable democracy.
Perhaps even the European Parliament is not truly accountable. It often
seems too vast and too remote to mean much to the citizens of the
member states.7
As a concession to regions – across the whole confusing range from
unitary to federal member states – the Maastricht Treaty on European
Union established a Committee of the Regions (COR) for the purpose of
providing the Council of Ministers and the Commission with advice on
matters of major importance to the regions. However, the 189 members
of the COR are appointed by the Council of Ministers on proposals
from the member states, not elected to the post by the people of the
regions. This is clearly not direct democracy either. Instead, just as the
directly elected members of the European Parliament are being trained
to try to bend the will of a largely unaccountable, non-democratic
Commission and an only indirectly democratic Council of Ministers, so
the Committee of the Regions is being conditioned to play along in the
same process.8
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The dilemma of the Commission
In the early hours of 16 March 1999 the twenty-strong European
Commission resigned en bloc, in what was perhaps the most sensational
event in the history of the European Union. The resignation was in response
to a highly critical report by an investigating committee of independent
experts created at the behest of the European Parliament a few weeks
earlier. The report cited allegations of fraud, nepotism and mismanage-
ment, but its basic charge was that lines of responsibility and, therefore,
accountability were unclear. In the wake of the Commission’s resigna-
tion, EU member states were left with the question of how – indeed
whether – a more democratic, accountable and transparent Commission
could be built on what had happened.
The core of the debate about democracy within the European Union
lies with the European Commission. Many people find it inconceivable
that the grown-up, sophisticated democracies that form the European
Union should have given so many rights to a statutorily independent and
largely unaccountable technocratic body. The answer to this riddle goes
back to the 1950s.
The Six of the ECSC set up the High Authority and equipped it with
such powers precisely because they wanted it to adjudicate among them
in times of crisis (which, as it happened, never occurred, since there were
always governments which considered that there was none). Marked by
their aversion to such vast supranational powers as they had granted the
High Authority, the Six in 1957, at the creation of the EEC, opted for
the tamer version of a Commission. It would be an initiator, a maker of
proposals, an implementer – but not a ruler in crises.
The Commission formula suited the member states of the EEC in the
early years, when the priority was to clear up the whole anachronistic
and suffocating underbrush of trade obstacles and other barriers in the
economic field.9 The problem with the Commission has arisen as first
the EEC, then the EC and now the European Union have increasingly
approached the very core of national sovereignty of the member states.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the single currency project,
but it also surfaces elsewhere.10
For instance, the Commission has wide-ranging powers to allow and
forbid mergers among European companies, acting as investigator,
prosecutor, judge and jury (with appeals possible only to the EU Court
of Justice, which has a history of not going against the Commission on
these issues). There are, on the one hand, the interests of EU citizens in
favour of competition and of keeping monopolies or oligopolies at bay.
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However, there are also general EU interests vis-à-vis say, a US or
Japanese mega-corporation that might otherwise threaten European
jobs. How can the Commission legitimately decide when it has no
popular mandate to fall back on? Indeed, whatever it decides it will be
criticised. Which leads us on to the question as to whether it should have
the power to decide. But if it should not, then who should? (Bringing us
back to the question of democracy versus efficiency.)11
An even trickier example is provided by the Commission’s powers in
relation to subsidies. Article 92 in the 1957 EEC Rome Treaty states that
state aid ‘which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as
it affects trade between member States, be incompatible with the
common market’.
However, when the Commission in the mid 1990s came out, on the
broader grounds of European competition policy, against one of the
German (new) Länder, Saxony, which, democratically, had decided to
subsidise the building of a local Volkswagen plant, critics posed the
question as to what right it should have to go against the will of the
people of that Land, with the German government as an embarrassed
intermediary, torn between its double loyalties to the EU and to one of
its Länder.12
When the Commission decides, ‘one last time’, in favour of allowing
yet another French government subsidy to Air France, to whom should
it have bowed? To a French democratic interest in protecting its national
flight carrier, or to other EU airlines, which have long since been weaned
off state support, such as British Airways, or which with the support of
their governments are indignant that their plans for expansion to new
EU markets are thwarted in this way and the playing field rendered
‘unlevel’? Again, the Commission cannot take the ‘right’ stand, for it has
no democratic legitimacy and is being reproached by all kinds of actors
who believe that they do.
In the case of the 1996 ‘mad cow’ disease crisis (which a few years
later had become even more serious), the question seemed reminiscent of
Watergate. When did the Commission know about the origin of the
disease and how much did it know? To whom should it bow? To the
lone German scientists who in 1993 claimed that transmission from
cattle to humans was indeed possible and even probable, and that
exports of British beef from animals born before a certain date should
therefore be banned? Or to the voices of the majority of its scientific
veterinary committee, who claimed the link was fictitious, and that even
the official mention of a possible link would cause panic and consumer
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resistance among the general public (as indeed happened as a result of a
subsequent UK report, with enormous economic suffering to EU farmers
in its wake?
The Commission settled for the latter course (and even asked the
German government to take the scientist in question to task and ask him
to keep silent – an action which would cause it considerable embar-
rassment when the matter was eventually unearthed). Again, whatever
the Commission had decided it would have been wrong, because it had no
democratic mandate (other than arguably a very limited one from the
European Parliament). Indeed, it had nothing to guide it in reaching its
decision, except pressure from others and pressure from within the
bureaucracy itself.
However, the extent to which the Commission may be held to account
by the European Parliament bears further mention. Since the Maastricht
and Amsterdam Treaties, the Commission’s President and overall com-
position are subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament.
Moreover, from the very inception of the European Coal and Steel
Community, the European Parliament has had the power to dismiss the
Commission. Furthermore, the European Parliament, together with
other EU bodies, can take the Commission to the EU Court of Justice if
it believes it has acted wrongly.
Nonetheless, collective approval/dismissal (known as the ‘censure
motion’) is a blunt instrument, with the likelihood of very serious con-
sequences to which the European Parliament has never taken recourse
(although several votes of no confidence have been held, the last time in
March 1999 over alleged corruption and mismanagement). Further-
more, the Commission’s accountability for its actions before the Council
of Ministers is almost negligible. Generally speaking, the Commission is
only accountable to anybody else for respecting procedure (and, after
March 1999, integrity) in areas within its remit, and even then only to a
limited extent. For the substance, contents and direction on what it is
doing, there is no such accountability.
The Commission has traditionally been a vehicle that chooses its own
direction and speed. In the days of the EEC–EC, direction and velocity
were largely determined by the rather obvious obstacles to trade. ‘Create
a common market!’ was the call of governments then, and the machine
did so, taking away first the visible, then the invisible, trade barriers
(even though that latter job to some extent remains to be finished). Today,
however, the EU touches on issues at the heart of national sovereignty.
The Commission is willing and eager to show the way. However, as it
does – such as taking a country to task over the handling of its budget
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within the EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact – the member states often
get cold feet and start asking who gave the order and criticising both the
destination and the road taken.
The Commission was created to move European integration forward.
Suppose, however, that – for instance due to a changed world economy
or a new political situation – the optimal degree of EU integration has
already been reached, or indeed surpassed. (The former British Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, maintained as much when she claimed
that the Treaty on European Union was ‘one treaty too far’.) Or suppose
that member states, in their heart of hearts, did not want more inte-
gration. The Commission would not know, for, driven by its very raison
d’être, it continues to move forward. It is empowered to propose and
develop policies and legislation, execute programmes, guard the legal
framework, represent externally and negotiate on behalf of member
states (such as in external trade), mediate and conciliate. If this was
acceptable in the early days of the EEC–EC, there is no guarantee that it
must in all circumstances be necessary, desirable or even acceptable
today. There is a growing risk that the EU blindly – without realising it –
pursues policies which are no longer wanted by the peoples of the Union
and their national parliaments, and eventually even by a growing
number of member state governments.
With the Commission at the heart of political Europe, decisions may
be ‘objectively’ right (if that can ever be established), but never subjec-
tively perceived as such by the component populations. Individual EU
decisions may be brilliant, but seen in succession over time they are
likely eventually to go wrong, for they cannot be corrected one by one in
a democratic process, as shown by the increasingly Byzantine Common
Agricultural Policy.
It may also be asked to what extent the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty
on European Union) was in fact shaped by the European Commission.
Ironically, we could have a situation where a body suffering from a major
‘democratic deficit’ has helped to shape treaties of democratic countries.
Official history will of course say it was the European Council, bringing
together the heads of state or government, which did it all, and to a
certain extent it probably did. (Most of the wide array of issues covered
in the Maastricht Treaty were originally suggested by one or the other
national capital). As for the European Council, it meets for the purpose
stated in the various treaties, namely to move the Union towards greater
integration. It feels obliged to make new proposals whenever it convenes
– proposals that have been largely conceived and given shape by the
Commission.
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Furthermore, it is uncertain how many EU governments in the 1989–
92 period, when Maastricht was elaborated at two intergovernmental
conferences, really wanted a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a
single currency as under the EMU. It is certain, however, that the role of
the Commission was not insignificant. Maastricht very nearly wrecked
the EU integration project, precisely because many of the peoples in the
EU felt alienated by it, in so far as they managed to grasp its meaning.
One is therefore justified in asking whether the Treaty on European
Union, or the Amsterdam Treaty, would have been what they became if
it had not been for the Commission’s input, or indeed if they would have
come into existence at all. This ‘distance’ from the peoples of the EU
could also help to explain the alienation from the institution felt by
many EU citizens and manifested in, for instance, the negative vote on
the Nice Treaty in the Irish referendum in 2001.13
There is a major difference between having the EU Commission pro-
pose to an EU Council of Ministers, and a national ministry preparing
government policy. A government wants to be re-elected and must there-
fore over time follow the will of the people. Even though a ministerial
bureaucracy may have wishes of its own (think of the British television
series Yes, Minister), these are limited by and bend to the needs of the
relevant ministers, and the Prime Minister, to survive politically.
Direction comes from above, and ultimately from the people.
In the EU, however, the majority of initiatives come from the Com-
mission or are prepared by it on the basis of proposals from the member
states. Here there is no pressure to do as any electorate may wish, for the
Commission is deliberately isolated from democratic pressure in its role
as the independent engine of the EU. Proposals which the Commission
presents may be rejected by the Council of Ministers, when the majority
of governments feel that they are not in the national interest.
However, Commission proposals have a way of coming back in revised
form, in a ‘war of attrition’ of sorts, until a, sometimes only slight,
majority of EU member governments are won over. For instance, in the
case of an EU-wide ban on tobacco advertising, the Commission, over a
twelve-year period starting in 1989, presented its proposals in favour of
such a ban all of ten times to a hesitant Council of Ministers. Nine times
the Council of Ministers – perhaps mindful of the considerable tax
income from tobacco products at national level – rejected the draft,
before the measure was finally passed in 1997.14 The Commission felt
empowered to make proposals to protect the health of EU citizens.
However, whether the ban was actually wanted by national govern-
ments, parliaments or national populations in the member states is more
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than uncertain. The driving force was, rather, determined Commissioners
and Commission staff (and to some extent the European Parliament).
A directive has direct application in the member states and supersedes
national law. It reflects not necessarily what a majority of EU citizens
want, but what the Commission wants, although possibly in a diluted or
slightly altered shape, since it has to be adopted by a qualified majority
of member state governments in the Council of Ministers.15 The EU
citizenry may blame their respective national governments for this, or
they may blame Brussels. If they choose the former, the government in
question normally throws up its arms and points to Brussels. However,
it is difficult to pinpoint responsibility in Brussels. The Council of Ministers
is still a secretive body, with virtually none of its meetings public, although
it is a fundamental tenet of democracy that any law-making meeting of
any legislative body must be public. The same holds for meetings of the
Commission.
In 1996 the United Kingdom was forced through a verdict by the EU’s
European Court of Justice to abide by a 1993 directive on maximum
working time and related matters. The UK had argued that this was a
social issue and should therefore have required unanimity, when in fact
it was approved by a majority in the Council of Ministers. The Court
argued, however, that it was a measure intended to protect the health of
workers. Hence, it only required a majority in the Council of Ministers.
Whatever the merits of regulated working time, the issue at stake here is
whether a national parliament, in this case that of the UK, should have
the right to decide in an area of central concern to its citizens, or whether
that right should be given to a supranational court not acting within a
federal system.16
If you try to contact a Commissioner or an ordinary staff member,
you may have to compete with some of the around 700 Euro-lobbies
(and many others at industry, national or subnational level).17 They,
unlike yourself, know whom to contact, whether they advocate higher
tariffs to protect the EU sugar beet industry or seek special favours for
European cars, shipbuilding or explosives. (The lobby phenomenon has
much less of a tradition in Europe than in the United States. There is a
difference, however, between lobbying an administration official or a
member of Congress (or their staff) and lobbying with the Commission;
for the administration official, member of Congress or Senator have a
popular mandate and go against the popular will only at their peril.)
The conclusion of the preceding reasoning is that everybody in the
Union must start to reflect on whether the Commission – whose role as
we have seen derives from the ECSC High Authority, though in diluted
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form – should have essentially the same functions today as forty years
ago. The question is all the more important as the President of the
Commission, Romano Prodi, declared that he wanted the Commission to
become a European ‘government’.18 The founders of constitutions,
whether in the United States of America in 1787 or in the Federal Republic
of Germany in 1949, know that everything hinges on the principles of
democracy and accountability pervading all branches of government. It
is doubtful whether in Philadelphia in 1787 anyone would have even
have dreamt of, let alone accepted, a Commission.
As we have seen, neither intensified intergovernmentalism nor supra-
nationalism is good for democracy, if political unification does not
proceed apace and is accompanied by an exclusive legislative authority
by a directly elected parliament. The EU has the latter in the form of the
European Parliament, but that body does not possess exclusive legis-
lative authority. The obvious solution to this problem would seem to be
to equip the European Parliament with such powers. However, and here
we are back to our original question, are the peoples, national parlia-
ments and national governments prepared to relinquish such authority
to the European Parliament? This is far from certain.
New EU transparency rules
In the summer of 2000 the Council of Ministers pushed through a new
secrecy directive banning public access to most EU correspondence and
documents. This was deemed necessary to protect confidentiality on
matters touching on the European Security and Defence Policy. How-
ever, the directive also inevitably came to include much of the rest of the
EU. At the end of 2000 the European Parliament therefore launched a
complaint with the European Court of Justice against the new secrecy
directive, calling for case-by-case secrecy authorisations rather than the
blanket one foreseen. Complicating the matter were other complaints
against the European Parliament itself over secrecy rulings by its internal
leading bodies vis-à-vis ordinary European Parliament members. The
EU’s fight for openness thus promises to be long and hard-fought.
The issue of access to EU documents was finally resolved in May
2001, when the European Parliament, the European Commission and
the EU’s Council of Ministers reached an agreement guaranteeing access
to most such documents. The transparency code will give citizens access
to most preparatory and final documents produced by EU institutions or
sent to it by others. Each EU body will have to establish a register of all
the documents it holds, including confidential ones.
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However, critics are concerned over the limits imposed, such as
excepting documents considered to ‘prejudice the public interest’, those
containing ‘individual opinions for internal use’ or those which submit-
ting countries do not want to see published. (The latter would not even
be referred to in EU registers.) Areas of exception include defence,
foreign policy, inner security, financial and economic policy and com-
mercial interests. Requests are to be judged by specially trusted persons
and not judges. Finally, the EU agreement supersedes national law in
member states, signifying that, for instance, countries with extensive
access rights are not at liberty to exercise them as regards EU documents.
The agreement did not fully meet the wishes of certain ‘open’ coun-
tries, such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, while others called it a
victory for transparency. It was perhaps the most forthcoming possible,
given that the EU is now not only a political and economic, but also a
security and defence institution.
Intergovernmentalism or supranationalism?
We shall return to the question as to where the EU is heading when we
discuss the Convention on the Future of Europe set up in 2002. But it is
worth examining the different institutional forces at play in deciding
whether the trend is toward more intergovernmentalism, more supra-
nationalism or more parliamentarianism. Some observers believe that
the European Parliament – whose role has been continuously streng-
thened over the years – will come to enjoy appropriate powers. This is
far from certain, however. National governments and parliaments are
not keen on further expanded European Parliament powers, and will no
doubt fight them at every stage, openly and by other means. National
parliaments may not be able to do much, since they are not part of the
EU machinery. National governments, however, form part of the EU’s
most powerful institution, the Council of Ministers. They are likely to
try to make sure that the Council of Ministers remains the strongest.
Characteristically, Agenda 2000 – the Commission’s vast reform pro-
ject for agriculture and regional support – was agreed by the Council of
Ministers, not by the European Parliament, even though it had to
approve and amend the project subsequently. The European Parliament
feels it has history on its side, fighting for democracy within the Euro-
pean Union on behalf of the people. However, given the sensitive issues
ahead, the peoples of the EU member states are likely to place their trust
more in the national governments when it comes to defending the
national interest than in an only vaguely understood political process in
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the European Parliament. This tendency can be expected to grow stronger
with a wider, more heterogeneous, membership. The low voter turn-out
for the European Parliament elections is a sign of indifference and
perhaps even distrust vis-à-vis the European Parliament and the EU as a
whole.
Whatever the effects of inevitable EU enlargement on the institution’s
finances or on the uniformity of its policies, enlargement will mean a push
towards intergovernmentalism. It will be country against country, bloc-
of-countries against bloc-of-countries along a number of dimensions:
‘new’ versus ‘old’ countries, North versus South, small versus big, net
contributors versus net beneficiaries, or even between one set of net
beneficiaries and another if EU largesse does not suffice for them all.
The battleground is likely to be the Council of Ministers, in spite of
claims by the European Parliament that it should be given that role. In
the essentially intergovernmental EU it is the member states alone that
decide on changes in EU treaties, and they are unlikely to give complete
and exclusive legislative authority to the European Parliament, on the
grounds that it is not a sufficiently fine instrument with which to adjudi-
cate between interests and also in order to preserve their own powers as
exercised via the Council of Ministers. The Commission will be squeezed
between an European Parliament wishing to extend its powers and a
Council of Ministers eager to preserve or even expand its own.
Supranationalism through EMU
If anything can be expected to come after the present EU intergovern-
mentalism, it is EU supranationalism through Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). On 1 January 1999 eleven of the fifteen EU countries
introduced the single currency – the ‘euro’ – marking the final stage of a
long process towards the EMU. They were Austria, Belgium, Ireland,
Italy, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Finland. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden chose not to
join from the outset but possibly to do so later. Greece wanted to join
but was not accepted. In early 2000 it announced its desire to join in
2001. The request was granted in June, 2000 and Greece became the
twelfth EMU member on 1 January 2001.19
 The run-up to the EMU in the months preceding its launch on 1
January 1999 was smooth, with interest rates converging down or up –
depending on the national currency concerned – toward the target single
rate of 3 per cent set by the European Central Bank. For countries strug-
gling to come out of recession at the time, such as Germany and France,
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the absence of an interest rate cut (or a raise of the rate) meant renewed
risk of a stifling of economic growth. For countries in a more expan-
sionary phase, like Italy, Portugal or Ireland, the necessary lowering of
the rate (in some cases by half) carried the danger of overheating their
economies and stronger inflationary pressure. However, the ‘locking’ of
the various exchange rates was achieved without great difficulties and
the euro at its start stood at 1.18 to the dollar.20
The reasons for entering the EMU on the part of the twelve parti-
cipating countries differed for each one of them. France saw joining as a
way to regain the monetary sovereignty it had effectively lost to the
Deutschmark, but also as a means to tie Germany closer to it and to
enable France thereby to play a larger role in Europe and the world.
Germany saw it as a way to assure its EU partners that it was genuinely
seeking a federated Europe, in which it would be a loyal and constructive
partner, not intent on seeking hegemony or striking out alone in Central
and Eastern Europe. The Benelux countries had sought greater EU inte-
gration ever since 1957 and were always enthusiastic EMU proponents.
Finland chose EMU membership essentially for political reasons, and in
spite of the risk of ‘asymmetric shocks’ due to its peripheral location and
its dependence on price-sensitive products such as forestry and pulp. For
Spain, Italy and Portugal EMU membership was vital to joining main-
stream economic Europe and shedding any notion of a less serious ‘Club
Med’ mentality. They made major sacrifices to qualify, with Italy even
introducing a special ‘eurotax’, which was stoically endured by a
population anxious not to be left outside ‘Euroland’.
The Economic and Monetary Union is likely to increase the pressure
in the direction of a federal European Union, with a strong supranational
character, not only among the participating countries (the ‘ins’), but also
vis-à-vis the non-participating EU members.21 This in turn could mean a
vastly expanded role for the Commission in the economic sphere, as it
would work to supplement the European Central Bank. With one
currency, national economic policies in Euroland have to be much more
co-ordinated. Deviations larger than the minimal are inhibited by such
things as EU fines or withdrawal of EU funds under the Stability and
Growth Pact, by which the members wanted to ensure adherence to the
‘convergence criteria’ of budgetary discipline.22 A much higher degree of
Euroland economic and monetary co-ordination will have to be estab-
lished in due course if the EMU is to work, as national politics will
become increasingly irrelevant and incapable of achieving the co-
ordination necessary to compensate for the varying impact of a single
currency on different countries and regions.23
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A major argument for the EMU is that it permits the single market to
function better. Previously, a depreciation by one country meant a
commensurate competitive advantage for its exporters vis-à-vis a EU
country whose currency had not changed in value. With inflation (though
not necessarily inflationary pressure) the same in different EMU coun-
tries under one currency, depreciation by some can no longer develop
over time. Trade and investment are likely to grow more quickly in an
atmosphere of currency certainty, leading to more efficient economies,
more employment and greater prosperity. EU enlargement, it is argued,
will enhance this effect further, just as the EU saw its economy revive in
the wake of earlier increases in its membership.
Finally, competition is believed to increase as people are supposed to
be better informed about price differences in different countries, say of
cars, causing prices to fall and consumption to rise. Tourism is undoub-
tedly becoming easier as the euro is the valid currency in many countries
of destination. Cross-border mergers and take-overs are already more
frequent, although not to the degree that many would have wished to see
as a sign of true European integration.
Capital has become easier and cheaper to come by, due to consolid-
ation in the financial sector. There are even attempts at mergers among
stock exchanges, even though differences in legislation and culture have
so far made their realisation difficult. In sum, the euro forces Euroland
firms to think in European terms when conducting business, something
that North American companies had to start doing already in the nine-
teenth century.24
EMU supporters go further. Euroland citizens, they say, are coming
closer, drawn together by the psychological impact of ‘one currency –
one destiny’. This facilitates the political unification sought through the
EMU. Political unification will in turn permit Europe to play the role it
might on the world stage – a rival to the US at times, an equal partner
and ally at others. Finally, proponents say, the euro is more stable and
better protected against world currency turmoil, now that it has a central
bank able to draw on all the national central banks under its authority.25
Monetary union without political union?
If the above describes the thinking of euro-enthusiasts in a nutshell, how
do those who are less convinced reason? For one thing, they doubt that
the peoples of Euroland are sufficiently close to each other, tempera-
mentally and politically, for economic federalism to be followed by
friction-free political federalism. They do not believe that Eurolanders
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are united enough to be able to stick to one and the same economic and
monetary policy and they fear international and domestic frictions such
an inability may engender – tensions that were previously avoided by
having each among them adapt the strength of their national currency to
their particular economic situation.
Before EMU, depreciations often paved the way for economic recovery
and ‘re-appreciation’ of the currency. Through appreciation, foreign
capital came in to supplement domestic capital, as did imports, thereby
taking some of the heat off the economy and dampening inflationary
pressure. Depreciation and appreciation of currencies, according to this
way of seeing things, permit relatively smooth adaptations to an altered
domestic or foreign economic environment. As neighbouring economies
grow in this stop-and-go fashion, they are also able to stimulate their
neighbours. Within an EMU such a corrective mechanism no longer
exists.
Even though trade is stimulated due to the absence of currency fluctu-
ations (since there is now only one currency), overall growth is hampered
by interest rates being too high for some countries (leading to economic
stagnation), too low for others (leading first to an overheated economy
and then to excessive contraction) and at the right level for just a few. If
it is too high for a major country, such as Germany or France, then that
country will be unable to pull out its smaller neighbours from a recession,
leading to prolonged weak growth for all.26 Some critics therefore con-
tend that the member countries of the EMU do not form an ‘optimal
currency area’.27
The main argument of the critics is that integration among sovereign
peoples must be first political, then monetary. They would presumably
have been less apprehensive if EU governments had stated their intention
first to aim for a true EU government, creating, for example, a bicameral
parliament with exclusive legislative powers over EU matters, before
going for a single currency.
The order of political union before economic union was the one chosen
in Philadelphia in May 1787, as representatives of thirteen American
states came together to amend the articles of the Confederation loosely
holding them together. By September, they found that they had drawn
up a constitution uniting them politically. Only three years thereafter, in
1790, did the newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, present a First Report on the Public Credit.
All obligations of the old Confederation, and the war debts of indivi-
dual states, could be exchanged for bonds of the new national govern-
ment. A national bank, quasi-public and patterned after the Bank of
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England, was to issue notes – eventually dollars – based on the public
debt. The Act creating the Bank of the United States was passed in 1791,
but it would take some thirty years until all the currencies of the several
states had ceased to be in circulation. Only in 1862 was a single currency
formally adopted. Full monetary integration was not achieved until
1913 with the creation of the Federal Reserve.
American monetary integration was possible because of the threat of
British invasion. The early prevalence of one language, English, was
certainly helpful as well. Decades of ‘national’ identity, not centuries as
in Europe, inspired the thirteen states. The expected expansion
westwards, requiring resources larger than could be mustered by
individual states alone, provided further impetus.
Differences between the EU and the United States
Monetary union survived in the United States due to the victory of the
Union in the Civil War and the gradual economic integration between
the states, facilitated by the elimination of the obstacles to interstate
trade and investment, and a highly mobile workforce.
Close to a fifth of all Americans move in a typical year from depressed
to more prosperous areas – whether from the east coast to California or
from the ‘rust-belt states’ in the north to the ‘sun-belt states’ in the south.
In total, 3 per cent of the national population, close to eight million
people, move officially every year from one state to another. Between
1990 and 1994 Utah saw a 24 per cent increase in the number of jobs, or
200,000. Colorado added 300,000, a 20-per-cent increase over the same
period. Between 1960 and 1990 the proportion of the US population
living in California rose by 37 per cent, and between 1980 and 1992 the
number of Californians grew by over 2 per cent per year. Conversely,
during the 1993–94 recession, 850,000 people left the state. The propor-
tion of the US population living in Florida almost doubled between 1960
and 1990, whereas the number of people living in New York fell by
more than one quarter. This kind of labour force mobility helps explain
why a single currency can function in the United States. People move
without hesitation to where the jobs are.
By contrast, only 0.1 per cent of the total EU population moved from
one country to another in 2000 and only 1.2 per cent changed region
within a country.28 It is difficult to imagine a mobility within Europe
similar to that in the United States without considerable political and
social upheaval, as most people out of work are not prepared to move
abroad or would not be able to find work abroad due to a lack of
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knowledge of the language of the country or countries where jobs might
be available. Although the European Union has taken important steps
towards ending the formal barriers which existed for citizens of any of
the member states to move to and live and work in another member
state, significant informal barriers remain. Linguistic and cultural differ-
ences are major impediments to wide-scale cross-country migration, and
the possibility of accumulated pension rights accruing from employment
in different countries is extremely limited, especially for ordinary workers.
With unemployment figures close to 10 per cent in many EU countries,
these countries ability to receive large numbers of foreign job-seekers is
restricted.
European mobility may of course increase over time. (It may also
become less important for economic growth as the latter is driven increas-
ingly by information and communications technologies, which reduce
the importance of geographical distance.) More retired people from
Northern Europe may seek out sunnier climes along the Mediterranean,
much as their American counterparts move to Florida. As the multi-
lingual workforce expands, more workers may find the attractions of
higher pay and the excitement of living in a different culture alluring.
However, this does not describe the Europe of today, where unemploy-
ment first and foremost hits those with less education. Europe cannot
yet rely on a pan-European labour force mobility anywhere near that of
the United States.29
Closely related to labour mobility is the degree of ‘flexibility’ of labour
markets, a theme raised in nearly every speech by ECB officials as they
exhort EMU governments to undertake ‘structural reform’ in order to
assist the euro. Most euro-zone countries have a panoply of labour
market regulations that tend to restrict economic growth. Costly social
programmes are financed by taxes that curtail business incentive. Gener-
ous payments to the jobless diminish their incentive to take up work.
The costs of lay-offs to employers discourage them from hiring in the
first place. Labour market flexibility in the UK and the US compare
favourably with that in Euroland on all these counts. Flexibility extends
beyond the labour market. The basic culture in the United States, and to
some extent the United Kingdom, observes the principle of government
non-interference in business life and encourages the seizing of business
opportunities and risk-taking more than is the case in most countries in
the euro-zone. (This may not always lead to higher lasting growth, how-
ever, as the various corporate scandals in the US in 2002 illustrated.)
Another difference between the EU and the United States is the com-
pensating effects of latter’s considerable fiscal transfers via its uniform
MUP_Torbion_07_Ch7 22/9/03, 1:51 pm146
147The European Union’s dilemma
income tax. As California grew in the 1987–91 boom-years, it contri-
buted nearly 17 per cent of additional federal tax revenue, raising its
percentage contribution to federal tax receipts from 12 to 13.4 per cent.
Conversely, during its economic crisis from 1991 to 1994, the state’s
share of increased federal tax revenue fell to just 8.1 per cent and its
share of the national burden declined to 12.5 per cent. If California’s tax
share had stayed unchanged during the period in question, its 1994
federal tax payments would have been $11 billion higher than they
actually became. This $11-billion decline is equivalent to roughly $350
per capita in tax relief. Thus, many of the stabilising properties of the
progressive tax system in the United States manifest themselves in an
automatic regional redistribution of the income tax burden through the
high mobility of the workforce. In other words, states within the United
States are assisted in overcoming recessions by contributing less to the
federal budget, while states with a growing economy pay more. In addition,
the federal government makes large transfers to individual states in the
form of grants and aid programmes, further equalising conditions among
them.
Europe, by contrast, has no such automatic fiscal transfer mechanism.
Labour mobility is much lower. Furthermore, the budget of the Euro-
pean Community is much smaller (when compared with the combined
GDP of EU member states) – about 1.2 per cent – than the US federal
budget, which amounts to about 20 per cent of the country’s GDP. It is
true that EU expenditure does involve some transfer-oriented program-
mes, such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the various regional
funds. But this is little by comparison, apart from the fact that the
destination of this type of EU funding does not change readily along
with recessions in individual regions. Overall, Europe lacks the kind of
automatic stabilising properties which a unified fiscal mechanism affords
the United States as an alternative to exchange rate variations. (This
invites the argument that the EU should as soon as possible try to unify
itself fiscally. However, as we have seen, formidable political obstacles
stand in the way of any rapid development in this direction.)
The stabilising properties of a currency zone-wide fiscal process are
thus not in place in Europe. Nor are they likely to be so in the near
future, given the reluctance of EU member states to increase the insti-
tution’s budget. Indeed, the EU 2003 budget of around €100 billion is
practically the same in real terms as that in 1996, and the EU is agreed
that this should remain the case for the years to come.30
Significant fiscal flexibility is difficult under EMU, unless a country
has built up a solid budgetary position in the past, such as by having
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shown budget surpluses in years of strong growth. The Stability and
Growth Pact foresees fines of up to half a percentage point of GDP on
any EMU country that goes beyond a maximum 3-per-cent budget
deficit in other than exceptional circumstances or for a brief period.
(This is necessary for the value of the euro to be maintained. An example
of what could happen was given in the spring of 1999 – a few months
after the introduction of the euro – when Italy was given permission by
the other EMU members to go slightly beyond its original budget deficit
forecast. Even though the deficit was less than the maximum 3 per cent,
the move caused the euro to fall sharply vis-à-vis the dollar.)
The concerns about inflation and solidarity among the Euroland
countries as regards fiscal orthodoxy are understandale. Yet it is difficult
to see the sinning country, already in economic difficulties, readily agree
to pay a fine of the order foreseen, since it would a priori take away even
more purchasing power from its citizens and risk channelling popular
fury against ‘Brussels’ or Frankfurt (where the ECB is based).
Europe’s low birth rates and rapidly ageing population also pose a
danger to the stability of the euro. As fewer people in active ages have to
support more, and longer-living, old-age pensioners (including a
growing number of early retirees), public finances in Euroland countries
will come under great strain, starting around 2010. The situation is
aggravated by the fact that almost all the EMU countries rely almost
exclusively on taxpayer-financed, ‘pay-as-you-go’ types of pension
systems. Either taxes will have to rise to much higher levels, impeding
growth, or government spending will have to be drastically cut, threat-
ening social peace.
Furthermore, since the single currency has locked the economies of
the EMU countries together, increased pensions payments in a country
in a demographic crisis, such as for example Italy, will raise inflation
also in a country with a younger population, such as Ireland. If, say,
France spends its way into a deep deficit to assist an ageing population,
Dutch homebuyers may end up paying higher mortgage interest, since
big government budget deficits tend to raise interest rates by increasing
competition for capital. Ireland and the Netherlands may protest, but
there will be little they can do, since Italy and France are sovereign in
their budgetary decisions – the EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact not-
withstanding. Governments in Europe, especially those resulting from
coalitions or with weak majorities, are more likely than not to delay or
dilute the necessary reforms. The cart of Euroland-wide single currency
management may well find itself put before, not the horse but the
horses, of national politics.
MUP_Torbion_07_Ch7 22/9/03, 1:51 pm148
149The European Union’s dilemma
An ‘exit risk’ would likely be exacted by the financial markets, were
ever any doubt to arise as regards the future of the EMU as such. As long
as monetary union is not accompanied by political union, the risk of
such doubt occurring cannot be ruled out. Two scenarios are possible. In
the first, economic difficulties, especially high unemployment, lead to a
political sea change in a major euro-country and therefore to popular
pressure within it to leave the EMU.31 In the second, though less likely
scenario, a given country develops such high budget deficits in spite of
the Stability and Growth Pact that others insist that it leave. In either
event, there would be a massive flight of capital from the country in
question. This would lead to downward pressure on the euro in all the
participating countries and to general confusion in all areas of economic
life, not least as assets or debts in the currency will have no clearly
defined national domicile.32
It remains to be seen whether, as a result of EMU, the peoples of
Euroland will start moving internationally to a greater extent. Perhaps
the unstoppable rise of English as the world’s, and Europe’s, lingua
franca even for the less educated will help reduce linguistic, and perhaps
even cultural, barriers to migration.33 Perhaps the single currency will
eventually bring about a more federal Europe, with a more centralised
fiscal policy. Perhaps such a larger fiscal role for the EU could then
become more of a regional stabiliser to assist countries or regions in
recession, even though it is unclear whether and how this could apply in
those EU countries which do not participate in the EMU. It also remains
to be seen how the peoples of the EU would react to such a development.
The EMU gamble
The EMU countries of the European Union showed considerable courage
in going for the single currency in 1999. Monetary unification was
sought before political unification – a feat which had never succeeded in
the past (the most notable attempt being the ineffectual and eventually
collapsed Latin Monetary Union among a few European countries from
1865 to 1925).34 Furthermore, EMU countries were not very integrated
economically, since the EMU ‘convergence criteria’ dealt exclusively
with ‘expressions’ of economic performance (so-called ‘nominal conver-
gence’), and not with ‘indications of true convergence’, such as similar
unemployment rates. Finally, EMU was started in the absence of two
major instruments to manage it: high labour mobility, and a central
fiscal authority with efficient means at its disposal.
Should the above-mentioned arguments have been sufficient cause for
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the EU not to attempt or to abandon the EMU project, at least at this
stage in European history? The alternative would have been to go on
living with a single market – malfunctioning in the absence of a single
currency. Complaints would have continued over excessive exchange
fees charged by banks and over exchange rate instability.
However, critics of EMU maintain that the status quo of using
different currencies should have been kept, considering the present early
state of European political integration and economic convergence. The
Internal Market would still have functioned, they say, even with the
handicap of occasional currency swings between EU members, and it
would not have been divided between the twelve in Euroland and the
three outside it. Countries could have depreciated their currency, but
they would have had much less leeway to do so in an effort to gain
competitive advantage. Depreciation would not have been undertaken
principally for the purpose of gaining competitive advantage, but simply
to help the national economy adapt to new circumstances. Furthermore,
countries could first have concentrated on internal structural reform in
their economies to create real convergence among them, and only then
entered into a single currency with all the further economic and political
convergence it would require.
One reason why countries today behave much more responsibly with
their currencies – and hence why the EU might have been able to live
also without an EMU – is that the confidence of international markets in
an excessively and continuously depreciating country evaporates
quickly, causing capital flight and reducing foreign investment. This
factor is far more important today than in, say, the 1960s, when capital
was much less internationally mobile. Another is that a country which is
tempted to depreciate for reasons of competitive advantage is also likely
to have a considerable government debt, much of it incurred in foreign
currency and owed foreign lenders. Depreciations thus add to the public
debt, providing a further disincentive to follow this path. In short,
countries are much less prone to engage in currency depreciation for
‘frivolous’ or ‘disloyal’ reasons today than in the past.
Critics of the EMU are not necessarily defenders of large numbers of
small currencies, especially within an intensely trading community such
as the EU. They do, however, point to a number of advantages. First, the
currency is managed – at least formally (and that is important) – by the
people of the country, for even an independent central bank is accoun-
table before it. Second, on a more practical level, a depreciating currency
of a country with a weak economy can gain certain export advantages
and will import less, permitting the economy to recover, the currency to
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appreciate, exports to be reduced and imports to rise. Conversely, a
country with a strong economy, and an appreciating currency will,
allowing for time lag, normally see its exports decrease and its imports
rise, reducing the risk of overheating. The resulting downturn in the
economy will restore the ‘natural’ value of the currency vis-à-vis others.
Trade predictability will suffer – perhaps therefore trade itself. How-
ever, in a community of nations with low labour mobility and many
different languages, this may be the lesser of two evils.
The debate between those in favour of a single currency for the EU
and those against it is, of course, now water under the bridge as far as
the twelve Euroland countries are concerned. However, the pros and
cons still matter for those three EU countries – the United Kingdom,
Denmark and Sweden – which are still outside it and for all the candi-
date countries preparing to join the EU and, hence eventually, the EMU.
The European Central Bank: independence versus accountability
The European Central Bank (or, more precisely, the European Central
Bank and the European System of Central Banks) is meant to operate in
complete independence. This had been at German insistence, reflecting
that country’s traumatic experience with inflation in the 1920s and the
success of its post-World War II economic recovery, which to a large
degree had been built on Bundesbank independence and a strong
Deutschmark. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France,
had had a somewhat different tradition implying a certain, but not total,
independence of their central banks vis-à-vis the government and parlia-
ment. (Now, however, both countries, along with others, have given
their central banks much greater independence, in part to satisfy EMU
requirements.) The justification for central bank independence is that
politicians may otherwise be tempted to have central banks ease money-
supply conditions as a painless (but often ultimately self-defeating) way
to overcome a recession, or to win an impending election.
A careful balance has, in fact, to be observed between central bank
independence to prevent manipulation of the economy for political ends
and the people’s need to keep any institution set up to govern it accoun-
table before the electorate (this latter being the touchstone of democracy).
The challenge facing the countries participating in the EU single
currency is therefore one of developing post-Maastricht rules for the
European Central Bank which successfully balance accountability and
independence. This, of course, is rendered more difficult at the present
time, since the political structure of the EU is itself in rapid evolution.
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Ultimately, responsibility and accountability to the public at large are
the things that matter. Accountability to intermediary institutions that
do not themselves possess the legitimacy given by public accountability
will not be enough.
Accountability and independence should not be seen as polar oppo-
sites. In a democracy, any central bank or monetary policy institution
which stresses only its independence and ignores its ultimate accounta-
bility to the body politic may soon find its independence at risk. The
basis of central bank independence is the role it can play in correcting
some imperfections in the normal democratic process. However, such
independence is granted democratically, temporarily and continually by
virtue of that process. There is currently a great deal of argument among
policymakers in favour of central bank independence as thus defined,
but such independence must ultimately be subordinated to the higher
principle of accountability before the people.
How democratic, or accountable, is the European Central Bank (ECB)?
Its President and the members of the Executive Board are appointed by
the heads of state or government of the member states, after consulta-
tion of the European Parliament. The President of the ECB reports
regularly on the system’s operations, and the ECB issues an annual
report. The ECB President also appears before the European Parliament
to explain the policy followed. Transparency of ECB policy is further
enhanced by the provision that the President of the EU’s so-called
ECOFIN Council (of European Union Ministers of Economy and Finance)
and a member of the European Commission may attend meetings of the
ECB’s Governing Council, albeit without voting rights, just as the ECB
President can attend ECOFIN meetings.
However, it is doubtful whether this amounts to sufficient democratic
control. Governments, who are two steps away from the people (the
parliament being one step away), scarcely possess sufficient democratic
credibility in this arena, especially when they have to share their influ-
ence over the ECB with the governments of other EMU participants. The
European Parliament – which is democratically elected but which does
not have the same legislative function in the European Union as a
national parliament – is not in a position to fill the gap.35
This can lead to problems. To the extent that the ECB will eventually
be forced to follow strict monetary policies, these will easily form the
object of national and populist anger at being governed not by one’s
national capital where there is direct democratic representation – say,
Paris or Madrid – but by a distant Frankfurt where the ECB is based. No
longer would the blame be laid at the national door, but at those of
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Frankfurt, ‘Brussels’ or fellow EMU countries. To this should be added
the risk of fines of the order of billions of euros imposed on countries
found in violation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Even if it is not the
European Central Bank that decides on such fines, it would risk being
associated with them in the minds of ordinary people. ‘Enough Brussels
and Frankfurt!’ could easily become a rallying cry for populist movements.
The euro from 1999 to 2003
As already indicated, the euro started out as a strong currency, standing
at €1.18 to the dollar at its launch in January 1999. Already by April 1999
– four months into the EMU – difficulties started to emerge. Ireland,
whose economy looked as if it might be overheating, would presumably
have wished a rise in the ECB’s 3-per-cent policy-setting interest rate
then in force. Others, and especially Germany, wanted to avoid the risk
of sinking into renewed recession and would have been in greater need
of a rate cut. In the end, the ECB lowered the interest rate to 2.5 per cent
in April 1999, hoping that it would help to revive in particular the
German economy. The ECB warned, however, that no further lowering
would be forthcoming within the foreseeable future, and that Euroland
governments would now have to start in earnest with structural reform
to stimulate growth.
The value of the euro sank from about €1.18 at the currency’s launch
to around parity with the greenback by mid-1999. Among other things,
there were doubts about ECB independence in the wake of calls by
several Euroland governments for lower rates, but also in view of (in
comparison to the US) lower economic growth in the region and the
approval by the EU–Eleven of a larger budget deficit for Italy than
financial markets would have preferred. The conflict over Kosovo in the
spring and summer of 1999 also hurt the euro, as the whole stability of
Europe was called into question. Later in 1999 it recovered somewhat
following the return to peace in Kosovo and more optimistic economic
forecasts in such key countries as Germany and France.
However, by May the following year, 2000, the euro had sunk well
below parity with the dollar, to around 90 cents. The decline reflected
lacklustre performance of the Euroland economies and pessimistic
forecasts; perceived interference by politicians in attempting to influence
ECB policies; and the continued vigour of the US economy, leading to
the continued popularity of dollars in the currency markets. The euro’s
depreciation helped exports but also raised inflation due to higher
import prices. Markets seemed to demand far-reaching structural reform
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in Euroland and insist that policymakers speak with a single voice on
monetary matters rather than in a cacophony of often conflicting state-
ments. Markets also appeared to react to various political or social crises
in EMU countries. It seemed exceedingly difficult to ‘talk up’ the euro
and all too easy to ‘talk it down’. The weakness of the euro stood in
stark contrast to the ECB policy-setting interest rate, which by April
2000, had been raised successively to 3.75 per cent, with further
increases held out.
The ECB now faced a dilemma. If it raised the interest rate to attract
investors, it would risk stifling for example the growth of the German
economy, the largest in Euroland. If it lowered it, the German engine
might go into higher gear, but already over-extended economies might
overheat and an already weakened euro slide even further. Exports
might increase, but with the US as the world’s only remaining ‘importer
of last resort’ this would add to that country’s already large trade deficit,
with negative consequences for the world economy.
The EMU suffered a further setback when, in a September 2000 refer-
endum in Denmark, 52 per cent of the population announced itself
against the country’s entry into the euro-zone. The Danish fears of losing
monetary, or even national, independence were somewhat illusory, since
the krone (unlike the Swedish krona or the British pound) closely followed
(± 2 per cent) the value fluctuations of the euro (also reflecting Den-
mark’s predominant trade links with Euroland). In mid-August 2000,
the euro stood at around $0.90, signifying a reduction of close to 25 per
cent from its initial $1.18. Exports from the EMU area were rising,
especially to the US with its strong dollar, but also to EMU ‘outs’ (or
‘pre-ins’) such as the United Kingdom, whose manufacturing industry
was complaining about lost exports to Euroland countries due to the
relatively stronger pound.
The euro had also weakened against an array of currencies around the
world not known for their strength. This was making Euroland imports
more expensive, especially products denominated in dollars such as oil.
Furthermore, in the absence of a country-specific interest rate weapon,
various EMU members such as Ireland, Spain and Portugal were experi-
encing inflation rates of over 5 per cent due to economic overheating,
while inflation in core countries like Germany and France was close to
or above the 2 per cent inflation limit established by the European
Central Bank as a trigger for interest rate hikes. The ECB interest rate
had been raised repeatedly in the spring and summer of 2000 to reach
4.25 per cent. Further increases looked necessary to stem inflation and
defend the currency’s value, not least in the face of capital leaving
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especially for the US with its higher (6.5 per cent) federal funds rate and
higher economic growth.
However, the export boom was contributing, at least temporarily, to
rapid economic growth in the EMU area (of between 3 per cent and 4
per cent in 2000) and a tangible reduction in unemployment (to less than
10 per cent). Many people were attributing the good times to the EMU
or had not started thinking about it, as they were still paying and being
paid in the national currencies, now truly only existing on paper.
Additionally, internal Euroland trade had grown more intense in the
two years of EMU existence, and a more integrated European financial
market, including that of London, had begun to emerge, making the
region less sensitive to external shocks. The EU’s work to harmonise
economic life in line with EMU requirements had also manifested itself
in an agreement to combat the evasion of taxes on interest income
(requiring member countries either to impose a withholding tax on
foreigners or to share information with these foreigners’ national tax
authorities) and a common company code meant to facilitate mergers.
In the early spring of 2001 – with the euro sinking toward the $0.85
level – the European Central Bank withstood pressure from EU govern-
ments, international institutions and financial markets that it lower its
policy-setting rate, in the meantime raised to 4.75 per cent, to prevent
Euroland from sliding into recession. The ECB’s argument was that
inflation was too high and risked rising further if the rate was lowered.
In May 2001, however, the ECB changed course and lowered the rate to
4.5 per cent, arguing that it had overrated actual inflation. Markets did
not take to this kindly and the euro weakened further to $0.83 in July,
but then firmed at around $0.90 during the autumn.36
The ECB’s dilemma perfectly illustrated the previously mentioned diffi-
culty of having one currency among politically independent countries
with, in addition, such widely divergent, perhaps even diverging, econo-
mies. For some, such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Finland, the interest
rate was too low and gave rise to inflation. For others, like Germany and
Italy, it was too high, jeopardising growth. Inflation in the former group
was so high as to pull Euroland-wide inflation up towards 3 per cent, past
the ECB’s self-imposed inflation limit of up 2 per cent (beyond which it had
decided it could not lower the ECB central rate). The ECB’s helplessness
now risked producing ‘stagflation’, in that the Euroland economy might
well stagnate even as it suffered inflation. Thus, in the spring of 2001, Ger-
many had both a slackening economy and an inflation close to 3 per cent.37
Neither the ‘bursting’ of the ‘new economy’ bubble as from the spring
of 2001, nor the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September
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the same year, could seriously dent the value of the dollar vis-à-vis the
euro. The US economy continued to attract foreign funds (in spite of
several US interest rate cuts to historically low levels that should in
theory have made the dollar less attractive). Investors were attracted by
the prospect of resumed high US growth after 11 September and were
further encouraged when this happened.
However, throughout the period of a strong dollar against the euro,
the Japanese yen and other currencies, lasting from early 2000 to the
middle of 2002, the US had accumulated a huge current account deficit
that made some kind of correction inevitable. It came in mid–2002,
when the euro rose to above parity with the dollar, in reaction to a series
of corporate scandals involving serious accounting irregularities, which
the markets felt had betrayed them.
The euro’s rise was in spite of indications that the requirement in the
EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact for a maximum 3 per cent budget deficit
might be difficult for some countries to meet. These included Germany,
France, Italy, Portugal and Greece, which all reported worsening pro-
spective deficits for 2002 close to the 3-per-cent level. Much discussion
in the EU’s Council of Ministers in early 2002 was devoted to whether
Germany and Portugal should be formally warned (in the end they were
not, despite urgings by the European Commission, which started an
‘excessive deficit procedure’ against Portugal in the summer of 2002,
after the country officially reported a 4.1-per-cent deficit for 2001).
There was also concern that France’s budget deficit might increase even
further as a result of promises by the new right-of-centre government
both to lower taxes and to increase expenditure.
The Stability and Growth Pact suffered a further setback when the
President of its prime guardian the European Commission, Romani
Prodi, called the Pact ‘stupid’.38 However, Prodi’s remark had the effect
of bringing on a debate about the value of the Pact in an economic
environment much less propitious than that which had prevailed at the
time of its conception in the 1990s. Even though the Pact was meant to
be ‘pro-cyclical’ – that is, have governments reach budget surpluses in
fat years to be used up in lean years – this did not happen, since govern-
ments have a tendency to want to be re-elected. The result was that in
bad times, when deficit spending would be needed, the Pact would
largely forbid it. Still, a number of adaptations to the Pact were possible.
One would be to have the deficit limit apply only over an entire econo-
mic cycle (from the boom stage to the recession stage) of, say, four or
five years, rather than each year. Another would be to define an
acceptable size of a country’s deficit when compared to its national debt
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(which would land, for instance, Italy in a much stickier situation than
say, Ireland) and that borrowing should be allowed outside the deficit
calculation for infrastructure investment.
In late 2002 the ECB lowered its policy-setting interest rate from 3.25
per cent to 2.75 per cent, the lowest in three years. The reduction took
place even as inflation in the euro-zone stood at above the 2-per-cent
limit, beyond which the ECB had said it would not lower interest rates.
The action was largely in deference to Germany, whose economic
situation had continued to deteriorate. The economy had barely grown
in 2002, while the budget deficit had soared to 3.7 per cent, well above
the Pact’s 3-per-cent limit. A number of smaller European countries with
stronger or indeed overheating economies had to bite the bullet, even
though a lower rate would result in even higher inflationary pressure
there. Their acceptance was also a consequence of their lesser influence
in the ECB Executive Board when compared to the bigger countries, and
because a further weakening of the German economy, the biggest in
Euroland, would soon spell trouble also for them.
Shortly thereafter the European Commission started an ‘excessive
deficit procedure’ also against Germany, which was now in a bind.
Unemployment was bound to rise, leading to less tax income and greater
unemployment expenditure. Government cutbacks to reduce the deficit
would further dampen economic activity. Devaluation was not a possi-
bility in a currency union. Deficit spending à la Keynes to kick-start the
economy was impossible under the Stability and Growth Pact. No relief
via exports could be expected, given the euro’s firming against the dollar.
Exports to other countries in the euro-zone might eventually accelerate
due to the lower inflationary pressure in Germany (1.3 per cent in 2002)
when compared to, say, Spain (4 per cent in 2002), but then Spanish
inflationary pressure would in the end also seep into Germany, as hap-
pens in any currency union over time, thus reducing that advantage.39
Finally, the German reforms needed – deregulating the labour market,
cutting the cost of health care, overseeing the pensions system, reducing
payroll taxes and decentralising wage bargains – would take consider-
able time in a country which had made social solidarity a central part of
its post-war reconstruction.
France’s economy was still holding up reasonably well, with growth at
around 1 per cent in 2002 and a budget deficit approaching but not yet
exceeding 3 per cent. This, however, caused the European Commission to
issue an ‘early warning’, especially after France made a cavalier announ-
cement that its ability to reduce its deficit would depend on how fast its
economy grew.
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Italy showed similar figures, but its government debt of 110 per cent
of GDP made its situation uncomfortable. The European Commission
complained about a ‘lack of information’ about many economic aspects.
With growth slowing ominously and deficits rising in the three dominant
euro-zone economies – Germany, France and Italy – overall prospects
were bleak, even as virtually all the other members of Euroland showed
budgets in balance or in surplus.
The euro by early 2003 had risen further, reflecting, however, more the
dollar’s weakness than any inherent strength in the Euroland economy. The
dollar suffered from fears for the US economy against the prospect of a
looming invasion of Iraq, for which the US was the leading proponent;
the large US current account deficit; and US economic growth which,
though higher than that of Euroland, was slowing down considerably.
A pattern was developing in 2003, in which the European Commission
and the European Central Bank – joined by ‘behaving’ countries such as
Ireland and Finland with balanced or surplus budgets – would call on
‘sinning’ EMU governments to cut deficits and pursue ‘structural reform’,
with the latter reporting difficulties and asking for postponement of the
2004 deadline when the budgets of all would have to be in, or close to
balance (a deficit of not more than 0.5 per cent). The postponement was
duly granted by the Commission in September 2002, when it extended
the deadline to 2006, while calling on countries to reduce ‘structural
deficits’ (that is, those not depending on countries’ position in the busi-
ness cycle). The Commission’s retreat was all the more understandable
as Euroland as a whole showed a 2-per-cent combined deficit in 2002, a
situation which would have made a return to balanced national budgets
by 2004 an impossible task.
As a result of these difficulties, the Commission suggested a bigger
role for itself in determining EMU policies. Thus its ‘recommendations’
to Euroland governments should become ‘proposals’, which could be
adopted through a simple, instead of a qualified, majority in the EU’s
Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the informal euro-group of EMU
Finance Ministers should receive a more official status and its chairman-
ship should be prolonged from six months to two years. EMU member
states, anxious to preserve their freedom of action, reacted coolly to these
ideas. In sum, the Commission’s proposals illustrated the difficulties,
referred to earlier, of reconciling the requirements for highly co-
ordinated management of a currency area with the present nation-based
running of the central aspects of the EMU. Presumably, the greater the
difficulties the euro may face in future, the greater the need (as apart,
perhaps, from the wish) will be to entrust its management to the EU. 40
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However, another development is possible, under which the Commiss-
ion, under pressure from countries with embarrassing budget deficits,
will increasingly ‘look the other way’ in awareness of its powerlessness
to ‘force’ sovereign countries back on to the straight and narrow. This
would of course meet with protests from euro-zone countries showing
fiscal rectitude, but they would be powerless to do much more than
shout. Whether this would necessarily hurt the euro is not clear, since
financial markets are more pragmatic than doctrinaire and may
welcome an occasional vivifying shot of good old Keynesian deficit-
spending in order to get an economy back on track.
EMU, the ‘outs’ and the others
Alongside the twelve EMU ‘ins’, three EU members have opted to stay
outside the single currency for the time being. The United Kingdom
under the Labour government under Tony Blair indicated its intention
to hold a referendum on the issue during the 2001–6 legislature, pro-
vided a number of criteria were considered to have been met as to whether
it was in the British interest to join.41 Denmark opted not to join follow-
ing a referendum in September 2001, in which a majority of voters
rejected membership. The Swedish government, after sticking to a ‘wait-
and-see’ attitude for several years, in 2002 announced that it would hold
a referendum in September 2003 to settle the matter. In the event of a
‘yes’, Sweden could be expected to join the EMU in 2006.
The single currency debate necessarily concerned also the rest of
Europe. European countries outside the EU were major trading partners
of the European Union. About half the exports and imports of the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland were to and from Austria, France,
Germany and the Benelux countries. The economies of an increasing
number of Central and Eastern European countries were by now highly
integrated into those of the EU. Trade with the EU and the four EFTA
countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) was prac-
tically liberalised, and the few remaining restrictions on capital flows no
longer constituted a serious constraint. The monetary and exchange rate
policies within the EMU area would therefore have a direct impact on
Central and Eastern European economies.
After EU candidates joined – ten being foreseen for membership in
2004 – they would be expected, in accordance with the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union, also to join the Economic and Monetary
Union – that is, have the euro replace their national currency. This
would take place after a two-year participation in the so-called ERM II
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(Exchange Rate Mechanism) of a maximum +/– 15-per-cent variation of
their national currency vis-à-vis the euro.
This would not be an easy operation, however. Firstly, the euro might
suffer if international money markets feared for the economic stability
of an EMU candidate country, a situation that existing Euroland mem-
bers would want to avoid. Secondly, since growth rates were often
higher in candidate than EU countries (also because they grew from a
lower basis level), they had the choice of either accepting the resulting
appreciation of their currency vis-à-vis the euro and thereby enjoy lower
inflation, or keeping a firm exchange rate to the euro but instead suffer
higher inflation. The former course of action might make eventual entry
into the EMU more difficult by ‘locking’ the national currency to the
euro at too high a level at the moment of entry (thereby hurting exports).
Thirdly, the ECB’s decision-making bodies would have to be reformed
to avoid paralysis under a widened EMU membership.42 Finally, joining
the EU would necessitate considerable public investment and pension
reform, thereby making the Maastricht EMU criteria of a limited budget
deficit more difficult to reach. 43
With ten of the twelve EU candidate countries expected to join in
2004, it seemed realistic to foresee them joining the EMU at around
2008. Inflationary divergence – and resulting inner monetary tension –
in the thus enlarged Euroland could be expected to be even greater than
today.
Notes
1 From Praefatio 4 by Titus Livius, the Roman historian (59 bc–ad 17). The
Latin text reads: ‘Ab exiguis profecta initiis eo creverit, ut iam magnitudine
laboret sua’.
2 See Weiler, 1997.
3 The real power resides in the COREPER – subdivided into the COREPER II
for ambassadors dealing with the more important matters and the COREPER
I of their deputies, who take care of more technical subjects. They are
assisted by some 250 working parties in different subject areas.
4 Meeting between representatives of the German Länder and Romano Prodi,
President of the European Commission, as reported in the Neue Zürcher
Zeitung on 26 May 2000.
5 For a more detailed discussion of the growing power of the European Parlia-
ment, see Neuhold (2000).
6 Some, such as Westlake (1998, p. 127) are more optimistic as regards the
development towards democracy in the EU. He sees the European Parliament
as asserting increasing control powers over the Commission and as sharing
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more and more influence with the Council of Ministers through the gradual
extension of its budgetary powers and the ‘co-decision procedure’ obtained
in the Amsterdam Treaty in particular. All three institutions have had to
become increasingly transparent in the process, helped by technological
advances such as the internet. New members such as Sweden and Finland
with their traditions of openness in public affairs are also, in his view,
contributing to this trend. Indeed, he says, with more and more EU members,
the Council of Ministers is increasingly becoming a kind of assembly, or
senate, with meetings involving over 75 people more akin to a ‘station con-
course’ (and correspondingly open). He sees a constant dialectic in the EU
between ‘effective government’ and ‘democratic government’, with trade-
offs having been traditionally in favour of the former but with the tide now
turning. Indeed, he argues, the Commission always ‘knew that its unaccounta-
bility was an aberration … No bureaucracy, however enlightened, could act
in the absence of political authority. The Commission sought out the
democratic legitimacy of the Parliament, much as plants seek out the light; in
the longer term, it knew that the Commission could not survive without it.’
7 Members of the European Parliament have no real home constituencies, as
do national parliamentarians. The Council of Ministers, for its part, has, with
its fifteen members, long ceased to be a forum for real debate, as opening
statements alone during the customary one-day ministerial meetings may
take up to three hours to read out. Most Council decisions are pre-prepared
by powerful and unaccountable civil servants. Extensive veto or blocking
powers by no more than a few countries (even after the December 2000 Nice
Summit) cause many issues to be postponed, even as, at national level,
decisions in the areas concerned are postponed on the grounds of ‘waiting
for the EU’. That the Council of Ministers has evolved in this way is not only
due to Parkinson’s Law (Parkinson, 1957), but also to the fact that it is not
directly accountable to any electorate, with national governments being able
to ‘blame Brussels’.
8 This raises the question as to whether the EU should have a constitution or
not, and whether it is indeed sufficiently united to be able to forge one – a
subject to which we shall return in a later chapter. A constitution would
have to address not only democracy in the Union government itself, but also
the rights of member states vis-à-vis the Union. What rights should member
states have as against perceived encroachments on their powers by the
‘centre’? Should they have the same rights of ‘nullification’ as US states enjoy
in regard to Washington? Should an EU majority – in the European Parliament
or the Council of Ministers – be enough on matters vital to member states,
or should an additional ‘second majority’ be required among the individual
member states through parliamentary approval – or through referenda such
as in Switzerland?
9 The philosophy behind the creation of the Commission is not, in fact, so dis-
similar to that of the Gosplan in the Soviet Union at the time. A predominant
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belief in the 1950s was in uniformisation. This notion is, however, ill-fitting
in an era when the world economy is fuelled by decentralisation and diversi-
fication.
10 Featherstone (1994, p. 165) concludes that: ‘[Jean] Monnet’s original concep-
tion of an elitist, technocratic High Authority to lead integration has been
found wanting. The very form of today’s EC Commission weakens its
capacity to exert political leadership. It is too vulnerable to attack, as a
result of its lack of accountability and democratic legitimacy … In different
senses, the Commission has been overtaken by the progress of integration:
more intensified forms of integration highlight the Commission’s lack of
democratic legitimacy; all too often it is not up to the job of exerting
political leadership.’
11 It could be argued that, for instance, the Bundeskartellamt is equally power-
ful within Germany. However, the Bundeskartellamt is under the control of
a directly elected German Parliament with exclusive legislative powers over
its statutes and operations.
12 In 1996 the Commission allowed Saxony to give a limited subsidy to Volks-
wagen. The conflict erupted when Saxony was felt to have given too big a
subsidy. In its verdict of December 1999, the European Court of Justice’s
Court of First Instance supported the Commission’s refusal to allow any
additional subsidy to Volkswagen in Saxony. Since then, Germany and other
EU countries have repeatedly insisted on their right to subsidise companies
in difficulties, especially in suffering regions, and the Commission’s statutory
obligation to try to prevent them has been used by politicians for electoral
‘Brussels-bashing’ purposes. Often, the Commission has in the end permitted
reduced subsidies rather than take the recalcitrant country to the European
Court of Justice.
13 This is in no way meant to call into question the dedication or competence
of those who work for the European Commission. Many of the achievements
which Europe takes for granted today would not have come about, at least
not so early, without the Commission. The work continues. The Commission
is the driving force in many areas, among which can be mentioned the
liberalisation of the energy sector leading to lower prices, foreseen by 2004
for businesses and by 2007 for consumers; the introduction of a single air
traffic management for civil aviation, reducing delays; the creation of a
single capital market, reducing borrowing costs; and anti-trust legislation to
increase competition.
14 In October 2000 the European Court of Justice overturned the EU ban on
advertisements for tobacco. The Commission had argued that the ban would
facilitate trade. Not so, said the Court, maintaining that it rather hindered
than helped the trade objective. Undeterred, the European Commission,
which had proposed the ban, said it would think of new ways to reduce
tobacco consumption (even as the EU gives €1 billion in yearly subsidies to
its tobacco growers). In May 2001 it returned with another proposal for an
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EU-wide ban on virtually all forms of tobacco advertising and sponsoring of
events by tobacco companies. In December 2002 the EU adopted a directive
meeting most of the Commission’s demands, against the opposition of the
United Kingdom and Germany. The ban would take effect in 2005.
15 The need for impartiality becomes acute in such an instance of Commission
unaccountability. In March 2000, for instance, the Volvo truck division
wanted to merge with the Scania truck division, but the request was turned
down by the Commission, which argued that the merger would give the new
company too dominant a position in Scandinavia. The Swedes complained,
however, that earlier Renault–Iveco and Mercedes–Kässbohrer mergers had
been approved, even though they meant a similar or even greater domination
over parts of the EU market. In other words, what drives the Commission in
the absence of any democratic accountability? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
The answer came in 2002, when the European Court of First Instance
(established in 1994 to relieve the European Court of Justice of some of its
workload) issued two verdicts overturning merger vetoes pronounced by the
Commission. The Court’s complaints – that the Commission had based its
decisions on insufficient analysis – caused a crisis within the Commission
and calls for an overhaul of its working methods in this area.
16 The same can, of course, be said about the Council of Europe’s European
Court of Human Rights, with the exception that this body is meant to deal
with alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined in
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Yet when it comes to its judgements on corporal punishment in schools or
parental spanking of children, it, too, has aroused much controversy in, for
example, the UK.
17 Greenwood (1998, p 587) refers to 700 ‘Euro groups’, mostly based in Brussels,
together with a variety of less formal collectives, 200 firms with their own
Brussels-based public affairs capacities, and a cluster of around 25 public
affairs consultancies operating from the Belgian capital. Such ‘overcrowded
lobbying’ raises the issue not only of possible ‘lobbying abuses’ but also
‘broader concerns in European public governance, including key concerns
regarding the democratic deficit, the management structures and capacities
of European institutions themselves, and standards of decision-making’.
18 Interview in Le Figaro of 17 June 1999. Prodi, asked whether his Commis-
sion would be ‘a government or rather an administration at European level’,
answered: ‘A government, of course’. He also said: ‘The Commission will be
a team inspired by the same philosophy, like a government cabinet. Not a
Commission of left or right, but a European Commission’. Some observers
will support such a stance. Toulemon (1998, p. 121), for one, argues: ‘Nomin-
ated by the governments of the member states for a limited period, most
frequently drawn from the political milieu, collectively responsible before
the European Parliament which, since Maastricht, approves their nomina-
tion; members of the European Commission enjoy the same democratic
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legitimacy as government ministers nominated by a head of state and
responsible before a parliament … The truth is that the Commission is con-
stantly done down by those who do not wish to see Europe equipped with a
true government, effective and legitimate.’
19 Greece was admitted to the EMU in spite of its not meeting some of the so-
called ‘convergence criteria’. Thus, its debt-to-GDP ratio in 2000 stood at
104 per cent, far above the required 60 per cent (although exceptions had
been made also for other EMU members before it). Furthermore, inflation
had been brought down to 2 per cent, but there were questions as to whether
this could be sustained. Finally, the Greek economy was considered as still in
need of structural reform, especially in the highly regulated markets for
certain goods and services. However, joining the euro was seen in Greece as
an important political commitment that would speed up the modernisation
of the country’s economy.
20 One of the reasons for success in reaching the start of the EMU was that
there was never any fall-back position if preparations had run into serious
trouble, such as if pressures on candidate currencies became unbearable. The
same holds now that the euro exists. There was no clause in the Maastricht
Treaty foreseeing any way out for countries, individually or collectively,
from the euro. The reason for the absence of any ‘retreat position’ on the
part of EU governments (such as postponement) was, of course, that this
would have whetted the appetite of speculators from the start.
21 EU parlance speaks about the countries participating in the EMU as the
‘ins’, whereas those outside are referred to as the ‘pre-ins’ or the ‘outs’.
22 The Stability and Growth Pact foresees fines of up to half a percentage point
of GDP on any EMU country that goes beyond a maximum 3-per-cent budget
deficit in other than exceptional circumstances (a systemic shock or a severe
recession) or for a brief period. This is necessary for the value of the euro to be
maintained. It also obliges participating countries to reach close to balanced
budgets by 2004, a deadline which the Commission in 2002 said could be post-
poned until 2006, provided a standby reduction was reached in the meantime
in that part of the budget which did not depend on conjunctural factors (‘struc-
tural deficit’). The Commission speaks about a ‘breathing budget’, which would
make the Stability and Growth Pact less of a straitjacket. The possibility
cannot be excluded that EMU members will introduce a new and looser
definition of ‘government spending’ if deficits continue to be embarrassing
for some among them. One option would be to exclude public investment,
on the understanding that it would both stimulate the economy à la Keynes
and permit stronger economic growth in future via improved infrastructure.
23 In a sign of growing influence by Brussels, EU Finance Ministers in February
2000 agreed to let the Commission frame the circumstances in which a
member state can change its mix of tax and spending policies. In particular,
‘pro-cyclical’ tax cuts that fuel inflation in an already overheating economy
were ruled out.
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24 However, in July 2001 the European Parliament rejected a legislative proposal
that would have considerably facilitated cross-border company takeovers,
including hostile offers, by making such bids conditional on agreement by
the management of the targeted company. While this was seen by some as
preserving a bulwark against American-style capitalism, to others it was
considered contrary to the implications of the EU Internal Market and the
single currency. At the same time the European Commission blocked a
takeover bid by General Electric vis-à-vis Honeywell on the grounds that it
would overly restrict competition, not by control over a given market but by
the presumed dominance, through subsidiaries, of several markets. This did
not go down well with the Americans, whose antitrust legislation (court-
based rather than Commission-led) tends to be more strictly oriented
towards consumer (as opposed to competitors’) interests.
25 This indeed turned out to be the case even before monetary union in the
latter half of 1998. The prospective ‘Euroland’ was scarcely affected by the
Russian or the Brazil currency crises, and this held also for weaker currencies
such as the Italian lira. It continued to be the case in the 1999–2002 period, in
the face of major fluctuations in the value of the US dollar and Japanese yen.
26 To use an allegory, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ interest rate is like having twelve
people wear same-size suits. For some their suit is too big and for others too
small. All in these two groups will be hindered in their walking. Only for a
few of the remaining twelve will the size be comfortable and the walking
unhindered, but they risk being slowed down by the others, since all now
have to walk in tandem.
27 Growth rates in the EMU area in the 1999–2002 period seem to bear this
out. Average GDP growth was only slightly over 2 per cent, compared to
about 3.5 per cent for the United States and around 2.5 per cent for the
biggest non-EMU member state of the EU, the United Kingdom. (Source:
OECD Economic Outlook.)
28 Source: European Commission.
29 The European Commission in 2002 recommended that EU member states
increase labour mobility by, for instance, making it easier to collect pensions
and unemployment benefits in countries other than one’s own, by introducing
an EU-wide health card that would speed up reimbursement for medical
expenses and by creating a central information office for jobs across the EU.
30 The European Council in 2000 fixed the annual EU budget for the 2002–6
period at around €100 billion, or about 1.2 per cent of the EU GDP.
31 An example was the unexpected advance to the second round in the French
presidential election in the spring of 2002 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader
of the extreme right Front National party. Le Pen said he wanted, if elected,
to take France out of the EMU. In this case, however, the euro did not
weaken noticeably, since the left-of-centre voters immediately shifted their
allegiance from the defeated candidates in the first round (especially Lionel
Jospin) to the Gaullist candidate Jacques Chirac, who was thereby assured a
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large victory. There is no guarantee, however, that such a propitious out-
come will always occur.
32 The European Central Bank (and the European System of Central Banks
which it heads) is much more decentralised than the US Federal Reserve. In
fact, it very much resembles the more decentralised Federal Reserve struc-
ture which was in place from 1913 to 1933 and which had to be abandoned
after the Depression in favour of a more centralised system. The ECB, unlike
the Fed, lacks four main competencies of a central bank – the latter being
still with the national central banks of EMU members. The four lacking
competencies are: a monopoly over the issuance of money; the right to set
refinancing interest rates on behalf of national central banks; the rejection of
insufficient securities for loans; and the ability instantly to supply the
totality of liquidity needed in a crisis situation. The ECB must therefore be
considered much more vulnerable than the Fed.
33 The EU of the fifteen member states has eleven official languages. There are
at present over a hundred different language combinations for translators
and interpreters. In the EU of twenty-five member states as from 2004 the
number will be over 300. Although German is the language most widely
spoken in the EU Fifteen (90 million people), its role in the EU is limited
when compared to English and French, with the former rapidly gaining
ground against the latter.
34 The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) entered into effect in 1866 and would in
due course include Belgium, France (the dominant member), Greece, Italy
and Switzerland. A ‘bimetallic’ treaty, it soon ran into severe difficulties
such as how to deal with the Austrian–Italian war in 1866 and the Franco–
German war of 1870–71 – let alone World War I, by which time it was
practically defunct. Vanthoor (1996, p. 37) sees the core problem of the LMU
as lying in the ‘insufficient convergence of the policies conducted by the
Member states. As a result, the country abiding by the rules most stringently
was inevitably flooded by the speculative capital flowing from Member
states whose currencies felt the pressure of their expansionary spending
policies.’ There were, apart from the LMU, also the lesser known – gold-
based and similarly inoperative – German–Austrian Monetary Union from
1857 to 1867 and the Scandinavian Monetary Union from 1872 to 1931.
35 The European Central Bank is not part of any government since no Euro-
pean government exists, nor is it truly answerable before the European
Parliament. Amtenbrink (1999), for one, deplores this lack of democratic
control and warns that: ‘Where power is delegated by the legislative or the
executive branch to independent bodies which are not considered as part of
a government, the traditional mechanisms of democratic accountability run
the danger of failing to a large extent, as the latter may be out of reach of
such mechanisms as democratic elections, answerability to Parliament, or
even control by the executive government.’
36 The European Central Bank’s mandate was, and is, exclusively to maintain
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price stability, soon defined as not tolerating inflation exceeding 2 per cent.
To measure current inflation and inflationary pressure in the short and
medium term, two pillars were to be used: monetary growth in the eurozone,
termed ‘M3’(monetary targeting); and a more broadly based assessment of
inflationary pressure (inflation targeting). The ECB had early on announced
that it would primarily be guided by M3 in determining its policy-setting
interest rates (as had been the policy of the German Bundesbank in the pre-
euro days). However, when the ECB lowered its central interest rate in April
1999, M3 growth stood at 4.5 per cent, well above the 2-per-cent inflation
limit. If anything, the ECB should have raised the interest rate, not reduced
it, even though a lowering stood to reason given the recessionary tendency in
Germany, the biggest euro-zone economy. The same contradiction between
announced criteria and actual policy was manifested on several occasions in
2000 and 2001, leaving financial markets unimpressed and contributing to
the euro’s slide against the dollar. However, it also signified a shift in ECB
policy toward ‘inflation targeting’, which may be considered a more flexible
and pragmatic approach under the circumstances. See, for instance, Econo-
mic Survey of Europe, of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (2000 No.1, pp. 35–7).
37 Unlike the ECB, the US Federal Reserve has a three-pillar mandate: checking
inflation, fighting unemployment and stimulating growth. Its freedom of
action is correspondingly wider.
38 Prodi said: ‘I know very well that the Stability Pact is stupid, like all decisions
that are rigid’.
39 In 2002 real interest rates, i.e. allowing for inflation, were negative in coun-
tries like Spain and Portugal, signifying that keeping money in the bank
there meant a loss for the depositor.
40 The European Commission in 2002 called on the EMU countries in particu-
lar to lower labour costs and integrate their markets for energy, communi-
cations and financial services. Tax reforms would have to be such as not to
worsen budget deficits. Public health reforms should reduce expenditure.
The Commission’s recommendations were adopted at the 2002 EU summit
in Seville, Spain, though in dilated form. Thus France made its compliance
with the 2004 goal for a balanced budget conditional on sufficient economic
growth (3 per cent), which, apart from being somewhat unrealistic, also
opened up loopholes for others.
41 The five ‘tests’ to be made before the British government would decide to
hold a referendum and recommend British entry into the EMU were (1) that
the British economy was converging with that of the EMU area; (2) that it
would remain capable of responding flexibly to outside shocks; (3) that the
euro was proven to benefit investment; (4) that it was shown to assist financial
services and especially the city of London; and (5) that it would promote
employment.
42 Up until enlargement, the ECB’s Governing Council would have eighteen
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members: one from each national central bank in the European System of
Central Banks plus the six members of the ECB Executive Board. After
enlargement to twenty-five EU states and assuming EMU membership for all
new members, the Governing Council would have twenty-eight members. If
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom were to join, the number would
be thirty-one. Given the major difficulty of making such a numerous body
function, the ECB in 2002 floated a proposal foreseeing a system of ‘weighted
voting’, according to factors such as the size of a member country’s economy,
its contribution to ECB resources, and a sub-division into two – and with
further enlargement eventually three – ‘groups’ of countries with a differing
say in decisions and with a rotating membership.
43 Birth rates in the EU candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe
were already low in communist times, as women were strongly encouraged
to join the workforce. They continued to be low after the transition process
to a market economy began, since women now had to keep working in a
more competitive economic climate. Meanwhile, the currencies of most of
these countries, contrary to what was expected, appreciated considerably
vis-à-vis the euro they were scheduled to join after EU accession, making
EMU membership all the more difficult to achieve. The appreciation was
being caused by substantial foreign investment and productivity gains,
permitting exports to be maintained at strong levels in spite of the currency
exchange disadvantage.




The Great role of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our
commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.
… Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote
relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of
which are essentially foreign to our concerns … ’Tis our true policy to steer clear of
permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. (George Washington)1
Summary
The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of its hold over
Central and Eastern Europe posed the question of the future of NATO.
What continued purpose could NATO serve? How far east could it
enlarge without upsetting Russia? NATO’s first enlargement in 1999
included the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, while various co-
operative programmes with other countries in the region, including
Russia and Ukraine, were expanded.
NATO’s first ever armed conflict was with Yugoslavia in the spring of
1999 over the latter’s Kosovo province and over Serbian mistreatment
of ethnic Kosovo Albanians. After three months of aerial attacks, NATO
stood victorious and a major international troop presence restored
relative calm to the province.
The Kosovo War led to intensified discussion in Europe and the United
States over the need for increased European defence spending and opera-
tional efficiency within the alliance and over the prospects of more ‘out-
of-area’ peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, such as in the ‘former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in 2001. European efforts to achieve
greater defence autonomy (see also Chapter 9) met with initial scepticism
by the United States. The Europeans showed similar scepticism as regards
preliminary US plans for a Strategic Missile Defence project aimed at
developing the capacity for shooting down incoming missiles.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001
and the converging interests of the United States and Russia by mid-2002
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modified the situation. Both sides abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, thus permitting the US anti-missile project to go forward.
The two countries also concluded the Treaty of Moscow, signifying deep
cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals. Russia’s relations with NATO
became even closer with the creation of a NATO–Russia Council. At a
summit in Prague in November 2002, NATO undertook its second
enlargement in the post-Cold War era, as it invited Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to join in 2004.
However, questions regarding NATO’s continued relevance arose
anew, as the US showed an increasing propensity to act independently of
the organisation, as the Europeans lagged behind in defence spending
and technology and as differences in the willingness to use military might
began to appear, such as in the Iraq crisis in 2003, which exposed deep
rifts in the perception of outside threats and the action to be taken in
their regard. NATO was not likely to disappear as it was still useful to
both sides, but the communality of purpose was not the same as it had
been during the Cold War.
NATO in the 1990s: where is the enemy?
When Mikhail Gorbachev began to apply his ‘new thinking’ to foreign
policy in the late 1980s, Georgi Arbatov, his expert on North America,
jokingly issued this threat to a NATO official: ‘We will do something
terrible to you – deprive you of your enemy’. This threat came true when
the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in the summer of 1991 and the Soviet
Union ceased to exist in November of that year.
A military alliance without an enemy has every difficulty of surviving.
NATO would have to find a new enemy, or at least a mission equivalent
thereof, and with it a new role. A first effort was made in 1991, with the
announcement of a new Strategic Concept. The enemy found was ‘insta-
bility’; the method was inclusion or enlargement; and the role was a shift
from major war-preparedness to, primarily, crisis management, peace-
making, peacekeeping and other ‘soft’ uses of military might.
The successive decisions leading up to this new posture started with a
number of questions. First, after the break-up of the Soviet Union and
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, should there remain, on the land-
scape of Europe, a military alliance, or should NATO dissolve? The
official answer by the NATO countries to this first question was that an
alliance was still needed, because their security might continue to come
under threat. Such contingencies could arise from regional conflicts or
instability due to ethnic and other tension inside one country or between
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countries; or they could be external, from the south or from the east,
especially in an era of modern missile technology, weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism.2
Second, should a new alliance take the place of NATO? NATO
members, and in particular the United States, concluded that it would be
easier and cheaper to build on something already existing rather than
start from scratch. Furthermore, NATO had come to be seen as the sym-
bol of North American commitment to the defence of Europe.3 Finally,
NATO had proved its ability over the years to assist in peaceful integra-
tion and democratic development of the continent – such as in helping
the defeated powers of Italy and Germany to join it; in the European
construction efforts since the 1950s; in spurring reconciliation between
France and Germany; in keeping peace, however fragile, between Greece
and Turkey; and in providing a unified military command, thereby
creating transparency and trust among the member states and removing
the incentive for military competition among West European powers.
A third question to be answered was whether a continued NATO
should enlarge or not. In the end the ‘yes’ prevailed. Part of NATO’s
post-Cold War mission had become to promote an evolution in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards civil society, a market
economy and peace with their neighbours. It was felt that NATO
membership for the countries concerned would benefit this process.
Conversely, a decision not to expand would risk being seen by these
countries as a parallel to the decision of the United States not to join the
League of Nations after World War I; as relegating them to a permanent
‘buffer zone’ between East and West; and as a punishment for having
involuntarily been conscripted to the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.
Both internal and external instability might have followed. As the
leaders of the sixteen NATO member states gathered in Madrid in July
1997, the question was therefore not whether, but how far, the alliance
should enlarge.
Three new NATO members in 1999
At US (and British) insistence, invitations were initially limited to the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, with most European NATO
members (and especially France and Italy) advocating early membership
also for Romania and Slovenia (they were singled out in the final com-
muniqué as being next in line for ‘preferential consideration’). Negoti-
ations with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were finalised by
the end of 1997 and NATO’s third enlargement was celebrated at a
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summit in Washington in April 1999, the fiftieth anniversary of the
Washington Treaty (at which time the alliance might statutorily have
been dissolved).
The decision to undertake a ‘mini-enlargement’ of this kind capped a
longstanding effort on the part of the three successful candidates – the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – for full economic and political
integration into what could still, though somewhat archaically, be called
‘the West’: a Euro-Atlantic community of shared values and goals, while
holding out the same prospect for their neighbours in the region. Neither
the Council of Europe nor the OSCE had been able alone to satisfy this
aim.
The Washington Summit also decided to build a European Security
and Defence Identity within the alliance. The policy called for a much
stronger European responsibility in handling future conflicts of the
Kosovo type. New threats would be brought to NATO’s attention,
giving it a right of ‘first refusal’. In cases where the alliance would not
want to act as such, a European Union chain of command would be
expected to take over responsibility, borrowing equipment from NATO
(and especially the United States). Such material could include spy
satellites, cargo planes and position-guided cruise missiles.
Russia had not expressed any wish to join NATO. Instead, a NATO–
Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security
(falling short of treaty value) had been signed in Paris in May 1997,
establishing a Russian diplomatic representation at NATO headquarters
in Brussels and concrete procedures for consultation and co-operation
between NATO and Russia. They included a Permanent Joint Council
meant to soothe Russian apprehension about the alliance’s eastward
enlargement and to step up co-operation on peacekeeping (such as in
Bosnia and Kosovo), anti-terrorism and ways to curb the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.4
In addition, Russia was invited to join numerous other non-NATO
members – and all NATO countries – in a new, at the time, forty-three-
member Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) with basically the
same purpose.5 A similar agreement – a Charter of a Distinctive Partner-
ship (again no treaty value) – was concluded in Madrid in 1997 between
NATO and Ukraine, providing for the two sides to develop a crisis
mechanism to consult together whenever Ukraine perceived a ‘direct
threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security’.6
The emphasis in these agreements was on contacts, co-operation,
sharing and rules of conduct. They had in common that they wanted to
include, not exclude – perhaps even to a fault in that it might become
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difficult for a continuously enlarged NATO to live up to its collective
defence commitments.7
The war over Kosovo
In the night of the 23 March 1999, almost to the day fifty years after its
creation, NATO fired its first shot in anger, as aircraft took off from
bases around Europe and the US to bomb Yugoslavia. Thus ended fifty
years in which the alliance had not had to act, and therefore had
successfully realised its mission.
The main reason for the attack, named ‘Allied Force’, was the way
Yugoslavia, under its President, Slobodan Milosevic, had been treating
the ethnic Albanian majority in its southern-most province of Kosovo.
Killings of civilians, executions of able-bodied men and ‘ethnic cleansing’
of entire towns and villages was leading to thousands of refugees leaving
Kosovo for shelter in the neighbouring ‘former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’, Albania and Montenegro (the second state in the Yugoslav
federation). Such atrocities were happening in many other places in the
world. However, this was Europe, NATO’s doorstep. NATO was driven
into action after it had delivered a long series of threats and ultimatums
which, when not met, called into question NATO’s very credibility.
The conflict was to last much longer than anyone had expected, until
June 1999 when Yugoslavia accepted the conditions for a ceasefire
belatedly agreed among the members of the United Nations’ Security
Council.8 On NATO’s side the war was waged entirely from the air to
avoid the delays, cost and potential casualties among troops and civilians
associated with a land-based invasion of Kosovo (or even Yugoslavia) –
a process during which NATO’s fragile inner cohesion could easily have
frayed.
This, however, inadvertently became an excuse for Serb militias and
even regular Yugoslav troops to accelerate their ‘ethnic cleansing’, driving
additional thousands of ethnic Kosovo Albanians into especially the ‘former
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia’. It also bolstered a feeling of martyr-
dom among the Yugoslavs and strengthened their patriotism, especially
after NATO began bombing major bridges and other infrastructure in
Serbia. The Serb leadership for its part underestimated NATO resolve in
continuing with the air strikes and the ability of its members, including
those least enthusiastic about the war, to stick to the battle plan. Serbian
leaders also overestimated Russia’s willingness, or ability, to support
them, while in the end that country’s role as mediator became essential
to putting a stop to hostilities.
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In the war’s aftermath, as peace returned to Kosovo and along with it
thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees, there was awe of NATO’s military
prowess, and especially that of the United States. However, there was
also criticism, especially as the Kosovo Albanian side was becoming
increasingly aggressive vis-à-vis the remaining Serbs and other ethnic
groups. Furthermore, questions were asked whether the negotiations
conducted with Yugoslavia in February 1999 to reach an agreement over
Kosovo had been more than a series of ultimata that had been exceed-
ingly difficult for the Yugoslav leadership to accept, such as the one
demanding right of access of NATO troops to any part of Yugoslavia.9
Europe after Kosovo was in many ways different from what it had
been before the conflict. In launching the war, NATO’s nineteen
members – all democracies – were aware that they were abandoning a
basic principle in international law, forbidding an attack against a country
that had not violated international borders (unless, since the establish-
ment of the UN, mandated to do so by its Security Council). It was clear
to all that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not violated any
international border, nor had it threatened to in this case (even though it
had done so a few years earlier, in its wars against the then newly
established Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
If the NATO action over Kosovo did not conform strictly to estab-
lished international law, it nevertheless reflected the moral outrage felt
by the international community at the forced expulsion of a whole
people and the systematic murdering of thousands. Milosevic’s actions
flew in the face of the efforts of half a century of the United Nations, the
Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO to reconcile nations,
peoples, and promote human rights and tolerance.10 NATO’s action was
in line with a more recent trend in history in the direction of greater
international intervention on behalf of humanitarian values, as wit-
nessed for instance in the creation of an International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague a few years earlier.11
This new component in international law had been in gestation over
the previous decade and had found expression in various OSCE and
Council of Europe summits, even though it has not been enshrined
formally as has, for example, the sanctity of borders. The world is still
grappling with the terms by which the international community may
intrude on national sovereignty to redress genocide or other atrocious
crimes perpetrated by governments against their own populations.12
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NATO and Russia in the 1990s: how far should enlargement go?
Many people in the early 1990s were opposed to any NATO enlarge-
ment, along the lines of ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. Among them was
the ageing George Kennan, the great scholar of Russian affairs, who in
1946 had first warned about Soviet intentions vis-à-vis the West. Kennan
maintained that enlargement could ‘inflame nationalistic, anti-Western
and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion’. To such commentators,
1989 marked a break in European history, in that it ended a compara-
tively stable balance-of-power era. NATO and the Warsaw Pact had
stood against each other during the Cold War, ensuring an uneasy and
at times tense balance. ‘Armed transparency’ had been achieved thanks
to new technologies of verification, leading to arms-control measures,
détente and eventually the peaceful collapse of one side. Since 1989, it
was argued, there had not been any balance, but rather economic and
political co-operation and integration. Why, then, now enlarge NATO
and thereby risk unbalancing and remilitarising a relationship between
Russia and the West, which since 1989 had been relatively stable?
Russia, critics maintained, was likely to view such an expansion as an
extension of US hegemony in Europe – with NATO as the instrument of
US predominance not only in Western Europe but also in its Central and
Eastern parts. It would, it was argued, weaken the ‘Atlanticists’ in the
Russian political establishment and give new wind to militaristic and
nationalist circles – in the process jeopardising Russia’s ratification of
the US–Russia START II Treaty reducing nuclear missiles and the
beginning of negotiations for the even further-reaching START III. Why,
those against NATO enlargement continued, humiliate Russia when it
was on its knees – its army in tatters, facing a resurgent China to its south-
east and a score of Islamic and potentially hostile central Asian countries
to its south?
Those in favour of enlargement, however, argued that Russia was not
in a position to halt the enlargement process to any significant degree,
due to its economic and military weakness. When it became stronger on
all these fronts again, as inevitably it would in time, it might well find
that there was nothing to fear from neighbouring NATO countries,
whose foreign policy ambitions could perhaps better be held in check by
NATO membership and the common desire for European peace and a
stable and prosperous Russia. Russian relations with NATO and the
West in general would, they felt, to a large extent depend on whether the
country could be successfully integrated economically with the rest of
Europe and the world. Economic integration with the West, coupled
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with co-operation with NATO, could provide stability on Russia’s
western flank and prevent a remilitarisation of its economy.13
 Slovenia, Romania and possibly Bulgaria seemed likely new entrants
in the early years of the new century. Slovenia was in many ways the
most likely candidate in such a ‘second wave’, as it could easily finance
its membership and had never been a member of the Warsaw Pact. In
addition, it would give NATO a presence (beyond Greece and Turkey) in
South-Eastern Europe and thus help stabilise that volatile region.14
The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – fervently aspired to
NATO membership. The question remained whether NATO members
would risk taking a step that in Moscow might be seen as a provocation,
if not a threat. The Charter of Partnership signed between the United
States and the three Baltic presidents in Washington in 1998 was not a
treaty. But it put on record the ‘real, profound and enduring interest’ of
the US in the independence and security of the three countries and a US
commitment to support their aspirations to join NATO.
Soon the opinion in NATO capitals swung in favour of wider and
earlier enlargement. Sensing this, nine Central and East European coun-
tries – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Albania and the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ – in May
2000 pledged to work together for a ‘big bang’ solution to early NATO
membership involving them all. 15
A year later, in Warsaw in June 2001, President George W. Bush in a
speech boldly stated:
All of Europe’s democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea, all that lie between,
should have the same chance for security and freedom – and the same chance to
join the institutions of Europe – as Europe’s old democracies … I believe in
NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to
share the responsibilities that NATO brings … As we plan to enlarge NATO, no
nation should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away
the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs. No more Yaltas.16
This statement was an indication that the US, too, was now prepared for
a radical NATO enlargement. The US Congress would find it difficult to
refuse to go along, given the large ‘ethnic vote’ in the US with roots in
the different candidate countries involved.
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A NATO transformed: the 2002 US–Russia Treaty of Moscow and the
NATO–Russia Council
In May 2001 US President George W. Bush announced his administra-
tion’s determination to build a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), a broad
array of defences to protect against missiles launched by so called ‘rogue
states’ or ‘states of concern’.17 The project, which had been contemplated
also by the preceding Clinton administration, was received with caution
in European NATO capitals, suspicion in Moscow and hostility in Beijing.
One complication was that, if installed, the BMD would violate the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and
the Soviet Union, which forbade anything more than minimal missile
defences for either side.18 West European concerns were that the BMD
would be seen by the rest of the world, and especially by Russia and China,
as confrontational and menacing rather than co-operative and that it would
have destabilising consequences for the international nuclear arms balance.
However, criticism was subdued for several reasons. Firstly, it could
prove politically costly to protest too strongly against the right of the
American people to defend itself, especially as it seemed to stand so
solidly behind the project. Secondly, it was difficult to argue against a
defensive as opposed to an offensive system, not least since the Euro-
peans, including the Russians, might some day benefit from it in defend-
ing against rogue attacks – Western Europe, say, from the Middle East,
or Russia from its south and south-east. Thirdly, the European NATO
allies and Russia could benefit from being included in a system that
neither would be able to afford on their own. Finally, NATO–Europe
might also in exchange receive a more positive US attitude to the Euro-
pean security and defence policy and the latter’s Rapid Reaction Force.19
By June 2002 both the Ballistic Missile Defence issue and that of the
ABM Treaty appeared to have been solved. President Bush abrogated the
ABM Treaty, arguing that the terrorist attacks against the United States
on 11 September 2001 had clearly demonstrated that the Cold War was
over and that BMD was urgently needed. Russia followed suit the follow-
ing day and at the same time announced that it no longer felt bound by
the START II Agreement that had outlawed multiple-warhead missiles
and other especially destabilising weapons in the two countries’ strategic
arsenals.20
Both sides’ abandonment of the ABM Treaty and Russia’s leaving
START II would have sent shock waves through the world only a few
years earlier. As it happened, however, they were preceded by a series of
agreements that rendered them relatively benign. In May 2002 Presidents
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Bush and Putin signed the Treaty of Moscow, which committed the US
and Russia to reducing their nuclear arsenals from about 6,000 war-
heads each to no more than 2,200 by 2012.21 Talks would also start on
the difficult issues of better transparency and verification as regards
nuclear warheads, whether in use or scrapped.
A few days later, a NATO summit in Rome established a NATO–
Russia Council, which in essence brought Russia inside the alliance by
giving it an ‘equal partnership’ role on issues such as counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping interventions and the spread of nuclear weapons, though
not on core military issues such as those relating to collective defence or
out-of-area peacemaking operations.22
The NATO–Russia Council held several advantages to all sides. It
reduced Russian apprehensions about any future NATO enlargements
and indeed stimulated co-operation between Russia and the European
Union, as well as with future NATO members it had once dominated. It
ensured Russian support for NATO’s and the West’s fight against
terrorism and helped diffuse the criticism in Russia that the country had
received little in return for its support of the West in that struggle since
the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001. It
also bound NATO closer to Russia in the protection of its interests vis-à-
vis its southern neighbours in central Asia.23 Furthermore, the NATO-
Russia Council aligned NATO to a new European reality, which trans-
cended the former Cold War divide between East and West, as symbol-
ised by the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union. The United
States (and Canada) could thereby retain a formal role in fostering
security in that more integrated Europe.
On the other hand, the agreement by the same token diluted NATO’s
role in the eyes of those NATO candidate countries which had viewed
NATO membership as a bulwark against any future Russian attempt to
dominate them. There was also the general European apprehension that,
as during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington would now settle the
big issues among them, indeed worsening a situation where Washington
seemed only to be using NATO when it pleased it, such as in building a
coalition (as it happened, outside NATO) for the war in Afghanistan
following 11 September.
The 2002 NATO summit in Prague: seven new members
The NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 brought the answer to
the growing sentiment in favour of NATO enlargement. At the summit,
the organisation undertook its second enlargement in the post-Cold War
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era by permitting seven new countries to join, thereby bringing the mem-
bership to twenty-six. The seven new members were Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
The speeches at the summit referred to the final closure of the legacy
bequeathed by the 1939 Hitler–Stalin Pact, Yalta and Potsdam. Luxem-
bourg Prime Minister Juncker exclaimed: ‘Our grandfathers and fathers
could not have imagined what has become reality today!’, while depart-
ing Czech President Vaclav Havel, himself a former political prisoner
under the communist regime, described the event as the end of European
power politics and of the imposition of the stronger’s will on the weaker.
There was something truly remarkable in the fact that not only several
countries in the former Warsaw Pact had joined, but also those Baltic
states which only a decade before had formed part of the Soviet Union –
and this with barely an eyebrow raised in Moscow.24
The Prague Summit also resolved to adapt the alliance to the new
security needs that had arisen as a result of terrorism and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. It was decided to establish a 20,000-
strong NATO Response Force (NRF), which would be fully operational
by 2006 and consist of highly mobile elite forces capable of intervening
also in faraway places. The Response Force was politically anchored in a
so-called Prague Capabilities Commitment, by which the member states
vowed to remedy shortcomings in areas such as air transport, munitions
and protection against atomic, biological and chemical weapons.
To certain less Atlanticist EU members, such as France, the NATO
Response Force might not have been an entirely welcome development,
since it would have to draw on limited resources in competition with the
EU’s own emerging Rapid Reaction Force. They may have seen US
pressure for the NATO force as a deliberate means to make the EU force
toothless. If so, the new NATO members could be expected to come to
the support of the US, as they were on the whole more Atlanticist than
some West European EU members.
Using Central European forces for the NATO Response Force would
also be convenient, considering the clear US wish to see NATO’s future
as lying primarily to its east and south-east, that is, in central Asia and
east of Turkey. This also helped to explain US pressure for early Turkish
membership in the EU. Both NATO and the EU would then be in a
position to project their influence on to the Caspian Sea region and even
to its east. (Georgia and Azerbaijan had both announced an interest in
joining NATO.) The aim would be to be in a better position to fight
terrorism, open new oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea region and
secure the transport of these resources to Europe and the world.
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For the European Union, the question became one of deciding on how
far it wished to follow the US on this course and, if it chose not to,
whether it could muster the political will to part ways with NATO.
Given the imminent enlargement of both NATO and the EU to include
more Atlanticist countries in the east and south-east – to which should
be added traditional Atlanticist members such as the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands – the likelihood of that happening was limited.
NATO’s future mission and relevance
Even before the Prague Summit, questions had arisen as to NATO’s future
mission, and indeed relevance.25 It was clear that NATO would be needed
in the fight against terrorism and out-of-area interventions such as in the
Balkans. Furthermore, as the European Union’s efforts to mount a
Rapid Reaction Force independent of NATO showed signs of fatigue,
the Europeans (and especially the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe) seemed to acknowledge that they would not be able to defend
the continent without NATO.
Aside from its new tasks, NATO will inevitably change its character
simply by being enlarged. Peacemaking or peacekeeping inside or among
member states and out-of-area operations, for instance to rescue civilians
in countries south or east of the Mediterranean, are likely to become
NATO’s operational mainstay, rather than the massive mobilisation of
forces for defence of NATO territory that so dominated past thinking.
Furthermore, NATO intervention – or NATO-approved intervention by
the US or one or more European NATO members – undertaken without
the sanction of the UN Security Council may become more frequent, as
the Kosovo conflict demonstrated.
NATO is developing a ‘southern strategy’ for NATO to supplement
its historical ‘northern’ one in Central Europe. It is based, not on territory,
but on common interests, to the extent these can be found. It includes
countering terrorist states that brandish weapons of mass destruction,
preventing conflict in the Balkans, undertaking rescue operations of
civilians in faraway places, and maintaining access to Gulf oil.
The ‘southern strategy’, while potentially embraced by all, would pro-
bably see ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’, with membership depending
on the particular threat posed. Thus Mediterranean NATO countries may
co-operate in rescue operations in North Africa. The strategy would have
to gain the support both of NATO’s northern European members, naturally
more concerned about the ‘northern strategy’, and its Southern European
members, more worried about NATO’s southern and south-eastern vicinity.
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Already, additional emphases are coming to the fore, reflecting the
fear on both sides of the Atlantic of a menacing triad of ‘rogue states’,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) used without or with little warning,
and terrorists. In brief, unless prevented from doing so, ‘rogue states’
such as North Korea would be in a position to produce WMDs and sell
them to terrorists, who could transport them to, say, New York har-
bour, Washington DC or central London. This would be the ultimate
nightmare from the defence point of view, since deterrence would have
failed and retaliation would be made difficult or impossible for want of
an identifiable aggressor country.
The resulting change in US defence doctrine consists in adding ‘pre-
vention’ or even ‘pre-emptive prevention’ to ‘deterrence’, since ‘deterrence’
– in a departure from what was the case during the US–Soviet stand-off
during the Cold War – cannot be counted on to work against a suicidal
rogue-state ruler, and even less against terrorists.26
Related to the above is a growing concern over a breakdown of coun-
tries as such and the resulting greater ease for terrorists to operate in
them, such as has occurred or is still the case in countries like Somalia,
Afghanistan and the Sudan. State breakdowns would force the established
powers to engage in additional preventive action and thus further erode
the tenet of border inviolability in classical international law. The
preservation of states and their ability to control terrorism within their
borders can therefore be expected increasingly to form part of the
security policy of the established powers.
A new National Security Strategy of the United States, presented in
2002, makes this clear. Quoting from a speech by President Bush in
2001, it states that:
We must be prepared to stop the rogue states and their terrorist clients before
they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of
strengthened alliances and the establishment of new partnerships with former
adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies,
including the development of an effective missile defence system and increased
emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.27
If NATO’s European members truly desire to maintain the organi-
sation’s relevance for, and support from, its strongest member, the US,
they will have to contribute to this strategy plan also for the protection
of Europe itself, since the effective threat against Europe from terrorists
and weapons of mass destruction is as great or perhaps even greater than
that against the United States.28
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The US attitude to NATO: still the priority?
Another question became how the Americans felt about the organisation
and how well it fitted in with their own perceptions of the world and
interests. NATO had enjoyed a revival of sorts in the 1990s and early
2000s in Bosnia, Kosovo and the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia’. The overriding question was whether another one could be
expected in the future without a fundamental scrutiny of what the
organisation should stand for.
The United States had waged its war in Afghanistan outside the NATO
framework, merely calling on one or the other NATO ally to perform ad
hoc tasks, whether in the United States to protect the skies against new
acts of air terrorism or in assisting in clean-up operations in Afghanistan.
It could even be expected that in many and perhaps most cases, the
United States would take recourse to ‘coalitions of the NATO-willing’,
as in Iraq in 2003, in order to avoid the ‘warfare-by-committee’, Kosovo-
style intervention. NATO as such would then be used for political
support, and as a ‘toolbox’ for identifying the ‘willing’ and the ‘able’ –
and especially those both willing and able – and for post-military peace-
keeping. Waging war alone would also present fewer problems related
to the widening technological gap between the US and its allies, a factor
that had made joint operations increasingly difficult.
Beyond such considerations, there were the different views of the
world held by either side. The Europeans had reason to believe that they
had moved their continent to a rules-based unity and harmony via
decades of negotiation and co-operation and the renouncement of force.
Surely the world could be brought to the same happy state via
international treaties such as the International Criminal Court, which
would bring miscreants such as any new Pol Pot or Milosevic to justice.
If that was Europe’s new mission civilisatrice, the US by contrast saw
the world as a much more anarchic place, where strength and power still
mattered, where recourse still occasionally had to be taken to unilateral
action, such as in Afghanistan against Al Qaida, or against the ‘axis of
evil’ – to use President George W. Bush’s expression – of Iraq, Iran and
North Korea. To the Americans, the Europeans were able to persist in
their high-minded approach only because the US persisted in its own
more Darwinian approach. As one writer put it, ‘Europe’s Kantian order
[of “perpetual peace”] depends on the United States using power accord-
ing to the old Hobbesian rules’ of unreliable international principles and
potential evildoers that would have to be overcome.29
These philosophical differences would not necessarily destroy NATO.
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Indeed, in a world that might still function according to the dictum of the
nineteenth-century Prussian soldier Clausewitz that ‘war is nothing but
the continuation of politics by other means’, they might complement each
other. However, they could set the stage for quarrels over both the purpose
and means of contemplated actions and thus cause alienation to grow
and cohesion to weaken, as became manifest in the Iraq crisis in 2003.
On that occasion, NATO found itself seriously divided as it became
clear that – due in particular to the threat of a French (but also Russian
and Chinese) veto – no UN Security Council Resolution would be passed
that authorised the use of military force against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
over its alleged non-compliance with previous Security Council calls for
the destruction of its presumed weapons of mass destruction.30
On the one side stood NATO members France, supported especially
by Germany (a non-veto member of the UN Security Council at this time)
and Belgium, who argued that NATO should not send even defensive
military equipment to protect its NATO partner Turkey against any attack
by Iraq. In the opposite camp were countries like the United States, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and several of the newer NATO members
in Central and Eastern Europe. They felt that military action was now
called for and in line with NATO obligations.31
In the ensuing invasion of Iraq, NATO was not involved, leaving the
alliance deeply split and rendering its role uncertain in any future conflict
where perceptions of outside threats and the action needed to counter
them might differ.
Notes
1 From his Farewell Address, 1796. The United States followed George Washing-
ton’s precept of not entering into alliances up until 1947, when it concluded
the Rio Treaty on the Defense of the Western Hemisphere with a number of
Latin American countries, followed, in 1949, by the Washington Treaty
creating NATO. US participation in the two world wars was not based on
any formal alliances.
2 The NATO enlargement in 1999 was ratified by the US Senate by a large
majority, in spite of concern about its cost. The US State Department in 1997
put the total cost (for all the members) of the first enlargement at between
$27 and $35 billion over 12 years, while other studies pointed to added
expenditure of between $42 billion and $100 billion. However, a NATO
study of early 1998 (considered ‘definitive’), placed the extra expenditure at
less than $2 billion. The enlargement project provided for a minimum of
communication and ‘interoperability’ between new NATO members and
current ones. It was meant to enable NATO to respond well in time should
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Russian capabilities or intentions ever change. The project also foresaw that
the defence of new members be based on reinforcement in crises, rather than
on the permanent stationing of combat forces in those countries.
3 Article 5 in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty states that: ‘The Parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all’. Article 1 says that:
‘The parties undertake … to settle any international dispute in which they
may be involved by peaceful means in such a way that international peace
and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations’. Article 7 recognises the ‘primary
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and stability’. (The intervention in Iraq in 1991 had been undertaken
under the authority of the UN. Similarly, in Bosnia, in 1995, NATO action
had been authorised by the UN Security Council. In the Kosovo case, UN
Security Council intervention was secured only ex post facto, in fact leading
to the end of the hostilities following Milosevic’s acceptance of the terms of
Security Council Resolution 1244.) Finally, concerning enlargement, Article
10 states that: ‘The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty’.
(The previous enlargements had been Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982.)
4 Russia withdrew from co-operation with NATO in March 1999 in reaction
to the Kosovo conflict. Co-operation was gradually restored after the end of
the conflict.
5 The EAPC included the previously mentioned Partnership for Peace (created
in 1994) and replaced the Council for North Atlantic Co-operation (estab-
lished in 1991). By 2002 the EAPC had grown to comprise forty-six coun-
tries (nineteen NATO members and twenty-seven others). Moreover, the
Dialogue on the Mediterranean, started in 1994, was to be enhanced. Finally,
the 1997 Madrid Summit decided on a reform of NATO’s military structure
aiming at greater operational flexibility, fewer headquarters and greater
openness to working with outside partners in preparing joint operations.
6 The NATO–Ukraine Charter included regular political consultations on security-
related issues, defence reform in Ukraine and Ukrainian participation in
NATO-led peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. It followed on
substantial Ukrainian steps in the defence field, such as the country’s destruc-
tion of nuclear weapons on its soil following the collapse of the Soviet Union;
its accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state; and its
agreement with Russia over the sharing of the Soviet-era Black Sea Fleet.
Ukraine army units have participated in numerous exercises with NATO forces
since 1994 and contribute troops to the KFOR mission in Kosovo. It provided
vital air transport during the military intervention in Afghanistan in 2002.
7 The Madrid Summit Agreement also linked up with the 1990 Conventional
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Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty also known as the Conventional Arms Control
Treaty). The latter entered into force in 1992 and has so far been ratified by
over thirty countries. The CFE meant a historically unprecedented reduction
in conventional forces in Europe. A revised agreement did away with the
previous NATO–Warsaw Pact balancing act and instead sought to define
‘national’ and ‘territorial’ and ‘zonal’ ‘ceilings’, especially in Central Europe.
However, the relevance of the CFE to today’s Europe was increasingly called
into question, for instance in regard to Russia, especially after the creation,
in May 2002, of the NATO–Russia Council. Russia’s military strength and
readiness in the conventional field never came close to the threat limits
established in the CFE, other than during fighting in Chechnya.
8 NATO’s conditions included a Serbian military withdrawal from Kosovo;
the return of all refugees; a well-armed international military presence to
protect them; and a Kosovo autonomy within Serbian sovereignty.
9 The Rambouillet Agreement of February 1995 – signed by the ethnic Albanian
side but not by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – foresaw that Kosovo
would remain a Serbian province, but with extensive autonomy for its Albanian
majority, to be supervised by NATO peacekeeping forces. After the conflict
it became a dead letter for many ethnic Albanians, who could not conceive
of having their province form part of Yugoslavia after the atrocities com-
mitted against them.
10 Guéhenno (1998–9, p. 10) speaks of the ‘ascendance of a humanitarian view
of foreign policy’, in which ‘upholding moral standards could become a
strategic goal’. However, he also sees, for example, the Dayton Agreements of
1995 as revealing
the limited depth of the West’s commitment to such standards. Although
moved to act by moral pressure as much as by traditional strategic consid-
erations, the solution found at Dayton was of a traditional nature. Rather
than deploy sufficient forces to uphold international standards of behaviour,
the US and its European allies created a balance of forces on the ground
between the Muslim–Croat federation and the Serbs. The horrors of the
Muslim–Croat war were conveniently forgotten and the Serbs contained,
but Bosnia’s de facto division through ethnic cleansing was accepted, and
no side could claim the moral high ground. The war was, at least tempor-
arily, ended; it is, however, unclear whether peace was made.
11 The move toward effective universal jurisdiction took a major step forward
with the coming into existence of an International Criminal Court (ICC) in
April 2002. The ICC has the right to go after what it perceives as war criminals
anywhere in the world, even in countries not party to it. Supporters argue
that this is vitally needed to apprehend the likes of Milosevic (who is now
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The
Hague). Opponents, however, see in the ICC a court lacking meaningful
political oversight and potentially dominated by unscrupulous regimes. They
consider the international political arena as, essentially, not appropriate for
legal action. The United States, under President George W. Bush in 2002 nulli-
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fied the Clinton administration’s signature of the ICC Treaty and announced
that it would not send it for ratification to the Senate. It even threatened to
withdraw from UN peacekeeping operations such as in Bosnia, unless the
UN Security Council guaranteed that no US soldier would be brought before
the ICC over alleged war crimes. A compromise was eventually reached for
a suspension of the threatened action. A dispute with the EU over the issue
was at least temporarily resolved in 2002, as the latter permitted the US to
conclude deals with individual EU (and candidate) states ensuring immunity
from ICC prosecution for US soldiers and government officials. EU countries
strongly supportive of the ICC considered the compromise a defeat in the
quest for a common EU foreign and security policy.
12 Shawcross (2000) points to what he sees as a considerable inconsistency on
the part of the world community – as represented by the UN and its Security
Council – in crisis or conflict intervention since the end of the Cold War.
Why Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, and not Rwanda, the Congo
or Chechnya? The determinants, he concludes in resignation, are practical
politics and money, and not moral outrage. He also argues that the inter-
vention of peacekeepers can sometimes prolong conflicts, such as when they
prevented either the government or the UNITA rebels from winning the civil
war in Angola in the early 1990s.
13 Russia had considerable problems in reducing the size of its military. Entire
branches of service were foreseen to disappear, and along with them the
careers of thousands of officers, with unknown consequences for social stability
and employment. Furthermore, scores of cities in the Urals, the Caucasus
and elsewhere, built purely for military purposes during the Soviet era, would
have to convert to civilian production or simply be closed down for lack of a
civilian purpose. The cost of all this was uncertain, but without economic
development the process would be even more difficult.
14 Ukraine – a resource-rich country, bigger than France – was considered of
great importance to European stability. Located between Russia and South-
Eastern Europe, it served as a counterweight to the former at regional level.
Western Europe and NATO would have a natural interest in seeing a strong
and stable Ukraine, while NATO membership was not for the near future.
By contrast, the undemocratic government of Belarus and its international
isolation was considered to preclude any early membership in NATO.
15 The selection of the countries with which NATO would start membership
negotiations was to follow criteria established under a Membership Action
Plan (MAP), covering not only military but also economic, political and
legal aspects and building on the 1994 Partnership for Peace programme. In
the end, however, the decision on membership would be taken as much on
political grounds as on the basis of technical criteria.
16 Address by President George W. Bush to faculty and students of Warsaw
University, Warsaw, Poland, 15 June 2001 (www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/06/20010615-1).
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17 The Ballistic Missile Defence is to consist of five sub-systems: (1) a satellite-
borne early warning system; (2) an additional earthbound early warning
system, permitting more precise predictions of missile direction and the identi-
fication of decoys; (3) an equally land-based ‘X-band’ radar system for the
same purposes; (4) launch of destroying missiles and destruction of targets;
and (5) success evaluation and, in the event of failure, launch of additional
destroying missiles. Construction of a first site in Alaska would start in 2004
and lead, in the first instance, to the readying of around twenty destroying
missiles by 2006. The installation is meant to counter long-range ballistic
missiles and will be supplemented gradually by systems installed on
warships to shoot down short and medium-range enemy missiles.
18 The 1972 ABM Treaty stipulated that the United States and the Soviet Union
could have only two missile defence sites of not more than one hundred
rockets; one around the capital and one around an attack missile centre. The
treaty, once ratified by both countries, underwent several mutually agreed
modifications. Building on the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine,
it was an important building block for the subsequent Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT), especially SALT I, and for the later START II
agreements. The United States in 2001 had 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons,
a number meant to fall to around 3,000 under START II. In 1997,
Washington and Moscow agreed in principle that a forthcoming treaty should
lower the number of missiles for each side to around 2,000. This goal came
closer with the signing, in 2002, of the Treaty of Moscow, signifying cuts to
this level.
It could be argued, in the case of ‘MAD’, that it has kept world peace for
over fifty years. However, its weakness is that it assumes rational behaviour
by all sides concerned. However, what if there is a leader of a ‘rogue’ nation,
recently equipped with nuclear weapons, who is not rational but irrational,
perhaps suicidal, somewhat like Hitler or Milosevic? Even in the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962, the US and the Soviet Union behaved rationally only
in the end, and then almost by chance. A Ballistic Missile Defence could lift
the threshold for the application of the MAD doctrine, by permitting a
country which is being attacked to shoot down a missile and thus avoid
instantaneous massive retaliation, at least until after all the facts of the
incident have been established.
19 Some experts on nuclear deterrence, such as Allison and Zelikov (1999,
pp. 397–401) argue that the risk of a nuclear exchange originating in Russia
is not yet over. They in particular point to (1) ‘Russia’s deteriorating com-
mand and control systems, both technical and human, that increase risks of
unauthorised or accidental launch of nuclear weapons’; (2) ‘the decline of
Russia’s conventional military capabilities [which] has increased reliance on
nuclear weapons [in a crisis]’; and [3] ‘loose nukes’, that is, Russian nuclear
weapons that are stolen, sold to terrorists or rogue states.
20 However, in 2003 Russia proposed to the United States the conclusion of a
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new Ballistic Missile Defence Treaty, by which Russia would benefit from
the US BMD system. If this becomes reality, NATO’s European partners
would be hard pressed to join, too.
21 The Treaty of Moscow leaves either country free to rebuild its forces as from
one year after the treaty’s expiration if it is not extended or amended.
22 The NATO–Russia Council effectively replaced the NATO–Russia Permanent
Joint Council, which had been largely ineffectual, not least during the period
when Russia–NATO relations cooled during the Kosovo conflict.
23 Russian efforts to exercise greater influence over its southern flank became
manifest in the spring of 2002, when it announced the creation of a Collective
Security Treaty Organisation also including the Community of Independent
States partners Armenia, Belarus, Kazhakstan and Tajikistan.
24 The enlargement, to be formally declared at a NATO summit in May 2004,
was expected to pave the way for various other countries such as Albania,
the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ and Croatia, provided they
made further progress on democratic consolidation and defence readiness.
25 As NATO undergoes enlargement in coming years, the relevance of its forty-
six-member-state Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and its Partner-
ship for Peace (PfP), which also includes certain countries in South-East
Europe and Central Asia, is being called into question. While the EAPC may
well disappear, the PfP may remain as a means for projecting NATO power
into Afghanistan and other countries in the region.
26 Reflecting the international community’s growing fear over the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, over ninety countries – including the United
States and Russia – in 2002 signed the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The Code is not, however, of a binding nature;
nor does it foresee any control mechanism, sanctions or ban on exports of
such weapons or their components. Among the non-signatories are India,
Pakistan, China, North Korea, Syria and Israel.
27 Speech by President George W. Bush, West Point, New York, 1 June 2002;
quoted in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
September 2002 (The White House). The National Security Strategy raises
many other objectives, such as that to ‘build a balance of power [in the world]
that favours freedom … [and] bring the hope of democracy, development,
free markets and free trade to every corner of the world’.
28 Naumann (2002, p 195) recommends a strategy for conflict prevention and
peace maintenance as having two elements: ‘Conflict pre-emption seeks to
resolve conflicts by political means and prevent new causes of conflict from
arising through assistance. Thereby the soil in which terror and violence thrive
will be taken away. Conflict prevention seeks to make attacks purposeless
through the greatest possible protection of states and societies, and to show
potential aggressors through intervention far away from their own regions
that they run the risk of losing their capacity for attack as well as that of
being apprehended. It is the idea of the carrot and the stick, of helping and
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punishing … The time may have come to develop a comprehensive political
strategy, in which the military element plays an irreplaceable – but not the
only and often not even the dominant – role.’ (Translated from the German
original.)
29 Kagan (2002, p. 1).
30 UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 threatened Iraq
with ‘serious consequences’ in the event of any further  ‘material breach’ of
Security Council Resolution 678 of April 1991 (adopted in the wake of the
1991 allied military intervention in Iraq and as a condition for an armistice)
and more than a dozen UN Resolutions adopted in the intervening years.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries con-
sidered that the words in Resolution 678 authorising the use of ‘all necessary
means’ in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with an earlier Resolution 660
of 1990 (following Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait) should apply also in 2002,
whereas the countries opposed to military intervention argued that ‘serious
consequences’ did not authorise such action in the absence of another UN
Security Council Resolution including words such as ‘all necessary means’.
31 Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty states: ‘The Parties will consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’.
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A new European Union
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its own
conservation. (Edmund Burke)1
Summary
A series of EU summits – Amsterdam in 1997, Berlin and Helsinki in 1999
and Nice in 2000 – focused on the need for inner reform of the insti-
tution against the prospect of future enlargement and new competences.
The general tendency was for increased intergovernmentalism, that is,
more power in the hands of the EU’s Council of Ministers and greater
influence for the European Parliament.
The Helsinki Summit decided to accept candidacies of thirteen coun-
tries (including Turkey) and to start negotiations with twelve (all but
Turkey) on an equal basis, with 2004 as a possible date for joining by
the first in line. It was also decided to establish, by 2003, a 60,000-strong
Rapid Reaction Force capable of performing peacemaking or peace-
keeping operations autonomously of NATO.
The Nice Summit confirmed and codified the trend towards inter-
governmental dominance in the EU, especially by the larger member
states. This may have been one reason why the Nice Treaty was rejected
by the Irish in a referendum in June 2001, an outcome that jeopardised
the treaty’s planned entry into force in preparation of enlargement.
Various leading politicians in EU member states in 2000 and 2001
offered their visions of the necessary future structure of the institution –
ranging from the federal to the (continued) intergovernmental to the
interparliamentary to the (continued) bureaucratic. With EU funds scarce,
efficiency suffering, democracy found lacking, the physical introduction
of the euro imminent and major enlargement around the corner, the
debate had come none too soon.
An EU Convention on the Future of Europe was consequently con-
vened in 2002 with a mandate to make proposals to governments for a
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new EU constitution in 2003. This would be necessary also to prepare
for the ‘big bang’ enlargement decided at a summit in Copenhagen in
December 2002, where it was agreed to invite ten candidate countries to
join in 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Negotiations would
continue with Bulgaria and Romania, with a possible date of accession
set for 2007. It was also decided that an attempt would be made in 2004
to set a date for the start of membership negotiations with Turkey.
Thorny questions remained, however, such as how to reform the Common
Agricultural Policy and EU finances overall in order to accommodate the
many new and less wealthy member states.
The Amsterdam Summit, June 1997
The European Union is characterised, strangely enough, by both inertia
and capacity for change. Some policies – such as those on agriculture,
fisheries and regional support – bitterly resist renewal, while others – such
as on enlargement, monetary unification and security – show remark-
able adaptability in the face of new impulses. It is worth following how
EU thinking has evolved over the 1997–2003 period, as manifested in
the decisions taken at six summits: Amsterdam in 1997, Berlin and
Helsinki in 1999, Nice in 2000, Laeken (Brussels) in 2001 and
Copenhagen in 2002 .
In Amsterdam, in June 1997, EU leaders crowned the efforts of an
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) started fifteen months earlier, by
adopting the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty foresaw EU membership
negotiations to start in 1998 with six ‘first wave’ applicant countries:
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
Five other countries would later be invited to start negotiations for a
‘second wave’ enlargement: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and
Slovakia. ‘First wave’ accessions were considered likely around 2004 at
the earliest.
In the Amsterdam Treaty environment protection was given a higher
profile (at Scandinavian insistence), in that individual member states
would be able to introduce stricter standards than those valid for the rest
of the EU. Majority voting in the Council of Ministers was extended (at
the cost of the unanimity rule).2 And the position of the European
Parliament was strengthened, as was the say of national parliaments.3
However, other tasks remained largely unresolved. One was EU
institutional reform, seen as a prerequisite for enlargement, since with
the present machinery the institution would risk paralysis with more
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than, say, twenty members. Here it was decided to continue negotiations
nearer to the time of actual enlargement, presumably in the hope that
urgency would help concentrate minds. (It was subsequently agreed that
an overhaul would be undertaken as from twenty member states, i.e.
between the ‘first’ and the ‘second’ wave.) All that could be agreed on in
Amsterdam was a strengthening of the position of the Commission’s
President and to have the number of Commissioners remain at a maxi-
mum of twenty.4 Furthermore, Amsterdam saw a battle between the
smaller and the bigger EU member states, in particular as regards the
‘one-country-one-vote’ principle in the Council of Ministers. The bigger
had hoped for a weighted voting system based on population, but the
smaller put up successful resistance.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy vaguely set out in the
Maastricht Treaty was left nearly in the same embryonic stage in which
it had found itself previously. The Amsterdam Treaty also saw procedural
simplifications in the complicated decision-making process, the creation
of a joint planning body, and a raising of the status of the Secretary
General of the EU Council of Ministers.
One innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty was the introduction of
‘flexibility’ in the future construction of the Union; that is, the possibility
for a qualified majority of countries (71 per cent of the weighted votes)
to engage in deeper co-operation in various fields without being stopped
by the others. Flexibility, it was felt, would become more and more
necessary as the EU was enlarged to include more and more heterogene-
ous countries from the political, economic and cultural point of view. It
would therefore become increasingly difficult to ‘deepen’ the Union in
ways that could be supported and implemented by each and every one.
The ‘EU-isation’ of policies on asylum, immigration and visas, as well as
the Schengen Agreement on uncontrolled internal EU borders, was seen
as already illustrating this, as they contained many exceptions for
different countries. The challenge for the EU would be to ensure that
flexibility did not lead to uninhibited ‘Europe à la carte’ policies by its
member states and to any further weakening of its cohesion.5
The relatively meagre results of Amsterdam reflected the resistance
waged by intergovernmentalism against integrationism. That is, the
member states, through their governments (and to some extent parlia-
ments) fought for the powers of the Council of Ministers to be defended
against the increased powers of the Commission. In this sense Amster-
dam meant a development of the EU towards a more classical inter-
national set-up such as the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.6
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The Berlin Summit, March 1999
The emphasis in Amsterdam in 1997 had been on the principle of EU
enlargement and the inner reforms necessitated by it. In Berlin in March
1999 it shifted to budgetary reform to finance the EU’s various pro-
grammes during the 2000–6 period, and to the question of who should
pay how much. An Agenda 2000 for an overhaul of the EU’s financial
structure, the CAP and regional support was agreed, though in a much
toned-down form compared to what the Commission had originally
proposed.
Germany had not been able to reduce significantly its role as the big-
gest net contributor to the EU budget (about €9.3 billion more in con-
tribution than in receipts in 2000, or 60 per cent of EU transfers from
richer to poorer members), but as host it had a strong interest in avoid-
ing a breakdown in the negotiations. Other major net payers – the
Netherlands, Sweden, Austria – were not much relieved either, nor were
net receivers much disturbed. Spain, in the last night of talks, managed
to squeeze out an extra €3 billion from the EU’s structural and regional
funds, which in total would amount to over €200 billion for the six-year
period. (In a reform of how the funds should be distributed, the summit
decided that more should go to the very poorest regions in the EU, rather
than to all except the richest, as had previously been the case.)
The United Kingdom was able to keep most of the special rebate it
had obtained in the Thatcher years (due to the particular situation of its
agriculture). France obtained most of what it wanted, in particular
smaller reductions than foreseen for its own and other countries’ farmers.
Yearly CAP expenditure was to be kept at around €40 billion, less than
half of the equally ‘frozen’ total EU expenditure of about €90 billion
(representing a maximum of 1.27 per cent of EU GDP). In all, the Berlin
Summit was a grab for money from all sides, a struggle to keep
privileges, however outmoded, or of redressing perceived injustices.
The agreements reached in Berlin, like those in Amsterdam in 1997,
appeared meagre, especially when measured against the original propo-
sals in the Commission’s Agenda 2000. Consumers and tax-payers could
have gained more if CAP prices had been more free-market-oriented.
More could have been done with less EU money if the structural policy
had been more specifically directed at the poorest regions. Greater
understanding could have been shown with regard to the big net payers’
positions.
However, a basis was thought to have been laid for sounder EU
finances in the future, in that the CAP and overall expenditure was
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stabilised up to the year 2006. EU enlargement seemed more feasible
from the financial point of view. The summit also showed a realisation
that ‘bribe money’ would not be available to the same extent as in the
past in order to smooth over disagreements between member states. The
net payers promised to be less generous in future and the net receivers
were warned they might have to adapt to a ‘leaner and meaner’ EU.
The Helsinki Summit, December 1999
At the December 1999 EU summit in Helsinki it was decided to bring
the number of EU candidate countries from the six agreed at Amsterdam
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland) to
thirteen. Negotiations would start in 2000 with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. In addition, and more controver-
sially, Turkey was accepted as a candidate, although no date for the start
of negotiations for membership was fixed.7
The talks with all the twelve candidates (i.e. minus Turkey) would
take place concurrently, along the lines of the so-called ‘regatta model’:
all were to depart from the same starting line as far as their actual or
expected adherence to each and every one of thirty-one ‘chapters’ in the
acquis communautaire. The progress of each country would be judged
according to the same criteria. (To the various economic requirements
should be added the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ agreed within the
EU earlier, calling on EU candidates to maintain democracy, the rule of
law, respect of human rights and the protection of minorities.) It was
hoped that, in this way, improvements reached by especially the original
six candidates would not delay their accession, while new candidates
would have a chance to accelerate their reform process and catch up
with the rest.
Some Balkan countries were excluded from candidate status, such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia’ and, for obvious political reasons at the time, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. At least the first three could, however, be said to have
been covered by the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,8 while
awaiting the day when their economic (and political) maturity might be
such as to qualify them for candidate status.
Meanwhile, the EU was to reform itself in order to be ready in its turn
to receive new members. An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would
be set up in 2000 and given until 2002 to finish its work (i.e. one or two
years before the first expected enlargement). The main task was to make
sure that a much larger EU could work efficiently and reach decisions.
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Among the issues discussed were the size and composition of the Com-
mission; the number of votes per country in the Council of Ministers and
a possible wider use of qualified majority voting in that body; and
prospects for a further enlarged role of the European Parliament.9
Turkey’s inclusion among the candidate countries in the eleventh hour
of the Helsinki Summit gave rise to considerable debate among com-
mentators. Some were asking where the EU was heading in preparing to
accept a predominantly Muslim country or where indeed Europe’s
political, cultural and geographic borders could now be said to lie.
Others, however, pointed to Turkey’s major, and growing, geopolitical
importance and the need to bind it more closely to Europe.
European co-operation in the political, security and defence fields
took a major step forward, at least on paper, when the Helsinki Summit
also agreed to create, by 2003, a 60,000-strong, air and navy supported
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) ready to go into action within sixty days.10
The Rapid Reaction Force, meant to form part of the EU’s European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), was to be used only in extreme
cases of conflicts in Europe or its vicinity. Emphasis would be laid on the
so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ of peacekeeping or peacemaking. These also
included conflict identification and prevention, including emergency
assistance, police training, the building of a civil society and even trade
policies for economic stability. The tasks of the Western European
Union, which up to then had served as the main expression of European
security defence policies, would for all practical purposes be taken over
by the EU.11
The UK, France and Germany would together provide around 40,000
troops, with all the other EU members making up the remaining 20,000
– all from within a pool of 200,000 men for rotation purposes. Troops
from EU countries that were members of NATO would be ‘double-
hatted’, that is available for either EU or NATO duties as the situation
might require. (One can therefore not talk about any ‘European army’ in
its own right, only about the use of national armed forces, whether from
NATO or non-NATO EU countries.) They would be used for more
limited roles of crisis management when NATO as a whole was not
involved.)
It was also agreed that EU military activity would come under its
Council of Ministers, with no role for either the Commission or the Euro-
pean Parliament. As if to underline this fact, the policy was to be
managed by about a hundred military staff at EU headquarters in
Brussels, under the EU’s High Representative for Security and Foreign
Policy, who was also the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers.12
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The Helsinki decision to create a Rapid Reaction Force built on the
British-French St Malo Declaration of 1998 and had to be seen against
the background of the relatively undistinguished military performance
by the European members of NATO during the Kosovo conflict. For
France, the new project represented a means to assert increased Euro-
pean independence and power. For a United Kingdom outside the
Economic and Monetary Union, it provided a chance to continue to play
a leading role in European affairs. With Germany, perhaps surprisingly,
so enthusiastically behind the new initiative, it became a fait accompli
for many of the smaller, more hesitant and sometimes neutral EU
member states.
The US (and Canadian) reaction to the European Security and Defence
Policy was ambivalent, reflecting the age-old US uncertainty as to
whether its security, and that of Europe, was better assured by exerting a
dominating influence over it or by withdrawing from it. US worries
included: a possible ‘decoupling’ of North American and European
security; discrimination against the US, or against non-EU NATO mem-
bers Iceland, Norway and Turkey and these countries’ exposure to new
risks, especially since they might have to come to the rescue of EU
members also belonging to NATO, under the latter’s collective defensive
obligation; a lacking European will to increase defence capabilities to
the level necessary for separate action; and duplication of effort, as the
new EU structures would work parallel to already existing NATO ones
set up to cater for European-led operations (after a Defense Capability
Initiative was adopted at NATO’s fifty-year anniversary summit in
Washington in 1999 to improve the strength of European military forces).
Further transatlantic worries concerned the risk of reduced ‘inter-
operability’ between NATO and EU defences; possible clashes resulting
from further NATO and EU enlargement (now with defence commit-
ments) such as in the case of the Baltic States; possible confusion in
future crises, such as over who should intervene – NATO or the EU (or
both); and the risk that the EU might ‘rush in where angels fear to tread’
in order to prove its untested worth.
Complicating the situation was the fact that France, although a
NATO member, was not part of NATO’s integrated military structure.
Could EU military planning take place apart from NATO when the EU
would for a long time need NATO resources? Would the US (and the
Canadians) remonstrate by not sharing intelligence or by reducing their
commitment to NATO.
Above all, would the EU be able to afford the establishment of a Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy, given not only the growing gap
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between US military technology and that within the EU, but also shrink-
ing defence budgets in most EU countries?13 It was estimated that the
already under-financed military forces of the UK, France and Germany
would have to increase by half in the next ten years to meet the ESDP
commitments – a politically delicate task before electorates that could
see no real security threat on the horizon.14
On the other hand, the project was seen as having the potential to
encourage transnational mergers in the European defence establishment,
permitting it to recuperate some of the US lead in weapons technology.
Furthermore, stronger economic growth could permit defence budgets
to start growing again, especially since defence spending could create
new employment.15  The bigger countries – especially the UK, France and
Germany - seemed to feel that a single security policy was a natural next
step after the Internal Market and the single currency. Such a policy
would be particularly needed if the United States should ever wish to
‘decouple’ itself from Europe. At the same time it could provoke such a
‘decoupling’. This was, in brief, the Europeans’ dilemma.
It remained to be seen how great an impact on NATO the European
Security and Defence Policy would have and whether the Rapid Reaction
Force would actually be deployed independently of NATO. A number of
factors made this less likely. First, it would be difficult and slow for the
EU to reach agreement on actually deploying the RRF, since the member
states – three of which (Austria, Ireland and Sweden) considered them-
selves unable to join military alliances – were all democracies, eager,
under popular pressure, to avoid foreign policy initiatives, especially if
these had a military component. EU members would likely interpret
threats differently. Only when all agreed on a threat scenario and the
necessary measures to combat it would it be possible to deploy troops (a
hope punctured by the Iraq crisis in 2003).
Second, major EU players such as France, Germany and the UK had
different interests in creating the ESDP, a circumstance that was seen as
likely to hamper its effectiveness. France wanted it eventually to lead to
full security independence from the US and NATO. Germany wanted
greater EU integration, a development that would require greater defence
autonomy. However, Germany also wanted a lasting US–NATO pre-
sence to prevent any emerging national rivalries within the EU. Finally,
the UK needed to be shown to be involved in Europe at a time when it
was outside the Economic and Monetary Union.
EU foreign policy in the early 2000s often lacked coherence, as it often
criticised and sought to be distinct from US positions without presenting
clear alternatives. The latter were all the more difficult to identify as the
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various EU countries, each with its own foreign policy establishment and
objectives, stood far apart on many issues. One example was a sudden EU
diplomatic opening to North Korea in 2001, unaccompanied, however,
by any tangible initiative to solve that country’s conflict with South Korea.
This was followed by a near-absent EU policy on North Korea as the
showdown over that country’s nuclear armament came to a head in 2003.
A second example was the serious split over Iraq in 2003 between
those – such as the UK, Spain and Italy – who stood by the US in seeking
Saddam Hussein’s ouster, if necessary through an invasion; and those
countries, led by France, Germany and Belgium, who advised against
any invasion until a UN Security Council authorising it could be secured.
As the US–British led invasion took place, the EU’s attempts to forge a
common European Security and Defence Policy suffered a serious blow,
since nobody could guarantee that perceptions of outside threats and the
action required to counter them would be any less diverse than they had
been over Iraq.
However, EU successes in the foreign policy field were also scored,
such as in the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in 2001, where
a peace agreement was reached between Slavs and ethnic Albanians,
thanks to concerted EU (and US) action, and where the EU took over
peacekeeping duties in 2003.
The Nice Summit, December 2000
During three days (and nights) in December 2000, European Union leaders
laboured to make the Union better fit to receive up to twelve (thirteen if
Turkey was included) new members.16 The internal reform would have
to include especially the decision-making Council of Ministers but also
the Commission. The general drift was towards even more intergovern-
mentalism, that is, the joint rule by national governments in the Council
of Ministers, fortifying the thesis made by some observers that the EU,
far from heralding the end of the nation-state, in fact had come to its rescue
and had perhaps been invented by EU member states to preserve it.17
In the end, in a confusing night session on the third day of negotia-
tions, when nobody quite knew how the arithmetic would work (indeed
it had to be fine-tuned in the weeks to follow), the ‘big four’ (France,
Germany, the UK and Italy) received 29 votes each, Spain 27, the
Netherlands 13, Greece, Belgium and Portugal 12 each, Sweden and
Austria 10 each, Denmark, Finland and Ireland 7 each and Luxembourg
4. It was agreed that 88 votes out of the total 227 would be enough to
block decisions in a majority-decision domain of activity.28
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Nice also signified a drift within the Council of Ministers towards
greater dominance by the bigger countries – France, Germany, the UK,
Italy and Spain – vis-à-vis the smaller ones, based on size of population.
(This was natural enough, considering the drift toward intergovern-
mentalism. With more power for the Council of Ministers, greater care
had to be taken to ensure that this power reflected demographic realities.)
A further sign of big-country domination was the request to limit the
right of veto to fewer areas in favour of majority decisions. (Veto right is
above all a means of defence for the smaller countries to resist decisions
going against them.) In the end, the new areas where majority decisions
would replace the unanimity rule were fewer than had been anticipated,
as different countries, not least the big ones, exercised their veto rights to
prevent change: the British against any extension to fiscal and social
matters, the French and the Finns on culture, the Germans on immigration
and asylum, the Danes on labour market issues and so on. In the end,
majority voting was extended to thirty-five new areas, including regional
funding and services (but not cultural services such as television and film).
Nice also agreed that, as from 2005, the Commission would keep its
current size of twenty Commissioners regardless of any further EU
enlargement. The five countries with currently two Commissioners (France,
Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain) would content themselves with only
one, leaving five seats to any new members. By the time the EU had
reached twenty-seven member states, the number of Commissioners was
to be reduced from twenty to a lower, still undecided, number. The
concession by the big countries could be better understood when seen
against the background of the reduced power of the Commission. Why
bother about representation in a body that presumably would have less
influence? Furthermore, since Commissioners were at any rate supposed
to be neutral and work for the EU – not for their countries of origin –
and were normally forced by inside and outside pressures to do so
anyway, the fact of giving up a seat might not amount to much.
One achievement in Nice was to prepare the ground for ‘flexible
integration’ in various fields, such as social policies or taxation, among a
stipulated minimum of eight member states, along the lines of the
Economic and Monetary Union. Even though this potentially prepared
the ground for ‘several EUs within the EU’, it also reflected the need for
a more heterogeneous membership to integrate at different speeds. It
remained to be seen which countries would then team up on what subjects,
in order to proceed in advance of the others. Finally, Nice produced a
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which did not have treaty value but
which some people hoped would form part of a future EU constitution.
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Even though the immediate reactions from member states – especially
the smaller – after Nice were sceptical or disappointed (also at perceived
French bullying during the negotiations), it remained to be seen how the
agreement would work in practice. Would power move even more in the
direction of the member governments as widely foreseen, and away from
the Commission and the European Parliament (whose powers had, after
all, been increased in the Amsterdam Treaty)? Would the Commission
and the Parliament ‘gang up’ against the Council of Ministers to com-
pensate for loss of influence, and how effective would such an alliance
be? Would the (moderately) increased number of areas where majority
voting was to replace the unanimity rule make the EU less prone to
decision-making paralysis and instead make it more effective? Would
the EU’s new ‘flexibility’ clause, which permitted groups of countries to
go further than others, be a source of division and confusion, or would it
resolve the old ‘deepening-versus-widening’ dilemma of the institution?
Would the EU be perceived by EU citizens as being closer to them, as
‘national’ interests were defended by ‘their’ government in the Council
of Ministers? Or would it be perceived as being further away from them
as the role of the European Parliament – the ‘voice of the people’ – was
less prominent and as the Council of Ministers decided by a majority
vote in more areas?
There was genuine concern about the EU’s ‘distance from the people’
as the institution embarked on matters more and more central to the
everyday life of citizens, such as the management of the euro and the
migratory pressure to be expected from the next stages of enlargement.
Nor was there any agreement upon the ‘finality’ of the EU, nor the road
there. The risk was one of growing resistance – and a resulting rise of
populist, nationalist parties – against continued EU integration as it
reached nationally ‘vital’ areas. Alternatively, there could be a growing
feeling of ‘togetherness’, as various acts of bringing the European Union
together took place, as had indeed been the case over much of the
Union’s history.
In a first setback to the Nice Treaty, Irish voters in a referendum in
June 2001 rejected it by a margin of 54 per cent to 46 per cent (with only
about a third participating in the vote). Together with the Danish
referendum ‘no’ in 2000 to the euro, the Irish referendum was a renewed
reminder to the EU that something was amiss in the unification process.
Irish voters had above all been uneasy that Nice was relegating smaller
powers in the EU to a secondary position, through loss of voting power
in the Council of Ministers and the increased use of majority decisions in
that body. Furthermore, the Irish objected to what they saw as their
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country’s forced abandonment of its neutrality through the new military
responsibilities of the EU. The Irish vote pointed to a growing estrange-
ment on the part of EU citizens vis-à-vis the EU, which was seen as
increasingly opaque and secretive and distant from EU burghers and
their concerns. By contrast, the vote did not seem to reflect any popular
sentiment against EU enlargement, even though that was highlighted in
the international reaction within the EU, where many argued that enlarge-
ment and the Nice Treaty in general would have to go ahead regardless.
The other EU countries refused any renegotiation of Nice with the
Irish (as had been done with the Danes on Maastricht) and still expected
ratification by all the Fifteen (i.e. including Ireland) to permit the treaty’s
entry into force in 2003. However, the treaty’s requirement that it be
ratified by all countries, coupled with the uncertain prospect of a ‘yes’ in
another Irish referendum to be held in October 2002, would have forced
the EU into unchartered legal territory, had it gone ahead as if nothing
had happened.
It was fortunate for the EU, therefore, that a second referendum in
October 2002 approved the Nice Treaty by a comfortable margin, per-
mitting it to enter into force in February 2003. Some critics wondered
what referenda on EU treaties were worth, if negative results were not
tolerated and new ones had to be held until approval was won. Others
asked why referenda were admitted at all and recommended that ratifi-
cation through the national parliaments should suffice in all member
states.
New visions for the European Union
In the spring and summer of 2000 the debate on the future of Europe
and especially the EU was given new impetus with a speech by German
Prime Minister Joschka Fischer.19 Fischer, in May 2000, called for an
EU federation with a constitution, a directly-elected President, the
Commission as a form of government, and a bicameral parliament –
with a Senate representing the member states and the European Parlia-
ment representing the EU population as a whole. The locomotive behind
such a development should be a ‘core Europe’, a ‘centre of gravity’ – of
Germany and France and any other willing country. It was time, he said,
at a later press conference, to finish with the ‘Monnet method’ of
opaque and technocratic decision making behind closed doors that had
started with the Schuman Plan in 1950 (as devised by Jean Monnet) and
the 1958 European Coal and Steel Community and had ended with the
Maastricht Treaty.20
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The French reply was courteous but reserved. President Jacques
Chirac, a few days later, approved of the ‘core Europe’ idea and the need
for stronger French–German integration, but never once used the word
‘federal’. Instead he emphasised the enduring importance of the nation-
states, whose ‘natural convergence’, he maintained, constituted Europe’s
real strength.21 The French Minister of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevène-
ment, went so far as angrily to react against a ‘Germany still dreaming of
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’, adding that it had ‘not
yet recovered from the derailment caused to its history by national
socialism’.22
The reactions from Italy and Spain were subdued, and that of the
United Kingdom as reserved as could be expected from a Blair govern-
ment wary of even submitting the EMU issue to a referendum. The small
nations seemed to be against the Fischer proposal, mainly because they
feared the increased dominance in the EU that it presaged for the big EU
countries.
Responding to Fischer’s call for an EU federation of nation-states and
Chirac’s urge for a limited number of countries to pursue closer inte-
gration if they so wished, British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a speech
in Warsaw in October 2000 said that EU enlargement should be the
priority, lest Europe again be split in two halves, and that national
governments should play the leading role in the running of the EU as the
‘basis of democratic legitimacy’. He also called for a second chamber of
the European Parliament comprised of members of national parliaments,
to ensure that the Union would stick to common EU matters and not
interfere in national policy areas.
Blair also suggested an EU ‘troika presidency’ to shorten the time
between national EU presidencies for member states (intervals of seven
years with fifteen members and thirteen years with twenty-five). Blair
did not wish to see an EU constitution established, but rather an ‘EU
Charter of Competencies’ of a non-legislative nature, clearly spelling out
EU and national prerogatives. He also proposed a second EU legislature,
supplementing the European Parliament and consisting of members of
national parliaments. Its task would be to supervise the respect of the
‘Competencies Charter’. (The role of the European Commission would
be correspondingly reduced.)
The former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the former
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made their contribution to the
debate by announcing a preference for an EU restricted to the present
Fifteen plus Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The other candi-
dates should, they said, belong to a new, separate organisation to be
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established for economic and trade co-operation, with only a minimum
of political integration.
In April 2001, the President of Germany, Johannes Rau, outlined his
vision of the future EU before the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
His main concern was the preservation of Europe’s diversity and he
therefore proposed a federation of EU member states based on a federal
constitution (similar to Blair’s ideas). The constitution would have three
parts: the Charter of Fundamental Rights declared at the Nice Summit in
December 2000; a definition of EU and member-state rights; and a
structure for the federation consisting of a two-chamber parliament
where the EU Council of Ministers (not the national parliaments as in
Blair’s proposal) would form a second chamber supplementing the
European Parliament.
Furthermore, to remedy the European Commission’s ‘democratic
deficit’, Rau proposed that the Commission’s President should be elected
directly by the EU population or by the two chambers of parliament.
However, the European Commission would keep the right to propose
EU legislation, since in his view the limits of intergovernmental initia-
tives had been reached.
Following the Fischer and Rau proposals, and as if to underline
Germany’s leading role in the new EU, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder in April 2001 presented his ideas for the European Union’s
future. The European Commission would be the EU’s government. The
European Parliament would gain critical new powers by having ‘com-
plete budget authority’, while the present power broker, the Council of
Ministers, would become the EU’s second chamber of parliament,
supplementing the European Parliament, and thereby filling the EU’s
‘democratic deficit’, which Schröder saw as lying in the Council’s secretive
deliberations. By contrast, competence over issues like the EU regional
and structural policy would be returned to the nation-states.
In May 2001, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission,
predictably called for much more power in the hands of the Commission,
which should be turned into a ‘European government’ for economic
policy, foreign policy and defence (with the EU’s High Representative
for Security and Foreign Policy joining it as a member). It would serve as
the political counterweight to the European Central Bank for manage-
ment of the euro. It would also administer a ‘European tax’, replacing
the present budgetary system of the EU. In other words, an EU run by a
bureaucratic body without any direct democratic accountability.
Also in May 2001, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin added his
‘vision’, which was very reminiscent of that of Prodi. Its emphasis was
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on the need for continued intergovernmental rule over the EU through
the Council of Ministers; more harmonised social and labour legislation;
universal access to supplementary schooling in another EU country; an
‘economic government’ to supervise the European Central Bank; more
subsidies for European culture; a transnational, multilingual European
television network; more European agencies such as an EU police force
and a European prosecutor; a harmonised European corporate tax level;
and more restrictions on tax advantages in different EU countries and on
competition in international trade.
Jospin also called for the election of the President of the European
Commission by the European Parliament (and not, as at present, by
member states with the approval of the European Parliament) and for
the right of the Council of Ministers (on the advice of the Commission
or of member states) to dissolve the European Parliament.
In sum, the ‘visions’ ranged from the federal-parliamentary (Fischer,
Rau and Schröder) to the intergovernmental (Chirac and Blair) to the
bureaucratic-intergovernmental (Prodi and Jospin). The discussion was
refreshing, since it showed how open the EU’s future still was. It was not
too dissimilar from what took place when the American constitution
was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, with the difference that in the
EU’s case years went by, not weeks. The big question was, however,
whether the EU intergovernmental conference convened for 2004 to
review EU institutional reform would have a constitutional mandate (as
the Germans, Dutch and others preferred) or not (as was the British wish
in particular).
Would Europe be able to manage these challenges? The writer Michael
Prowse saw the ‘21st century as belonging to Europe – to that unique
and underrated political organisation called the European Union’. The
twenty-first century would be Europe’s, he argued,
because it will offer the world the most satisfying overall combination of individual
liberty, economic opportunity and social inclusion. It will offer the individual
more freedom than intolerant Asia. And the value of this freedom will be enhanced
by a sense of community and a commitment to social welfare that is largely
missing in atomistic America. That will make Europe an unbeatable bargain.23
A contrasting view was put forward by Lord Howell of Guildford, at
the time the chief Tory spokesman for foreign affairs in the House of
Lords. Howell argued that what Europe needed might in fact be less
integration, not more. He wrote:
The merging of nation states, like corporations, and the building of bigger and
bigger blocks and institutions to preside over them can sometimes mean
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advance. But it can also mean heavy centralisation and stagnation. In the modern
milieu of webs and electronic networks, ideas of block-building and centralisa-
tion can seem particularly inappropriate … and it may prove easier to bind
people and societies together by not pushing them together.
Howell went on to call on the builders of modern Europe to muster the
courage to show that there are different models for European advance, and that
closer integration is not necessarily the best one … There may not even be a
clearly definable goal for modern Europe. It may turn out to be more of a
continuous process of bargaining and adjustment, managed by a reformed and a
sharply downsized Commission.24
Not all of Howell’s compatriots would have agreed. The British
political thinker Larry Siedentop, for example, urgently wanted the EU
to adopt a federal constitution, not so that it would become more central-
ised but, to the contrary, so that clear limits could be set against any
encroachment by Brussels into the proper domains of member states or
regions. Only in this way could real meaning be given to the Maastricht
concept of ‘subsidiarity’.
Siedentop saw three current national approaches to EU integration.
The ‘French’ approach – born out of France’s traditional centralism
under a grande école, still essentially Jacobinic, elite – would try to do
the same with the EU, thereby making it centralist, bureaucratic and
secretive. The second was the ‘British’ approach, which was to avoid
excessive centralisation on an ad hoc basis, but without any grand
strategy or theory for doing so. This method, Siedentop feared, was
bound to fail in the face of the centralist onslaught brought about by the
‘French’ approach.
The third approach, and the one favoured by him, was the ‘German’,
building on the positive German experience with a federal constitution
established after World War II and largely inspired by that of the United
States. By overly fearing the ‘F-word’ (federalism), Siedentop concluded,
those against excessive Brussels power were in fact undermining their
own cause. Only a constitution setting out the strict limits of central
power could lastingly protect the prerogatives of member states and
democracy itself.25
The 2002 Convention on the Future of Europe
The EU summit in Nice in 2000 had concentrated on ways to enable the
institution’s decision-making machinery, above all within the intergovern-
mental Council of Ministers, to cope with the arrival of up to twelve
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new members from the mid–2000s onwards. This was clearly not
sufficient to prepare the EU as a whole – that is, its other institutions and
its policies – for such a development. The ‘vision’ debate on the EU’s
future (described earlier) therefore started shortly after Nice and led to
the establishment, at the EU summit in Laeken (Brussels) in December
2001, of an EU Convention on the Future of Europe.
The convention, presided by former French President Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, started its work in February 2002. It brought together around
a hundred delegates and representatives of national governments of EU
member states and candidate countries, the European Parliament,
national parliaments and the European Commission around a mandate
of proposing necessary changes to EU treaties (or a new treaty), to ensure
that the institution could function democratically, efficiently and close
to EU citizens in decades to come.26 The proposals of the convention
would be ready by 2003, for ultimate adoption (after likely modification
at an intergovernmental conference) at an EU summit. The new treaty
would be in place, it was hoped, in time for the next EU enlargement in
2004.
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in his speech opening the convention in
February 2002 said that it should ask itself what the Europeans in an
enlarged EU wanted Europe to be, now that the continent had overcome
its divisions and found peace. The world as a whole, he continued,
needed a strong, united and peaceful Europe that stood by its inter-
national commitments and promoted tolerance and democracy. The
convention should shape its recommendations according to all these
expectations, in defining the EU’s institutional architecture, competences,
inner functioning and democratic legitimacy. Above all, he concluded, it
would have to arrive at a consensus on a single document and not let
itself break up into factions.
Pat Cox, the Irish President of the European Parliament, in his speech
on the same occasion emphasised the need to make the EU more
democratic and more parliamentary, while Romano Prodi, the President
of the European Commission, spoke of the development of the EU as a
harmoniously functioning model of a supranational democracy and one
where no member state should dominate any other, presumably via a
strong role for the Commission.
During the convention’s first few months of work, proposals flowed
in from many quarters.27 There were certain similarities (but also impor-
tant differences) between Brussels in February 2002 and Philadelphia in
1787 or Bonn in 1948, to mention just a few conventions entrusted with
shaping a new constitution for a state or group of states.28 The actors –
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governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, the Com-
mission and others – were all present and eager to present their ideas and
defend their interests. The quality of the end result would determine
whether all those absent but who mattered most – the ordinary citizens
of the enlarged EU – would start feeling that the EU was with them and
in their hearts, rather than above and apart from them.
By early 2003 the convention still held together well and had made
steady progress in reaching its aim of presenting a joint text to the new
member states within the timeframe foreseen. Thus there was now a
broad consensus to draw up a constitutional treaty, a framework for
which was presented at the end of 2002. EU legislation would come under
a single legal entity (signifying a departure from the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty on European Union) and would be drastically simplified, as
would EU procedures.
A first part of the future constitution would deal with fundamental
rights, EU powers and institutions, democratic government, finances
and representation vis-à-vis the outside world. The framework described
the EU as ‘a Union of European states which, while retaining their
national identities, closely co-ordinate their policies at the European
level and administer certain common competences on a federal basis’.
Subsidiarity would be assured by ‘the principle that any competence not
conferred on the Union as a constitution, rests with the member states’,
thus limiting the scope for institutions such as the Commission to gain
undue power. A ‘Congress of the Peoples of Europe’ was foreseen in
order to give a voice to national parliaments and to preserve subsidi-
arity. Countries would if they so wished be able to leave the EU, whose
final name would be decided in due course.
A second part of the framework dealt with various EU policies,
without seeking large modification to them, such as the free movement
of goods and people, economic policy, competition and internal security.
A third and final part took up legal issues, such as the continuity in
relation to the European Community and the repeal of earlier treaties.
As the convention attempted to go from framework to constitution
proper, several countries – notable among them France and Germany –
sent their Foreign Ministers to represent them. Among the first proposals
they had to consider was one from the Commission, in which it asked to
be given the central right of initiative in all fields relating to legislation
and an almost exclusive executive authority. The Commission President
should be elected by the European Parliament and confirmed by the
European Council (of heads of state and government). As a counterpart,
the Commission would be politically accountable before these two
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bodies. The European Parliament would be given the same legislative
powers as the Council of Ministers, while the veto power within the
latter would be abandoned in favour of majority decisions. A single
‘Foreign Secretary’ would be responsible for external relations, rather
than divided between a High Representative of the member states and a
European Commissioner, as at present.
In early 2003, France’s President Chirac and Germany’s Chancellor
Schröder proposed a dual EU presidency: an EU President would be
appointed by the Council of Ministers to serve as the public face of the
EU and as its political driving force, also on foreign policy. A European
Commission President would be elected by the European Parliament.
The EU’s ‘Foreign Secretary’ would work under the EU President but be
based in the Commission. The French–German compromise proposal
was considered as having a chance of being accepted by many other
member states, since the differing French and German views – France’s
being more intergovernmental and that of Germany seeking a stronger
influence for the EP and the Commission – rather well reflected the
major strands of opinion in the EU as a whole.
However, the most difficult choices still remained to be made. What
should be the final purpose, ‘identity’ and popular legitimacy of the EU –
questions all the more pressing given the already achieved high degree of
integration? Should the EU be given more capacity for action in the
international arena, such as in ensuring the success of the euro in world
markets? Or was this not necessary, to the extent that member states felt
they could safeguard such interests better individually or in (shifting)
coalitions, such as dealing with Iraq in 2003?
Should the EU be a confederation along the Swiss model, a ‘Europe of
states’? Or should it be a federal state, a ‘United States of Europe’? Or
should it be a combination of the two – more federal internally via
increased powers for the Commission, and more confederal in its inter-
national relations, via the intergovernmental Council of Ministers? Or
should the ‘community model’ be sought along the lines of the present
set-up, with the Commission as the engine behind final decisions to be
taken by the Council of Ministers and approved by the European Parlia-
ment? What should be the balance of power between the EU institutions
and to whom should they be accountable? Presumably, final answers to
these questions would essentially have to be given at the truly political
level, that is, at the post-convention stage of deliberations.
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The EU’s policing of its inner democracy: the ‘Haider affair’
In February 2000, the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volks-
Partei – ÖVP) formed a government coalition with the Austrian Free-
dom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) led by Jörg Haider, a
far-right populist who had made statements, later withdrawn, praising
aspects of Hitler’s rule.29 The government had come about as coalition
negotiations between the ÖVP and its earlier partner, the Austrian Social-
Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) had
broken down. The other fourteen governments of the EU reacted by
downgrading relations with Austria, provoking a bitter debate about the
meaning of national sovereignty and about whether the quest for
morality as the basis for an emerging new international order should
take precedence over the democratic expression of a people’s will.
With the FPÖ obtaining virtually as many votes as the ÖVP in the
national elections of October 1999, and well ahead of the SPÖ, the
coalition seemed natural enough, if it had not been for Haider’s extreme
remarks and his party’s perceived xenophobia or even antisemitism.30
The French and Belgian governments were in the forefront of a weekend
move, which by the following Monday had virtually isolated Austria
diplomatically from the rest of the EU and which would continue, it was
declared, for as long as the coalition remained. The French and Belgian
fervour was due not only to the personal convictions of the leaders of
these countries, but also the particular inroads into the political arena
made by the extreme far-right Front National in France and the Vlamse
Bloc in Belgium.
However, the rather hurried decision among the Fourteen also drew
fire from some quarters. Why, it was asked, had it been rushed through
over a weekend, without much consultation of especially some smaller
EU member state governments or any consultation of national parlia-
ments or the European Parliament?31 Why was it made even before the
new government had even been formed, let alone taken any actions that
might have represented ‘serious and persistent’ breaches of the principles
of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights, in the words of a
recent EU treaty revision? Where was the respect for an EU ‘subsidiarity’,
in this case the right of each country to decide on its own government?
Would the EU have done the same to a big or central country as it had
done to Austria?
The proponents of the action argued, however, that incursions by the
extreme Right had to be nipped in the bud, especially in view of forth-
coming EU enlargement to the new democracies in Central and Eastern
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Europe. If Europe had shown similar resolve in 1933, they said, the
Third Reich and World War II might have been avoided. Finally, if
political Europe was to have any meaning, the political situation in any
one country would have to be the concern of all, especially if it went
against basic EU principles.
In the summer of 2000 a delegation of ‘three wise men’ was dis-
patched to Austria to judge the country’s policies as well as the evolution
of the FPÖ.32 Finding a way out had become more and more of a
necessity for the Fourteen, as the sanctions were proving ineffectual and
unpopular in the EU. An Austrian referendum on the sanctions was to
be held in October, 2000, and it was feared that the boycott would
influence a Danish referendum on the euro the preceding month in the
direction of a rejection.
In the autumn of 2000, the sanctions of the Fourteen against Austria
were lifted following a report by the ‘three wise men’. The report said
that, although the FPÖ had often used ambiguous and xenophobic
language and had ‘trivialised’ Nazism, it had not used such language after
it had joined government. The latter, the report went on, had respected
‘European values’ and its record on minorities, refugees and immigrants
was no worse than in any other EU country. Under such circumstances,
the ‘three wise men’ concluded, it would be counterproductive to
continue the sanctions. These were subsequently lifted.
Whatever view one took, the EU would now have to follow a rather
interventionist course if it was to be faithful to the Austrian precedent.
Nor was it clear how such a course would work out in different EU
countries with strong xenophobic or far-Right parties. The road from
European union to European disunion and paralysis could be shorter
than one cared to think .33
Turkey and the EU
Turkey first applied for EU membership in 1963 and soon was given
association status and preferential trade links. However, it was told that
membership would have to wait, until even that hope was thrown out at
an EU summit in Luxembourg in 1997. The arguments raised by the EU
included the as yet unresolved Kurdish question and Turkey’s human
rights record, which was perceived as inadequate. Turkey was urged not
to try to hinder the accession of Cyprus to the EU and to improve its
relations with Greece. In order to patch up relations, Turkey was invited
to participate in a special Europe Conference in London in 1998, an
invitation subsequently spurned by Ankara. (The conference brought
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together the Fifteen and the eleven ‘first and second wave’ states, but left
few traces.)
When Turkey was finally included among the seven ‘’second wave’
candidate countries in 1999, it was in part in recognition of the country’s
support as a NATO member during the Cold War and its key strategic
position in between three restless regions: the Balkans, the Caucasus and
the Middle East. A Turkey in the EU would radically increase the institu-
tions’s influence in these regions, while a Turkey outside it would corres-
pondingly diminish it. Turkey was a major, and rapidly developing
economy, with its sixty-six million people and one of the fastest growing
and youngest populations in Europe. As an EU member, however, Turkey
would of course also be part of the Internal Market, implying free
movement of, among other things, labour. With unemployment high in
many EU countries and xenophobia not far below the surface, the effects
of likely large-scale immigration by Turkish workers was an issue of
considerable concern to some EU members. Finally, Greece’s opposition
to Turkey’s entry went deep, because of memories of past Ottoman
domination, the conflict over Cyprus and strife over borders in the
possibly oil-rich Aegean Sea. By the early 2000s, however, relations
between Ankara and Athens had improved considerably.34
Turkey, for its part, was not without options. With a customs union
in place with the EU since 1996, its immediate economic interests (minus
the EU financial assistance that would come with membership) had
largely been secured. The country was unlikely to stop playing its other
cards even as an EU candidate, especially if membership negotiations
were to drag on. These included closer relations with the United States,
Russia, Israel and culturally and linguistically related countries in central
Asia, not least in view of the oil and gas riches in and around the
Caspian Sea. To the extent that these cards were played skilfully, the EU
might well find that delaying Turkish entry could carry with it a cost, in
that it was shut out of deals between Turkey and its new partners.
Amidst all this there was, in Turkey, a strong and, some argued, growing
Islamic fundamentalism. While this was not likely radically to alter the
overall orientations of the country (which were largely geostrategically
determined), it could still add to political instability.
By the time of the December 2000 EU summit in Nice, Turkish rela-
tions with the EU had cooled considerably.35 It was clear from a critical
report by the Commission of November 2000 that the EU candidate in
question was far from actual membership negotiations due to the Kurdish,
human rights and Cyprus issues. Ankara responded with anger, by down-
grading contacts with Brussels. It also blocked the approval by NATO
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(of which it was a member) for the EU’s wholesale use of NATO
resources for the purposes of its Rapid Reaction Force.
Turkey began a major reform process in 2001, one purpose of which
was to prepare it for EU membership. Constitutional and legislative
changes were made ensuring gender equality, liberalising party and trade
union legislation and consolidating civilian control over its National
Security Council. In 2002 the death penalty was abolished, the Kurdish
language permitted on radio, television and in education, and religious
rights protected.
The reforms were enough to extract from the 2002 EU summit in
Copenhagen a promise that a decision would be taken by the end of
2004 on the principle and date of the start of membership negotiations
with Turkey, provided that the reform process was continued and imple-
mented and progress reached on the issue of the still-divided Cyprus.
Behind the EU’s commitment lay strong US pressure and Turkey’s
agreement to lift its veto, referred to above, against letting the EU’s
Rapid Reaction Force use NATO resources – an issue that had hampered
the Force’s realisation since the 1999 Helsinki Summit.
The inner logic of EU enlargement: ten new members in 2004 and more in line
For the European Union, enlargement is central to its very essence and
raison d’être. Previous chapters have related how the United Kingdom,
Denmark and Ireland joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981,
Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
It had been clear already in the early 1990s that the newly liberated
countries in Central and Eastern Europe would eventually join, the only
question being when this would be possible given the European Union’s
rather exacting acquis communautaire and the still low economic output
of the countries in question. As they strengthened their democratic insti-
tutions, they were able to join the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe
in growing numbers, but one of their main ambitions, apart from joining
NATO, was EU membership.
It was also obvious that the EU, in order to be able to include many
new members, would have to reform its inner functioning, both as
regards institutions and financing. The former were essentially the same
as, and construed for, an EU of six or perhaps at most a dozen or so
members, as had been the case between 1986 and 1994. The finances
would have to be reviewed as the candidate countries were compara-
tively poor and had large farming populations.
The EU summit in Amsterdam in 1997 had agreed to the principle of
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enlargement with the number of ‘first wave’ new members – considered
to have reached furthest in economic and political development – soon
crystallising at six: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia.
The 1999 Helsinki Summit – in a departure from the earlier ‘small
bang’ enlargement plans to a ‘big bang’ variant – widened the circle of
recognised candidate countries from six to thirteen by including Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey, even though
negotiations would start with Turkey only at a later, unspecified date.
The Nice Summit in 2000 concentrated on readying the EU from the
institutional and decision-making points of view for such a further
enlargement.
The EU would have to enlarge in its capacity as the main unifying force
in Europe, even as nobody could predict where the EU’s ‘final’ borders
to the east and south-east might some day lie. Unlike earlier such unify-
ing forces – a France under Napoleon or a Germany under Hitler – this
was not an empire in the making, but an institution in which countries
joining would do so voluntarily and be part of the management. Some
sovereignty – unknown how much – would have to be abandoned, but it
would presumably be the same for all members, new and old.
A power vacuum that had arisen with the disappearance of the Soviet
Union and its area of influence in Central and Eastern Europe had dis-
appeared and needed to be filled. NATO, a pure defence and security
organisation, would not suffice. There was therefore a logic which
pushed the EU toward enlargement far into the east, up to the borders of
Russia (and a Ukraine not yet deemed fit for candidacy), a country that
would have to be brought into as a close a partnership as possible with
the EU. The US was also supportive of the effort, as it saw the EU as a
stabilising force largely serving its own security concerns and presence in
this part of the world, as underpinned by NATO enlargement.
The candidate countries, especially those that had been under Soviet
sway, were on the one hand keen to preserve as much as possible of their
newly won national sovereignty and freedom of action – achievements
they might have partly to give up along with EU membership. On the
other hand, there was the political and security protection offered by the
EU and the prospect of important EU financial support for these coun-
tries’ agricultural sectors and poorer regions. The EU still had the aura
of Europe’s ‘rich men’s club’ and membership in it was seen as a sign of
economic and political success, of having ‘made it’ into established
Europe. Meanwhile, during the candidacy process, the goal of membership
would give these countries’ foreign policy and economic reform efforts
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stability and direction. Less clear to the candidates was perhaps the fact
that membership would not mean any automatic acquisition of pros-
perity but would rather imply a continued commitment to the, increas-
ingly, stringent acquis communautaire as regards, for instance, the
opening of markets and the reduction of domestic subsidies.
In 2000, the European Commission, which negotiated with the twelve
candidates on behalf of the EU, announced that it hoped to conclude the
talks, focused on thirty-one ‘chapters’ of the acquis communautaire by
the end of 2002, so that a formal target date for entry could be fixed for
2004, ahead of the elections for a new European Parliament foreseen for
that year. By mid–2002 this forecast was confirmed by the Commission,
even though the number of likely new members in the ‘first wave’ had
now shrunk from twelve to ten following a decision at the 2001 EU
summit in Brussels.36
The prospective membership of Lithuania and Poland presented the
EU with a major problem in its relations with Russia. The Kaliningrad
region – a part of the former East Prussia (Königsberg and surroundings)
sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland, ceded to the Soviet Union
after World War II and now forming part of Russia – had become
geographically separated from the rest of that country as a result of
Lithuanian independence. With Lithuanian and Polish membership of
the EU – and hence participation in the Schengen Agreement foreseeing
the free movement of people and goods across borders – the one million
inhabitants of Kaliningrad would not be able to move freely between the
region and the rest of Russia. Instead, as non-EU citizens, they would
need a visa. This, Russia argued, would mean an unacceptable infringe-
ment of their human rights. Russia asked for ‘corridors’ through
Lithuania and Poland, something which, however, neither of these two
countries nor the EU felt they could accept. A solution was becoming
urgent, both for EU–national relations and for the people of Kaliningrad
who, isolated from Russia and the outside world in general, were
sinking into greater and greater poverty.
There were tensions among the EU member states as to the extent and
timetable of enlargement. The UK was in favour of wide and speedy
enlargement, believing that the resulting larger heterogeneity would weaken
any feared ‘deepening’ of EU integration. The Nordic EU countries –
Denmark, Finland and Sweden – were eager to include the Baltic states
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) as well as Poland – as was a Germany
keen on stability to its east. All EU members agreed on the need even-
tually to include also Bulgaria and Romania to promote stability in
South-Eastern Europe.
MUP_Torbion_09_Ch9 22/9/03, 3:41 pm214
215A new European Union
However, some EU members feared that too wide and speedy an
enlargement would hasten the arrival of the day when an increasingly
financially strained EU would have to cut its regional and agricultural
funds to the older members. Countries like France, Portugal, Spain,
Greece and Ireland therefore emphasised the necessity for the candidates
to meet all parts of the acquis communautaire before accession – a
requirement that would tend to slow down the process – and also wanted
to make support levels lower for new members than for the current ones.
The candidates, by contrast, insisted on a number of temporary exemp-
tions from the acquis and on uniform financial-support models to avoid
becoming ‘second class’ EU members. Meanwhile, net contributors to
the EU, and in particular the biggest net payer Germany, insisted on not
having to pay (much) more into the EU budget following enlargement.
The EU’s long-awaited ‘big bang’ enlargement came at its summit in
Copenhagen in December 2002, when it decided to admit ten new
members by May 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The EU’s
population would increase by 70 million to over 450 million. Following
the agreement to the enlargement by the European Parliament in 2003,
the accession treaty would have to be ratified by all the fifteen current
member states (and perhaps submitted to referenda in a few among them).
The EU would also monitor the implementation of the commitments
given by the future members, including reforms promised in the admini-
strative and judicial domains.
Meanwhile, negotiations would continue with Bulgaria and Romania,
with a possible date of accession set for 2007. Finally, as has been
mentioned, an attempt would be made in 2004 to set a date for the start
of membership negotiations with Turkey.
Negotiations with the ten candidate countries were difficult up until
the Copenhagen Summit. They focused on the level of agricultural and
regional support to be given to the new members and on whether
compensation to their farmers would be the same as that paid to their
colleagues in the ‘old’ member states. The added costs to the EU for the
2004–6 period were budgeted at around €40 billion.
The Copenhagen Summit was truly historic, as had been the NATO
Prague Summit a month earlier, where it had been decided to invite
seven new members to join the defence alliance. The Copenhagen Sum-
mit came only nine years after the EU summit of 1993 in the same city,
where the so-called ‘Copenhagen accession criteria’ – now met – had
been agreed, and twenty-one years to the day after communist Poland
had proclaimed martial law in 1981. As in Prague, the speeches referred
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to the ‘reunification of Europe that had been divided at Yalta’ in 1945.
Even the issue of the Kaliningrad region was resolved in parallel nego-
tiations among the EU, Russia and Lithuania.37
The EU’s enlargement was unlikely to stop at the ten invited in 2002
or those foreseen for the years thereafter. At least some of the countries
in the Balkans would be next in line, as witnessed by the many associa-
tion and assistance agreements concluded with the countries of the
former Yugoslavia in particular. Since the Kosovo conflict, the EU had
been paying much greater attention to the region. The Stability Pact,
jointly administered by the EU and the World Bank, was not only about
giving money, but also about enhancing trade and investment within the
region – a difficult task given its recent and not so recent history of
conflict. The EU, like the rest of the international community, expected,
however, that borders would not be changed, as they would be if
Kosovo or Montenegro were to leave what remained of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (which in 2002 decided to change its name to
Serbia and Montenegro). The fear was that, if this happened, many
other borders in the region would be called into question.
Finally, non-EU countries in Western Europe had begun to rethink
their position, as the inconveniences of remaining outside the EU began
to be felt. The EU’s European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement con-
cluded with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in 1994 gave the latter
free access to the EU’s Internal Market in most areas (though not
fisheries) but little say in decisions. The situation could only worsen in
an EU which in 2004 would go from fifteen to twenty-five, especially as
the EEA countries would have to pay much more into the EU’s
‘Cohesion Fund’ used to assist the less wealthy new members. The EEA
countries would also face new trade barriers with the new EU members,
with which they had, paradoxically enough, already concluded bilateral
free trade agreements via EFTA. Iceland treasured its exclusive control
over its fishing waters, but other economic areas suffered from being
outside the EU. Norway also had important fisheries interests to defend
and would be a major net payer once inside the EU due to its oil wealth.
Still, even there doubts about the advantages of remaining outside began
to arise. Popular referenda on membership in those countries could not
be excluded in some future.
Switzerland’s relations with the EU had been defined in a so-called
‘Bilateral I’ agreement of 2002, but difficulties had emerged in the
negotiations for a future ‘Bilateral II’ treaty, especially over customs
issues and the taxation of income from interest to be paid by EU citizens
on capital held in Swiss banks. A Swiss referendum on EU membership
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was not, however, on the cards for a variety of reasons. These included
opposition against membership by a seemingly solid majority of the
Swiss and difficulties in reconciling Swiss direct democracy with the
EU’s method of functioning.
Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the aid to regions
One area in great need of reform was the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Ever since the crucial decision was taken by the EEC in the
late 1950s to engage in price support (a guaranteed price for each unit of
various commodities) rather than income support (a guaranteed income
regardless of production), the EU had had to compensate for one adminis-
trative shortcoming in the system by adding another. Big farmers were
favoured, deliberately at first so as to rationalise farming by creating
larger units and forcing smaller farmers off the land into other occupa-
tions. This worked as long as production was not in excess, i.e. up until
the mid–1960s. However, as from the early 1970s, when excess pro-
duction of dairy products and beef in particular rose to worrying levels,
the EU had to resort to dumping on the world markets (much to the
irritation of North Americans, Australians and others), and pay for it
through export subsidies. (The CAP and other agriculture-related expen-
diture still today accounts for about half of an EU budget, which has in
the meantime become much bigger.38)
The early 1990s saw various limited EU efforts to reform the CAP:
cuts in price support beyond certain production levels; ‘set-aside’ pro-
grammes, i.e. payments to farmers for letting land lie fallow; refores-
tation and support for environment protection initiatives; and a cutback
on export subsidies under international pressure (notably US). 39
 In 1997 the Commission, as part of its more general Agenda 2000 for
revamping various EU policies, proposed further cuts in price support
for main crops in order to return EU agriculture slowly to the free market
and to lower prices for consumers. It further suggested greater reliance
on supporting farmers’ incomes, signifying a return to an idea discarded
in the 1950s. The new aim would be to help smaller farmers stay on the
land and thereby counter the flight to the cities where jobs were now
scarcer, and to encourage local food varieties and higher food quality.
Reform of the CAP was all the more urgent in view of the forthcoming
EU enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with
their large and comparatively poor farming populations. At the same
time the EU would have great difficulties assuming any major extra
outlays as a result of enlargement, especially since the new countries
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would all be net beneficiaries from the EU budget. With uniform and
unchanged CAP payments throughout an enlarged EU financially
almost impossible – and with reduced overall CAP payments politically
difficult vis-à-vis farmers in the present EU member states – a non-
uniform CAP giving less to the farmers of the new entrants might be the
only way out.
The 1999 Berlin Summit, as described earlier in this chapter, showed
that resistance against changes to CAP payments was fierce, not only
from EU members that stood to gain the most, but also from strong and
well-organised farming interests. Another idea – the ‘renationalisation’
of the CAP (i.e. its abandonment) – was floated by Germany in the lead-
up to the Berlin Summit, but it was abandoned after heavy French
resistance. Given the difficulties of reforming the CAP in any meaningful
way, the enlarged EU was likely to face both a costly system and con-
siderable excess production, especially in the meat and dairy sectors.
A new Commission proposal in 2002 suggested an even greater
‘decoupling’ of agricultural payments from farm production. A set sum
would be paid to each farm, the size depending on past production and
the farmer’s contribution to environment protection, landscape improve-
ment such as forestation, animal welfare and village renewal. This would
lead to less production of commodities in excess, such as dairy products
and beef, and hence to fewer export subsidies, considered to be in viola-
tion of World Trade Organisation rules. The new proposals would,
however, keep intact many other features of the traditional CAP, such as
price guarantees and levies on imported food. Meanwhile, farm aid to
new member countries would be phased in as from enlargement, starting
with a quarter of the EU level in 2004 and reaching it in 2013. The
Commission’s proposal led to fierce reactions on the part of several EU
governments with important CAP payments to defend, especially France.
In 2002 France managed to rally Germany – normally a country in
favour of CAP reform but now politically weakened over the Iraq crisis
in particular – and eventually also the EU around a proposal to delay
any strict limit on CAP spending and further reform until 2007, rather
than the earlier 2004 date sought by the European Commission through
countries like the United Kingdom and Sweden.40
The European Commission, eager to achieve reform, fought back,
however, pointing out that an unreformed CAP of massive export
subsidies and import restrictions might scuttle the ongoing World Trade
Organisation’s round of negotiations – the Doha Development Agenda –
where other essential EU interests, such as in the services sector, were at
stake. Agriculture was now moving to the very centre of international
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politics, with developing countries and major agricultural producers
such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada pressing the EU, and
increasingly also the US, to give up subsidies and let more imports in, or
risk a collapse in trade negotiations and a brake on world economic
development. The Commission, representing EU member states in the
trade talks, faced a formidable balancing act.
It was similarly difficult to reform the EU’s regional assistance pro-
grammes. At the beginning of the EU’s history, regional aid was devoted
to the assistance of the truly poorest regions of the then Six, such as the
Italian Mezzogiorno or the eastern parts of the Federal Republic of
Germany that had lost their links with the east due to the Iron Curtain.
However, it was increasingly being used to compensate other regions or
even countries which felt they gave much more to the EEC–EC than they
received in return (this was the case with the British rebate). For every
new enlargement, starting with Greece, regional support was used for
such compensatory purposes by the existing member states, who saw
their own receipts threatened if they had to be shared with newcomers,
unless of course the overall EU budget was increased and they could
receive extra funds. For the Twelve-to-Fifteen enlargement, a new Cohesion
Fund was introduced, principally benefiting Greece, Ireland, Spain and
Portugal. The Berlin Summit of 1999 meant both a restriction on the
growth of regional outlays and a concentration on the poorest regions.
The EU’s regional support amounting to some €30 billion per year
(over 30 per cent of the EU budget) would face particular strain. Whereas
in the EU of twelve member states one-sixth of the population lived in so
called ‘cohesion countries’ (a per capita income of less than 90 per cent
of the EU average – Greece, Portugal and Spain), that proportion would
rise to one-third in an EU of twenty-seven member states. Similarly, in
an EU of twenty-seven member states, the poorest 10 per cent of the
population would have a per capita income of only about one-third of
the EU average, as opposed to close to two-thirds of that level in the EU
of fifteen states. Not only would this mean that more regional funds
would have to be made available, but the ‘cohesion countries’ of the EU
of twelve member states might receive less.
The fraud problem
CAP and regional aid are among the EU programmes most afflicted with
fraud and payment ‘irregularities’, which are estimated to amount to
close to €7 billion per year, or around 8 per cent of the EU budget. The
EU’s Court of Auditors in Luxembourg – an institution with great expertise
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and a strong will to remedy the situation but with a limited remit, in that
it can only report but not initiate prosecution – regularly points to
wrongly waived customs duties, export funds paid ‘in error’, and sub-
sidies to farmers for non-existent or already subsidised set-aside land,
for dreamt-up herds of cattle, olive groves and other products, or for
surpluses of already rotten fruit. The absence of border controls through
the Internal Market, coupled with VAT payments only at the point of
delivery of goods (instead of at the point of departure), is reported to
give rise to massive fraud involving organised crime, lorry drivers, trans-
port companies and customs agents.
Even where there is no outright fraud, the Court has found many
examples of inefficient use of funds due to poor planning, co-ordination
or evaluation of projects. For example, regional support is often invested
in ways that run counter to environmental objectives. Aid to non-EU
countries is often inefficient because of a lack of ability of recipient
countries to absorb it.
Even though the magnitude of fraud is thought to have come down
following stricter procedures (many of them called for by the Court of
Auditors) and even the use of informers, it still eats like a cancer at the
whole EU edifice, affecting the morale of EU tax payers while building
up the bank balances of profiteers. It is, however, difficult to see how it
can be radically reduced, since normally the controlling and disbursing
authorities are national (over three-quarters of all EU spending is
administered by the member states), but the funds come from the EU as
a whole. There is no obvious reason why a member state should devote
all the effort it takes to check on the use of money which is mainly paid
by fellow EU countries. It cannot be excluded that national controllers
are even tempted to turn a blind eye to the problem. At issue is the
unnecessary centralisation of payments, and the unaccountability of the
central authority, the European Commission, before a popularly elected
assembly that has greater powers than those at present enjoyed by the
European Parliament.41
The risk of excessive uniformity
One problem for the EU is the rigidity of its legislative framework – the
80,000-page-thick acquis communautaire. A national parliament, acting
under popular pressure or not, can with relative ease cancel or modify a
law which has outlived its usefulness. However, to modify or cancel a
directive is much more difficult and lengthy, requiring that several EU
governments view things the same way and present a corresponding
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proposal for change to the Council of Ministers; that the latter author-
ises the Commission to study the proposal and possibly prepare a new
draft directive for submission back to it; that the new text meets with the
approval of the required majority of governments on the Council of
Ministers (or them all, as the case may be); and, finally, that the new
directive is transposed into national law by all the countries.
Meanwhile, the world goes on at ever more tantalising speed, which
would require more rapid, not slower, adaptation of the legislation. The
EU seems to be caught in a time warp, stuck in an approach to life more
in line with the assumed exigencies of central planning, uniformity and
secretiveness of the 1950s than with decentralisation, flexibility, public
openness and the diversity associated with present times. Europe derived
its strength and dynamism over history from the inability of one power
to dominate all the others, thus preventing it from falling into the decline
of an Ottoman or Ming Empire. The price Europe (and the world) had
to pay were wars, of which the last two nearly destroyed it. The question
for Europe today is whether it can find a system with which it can pre-
serve its dynamism by enabling its various regions to experiment with
different social and economic models, and at the same time to maintain
peace. (This is all the more important as the stagnation that is likely to
follow from excessive uniformity may itself engender conflict.)
One example of the above has been in the social field, where the Social
Protocol to the Maastricht Treaty was integrated into the EU acquis
communautaire, following signature and ratification by the last remain-
ing EU member to do so, the United Kingdom, in 1997.42 The UK made
it clear that it would continue to follow its own, more flexible – many
would say less social and less employee-friendly – social policies regard-
less. But the end result of further EU legislation in this field flowing into
the breach opened by the Social Protocol may well be the inability of any
and all to adapt the EU to new circumstances.43
The Common Agricultural Policy has already been mentioned. Here,
uniform principles collide with extremely diversified farming situations,
leaving as a result over many decades a myriad of ad hoc exceptions that
render the overall CAP regime largely impenetrable to the outsider and
hence the more difficult to change.
Subsidies, also in principle barred in the EU (although still frequent in
many sectors), are a special case. From a single market point of view, it
is of course desirable to equip a non-democratic European Commission
with powers to prohibit a country, say, France from subsidising Air
France or Crédit Lyonnais, or a German Land from supporting a local
Volkswagen plant. However, if the French or the German people
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happen to want this to happen, they are in principle prevented from
doing so by the EU, acting through the Commission. In a different type
of EU, countries would have been free to subsidise whatever they wanted
(as the individual states in the US can do), on the understanding that
they would eventually pay the price in the form of slower growth due to
higher taxes and less efficient companies (as a result of being subsidised).
Another example comes from the economic and trade arena.
Germany, a nation particularly fond of bananas, traditionally imported
them from whatever country offered the lowest price, whether or not it
was linked to the EU through the so-called Lomé Agreement giving
preferential trade status to a large number of so-called ACP (African,
Pacific and Caribbean) countries. However, a judgement by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Luxembourg ruled that this was a violation of
Lomé, in spite of Germany’s protests that in buying from a country such
as Costa Rica it only respected GATT–WTO principles. The economic
interests of the Germans (who consume more bananas per person per
year than any other EU member) and of other EU citizens were sacrificed
on the altar of the economic interests of other EU and ACP nations and
the uniformity of consumption, through a decision of a supranational
court essentially deliberating behind closed doors.44
To some, the banana case and others similar to it highlighted the risk
posed by excessive EU constraints to more open world trade and to the
welfare of EU consumers. To them, an EFTA arrangement in place of the
EU’s customs union would never have created the problem in the first
place, as there would have been no common external tariff on bananas
or other products. Others maintained, however, that the EU must show
solidarity to its own producers and to those in the ACP area, whether it
be through trade preferences, regional support, the CAP or development
assistance through the Lomé Convention, which from 1990 to the year
2000 disbursed some 24 billion ECU to the ACP region.
The EU’s fishing policy – ‘Blue Europe’ – shows the risks caused by
excessive uniformity vis-à-vis the resource itself. ‘Blue Europe’ is based
on the noble EU principle that in a single market one must essentially
share everything, in this case the fish stocks, whether they are inside or
outside the traditional fishing zones of individual EU countries. How-
ever, in the 1980s it was discovered that free and equal access for all –
Spanish fishermen in British waters, British in Spanish and so on –
depleted stocks, since everybody suspected everybody else of catching
more than they should and therefore did likewise. Before, each country
managed its fish resources (sometimes giving quotas to foreign fisher-
men) and had an interest in ensuring the long-term stability of stocks.
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Now, however, nobody knew who was in charge, unless it was a Euro-
pean Commission trying to act as an honest but largely ineffectual
broker who found it easier to say ‘yes’ than ‘no’ to the various demands
for more fishing rights coming from all sides.
Only a complicated system of EU quotas, inspectors, zones and
fishing licences has managed to keep fish stocks at just above the
extinction level – with recriminations over ‘quota-hopping’ by neigh-
bours and occasional shoot-outs between coastguard vessels of different
nations. Again, less emphasis on the ‘communal’ aspects of the European
community idea and greater recognition of the specific characteristics of
nature, and of nations, might have led to more (and cheaper) fish on the
tables of EU consumers and less aggravation among fishermen and
governments.45
Unemployment: too high for comfort
National economies in the EU – and elsewhere in Europe – have to grow
by between 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent a year in order to keep unem-
ployment from rising. Any growth rate below that range will tend to
increase unemployment, while any rate above it will tend to reduce it.
This is so because the implementation of the EU’s Internal Market, and
the continuing opening of markets under the World Trade Organisation
process, will increase competition in many sectors of the economy and
cause many firms to go out of business, ‘downsize’ their workforce or
‘outsource’ their production to countries with lower labour costs. As a
result, many people will lose their jobs. Those with few qualifications –
women, school leavers (especially those with interrupted studies), elderly
people and even the not so elderly – are particularly exposed. Only with
sufficient growth will new companies be created and established firms
grow sufficiently to create new jobs to replace those that have disap-
peared. It has therefore become essential for EU member countries to
show sufficient economic growth. Several Commission White Papers on
the subject have seen the light of day and many EU summits have been
devoted to it, leading to ‘job pacts’ and ‘processes’ meant to lead to
lower unemployment.46
While economic growth came relatively easily in the 1950–70 period,
with rates of 5 per cent or more, it became more difficult to reach them
ever since the first oil crisis of 1973–74. Long-term unemployment –
that is people being out of a job for several years – shot up in the 1980s
despite resumed growth and has stayed high ever since. Job creation also
began to lag behind the growth of the workforce (a result of the ‘baby
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boom’ of the 1940s and 1950s), causing overall unemployment to grow.
The entrepreneurial spirit for whatever reason seemed to prosper less in
the EU than, say, in the United States, where new jobs absorbed virtually
all of an even more rapidly growing workforce.47
Unemployment in the EU in the 1990s remained high, at around 9 per
cent. The early 2000s saw a reduction to around 7.5 per cent, assisted by
economic integration and increased intra-EU trade resulting from the
euro’s introduction in 1999. However, as European Union growth in
2002 slowed to less than 1 per cent, with uncertain prospects for 2003,
unemployment looked set to rise, especially in key countries like
Germany and France.
Many problems remained. Labour markets were recognised as being
too ‘rigid’, meaning that companies could not shed workers as fast or as
cheaply as they would wish. Aware of this, they hesitated to hire when
the going was good. High extra-salary costs further discouraged hiring.
The start-up of companies was a complicated, lengthy and costly process
in some countries. Taxes on companies were often so considerable as to
deprive them of sufficient capital to grow and hence employ.48 Taxes on
individuals in many countries were too high to leave them with enough
money to spend on goods and services, and hence permit companies to
profit and grow.
Many of the jobless, meanwhile, remained outside the labour market
so long that they lost the skills, motivation and self-confidence they
would have needed to re-enter it. This raised the ‘structural’ unemploy-
ment rate, that is, the rate below which even an economy in full expan-
sion cannot readily recruit from the pool of the unemployed, swelled by
a growing number of people sent into ‘early retirement’. Many jobless
would not even make more money if they worked, or the difference
might be marginal, and so would not take jobs offered to them. In the
EU of the early 2000s, the structural rate of unemployment, below
which the economy would not be able to recruit workers without
igniting inflation, lay at around 8 per cent of the workforce, as opposed
to 4 or 5 per cent in the United States.
The unemployment picture in the EU was, however, far from uniform.
In Ireland it had come down from about 15 per cent in the early 1990s
to around 4 per cent in the early 2000s, as the country profited mightily
from the ‘new economy’ and the ICT (information and communications
technologies) revolution. Spain, another ‘tiger’ in the new euro-zone con-
text, had managed to reduce its unemployment from 16 per cent in the
mid-1990s to around 11 per cent in 2002. The UK’s unemployment in
2002 remained at about 5 per cent, even though with large differences
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between regions. The situation in 2003 was more serious in big Euro-
land countries like France, Germany and Italy, with rates close to or in
the double-figure range. The labour markets of these countries seemed
particularly impervious to the increased ‘flexibility’ sought by, for
instance, the European Commission and the OECD.
Longer-term prospects for the EU were not altogether bleak, however.
Labour market reforms in the direction of greater flexibility were
proceeding in many countries, setting an example to others. EU
enlargement would increase trade and investment in the region and help
to reduce the comparatively high unemployment rate in the new member
countries. Finally, many more people in the EU would reach retirement
age as from about 2010 and there would be fewer younger people to
take their place, leading to an automatic lowering of unemployment (but
also to many other problems discussed in Chapter 10).
Notes
1 In Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790.
2 The new Labour government that came to power in May 1997 under Tony
Blair made this concession, which its Tory predecessor under John Major
had refused. For example, the provisions for an EMU in the 1992 Treaty on
European Union required British acquiescence (in exchange for a British
opt-out clause), whereas a future similar project could well be taken without
the consent even of a large EU country.
3 These increased powers of the European Parliament included: individual
approval of a new President of the Commission; the possibility of estab-
lishing common rules, or at least principles, for the election of European
Parliament members in the different countries; a greater say in sanctions
against a member state in the event of serious human rights violations; and the
right, within certain limits, to determine the status of rights of its members.
4 Presumably, the reformers took their cue from the British historian C. North-
cote Parkinson, who in his Parkinson’s Law (1957, p 49) postulated that no
committee can succeed with more than twenty members since, at that point:
‘It is finished. It is hopeless. It is dead.’ On a more serious note, the number
of Commissioners is highly arbitrary. The fact of having so many Com-
missioners often leads to confusion and paralysis, especially where economic
and political relations overlap, as they increasingly do. Thus, for example,
the Commissioner in charge of EU enlargement risks clashing with the
colleagues responsible for external trade, transport, agriculture, develop-
ment co-operation and possibly others.
5 In October 1999 an EU summit in the Finnish city of Tampere agreed to
speed up work aimed at the creation of an area of common EU law in such
fields as asylum, migration and the fight against terrorism, financial crime,
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organised crime, drugs, the trade in human beings and child labour.
6 Some observers, such as Shaw (1998, pp. 63–86), saw the Amsterdam
Treaty as just as Byzantine as the Maastricht Treaty, and as an inconclusive
way of restoring the EU’s legitimacy following the latter’s ratification hurdles:
‘Amsterdam – following Maastricht – was the culmination of a growing
legitimacy crisis in which all aspects of integration – processes, procedures,
institutions, leadership, goals and raison d’être – were thrown into serious
question for the first time in 40 years … But real simplification requires
something more than these forms of tinkering at the margins’.
7 The Cyprus issue presented many complications for relations between the
EU and Turkey. The EU had made it a virtual condition for membership that
the island overcome its division, since 1974, into a Greek-speaking part in
the south (internationally recognised) and a Turkish-speaking part in the north
(recognised only by Turkey and a handful of other countries). This might,
however, be used by Turkey to stall a negotiated settlement and thereby
unduly influence Cypriot membership. The EU tried to counteract this by
making Turkish rapprochement to the EU conditional on progress on Cyprus.
8 The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was established in 1999 at the
initiative of the European Union. Its aim is to ‘foster peace, democracy,
respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve
stability in the whole region’. It is led by a Special Co-0rdinator and operates
via different Working Tables dealing with democratisation and human
rights, economic reconstruction and security. Its membership includes the
EU member states, other west European countries, the non-European Group
of Eight (G-8) countries (Canada, Japan and the United States) and several
international organisations.
9 The ‘Internal Reform IGC’ was to base its work, among other things, on a
report presented by the so-called ‘Dehaene Committee’ in autumn 1999. The
report proposed extended majority voting as a way to avoid gridlock.
Furthermore, it suggested that future treaties be divided into two parts: one
containing fundamental principles to be ratified by all member countries;
and another dealing with more detailed policies that could be changed
through majority vote. This would facilitate any modifications necessitated
by new circumstances.
In parallel to the above reforms, Commission President Prodi presented,
in March 2000, a far-reaching administrative and structural reform of the
European Commission. The competence of Commission staff would count
for more than nationality (i.e. staff quotas for the different member states) in
terms of recruitment and promotion. Greater staff flexibility was to be
encouraged. The cabinets of Commissioners were to be made more ‘inter-
national’, i.e. less dominated by one nationality (that of the Commissioner
in question) and would be made more transparent (thereby reducing the
chances of the mismanagement of EU funds). An independent auditing unit
was to scrutinise financial management. External agencies were to take over
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certain executive tasks. A charter was to be created to help protect whistle-
blowers, along with a revised code of conduct to guide Commission staff in
their work. The EU should come closer to citizens through delegation of
tasks and decentralisation. The Commission should limit itself to core poli-
tical tasks that would move integration forward, especially in the shaping
and implementation of legislation. Even some of these, such as anti-cartel
activities, should be pursued in greater contact with national authorities.
10 The army corps was to consist of up to fifteen brigades and would be sup-
ported by around five hundred aircraft and fifteen naval vessels. It was not
yet clear to what extent the force would draw materieal from the existing
Eurocorps in Strasbourg (with Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and
Spain as members). The hope of fielding a fully fledged Rapid Reaction
Force by 2003 turned out to be unrealistic, however, owing to major
lacunae in the military capabilities needed. EU sources spoke of 2012 as a
more realistic timeframe for full ESDP operability.
11 The Western European Union (WEU), originating in the pre-NATO days of
1947–48, became the expression of the West Europeans’ ambivalence as
regards their own defence needs. Should it be within NATO or separate from
it? However, even during the WEU’s ‘somnolent’ years in the 1970s and the
1980s, it reflected, at various times, the ‘European pillar of NATO’ and the
beginnings of a ‘European defence identity’, which would find its first
expression in the communiqués issued at NATO’s fiftieth anniversary. The
WEU could be said to have prepared the ground for possible future Kosovo-
type interventions under exclusive European management. See, for example,
Deighton and Runacle (1998).
The Western European Union handed over its operative security functions
to the EU at the end of 2000. However, the EU would not take over the
WEU’s collective security guarantee, in deference to the non-WEU members
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. In this sense, the WEU would con-
tinue to exist.
12 A Policy and Security Committee was to exercise the political control and
strategic direction of military operations in a crisis, taking its instructions
from the EU’s Council of Ministers meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers.
It was to be assisted by a Military Committee consisting of Chiefs of Staff of
EU member states and a Military Staff coming under the Council of Ministers
and consisting of representatives of all branches of the armed forces. It
would assume the conduct of military operations.
With the virtual disappearance of the WEU, European defence policies
had become a purely intergovernmental affair, with the European Parlia-
ment having a right only to be informed, not consulted. National parlia-
ments of the EU Fifteen, however, did not have the right to be informed,
even though they alone had the formal right to engage their nation in war.
The EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ in the security and defence area could there-
fore be said to have been aggravated by the WEU’s shrinking role. It was not
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clear how the situation could be remedied, especially under the EU’s new
secrecy rules.
13 Germany’s defence allocations, which from 1970 to unification in 1990 stood
at between 17 and 20 per cent of the federal budget, in 1999 amounted to
only 8.7 per cent. Between 1990 and 2000, the Bundeswehr budget was
reduced by over 20 per cent in real terms. The budget for 2000 was down a
further DM1.7 billion from 1999, to DM45.3 billion. No reversal of the trend
was likely unless spurred on by the new European Security and Defence
Policy. Germany’s defence reform effort was rendered more difficult by its
continued reliance on obligatory conscription (now abandoned by both
France and the United Kingdom) (Rühle, 2000).
To illustrate the difference between US and EU military capabilities, the
US – with 276 million people and a GDP of about $9.2 trillion – in 2000 had
a military budget of $283 billion and a total troop strength of 1.37 million
soldiers. The fifteen EU member states – with 376 million people and a GDP
of $8 trillion – had combined military outlays of only $165 billion (58.4 per
cent of those of the US) but a troop strength of 1.8 million soldiers. EU
military capability, however, was considered to be less than 20 per cent of
that of the US. (Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies: ‘Military
Balance 2000/2001’.)
14 Rearmament need estimates by Professor R. Seidelmann of Göttingen Uni-
versity, Germany, given at a Cicero Foundation Seminar on the European
Security and Defence Policy, Paris, December 2000.
15 Increased military spending may not be harmful to economic growth under
all circumstances, as the post-World War II period in Western Europe
demonstrated. This is a complicated issue involving such factors as whether
and how militarisation affects trade and investment, labour supply, the state
of technological development, and spin-off effects from the military to the
civilian sector. For instance, the longer-term effects of the Kosovo conflict
on the region’s economies or on those in Europe as a whole (especially those
of NATO members) are not yet clear.
16 The thirteen candidates were Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,  Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania
and Turkey.
17 This is the central thesis contained for instance in Milward’s book The
European Rescue of the Nation-State (2000, p 3), where he sums up his
argument in these words: ‘The European Community has been [the nation-
state’s] buttress, an indispensable part of the nation-state’s post-war con-
struction. Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its citizens
the same measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which
has justified its survival. After 1945, the European nation-state rescued itself
from collapse, created a new political consensus as the basis of its legitimacy,
and through changes in its response to its citizens which meant a sweeping
extension of its functions and ambitions, reasserted itself as the fundamental
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unit of political organisation. The European Community only evolved as an
aspect of that national reassertion and without it the reassertion might well
have proved impossible. To supersede the nation-state would be to destroy
the Community. To put a final limit to the process of integration would be
to weaken the nation-state, to limit its scope and to curb its power.’
Furthermore, it is significant that the EU’s High Representative for
Security and Foreign Policy is also Secretary General of the Council of
Ministers, which represents the governments of member states. Finally, the
Union’s new Rapid Reaction Force likewise serves under the Council of
Ministers, rather than the Commission.
18 The pre-Nice ‘weighting’ of votes in the Council of Ministers had been ten
for the ‘Big Four’ against two for the smallest country, Luxembourg. Nice
thus meant a reduction in the weight of the smallest country to the biggest
from 1–5 to 1–7.25. It was not clear, however, that Nice would produce an
EU better capable of overcoming its earlier difficulties in taking decisions.
This was so because the new weighting still permitted any of the bigger
countries to block decisions by alliances with just a few smaller ones, and
because the ‘unanimity areas’ were not greatly reduced in number (since any
country could veto the transformation of their own favourite veto area into
a ‘non-veto’ area). There is even an ‘olive oil’ veto minority of 68 foreseen
for Spain (27), Italy (29) and Greece (12) to defend the particular interests of
these three countries. After enlargement to twenty-two countries, the total
number of votes would go from the present 237 to 345, with 27 for a bigger
new member state like Poland and 3 to a small country like Malta.
19 Speech at the Humbolt University in Berlin, 12 May 2000.
20 Press conference by Joschka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Germany, Berlin, 13 May 2000.
21 Speech before the Western European Union in Paris, 30 May 2000.
22 ‘Streitgespräch Fischer contra Chevènement’, Die Zeit, No. 26, 2000.
23 Prowse, Michael, ‘An Unbeatable Bargain in the Making’, The Times, 13–
14 May 2000.
24 Lord Howell of Guildford, ‘Maybe what europe needs is less integration’,
International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2000.
25 Siedentop (2000).
26 The convention was led by a twelve-member praesidium. The Chairman,
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was assisted by two Vice-Chairmen, former Italian
Prime Minister Giulio Amato and former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc
Dehaene.
27 In February 2002 the British government proposed that a ‘statement of
principle’ be prepared specifying the division of powers between the EU and
national capitals, following which national parliaments or the European
Court of Justice should be empowered to enforce the principle of ‘sub-
sidiarity’. The heads of government of the member states should also be able
to elect their own chairman, a de facto ‘EU president’ (a proposal reiterated
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in 2002 in joint British–French and French–German contributions). Majority
voting in the Council of Ministers should be extended. The size of the
Commission should be limited and Commissioners should be answerable to
the European Parliament. The latter should work more closely with national
parliaments and be given greater influence over law enforcement.
In May 2002 the European Commission’s President Romano Prodi sub-
mitted a proposal to the convention resuming many points he had made
already in 2001. The proposal sought a two-speed EU, by which euro-zone
countries would be able to make decisions on their own, possibly including
legislation. Finally, he suggested that the European Commission be divided
into two levels, with Commissioners responsible for more central EU areas
forming the inner core. It was clear that the Commission by this time saw
itself as the main proponent of true, supranational integration and also as the
champion of smaller EU member states, whose interests risked being ignored
in a more intergovernmental EU, where bigger countries could combine on
important issues to establish qualified majorities in the Council of Ministers.
Finally, the European Parliament in May 2002 presented a report to the
convention proposing that the EU be given a federal constitution with a
clear separation of powers among the institutions as well as between the EU
and the member states. Important policy areas, such as the functioning of
the Internal Market, should be the sole domain of the EU, while the say over
agricultural and fisheries policies should be shared with member states. The
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should be truly equal in
the legislative field.
28 In Philadelphia in 1787 the task was to take over the government of a new
country, the United States of America, from its former colonial master, Great
Britain, and to shape it according to the people’s will. In Bonn in 1948 it was
about establishing a form of government that could take over from a
military occupation that encouraged the undertaking, and to transform the
unitary state that had existed under the Third Reich into a federal system. In
Brussels in 2002 it was essentially to move democratic powers that already
existed at national level to a higher level, that of the EU. Similarities with
1787 included the issue of federation, where, for example, the Federalist
Papers inspired by Hamilton and Madison showed a strong federalist inclina-
tion. The issue could not, however, be pressed, due above all to the divisive
question of slavery. Not until seventy years later, after the Civil War, could
federalism take real hold, in the sense that Washington was given authority
over the states in certain domains. Even today, however, the issue of ‘states’
rights’ crop up occasionally (in their non-racial segregation context) in the
decisions of the US Supreme Court. EU ‘subsidiarity’ might solve the dilemma
more quickly and painlessly than was the case in the US.
29 Haider had, among other things, praised Hitler’s labour policies, called Nazi
concentration camps ‘punishment camps’ and had seemed to want to exon-
erate Austrian former members of the Waffen-SS of any war crimes.
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30 Austria did not go through the same Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or ‘recon-
ciliation with its past’, as Germany had done after the Hitler era and World War
II, when Austria had been part of the Third Reich. The country had been
fortunate in obtaining the 1955 State Treaty, which restored its pre–1938
borders, freed it from Soviet occupation and granted it neutrality. The contro-
versial Wehrmacht past in the Balkans of Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General
of the United Nations between 1972 and 1981 and Austrian President from
1986 to 1992, had brought major embarrassment to the country but had not
led to any truly cleansing public debate about its share in the war guilt.
31 The decision by the fourteen EU countries to ‘isolate’ Austria cannot be
considered an act by the EU itself, since such action would have to be taken
by all the fifteen jointly. However, it was the EU presidency, Portugal, that
announced the decision on behalf of the fourteen. Furthermore, the Euro-
pean Commission followed up with a warning to Austria, invoking the
possibility of sanctions mentioned in Article 7 of the Treaty on European
Union. These actions lent the decision an EU character that could be con-
sidered as going against the spirit and perhaps even the letter of EU legis-
lation. At a minimum, the decision violated – was indeed meant to preach
against – the comitas gentium (international courtesy).
32 The ‘three wise men’ were Marti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland;
Marcellino Oreja, former Foreign Minister of Spain, former Secretary General
of the Council of Europe and former European Commissioner; and Jochem
Frowein, a German lawyer and Director of the German Max Planck Institute.
33 There was no similar action by the EU against Italy after its parliamentary
elections in the spring of 2001, even though its government included repre-
sentatives of a far-Right party.
34 Improved Greek–Turkish relations were vital to both countries, and to Europe.
They could lead to an agreement to end the division of Cyprus, a mutually
accepted delineation of territorial waters and air space in the Aegean, an
earlier Turkish entry into the EU and greater Turkish alignment with EU
policies in the region.
35 With the weighted voting system in the EU’s Council of Ministers decided at
the EU’s 2000 Nice Summit, Turkey, with its close to 70 million people,
would have a say equal to that of any of the biggest EU countries. Since
many of its regions are poor in comparison with the EU average, a consider-
able reorientation of EU agricultural and regional would be the likely result.
36 Already at this time the EU gave major assistance to the candidate countries.
In 2001 alone over €1 billion were awarded under the so-called Phare Pro-
gramme.
37 A Facilitated Travel Document (a multi-entry and exit permit) would be avail-
able to Russian citizens for travel between the ‘exclave’ and Russia proper
across Lithuanian territory, in future perhaps via a fast rail network. The EU
would also assist Kaliningrad economically.
38 The Common Agricultural Policy also today ensures farmers the right to sell
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much of what they produce at guaranteed prices to governmental purchas-
ing agencies. Import levies, whose level varies according to world prices,
protect against foreign competition, while subsidies enable exporters to sell
at prices at or below those in world markets. Following various CAP reforms,
the market regulating payments as a proportion of total CAP expenditures
have been reduced considerably, with direct payments to farmers (inde-
pendent of production) taking their place. Around 10 per cent of total CAP
expenditure is devoted to countryside development in its widest sense.
39 The subsidised exports of EU surpluses to developing countries, now
reduced, undercut local production in these countries and drove millions to
slums in the cities. This contributed to a new imbalance between countryside
and city in the world’s poorer countries, rendering the countryside less and
less able to compete with food imports from Europe and elsewhere, and
turning cities into a source of cheap labour for industries that increasingly
began to compete with those in developed countries. The loss of industrial
employment in, for example, Western Europe through migration of multi-
national companies’ production units to poorer countries may therefore in
part be traced back to subsidised European food exports. Big EU farmers
have been the big winners under the CAP, while the small farmers (whose
numbers went up as poorer and more agriculturally oriented countries joined)
also had to be supported, at least enough to be able to make a living. (This
they increasingly have had to learn how to do, as there are fewer jobs to be
had in the rest of the economy.)
40 In October 2002 the EU agreed to increase direct payment to farmers in ten
new member states gradually from 2004, so that they would reach the
overall EU level by 2013 (‘phasing-in’). Total EU CAP expenditure would
stay at the 2006 level during the 2007–13 period, at around €45 billion per
year, with annual increases of 1 per cent permitted.
41 Kapteyn (1996, pp. 96–7) summed up the agricultural fraud problem as
follows: ‘Seen from a national state perspective, one would expect [the
payment of subsidies and the decision to pay] to be more or less managed by
a single authority, but this was not how the Community agricultural policy
worked. Member states provided the Community with its ‘own resources’ …
The subsidies were paid from these resources. The actual decision to pay,
however, together with the procedure for checking the legitimacy of claims,
became the province of national states; by comparison, the authority of the
Community’s control instrument, the Commission, was slight. It was given
the task of comparing national decisions with procedural law and trans-
ferring money from Brussels to a member state on this basis … In the absence
of a central authority, the member states’ agricultural production and the
subsidies on this production spiralled upward, while their national monitor-
ing procedures spiralled downward.’
42 The European Social Charter of the Council of Europe (an organisation
separate from the European Union), adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996,
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provided the first impetus to a ‘social dimension’ to the Internal Market. EU
summits from 1988 to 1990 prepared the ground further. The European
Commission drew up its own version of a ‘social charter’ in time for the
December 1990 summit, but because the UK did not agree, the text could not
become EU legislation but only a set of political intentions. The Maastricht
Treaty left the situation unchanged for the same reason, and the agreement
was simply appended to it as a ‘Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy’
(commonly known as the ‘Social Protocol’), with a UK derogation attached
to it. It was only with the 1997 agreement by the new Labour government in
the UK that incorporation into EU legislation could take place. Finally,
many social rights were included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights
declared at the 2000 EU summit in Nice, even though the charter did not
have treaty value.
43 Indeed, any authority has a natural tendency to want to do something rather
than nothing, as it would otherwise call its existence into question. And that
something will normally be to control something else, rather than to leave it
uncontrolled.
44 The banana dispute soon took on an international dimension. It pitted the
United States (acting largely on behalf of the US food multinationals Chiquita
and Dole Foods) and a number of central American banana-producing
countries against the EU (including the European Fyffes company) and
many former European colonies covered by the EU’s preferential agreement
with the over seventy so-called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) coun-
tries. The latter, perhaps because of the preferential access they enjoyed to
EU markets for their bananas, sold at a higher price than the non-ACP
countries, which offered so-called ‘dollar bananas’ at lower prices but found
themselves largely shut out of the EU area. The Commission argued that the
EU had special obligations born out of history towards ACP countries, and
that the higher prices meant better salaries for plantation workers.
However, the countries shut out, as well as the US, complained that this
was contrary to WTO rules, and that the ACP countries concerned had
developed an unsound and excessive concentration on bananas as opposed
to other types of food production. A World Bank study estimated that EU
consumers paid up towards €3.5 billion a year more than they would other-
wise have done, and that only a little over €100 million actually benefited
the ACP countries themselves. The WTO’s verdicts at different stages of
appeal, including the final one in early 1999, went against the EU.
Only in 2001 could the seven-year-old banana conflict be resolved. The
EU agreed to abandon, by 2006, essential parts of its protection of imports
from ACP countries and let more bananas in from non-ACP countries,
especially from Latin America. The US for its part would lift its counter-
measure tariffs on a series of EU exports.
45 The EU could learn from the Icelanders. Here, one country is in charge.
Flexible limits – about 25 per cent of the fishable stock per year – are
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established jointly by scientists, government and industry. The limits are
raised or lowered based on constant sampling of stocks, coupled with brief
periods of total bans during spawning periods or to allow young stock to
mature in spawning zones. Stocks are growing steadily, adding to the
country’s wealth.
In 2002 the European Commission put forward a controversial proposal
to restore seriously depleted fish stocks by radically cutting the size of the
fishing fleet, establishing multi-year instead of annual fish quotas, tightening
control over catches and protecting young fish. The proposal met with heavy
opposition from especially Spain (the main beneficiary of the existing system)
and also from France, Italy, Greece and Portugal. A compromise agreement
reached in December 2002 was generally considered insufficient to protect
threatened fish stocks.
46 The Commission in 1993 published a White Paper on growth, competitive-
ness and employment, calling for the halving of unemployment by the year
2000. In 1994 it presented a White Paper on European social policy, with
new jobs and investment as its main themes. Employment considerations were
prominent in the recurrent discussions about trans-European networks. An
EU summit in Essen in Germany in 1994 agreed on a European strategy
against unemployment, recommending, among other things, lower extra-
salary costs for employers, greater flexibility in labour markets, and
unemployment and other social benefits that would not discourage people
from seeking employment. The Commission in 1996 presented an update of
the White Paper called ‘Confidence Pact for Employment in Europe’. The
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 contained an article providing for yearly reports
on the unemployment situation in the EU, with guidelines – even for indivi-
dual countries – to be decided for the upcoming period by a qualified
majority in the Council of Ministers. Following a commitment made in
Cardiff, Wales, in 1997, an EU summit in Luxembourg in November 1997
was entirely devoted to the unemployment problem. It decided to co-ordinate
the struggle against joblessness by issuing common guidelines. However, no
quantitative targets were given, and little in the way of new funds. The
Cardiff and Luxembourg ‘processes’ flowed into the ‘Cologne process’ in
June 1999 and led to a ‘Jobs Pact’, which was relatively short on specifics. In
March 2000 a special summit on unemployment in Lisbon – rapidly termed
the ‘dot.com summit’ – committed the EU to a major structural reform
effort, including in telecommunications and financial services. By 2003, the
Commission complained that little had been done to realise the Lisbon
commitments and that the aim of having two-thirds of the EU workforce in
employment by 2005 was at risk.
47 However, about 1.5 million American men were in jail in 2001, and about
eight million more were on parole, together representing nearly 10 per cent
of the male workforce. If one were to include these numbers, adjusted for
parolees with jobs, US unemployment would rise considerably).
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48 What is logical from the ‘micro’ viewpoint of the individual company,
namely the reduction in the number of employees to bring down costs, may
clash with the logic of society as a whole. To the extent that those shed from
the workforce cannot find new employment, society will have to pay them
unemployment benefits. These must be financed by higher taxes on com-
panies, people (income taxes) or sales taxes (for consumers). Companies may
then find that they have to lower their prices even further to find buyers,
dismiss even more workers, etc. This could lead to a vicious circle of deeper
and deeper recessions and the emergence of a world economy of ‘glut’ – long
prophesied by especially Marxist thinkers – where there would be too many
things and not enough people with the money to buy them. Eventually,
however, increased profits by ‘downsized’ companies may well be such as to
permit overall economic growth, and hence employment, to resume. Some
maintain this is what happened in the United States and is happening in
many European countries today.
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Where is Europe heading?
Stability … has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a
generally accepted legitimacy … It means no more than an international
agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible
aims and methods of foreign policy. It implies the acceptance of the framework
of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state
is so dissatisfied that … it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign
policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their
scope. (Henry Kissinger)1
Summary
As the EU and NATO enlarge, prospects for overall economic growth
and peace are good, even if tensions both within and without the
enlarged circle of EU and NATO member states could cloud the picture,
as over Iraq in 2003. Prospects for peace and prosperity improved in
South-Eastern Europe under a Stability Pact for the region, involving
major international assistance.
Continuing EU and NATO enlargement will mean an eastward shift
of Europe’s ‘centre of gravity’, with a major role for Germany. That
country is, however, embedded in an EU and a NATO that, through
their inclusive and non-aggressive character, do not permit the ‘alliance–
counter-alliance’ structure of the Europe of the past. An intricate ‘Euro-
pean security architecture’ – provided by the two institutions mentioned
plus others – may be confusing and overlapping, but may also preserve
peace and co-operation via their multiple activities. Co-operation
intensified following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11
September 2001, leading to a broad anti-terrorism coalition spanning
the Atlantic and beyond and causing Russia to become even more
involved in that architecture.
This does not mean, however, that country relations have ceased to be
of significance, only that they will remain sub-themes as European co-
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operation progresses. Thus there may be fatigue but no break in the
French–German marriage, especially as the two try to ensure leading
roles for themselves in an enlarged European Union via joint initiatives.
The United States and Germany have differences, such as over the Iraq
issue in 2003, but share the conviction that a continued US presence in
Europe is needed. The United Kingdom, torn between Europe and itself
(and the US), continues to have an interest in seeing no single power
dominating the continent. France wishes to play a leading role in an EU
more independent of the US, but is also aware of the consequences that
any US disengagement from Europe would have. Russia, strengthening
politically as its economy recovers from the legacy of the Soviet era,
wishes to play a significant role in Europe and especially its eastern part.
However, it also has important interests in East Asia as well as in the
Caucasus and Caspian Sea regions, with the latter’s oil and gas riches
forming an important consideration not just for Russia, but for other
powers in the region and beyond.
Economic co-operation will intensify further under the pressure of EU
integration (including the single currency) and ongoing globalisation,
and Europe will be obliged to tackle, in international as well as European
fora, such worldwide threats as terrorism, transnational crime, climate
change, water shortages, deforestation, missile threats from ‘rogue states’
(also via terrorists), economic instability and democratic malfunctioning.
Europe is rapidly ageing. This places great strain on its finances,
especially for old-age pensions, and is likely lead to a less dynamic and
innovative society. Immigration from parts of Europe and other world
regions with higher birth rates will become necessary if the economic
and other consequences are to be mitigated, testing the tolerance of
‘natives’ vis-à-vis ‘foreigners’.
Other forces of Europe’s future include possibly reawakening nation-
alism in protest against state borders that are perceived as unreflective of
ethnic realities (such as in the recent wars in the Balkans), pitting the
‘European–universalist’ mission of the European Union against the
desire for ‘apartness’ and ethnic distinctness. Even religious conflict could
revive, especially between immigrants and ‘natives’. Overall, however,
Europe is experiencing a unique period of peace and integration, in
which it will have to choose in which political context its future should
be shaped. The choice is essentially between some type of federation and
something less, such as simply being good and close neighbours. While a
federative system via the EU looks more likely at present, only the
Europeans can in the end provide the answer.
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11 September 2001 and its aftermath
On the morning of 11 September 2001, four US commercial jetliners
were hijacked by nineteen men belonging to the Al Qaeda terrorist
network led by a Saudi Arabian millionaire-turned-terrorist by the name
of Osama bin Laden. Two of the planes rammed the two towers of the
World Trade Center in downtown New York, one was flown into a
wing of the Pentagon in Washington, and one (perhaps heading for the
White House) crashed into the ground after the hijackers were over-
whelmed by passengers. Nearly three thousand people – passengers and
crew, those present in or around the buildings and firefighters – perished.
Political and economic life came to a standstill as people around the
world went into a state of shock. A general economic crisis looked
inevitable, since a large part of a major financial centre, Wall Street, had
been destroyed or had to be evacuated. Share values plunged. Travel to
and from the United States was halted for days. Trade in goods and
services contracted. Terrorism had managed to strike at a nerve centre of
the world’s most powerful nation.
However, the United States and the rest of the world recovered with
astounding speed. The US Federal Reserve lowered its policy-setting
interest rates massively to revive the national economy. The European
Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and other central
banks around the world followed. By early 2002, economic recovery
was well under way, even though the various sequels, apart from those
of a psychological nature, would continue to beset the world for a long
time to come, in the form of, for example, slowed-down trade due to
terrorist checking procedures against terrorism and higher insurance for
buildings, airlines and other assets.
The day after the attacks, 12 September 2001, NATO – for the first
time in its history and at the request of the United States – invoked
Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty calling for collective defence in
the event of attack from outside.
As it turned out, the United States, having assured itself of NATO
support, chose to wage its war against the Taliban regime in Afghan-
istan, which was offering shelter to bin Laden and his followers, outside
the NATO military command. The allies were instead asked to provide
assistance in selected areas, such as in the surveillance of the US airspace
against more hijacked planes, in naval surveillance in the Indian Ocean
and elsewhere, and in various peacemaking and peacekeeping opera-
tions in Afghanistan. Co-operation also intensified in the tracing of
terrorist funding and the apprehension of suspected terrorists. The UN-
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sponsored Bonn Accord on Afghanistan in late 2001 established a post-
Taliban government in that country, demonstrating the strength of the
international coalition.2
However, transatlantic tensions began to appear soon after 11
September. Some Europeans had feared that the war to unseat the
Taliban regime, started in October 2001, would take a long time or even
fail and that, to avoid large-scale civilian suffering, a negotiated solution
should be sought at all cost. When, after a few weeks, the Taliban
regime fell along with Al Qaeda’s fortified hideouts in the mountains
bordering Pakistan, European critics raised their legal and human rights
concerns over the fate of prisoners of war suspected of belonging to the
Taliban or Al Qaeda. Would they, and any terrorist suspects arrested in
Europe, face the death penalty if extradited to the United States? Would
they be treated in conformity with the 1949 Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war (a status not granted them by the US
administration)? A picture of blindfolded and chained prisoners who
had been transferred to the US naval base of Guantanamo in Cuba
raised these fears further and drew a storm of protest.
Transatlantic frictions rose further with President Bush’s State of the
Union message to Congress in January 2002, in which he threatened to
overthrow the governments of an ‘axis of evil’ group of countries – Iran,
Iraq and North Korea – through military or other means. The Europeans’
preferred method of solving international conflicts through diplomatic
and political means was exposed as standing in stark contrast to the US
preference for early and resolute action against ‘rogue nations’ possibly
in the possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery.
Underneath these developments a geopolitical sea change was under-
way. Firstly, NATO had demonstrated its usefulness, in that Article 5
had been instantly activated, permitting a large transatlantic political
and security coalition to be formed. (Paradoxically, it had been invoked
not on behalf of European members, as had seemed the most likely
during the Cold War, but following an attack on the United States.)
New life had been blown into the organisation, at least for a time.
Secondly, ‘September 11’ caused Russia to move much closer to NATO
and the US – culminating in 2002 with its relatively collected acceptance
of the US abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty; the conclusion the same
year of the Treaty of Moscow with the US reducing strategic nuclear
missiles; and the creation of a NATO–Russia Council, also in 2002, by
which Russia moved much closer to NATO. Russia in return expected
help from the US and NATO in countering terrorist attacks and Muslim
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fundamentalism on its southern borders, and less foreign criticism of its
military campaign to quell a rebel insurgency in Chechnya.3
Thirdly, China, which faced a Muslim insurgency in some of its
western provinces, became a de facto partner in the anti-terror coalition.
India also moved closer to the West, as did many other countries that
feared for the stability of the international order. Terrorists, who had
been able to find shelter and sometimes even support in some Muslim
and other countries, now found they were no longer welcome.
Fourthly, the developed countries began to fear that there was a link
between underdevelopment in poor countries and terrorism. Thus the
World Trade Organisation’s Doha Development Agenda launched in
Qatar in 2001, the UN Conference ‘Financing for Development’ in
Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 and the Africa Action Plan announced at
the G–8 meeting in Canada that same year saw much greater openness
to the concerns of developing countries than had been the case prior to
11 September. Furthermore, the international community intensified its
efforts to find solutions to the Kashmir and Middle-East conflicts, in
recognition of the importance of these regions as recruiting grounds for
terrorists.
It was uncertain for how long the wide international coalition formed
after 11 September would last. Coalitions are built around a specific
purpose, often to avert a perceived common threat. When that threat is
believed to have subsided, such as through a successful co-operation to
fight it, the coalition may weaken too. Terrorists want to strike, but
when they do, they harden the coalition, making it more difficult for
them to strike again. Meanwhile, other issues that tend to divide the
coalition will not go away, and may indeed grow bigger as they are not
given sufficient attention due to the coalition’s overriding cause. A
successful strategy of those most eager to maintain the coalition must
then be to keep the common cause alive, while also working to resolve
other issues dividing the coalition partners.
The strain on the anti-terrorist coalition was shown in the Iraq crisis
of 2003, when the United States, the United Kingdom and a number of
other European countries saw the desired toppling of Saddam Hussein
as necessary and as forming part and parcel of the fight against
terrorism, while others, such as France and Germany, felt that military
action was if at all possible to be avoided as it would prevent the world
from concentrating on terrorism and indeed provoke new terrorist
attacks.
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The terrorism phenomenon
Terrorism may be defined as violence with a political purpose. It is
aimed at provoking fear and uncertainty among the general public,
sympathy among terrorism’s own followers and a change in conduct on
the part of the state (or international) authority attacked.
Terrorists justify their actions on religious, ideological, moral, ethnic-
political, cultural or other grounds. Targets have in recent years increas-
ingly been chosen for their symbolic value. The 11 September attacks are
a case in point. In the eyes of the attackers and their supporters, the
World Trade Center in New York stood for global capitalism as
represented by Wall Street. The Pentagon symbolised US military might.
The White House or the Capitol in Washington DC – where the plane
that was forced down by passengers and crashed in Pennsylvania
probably was headed – stood for US political power.
In future, terrorism is likely to be not only ‘conventional’, that is, to
use guns or explosives, but also to use weapons of mass destruction
involving radioactive, biological and chemical materials. ‘Cyber-terrorism’
may also be used, in the form of attacks with or against computer
networks. Terrorism will try to use the mass media for greater impact,
counting on the latter’s interest in attracting the larger audiences that big
news will yield.4
The international community for its part is first of all concentrated on
crushing the Al Qaeda network, militarily and through better intelli-
gence, especially by apprehending potential terrorists and cutting off
their financial sources. The fight against other terrorist networks is also
being pursued, including in Europe, such as against ETA in Spain and
‘17 November’ in Greece. Co-operation between police, judicial and other
authorities is being intensified, across Europe and worldwide. Countries
in the Middle East, Africa and Asia that may have tolerated or even sup-
ported terrorists are being pressured by political and other means to mend
their ways. Meanwhile, development assistance is targeted to counter
the destabilising effects of globalisation and the impression in parts of
the Muslim world that globalisation is destroying its culture and religion.
The war between terrorism and the established order will be very long
and have a lasting effect on Europe, not least because it is one where
there is never certainty that, say, the foiling of a plot or the arrest of a
presumed terrorist marks the final defeat of a given terrorist network.
Countries will draw together as their governments learn to co-operate
more closely with each other to counter the common threat. New
controlling technologies will arise, leading citizens to feel more under
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surveillance, even as they may accept it as the lesser evil. Human rights,
especially the right to privacy, may be more narrowly interpreted in
legislation and courts. Public appearances by political leaders as well as
public gatherings in general will be less frequent and more cumbersome
due to added security. Higher insurance premiums and new security
systems for individuals, companies and official buildings will lay an
extra burden on the overall economy but also give rise to new economic
activities.
Europe’s intricate security architecture
It cannot be argued that either the EU or NATO is directed against
anyone. Rather, both the EU and NATO have as their long-term aim to
include almost everybody that can fit geographically in their mandate
(and have friendly relations with the rest). None of the ‘outs’ can form
alliances with any of the ‘ins’, nor can any ‘ins’ form an alliance between
them against one or more other ‘ins’. This is in stark contrast with the
European past, when stability could only be bought (temporarily) by allian-
ces and counter-alliances. It is difficult to say for how long this fortunate
situation will last. Much will depend on how far the economic inter-
twining of the different countries and regions can proceed, making rup-
tures superfluous or more costly in terms of economic opportunities lost.
Another historical novelty is evolving: that of an, albeit confused,
pan-European security architecture in the widest meaning of the term. It
is confusing in the sense that there are many presumptive architects – or
architectural companies – with considerable shareholder overlap. They
include the EU, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the OECD, the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (and what remains of the Western
European Union).
Sometimes these ‘interlocking’ institutions have rather given the impres-
sion of being ‘interblocking’. However, even if no coherent European
architecture may be in sight, an incoherent one exists and it is probably
better than none; for the institutions make sure that a series of processes
are constantly under way in parallel fashion – some failing, some moving
forward, some ad hoc and specific, some more general and systematic. It
is precisely their multitude and the ideas and projects they propose
which from day to day creates a slightly new Europe.
Rather than a ‘survival of the fittest’, or even the domination by one
institution or the other, there is a constant adaptation of them all to
changing relations between countries or groups of countries. The overlaps
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that doubtless exist ideally serve to strengthen the architectural structure,
somewhat like crossing beams in a ceiling. Whether the actions of one
institution have a perfect logical consistency with those of all the others
therefore becomes less important than the continuation and deepening
of existing co-operation. The process – or processes – are often messy,
but the end result may be more positive than if they were all entrusted to
one central organisation upon whose success or failure European peace
would stand and fall, such as was the case with the League of Nations in
the period between World War I and World War II.5
The fields of action of the different institutions are well known:
transatlantic security co-ordination through NATO, increasingly also
involving Russia and Central Asia; political, economic and increasingly
also security integration through the EU; pan-European co-operation in
the political, human rights, democracy and rule-of-law fields through
the Council of Europe; transatlantic and pan-European technical co-
operation through the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe;
virtually worldwide economic co-operation through the World Trade
Organisation and the OECD; and the reaching out to countries in the
southern Mediterranean through NATO and the European Union’s so-
called ‘Barcelona process’.
To these European, Euro-Atlantic or worldwide institutions should be
added the many ‘sub-regional’ co-operation forums that have sprung up
alongside more long-established institutions: the Benelux co-operation
(actually dating back to before World War II) , the Nordic Council or EFTA.
Such sub-regional organisations involve areas such as the Baltic Sea, the
Barents Sea, the Black Sea and Central Europe, to mention just a few.6
This ‘division of labour’ among institutions – which themselves have
arisen out of specific historical circumstances and have simply been
added to one another as a new perceived need arose – is not very logical.
The important thing to consider is, however, how well it manages to
keep Europe at peace and working in at least relative unison. Here the
jury is still out, as shall be seen below when the various ‘new–old’ forces
in Europe will be discussed. However, the record so far is an indication
that the architecture cannot be all that bad, examples being Europe’s
mastering of the challenges of the Cold War and its peaceful ending; the
essentially non-violent dissolution of the Soviet Union; the introduction
of democracy and a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe; the
eventual, at least temporary taming of the conflicts in the Balkans; and
the growing co-operation, indeed integration, in the economic, political
and security fields across the Continent. As regards the future, much will
depend on how the institutions in question manage to reform themselves
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and how they co-operate and co-ordinate with each other to create a
‘synergy’ among them.
NATO and the OSCE are of great importance in the overall security
equation, even though the plans to have the OSCE assume the top
position in the hierarchy of the institutions was never a realistic one. The
OSCE monitors elections in troubled countries, oversees the respect of
sanctions, engages in ‘quiet diplomacy’ over budding conflicts and
minority rights, and runs disarmament talks, notably the follow-up to
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. However, it also has
weaknesses, such as an often paralysing near-unanimity requirement.
NATO’s continuing importance for European stability has already
been discussed. NATO and the OSCE serve to underline the largely
Atlantic character of the European security architecture. The commit-
ment of the United States to the security of Europe is still holding and
can be said to have grown stronger after the creation of the NATO–
Russia Council in 2002 and the ten-country NATO enlargement foreseen
for 2004. Enlargement itself may strengthen transatlantic security ties,
since the new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe are more
positive to continued US commitment to Europe than are some of the
old, as shown in the crisis over Iraq in 2003. NATO’s Partnership for
Peace and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will lose some of their
relevance as NATO enlarges, but can still serve as useful fora for the
widest possible participation by countries in peacekeeping operations or
‘coalitions of the willing’.
Finally, the EU has resolved, at least for the foreseeable future, one
main source of geostrategic instability in Europe, that of what to do
about too powerful a Germany. Out of that dilemma, which Germany
itself could not do much about, had emerged the alliance–counter-
alliance system which, although it provided some stability at times, also
gave rise to both world wars. Only through the embedding of Germany
first in the NATO security structure and then in the EU economic,
political and security structure (plus those structures provided by others
such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE), has it been possible to
overcome the otherwise latent opposition between France and Germany,
with the former’s tendency to try to contain the latter with an alliance
with Russia, leaving the countries of Central Europe as hapless pawns in
between. Thus, provided Russia continues its already considerable
integration with western Europe, the Zwischeneuropa (the Europe in
between Germany and Russia) may definitely be relegated to the past,
much to the benefit of countries from the Baltics down to Hungary and
Romania. This, then, is another great achievement of the EU.
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The above does not, however, mean that Europe’s institutional arrange-
ments are in any way perfect. One concern is how to give a proper role
within the European concert to Russia, and also to Turkey, which is
threatened by political marginalisation in Europe quite out of measure
to its strategic importance. Nor is the structure invulnerable to any future
economic or political rivalry between the EU and the United States, or to
the unpredictable forces of nationalism.7
An eastward shift of gravity; international relations in the new Europe
As NATO and the EU enlarged eastwards, the first obvious result would
be that Europe’s ‘centre’ would move eastwards, too. Central and Eastern
Europe in particular could not but help develop economically now that
the region again enjoyed free trade and investment relations with
especially Germany and all of Western Europe in general. Along with
that development would come an enlargement of Europe’s post-World
War II ‘arch of wealth’ – south-east England, Benelux, north-east France,
south-west Germany, Switzerland and northern Italy – to include Berlin,
Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, Vienna and other economic centres in the
region.
The late French President Mitterrand presumably foresaw the east-
ward shift in 1989, when he tried to prevent or at least considerably delay
German unification and exacted the country’s participation in the Maas-
tricht Treaty and especially the EMU as a price for ‘allowing’ unification
to take place. Thus in December 1989 he issued a joint declaration with
President Gorbachev stating that border changes were premature and
expressing support for an ‘East German identity’. In the view of the
historian Andrew Moravcsik, he also ‘sought to establish a pan-Euro-
pean confederation, a policy that had the added advantage of possibly
forestalling entry of East European countries into the EC, an event [he]
is said to have hoped to delay for decades’ After these efforts failed,
Mitterrand’s sole goal became to secure a monetary quid pro quo [with
Germany] for France, backed by whatever concessions on political union were
required … It is commonly asserted that the French government viewed Franco-
German cooperation as a means to offset growing German power and, therefore,
as a substitute for possible alliances with the UK or the Soviet Union.8
However, it was not certain that any effort by France to tie Germany
closer to its western flank, and especially France, would work, for
German interests were increasingly towards the east, aptly symbolised
by the change of the nation’s capital from Bonn to Berlin, and the
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moving there of its government and parliament in 1999. In a new
Ostpolitik following that pursued during the Cold War, Germany had,
since the end of that era, pushed for expansion both of NATO and the
EU. With the 2004 enlargements of these two institutions, Germany
would for the first time in its history be treaty-bound to virtually all of
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the political, security and
economic fields. It hoped thereby to extend stability to the Balkans, the
Baltic States and other parts of the former Soviet Union. Good relations
with Russia were a top priority. German business interests were also
changing. Germany had become the biggest trade investment partner for
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Max Jakobson, the Finnish diplomat and scholar, saw EU enlarge-
ment as essential in order to have German security enhance European
security. He considered what he called the ‘German–French axis’ as
obsolete and
valid only as long as Germany was a western European country – an economic
giant but a political dwarf. Following unification, however, Germany is no longer
a western European country: it is a European power, again at the heart of the
continent … Germany has an obvious strategic and economic interest in the
furtherance of political stability and material progress in central and eastern
Europe and in the Baltics, including Russia.
Jakobson therefore considered it essential that Germany’s present Drang
nach Osten (eastward influence) be achieved through EU enlargement
and with Germany firmly within it.9
The half-a-century-old Franco–German marriage in the 1990s and
early 2000s showed renewed signs of fatigue. French leverage over
Germany had been reduced with the end of four-power status in Berlin
(where France had been a participant) and German unification in 1990,
which had made Germany the most populous country in the EU.10
This was natural since Germany was looking increasingly east and
France found it more and more difficult to count on generous German
funds for the EU and on German acceptance of French leadership of the
marriage, or of the EU. In 2003, the fortieth anniversary of the 1963
Elysée Friendship Treaty between the two countries gave them an
opportunity to declare that all in the marriage was indeed well and that
they would continue to provide EU leadership together.
A common stance against the US–British invasion of Iraq that same
year added to the impression of unity, as did a freshly announced joint
ambition, resulting from that stance, to pursue (with Belgium and
Luxembourg  and possibly others) a defence integration on their own
that would leave other EU members, such as the UK, outside.
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The celebrations could not, however, conceal numerous underlying
differences, such as over the future running of the EU (with France
opting for more intergovernmentalism and Germany for a stronger role
for the European Commission and the European Parliament) and over
EU security policy (where France wanted greater independence vis-à-vis
the US). Seen against the background of the multilayered European
security architecture, however, the ups and downs in the long-standing
Franco–German relations might not matter overly, especially since they
have so far served the strategic interests of both countries in Europe and
beyond and will remain central to Europe in the future.11
Bilateral French–German military co-operation outside NATO was
meant to be given a major push through the so-called Nuremberg
Declaration of 1996. However, the results were mainly multilateral within
the EU context, such as in the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps and the
Rapid Reaction Force meant to come into being in 2003.12 Budgetary
difficulties in both countries have prevented more ambitious projects –
especially since their participation in the peacekeeping forces in South-
Eastern Europe and elsewhere absorbed a good deal of the resources that
might otherwise have been available. Finally, co-operation on new
weapons was hesitant, with Bonn often seeming closer to London or
Washington than to Paris, not least because France’s defence industries
were still largely in state hands and thus less attractive partners to
foreign companies.
New strains in French–German relations became apparent at the 2000
EU summit in Nice. France under President Chirac and Prime Minister
Jospin insisted on the same voting power in the European Union’s Council
of Ministers as Germany, in spite of the latter’s 30 per cent larger
population. President Chirac insisted that this had been agreed for all
time to come by de Gaulle and the German Chancellor at the time,
Konrad Adenauer.
The insistence reflected the unwillingness of the French establishment
to recognise not only that France could no longer claim to lead Germany,
and hence Europe, via the European Union, but that now Germany was
assuming the role of primus inter pares (first among equals). Paris could
do little about Germany’s gradually assuming the leading role in the
European Union and working in favour of a federal EU structure in
which Germany’s larger population would give it a correspondingly
strong role. Against France’s insistence on its singularity and hence its
vocation to lead Europe – in Europe and in the world – stood Germany’s
subtle assumption of this role, even as it tried to avoid worrying its
neighbours, and especially France, by not overplaying its hand.
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It was far from certain that the sentiments of the French ‘establishment’
in favour of French grandeur were shared by a rapidly ‘Europeanising’
French population and business community. Even a few intellectuals
were beginning to have doubts. Claude Fouquet in his book Délires et
défaites wrote: ‘It is hard to abandon the historic dreams that continue
to caress us because we love this imagined France. However, we have to
give it up, firstly because truth demands it, but especially because it
blocks our understanding of the modern world, and therefore our
adaptation to it.’13
The US–German relationship also underwent strain, as Germany in
2003 ruled out participation in any US-led military action in Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. To this came a concern in Germany (and perhaps in
Europe in general) about how the United States exercised its position as
the world’s only superpower without heeding the advice of others. For
all the friction, however, Germany’s foreign policy in the early 2000s
could be expected to emphasise close alignment with US policies,
including on missile defence, even as Germany built up the European
Security and Defence Policy with its EU partners. This was so because
Germany realised more than most the importance of a US security
presence in Europe to prevent European rivalries.
However, over the longer term, shifts in the strategic agendas of the
two countries could have an impact. Firstly, Germany occupied much
less of a place in US domestic policies than, say, during the medium-
range missile crisis of the 1980s, not to mention the various Berlin crises
from 1948 to 1961. With the ethnicity of Americans becoming less pre-
dominantly European and more Asian in character, and with the prin-
cipally Asia-trading US West Coast growing more important, the priorities
of the new political class in the United States were shifting accordingly.
The US wanted Germany to assume its responsibilities more fully as
Europe’s major power, a role which the Germans were hesitant to fulfil
for fear of raising apprehensions among their neighbours (and also due
to financial difficulties). Furthermore, Germany’s foreign policy could
not be readily expressed, since it was largely tied down by the EU. To the
extent it tried to pursue a foreign and security policy through the EU, the
end result was often minimal. It could hardly be otherwise after
initiatives had gone through the decision-making machinery of fifteen
sovereign states plus the Commission. Meanwhile, any German foreign
policy action taken independently of the EU risked causing an uproar
among the other EU member states, and possibly others as well.
History therefore weighed heavily on Germany’s shoulders. To the
extent it tried to strengthen its own political voice in the European choir,
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it had to be done in ways acceptable to the others (and France in
particular) and would have to be seen as being necessary for stability
rather than heralding a return to a dreaded past. At the same time
Germany wanted to assume a political influence commensurate with its
still considerable economic might. Only within a politically strong and
united Europe would this be possible.
One way for France to counter what it might consider excessive
German (and US) influence was to cultivate relations with Russia. This
had held both during World War I and World War II. Even though
France joined NATO after the latter, there was also de Gaulle’s decision
to leave NATO’s integrated command and his vision of a Europe
extending from the Atlantic to the Urals.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, France’s overtures to Moscow
repeatedly raised eyebrows in Washington, such as over joint oil explor-
ation in Iran despite a US embargo, or a lifting of sanctions against
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Furthermore, France’s refusal (together with
Germany) to authorise force via the UN Security Council in deposing
Saddam Hussein in 2003 led to major friction with especially the US and
British governments (though not necessarily with all the citizens of these
countries, especially the UK where public opinion was highly divided on
the issue, at least until the start of the invasion).
On the other hand, France did join the war against Iraq over Kuwait
in 1991 and that against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999. It played a
major role in the NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia. And it supported
NATO enlargement despite initial Russian reservations. The picture of
France as a maverick in transatlantic co-operation is therefore not
wholly justified. What seems to matter most to Paris is to remind
Washington that the US is not the only major power in the world, but
that France also counts for something. France fundamentally needs the
United States in Europe vis-à-vis Germany, Russia and the Balkans more
than it wants it out. French–US relations are therefore likely to continue
in their hot–cold mode.
The UK’s relationship with France has traditionally been ambiguous.
Britain was Napoleon’s main adversary and ultimate vanquisher. Its
alliances with France in the two world wars had resulted mainly from a
desire to check German ambitions rather than from any natural sense of
common destiny, and in the aftermath of World War I the UK feared
French hegemony in Europe before its concerns focused on Hitler. When
the UK tried to join the EEC in the 1960s it was rebuffed by de Gaulle.
Margaret Thatcher was vilified in France for her insisting on more EU
funds in the 1970s and 1980s and for her opposition to the Maastricht
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Treaty. To the French, the term ‘Anglo-Saxon’ – which has no clear
meaning to the British or others – conjures up the notion of various
British–American designs to take over the world economically, cultur-
ally and linguistically.
The UK has traditionally feared any single power gaining hegemony
over continental Europe, whether a France under Napoleon, a Germany
under Wilhelm II or Hitler or a Russia under Stalin. However, as France
was removed from the European chessboard, as happened during both
world wars, the UK came to its rescue (followed by the Americans) to
avoid European domination by another power.14
The UK’s relationship with Germany is similarly complicated. Twice
in the twentieth century the UK came to the aid of France and Russia to
contain German ambitions. However, after both world wars the UK was
anxious to rebuild Germany into a power capable of filling a political
vacuum in Central Europe, and of containing French and Russian
ambitions for excessive dominance. This ambivalence reflects the UK’s
geographical position, outside the Continent and yet inexorably linked
up with it.
With a modern Germany that since 1945 has shown no inclination to
try to dominate Europe, the UK has had few problems and indeed an
increasingly close relationship with the country. For the UK, this has
been important in order to avoid having a Berlin–Paris link overshadow
the EU and it helps to explain British efforts to participate in EU defence
initiatives such as the Rapid Reaction Force, especially as Britain is not a
member of the euro-zone. For Germany, close links with the UK have
been important in order to avoid becoming too dominated by France in
the EU. It is balance-of-power politics on a miniature scale, with the EU
and the transatlantic relationship serving as obvious limits to anything
more significant. This outcome has produced a broadly functioning
ménage à trois, with Spain and Italy joining in as occasional mediators.15
A seemingly rock-solid ‘special relationship’ holds firm between the
UK and the US. It is born out of a shared language and the origin of the
United States as British colonies, and strengthened in two world wars.
However, there is more, such as the desire of both to maintain a political
equilibrium in Europe – as manifested in the world wars, during the Cold
War, in the Balkans, and possibly even in today’s Europe of the EU.
There could also be something else. A certain common approach to
trade, investment and generally to doing business; a belief in a certain
style of democracy born out of the ‘township democracy’ tradition in
pre-industrial England and the American colonies; a duty to challenge
(at least some) tyrants; and a certain pragmatism and an aversion to
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grand theory, in which a measure of the American ‘universal mission’
clashes only marginally with the ‘little Englander’ tendency in British
politics (the latter being a cousin to American isolationism).
Italy and Spain continue to play important roles in European history.
Spain in the 1970s brought down dictatorship in part to be able to ‘join
Europe’. Both countries made major and successful efforts to join the
EMU. Northern Spain’s and northern Italy’s economic integration with
Europe’s economic heartland are complete. The two countries also serve
as important links with other continents, such as Latin America. However,
their geographical position on Europe’s southern periphery gives them
fewer options in the European ménage than, say, France, Germany and
the UK enjoy. (This is a predicament shared by the countries in Europe’s
far north.) Italy and Spain find themselves in a position of weakness,
since, unable to seek ‘allies’ in European affairs to their south, they have
to turn north (or towards the US, as in the 2003 Iraq conflict).
Finally, with EU and NATO enlargement in 2004, the new members
in Europe’s east and south will play larger roles in the European concert.
This holds especially for Poland, which not only has a population close
to that of Spain but also holds a key strategic position between Germany
and Russia.
Russia’s natural place in the European arena is that of a major player,
given its size, population and strategic position between Western and
Central Europe on the one hand, and Southern and Eastern Asia on the
other. From that viewpoint, the present situation of a still economically
weak Russia is in a way unnatural and potentially destabilising. The
West has been trying hard to involve it as closely as possible in various
forums such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the EU. The semi-
inclusion of Russia in NATO via the 2002 NATO–Russia Council bears
witness to the success of this policy.
Russia is trying to regain influence not only in Central and Eastern
Europe but also in Central Asia – with major consequences for Europe.
Russia has enormous reserves of natural resources, including oil and gas.
If these are developed efficiently – and this clearly is Russia’s aim – the
country could have major leverage over European affairs, especially as
the supply of North Sea oil will start to decline in a few years’ time.16
Russia’s smaller neighbours to the south and west, such as the Baltic
countries or Ukraine, may on the one hand welcome Russia’s relative
weakness, since it increases their freedom of action in relation to the EU
and NATO. However, they also have an interest in an economically
stronger Russia with which they can trade, which is stable politically,
and which is co-operating closely with international institutions.
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Europe, too, has an abiding interest in an economically healthy and
politically stable Russia, since there would otherwise be no stabilising
force projected to that country’s south and south-east. A Russia closely
involved in European affairs would also help maintain a North
American political and security interest in Europe – a presence important
for long-term peace and stability in Europe and for preventing European
powers reviving old rivalries.
US–European relations
Europe will no doubt in due course assume main responsibility for its
security and project its influence more independently towards regions
where it has strategic interests. The European Security and Defence
Policy and its envisaged Rapid Reaction Force, whatever their present
difficulties, illustrate this trend. However, the experience of two world
wars – followed by Western Europe’s peaceful integration under the
NATO umbrella and the West’s ultimate, equally peaceful victory over
Soviet communism – explains why many Europeans want North America
to continue its contribution to European security and defence and the
EU’s own ambivalence in seeking a security and defence role of its own.
The growing US military dominance in the world is likely to accentuate
this tendency.
Political and security co-operation is strongly linked with economic
relations. The United States and the European Union are the world’s two
leading economic powers and their economic relations in trade and
investment are without parallel in the rest of the world. As the EU
enlarges, it provides a goal and destination for many countries in Central
and Eastern Europe and stimulates many domestic reforms necessary for
membership – a process which is also in the US interest, not least since
EU enlargement serves as a politically stabilising counterpart to NATO’s
own enlargement.
The euro in particular has created EU capital markets of a size, depth
and liquidity that did not exist before. Decades of major capital flows in
both directions have made the US and the EU increasingly intertwined.
About five million Americans work for EU-based companies, and
almost as many EU citizens work for US-owned firms. This fact of life
helps to cool tempers and assists in the search for compromises to defuse
conflicts, and it is likely to prevent any excessive drifting apart also in
the political and security arena.
There is opposition to the US in Europe, as in the world – such as over
Iraq in 2003 – but it is scattered and far from shared by all social strata.
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It has, since the fall of the Soviet Union, failed to give rise to formal
counter-alliances among countries – in the world in general and more
particularly in Europe. Counter-alliances are rendered the more difficult
since the US, through its might, provides ‘public goods’ to the world by
keeping world trade and international financing functioning (through its
strong role in the WTO and the International Monetary Fund), sea lanes
open and global security intact by clamping down on countries intent on
upsetting this world order. If it were possible to sum up the goals the
United States has set itself for the world, it might be to maintain peace
via arms control; prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
and promote democracy and free markets.
European elites tend to be sceptical of the US, either because they do
not believe it is honest in pursuing these goals or because they do not
share the American definition of democracy or its belief in the virtues of
globalisation. Another grievance is the maintenance of the death penalty
in many US states (and at federal level). Critics see the US as the main
engine behind inhuman globalisation and ‘MacDonaldisation’ around the
world. Still, with so many, especially young, people in Europe and the
world attracted by American movies, culture, universities, food, clothing
and technology, any united anti-Americanism has difficulties taking root.17
There is widespread denunciation among European political and
cultural elites of US ‘unilateralism’, that is, the country’s refusal to
adhere to treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol on global warming and the
treaty establishing an International Criminal Court to punish alleged
war criminals. Generally, many Europeans feel estranged by the US’s
forward stance in the fight against terrorism and ‘rogue states’, which
they see as additional signs of US hubris.18
In 2003 European division on the Iraq crisis not only led to diplomatic
complications with the US but also, at least temporarily, frustrated any
ambition to forge a common EU foreign and security policy. Following
the declaration by France and Germany against early military action
against Saddam Hussein, leaders of eight countries – including the UK,
Italy, Spain and several Central and East European countries – published
a message extolling transatlantic relations and the historical US contri-
bution to the old continent and calling for a resolute attitude vis-à-vis
Iraq. The declaration and the ensuing European row reflected both the
divided views held by Europeans as regards the US and the dissatis-
faction felt by many EU and other European countries, with a perceived
French–German attempt to dominate the European agenda.
Many sceptical Europeans and others are waiting for the US to under-
go decline like any other dominant power. This may happen, but the US
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has a formidable strength in its 200-year old constitution. As Watergate
proved, the constitution does not tolerate any attempt at usurpation.
Power is strictly divided between the President, the legislative and the
judiciary. Such a system tends to involve the citizenry more than do
parliamentary systems such as in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. It is a
bulwark against excessive power gathered in one quarter, against overly
hasty decisions and against any overreach in international endeavours.
Where such overreach takes place, such as in Vietnam, it is likely to be
corrected in time due to domestic opposition.19
The US scholar Robert D. Kaplan in his book Warrior Politics, devoted
to the United States’ future as a world hegemon, concludes that ‘the very
weakness and flexibility of such a non-traditional American-led empire
will constitute its strength. The power of this new imperium will derive
from it never having to be declared, saving it from the self-delusive,
ceremonial trappings of the United Nations.’ Referring to the Chinese
fourth-century war historian Sun-Tzu, Kaplan argues that the ‘strongest
strategic position is “formless”; it is a position that adversaries cannot
attack because it exists everywhere and nowhere … Triumphalism has
no role in [US] foreign policy: our ideals will have to grow less rigid and
more varied if they are to meet the needs of the far corners of the
earth.’20 It can only be hoped that such ‘less rigid and more varied ideals’
will also encourage the United States to listen enough to its European
and other partners.
The future of the Balkans
The future of the Balkans is still uncertain. The building of a civil and
democratic society in Kosovo remains a difficult task, especially after the
Kosovo Albanians split into at least two political factions bitterly
opposing each other, and as the Serbian minority – dwindling as a result
of harassment by some in the Kosovo Albanian majority – was either
unwilling or unable to participate politically in the province’s life.
Organised crime is becoming a problem.
Municipal elections in Kosovo in 2000 resulted in overwhelming
support for the more moderate Kosovo Albanians around its leader
Ibrahim Rugova and the rejection of his more radical opponent. Both
parties, however, were determined in their quest for ultimate Kosovo
independence from Yugoslavia, something that neither Serbia and
Montenegro nor the international community were a priori willing to
grant, especially if Yugoslav democracy was strengthened. Indeed, the
latter could come under strain if Kosovo headed for independence.21
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In 2001 new risks arose in the Balkans. Minority Albanians in the
‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, aided by militant brethren in
Kosovo and Albania, started a guerrilla war against the Slav-dominated
government, which called on the international community for help in
quelling the rebellion. (A peace agreement in 2001 granting more rights
to the ethnic Albanians and involving a NATO intervention to collect
rebel arms forced a growing dialogue between the two sides.) Nearby,
Kosovo Albanians attacked Serbian police forces across the Kosovo–
Serbia border, where many ethnic Albanians lived. Ethnic Albanians
attacked minority Serbs in Kosovo, prompting the international NATO-
led KFOR (Kosovo Force) to come to the latters’ rescue. Croats in
Bosnia-Herzegovina requested to leave the country and establish closer
ties with Croatia. Serbs in the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
sought closer ties with Serbia. Montenegro contemplated leaving Yugo-
slavia to form an independent country.
The reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina met with similar difficulties,
as the three ethnic groups of the country – Croats, Bosnians and Serbs –
experienced difficulties in agreeing on common policies. Economic
stagnation followed. However, by 2003 refugees were returning in greater
numbers and destroyed mosques and churches were reconstructed with
international assistance.
The year 2000 saw welcome changes in Yugoslavia as Voyislav
Kostunica, a soft-spoken academic, unseated Milosevic to become Presi-
dent of Yugoslavia in September, and as the opposition also won the
Serbian parliamentary elections against Milosevic’s forces. Yugoslavia
could now be welcomed back into Europe and the international
community as a whole, including their financial institutions. Milosevic’s
transfer to The Hague in 2001 to face charges before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia led to an even stronger
international acceptance of the country.
The rebuilding and economic revival of South-Eastern Europe would
cost large amounts of money, which would have to be supplied by
already financially strained Western countries.22 Newly democratic
Yugoslavia – under the new name of ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ – also had
a long way to go before it had been rebuilt from after the war over
Kosovo.23 The economic development of countries like Bulgaria,
Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Ukraine, the ‘former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ and even Greece very much depended
on the continued recovery of Yugoslavia, given its central location in the
region. The Stability Pact gave a major operational responsibility to the
EU (in particular the European Commission) and the World Bank, with
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many other institutions assigned supplementary roles.
For South-Eastern Europe these changes also meant that – with no
‘black hole’, Serbia, any longer in its middle – the region’s reconstruc-
tion could start in earnest. The Stability Pact still had problems co-
ordinating among its many participants. However, with many projects
nearing implementation and the recipient countries concentrating on
building closer links with ‘Europe’ – if not as convincingly among
themselves – the pact was enough to offset whatever problems and
uncertainties remained, such as Kosovo Albanians’ harassment of
Kosovo Serbs, Bosnia’s stagnant economy or Serbia and Montenegro’s
lingering difficulties in shaking off the Milosevic heritage. The inter-
national community’s (at least temporary) determination to continue to
deploy troops in Kosovo and Bosnia illustrated Europe’s and NATO’s
resolve not to let the Balkans explode yet another time, with possible
ripple effects on the rest of the Continent.
All these developments placed before the international community a
series of dilemmas. Should it try to keep together – at great cost in the
form of troops and aid money – what apparently did not want to stay
together? Should the international community restrict itself simply to
monitoring the ‘controlled’ dissolution of countries and the establish-
ment of new ones? If Croatian areas in Herzegovina were to join Croatia
and the Republika Srpska were to unite with Serbia, what would become
of predominantly Muslim Bosnia? If the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’ were split into an Albanian part (possibly joining Kosovo or
Albania) and a rump Slav part, would Skopje, the capital, be divided
into two parts – an Albanian and a Slav – as well? What would become
of the Muslims in southern Serbia and the many minority Serbs in
whatever new country came into being?
The international community fears any changes of borders, since they
could open up a Pandora’s box of new demands. For Kosovo, it sought
to preserve the ‘substantial autonomy’ already achieved, without letting
it proceed to independence. The same held for Montenegro, in a change
from the days of Milosevic’s rule in Belgrade, when the West cautiously
encouraged Montenegran independence. The international community
would also try to maintain Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ‘former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ as intact countries. It was likely to
maintain a military and civilian presence in the region for a long time to
come, in spite of the high costs and simply because withdrawal could be
even more costly in the form of wars and many refugees. Efforts would
be made to strengthen regional co-operation and economic development,
for instance through the Stability Pact, the integration of minorities and
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the promotion of democracy and decentralisation. EU and NATO
membership would be held out as baits.
The Balkans could thus end up with a number of virtual ‘international
protectorates’, for as long as the international community was willing to
supply the necessary troops and funds: Bosnia, Kosovo, ‘the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ and, possibly, Montenegro (should
‘Serbia and Montenegro’ fall apart).24 Alternatively, if the fullest aims of
the Stability Pact were realised, then the countries concerned might come
to see the advantages of living together in peace and greater prosperity
within existing borders. However, the risk was real of further pronounced
nationalism in the Balkans, jeopardising what had been achieved. For
instance, when visitors enter Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia, they are
met, not by that country’s flag, but by that of Croatia. Throughout
Herzegovina, the Croat-dominated part of the country, Croatian flags
are everywhere. This illustrates the difficulties of the international
community in forging a national consensus in the region in conformity
with internationally recognised borders.25
The Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region; Europe and the rise of China
Europe has a major stake in political stability in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, not least considering the oil wealth of the Caspian Sea
region. The area is believed to contain up to 200 billion barrels of oil,
worth as much as $4 trillion at current prices, plus comparable resources
of natural gas. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Turkey,
Iran and, of course, Russia are closely involved in this gamble – in their
capacity as either sitting on the riches, acting as potential hosts to
pipelines over their territory or being major powers with a strategic
interest in the region.26
The struggle over Chechnya in the mid 1990s and Russia’s assertion
of its power in the province in the early 2000s is better understood when
one considers the oil riches under Chechnya itself and the fact that vital
pipelines to the west were likely to go across it. Peace there, and in the
region as a whole, would depend on whether all parties concerned could
find an agreement which accommodated them. Efforts were under way
to establish an overall Caucasus security system. Washington was actively
involved (a fact underlined by the strong presence of US oil companies in
the region), as were major West European countries.27
Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan tended to work closely
with US companies. Armenia, Iran and Kazakhstan had strong links
with Russian firms. China was still lying low but could be expected to
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become more active as it developed further economically. Russia had the
advantage of having most of the existing pipelines cross its own territory
or former Soviet territory.
The biggest present and future producers – Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
– realised that European and US investment was needed for the major
investments necessary. Investors, for their part, need peace and stability
in the region through government involvement. A new pipeline from
Azerbaijan via Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean (the port of
Ceyhan) would be finished by 2005 and others were envisaged across Iran
to the Persian Gulf, via Georgia to the Black Sea, from Turkmenistan via
Afghanistan and Pakistan to China, and from Kazakhstan to China.
The countries and companies involved often have conflicting interests
over access, ownership and transport of the oil and gas. However, they
share an interest in overall peace so that those resources can flow. There
is every reason to expect the Caspian–Caucasus oil and gas game to
figure prominently in world affairs in coming years. Europe, as a main
potential beneficiary of Caspian oil and gas, therefore has a strong
interest in good relations between Russia and China and in the Caspian
region in general.28
China is a rising power in East Asia and the world. While it still has
some way to go before it can be considered an economic superpower, its
natural strategic and political interest lies in re-establishing its historical
primacy in Northern Asia. This can only be achieved if the Japanese–
American alliance is weakened and America’s presence in the region
reduced. Both Russia and the United States would be against this: Russia
because of concern for the security of its eastern regions; and the United
States because it would see it as upsetting a balance of power, which in
reality is a strong US economic and military predominance. Japan’s
position is ambiguous. On the one hand it would like to reduce the US
dominance in the region in order to enhance its own. On the other it
realises that this would facilitate China’s (and Russia’s) rise. China,
similarly, needs the United States to keep in check any political and
military ambitions of Japan.
The persistent force of nationalism
In eastern Serbia there are four small regions – Kula, Tran, Tsaribrod
and Bosilegrad – which were ceded by Bulgaria in the 1919 Treaty of
Neuilly. At the stroke of a pen, villages were cut in two and families
separated. For decades, no contact was possible. Then the borders were
open for one day in a year. Still, the division is intact.
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The Bulgarian poet, Stoyan Chilingirov wrote:
Those of you who wish to learn what injustice means and what is a wound to the
living body of a people: come here all of you! Come here twice if you are
Bulgarians and want to see how a Solomonic farce became a true condemnation
at Neuilly. Come and see how an international frontier turns the garden of a
person into two state territories. How, on the one side of an invisible frontier the
daughter sighs, while on the other a mother turned grey by pain is crying. How
on this side the son is waiting for his father, and how on the other the father does
not even have the right to see his son.29
The Neuilly Treaty – by which Bulgaria also lost western Thrace and
with it its access to the Mediterranean – was preceded by those of Saint-
Germain, Trianon and Sèvres, all parts of the Paris Peace Conference
which convened in 1919 to draw up separate treaties for each state on
the side of the vanquished powers in World War I. To mention only a
few of the territorial consequences, Slovenian and Dalmatian lands went
from Austria to the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
(later Yugoslavia). Hungary lost Transylvania and part of the Banat to
Romania. Hungary also ceded Croatia, Slavonia and the rest of the
Banat to the new South Slav State.
After 1919 nearly a quarter of Eastern Europe’s total population of
110 million inhabitants found themselves as minorities under alien rule.
If these accords settled, in a comparatively enduring way, many of the
territorial questions that had long distracted Balkan politics, they also
laid landmines for an indeterminate future. Subsequent agreements
negotiated under duress, such as after World War II, led to a situation
where virtually all the countries of Europe, especially in its central and
eastern parts, became either ‘amputees’ or possessors of lands with foreign
minorities who had lived there for centuries if not millennia. Albanians
in Kosovo and what is today ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia’; German-speaking Tyrolians in Italy; Lithuanians in Poland;
Poles in the Ukraine; Greeks in Albania; Hungarians in Romania; and
Germans in Poland. This pêle-mêle list is not even half complete. Only a
few fortunate countries, such as the Nordic ones, seemed to have borders
on the whole reflecting ethnic, linguistic and cultural bonds, although
that was of course different in centuries past.30
The international community redrew borders – which were far from
reflecting ethnic realities – in part as rewards for victors (along the
theory that wealth equalled territory) and punishment for losers and
their allies. In part it was also done to create greater stability, on the
assumption that the victors would remain stronger in the future,
especially with more territory. However, arbitrariness and ignorance
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also accompanied negotiations. Maps were rolled out and staff ordered
to work out the details – perhaps leaving Stoyan Chilingirov’s village
divided rather than intact as a result of a glass too many at lunch for the
pen to hold steady.
The world’s hope that ‘national self-determination’ would satisfy the
minorities and be respected by the majorities – or that borders would
become so ‘porous’ as to unite ethnic groups across countries in all but
nationhood – has been realised occasionally but remains frustrated as a
rule. Even internationally ‘midwifed’ exchanges of populations, such as
between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria in the late 1920s, have come back
to haunt an era later when, for example, thousands of Turks rebelled in
the 1980s after they were threatened with a forcible adoption of
Bulgarian family names to replace their Turkish ones. Even where
deportation of whole peoples were undertaken – such as the Tatars and
the Volga Germans under Stalin – the dead seem to govern the living, to
use the words of the French author Auguste Comte. If Soviet domination
in Central and Eastern Europe managed temporarily to suppress nation-
alism in the name of communism, ethnic tensions were never far below
the surface. Once communism disappeared, the migration of minorities
and ethnic disputes resurfaced as contentious issues.
The international community basically pursued the same policy in the
early 2000s as after the two world wars, with Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo as good examples. The notion of a state was upheld, with a
majority of Croatians, Serbs and Bosnians still maintaining considerable
suspicion among them. The big question remains whether humans can
be changed by circumstances or not; whether the three groups can learn
to live together as a result of internationally induced first efforts at co-
operation; or whether old hatreds will surface, once the foreign troops
and mediators are gone.
In Kosovo, two kinds of nationalism collided: that of memory, where
Serbia considered Kosovo its national birthplace because of a valiant,
though lost, battle against the Ottoman Turks in 1389; and that of
ethnicity, where the province’s overwhelming Albanian majority wanted
independence if not reunion with neighbouring Albania. The world was
horrified by the Serbian treatment of the Albanians in the late 1990s. At
the same time, however, the international community was fearful of
calling into question established international borders. Kosovo was
confirmed as forming part of Yugoslavia after both world wars – against
‘ethnic logic’ even at that time – as well as in 1992 when the newly
truncated Yugoslavia saw the light of day. An independent Kosovo or
one united with Albania could, it was feared, give rise to similar claims
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by Albanians in the multi-ethnic ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia’ – who had already started a ‘war of liberation’ in 2001 – and by
minorities elsewhere. Thus, a painful status quo was preferred to a new
arrangement that, it was felt, could lead to even greater chaos.
What, then, is ‘nationalism’? To William Pfaff, the American columnist
and author, it is
the most powerful political force in the twentieth century and it is likely to prove
the most powerful of the twenty-first as well. Nationalism is a profound, if often
maligned, expression of human identities, a negative force but also a positive
one. It is an expression of love as well as of hate. It is a fundamental element in
modern political life and international relations. It demands to be better
understood.31
Nationalism is not an ideology, he says, because it has no universality
(unlike the universal and rational messages of the French and American
Revolutions). It is a feeling that neither depends on nor observes the
rules of logic. It is not an idea but a prejudice – like racism or, to put it
more positively, like family feeling. It is an expression of love of the
particular – one’s family, town, region or country – at the expense of
larger, or abstract realities such as Europe or the world (even though a
‘country’, too, is a highly abstract notion). Carlton J. Hayes, the American
scholar, said:
Nationality is the product of remembered or imagined factors from a people’s
past which together produce the conviction of being a separate and a distinct part
of mankind ... Nationalism is an emphasis upon this distinctness at the expense
of the similarities of mankind as a whole, and for that reason easily becomes an
aggressive attempt to impose the difference as a superiority.32
What, then, is a ‘nation’, the very object of nationalism? If it is
language, why did the former Yugoslavia, which largely shared one, fall
apart? However, language seems to hold France together. What keeps
the United States intact, where there is not even an official language
(only one used in official texts)? If history were logical, Yugoslavia
would embrace under one flag, while the United States would be a
mosaic of quarrelling tribes.
Nationalism is not a very old phenomenon. It arose in nineteenth-
century Europe, largely from German resistance against French armies
under Napoleon and from universal philosophies born under the French
Revolution. As both French and German socialists, who in theory
adhered to a universalistic creed, went into the trenches to fight for the
patrie and the Vaterland, nationalism triumphed over universalism. The
Soviet Union, while declaring itself built on the universal principles of
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Marx, in reality built on Russian nationalism, which in the end ran
aground on the nationalisms it had tried to subjugate. Nazism was an
internationalist ideology only in so far as it was based on racial
characterisation and myth – that of the Nordic peoples over allegedly
lesser races, peoples and their nations. Yet it, too, was defeated by the
joined forces of the nationalisms (and internationalism) it had tried to
eradicate.
Today, the comparatively abstract international aspirations of the
European Union confront the loyalties and embedded national pre-
judices of many citizens of its member states. Against the message of
nationalism stands that of the French and American Revolutions – and,
one could argue, the Council of Europe with its European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This message is rational
and universal. It holds that all people everywhere are equally endowed
with natural rights, regardless of creed or blood, and that no nation is
superior to any other. The origins of universalism can be traced to the
notion of international law first developed by Grotius in the seventeenth
century, later inspiring various peace treaties. The 1815 Congress of
Vienna tried to bring order to European affairs after the Napoleonic
Wars through an international system of dynasties. The Congress of
Berlin in 1875 attempted to do the same after the upheavals of 1848.
Both events in the end represented efforts to create a universal political
order (Europe was considered the world at the time), which would be
able to cope with the phenomenon of nationalism. (Nationalism had, in
the nineteenth century, taken the place of the cultural internationalism
of earlier eras shared by the elites of Europe.)
The conflict between universalism and nationalism – between a
feeling of ‘sameness’ and ‘common destiny’ as against ‘differentness’ and
‘separate destiny’ – is presumably eternal. They to some extent correspond
to the ‘id’ and the ‘super-ego’ within a human. Our intellect insists that
all human beings are equal, and that in order to uphold that equality we
need impartial, universal systems of justice and morality. Our hearts,
urged on by more basic instincts, respond that charity begins at home,
with father, mother, ‘fatherland’ and ‘motherland’. Human beings are
capable of complex abstract thought at the same time as showing
behaviour like that of a social animal, fiercely loyal to its group. The
author and philosopher Arthur Koestler once said that when a patient
lies down on a psychiatrist’s couch, a horse and crocodile lie down
beside him. Fans battling each other during a football match display a
kind of nationalism – one’s own club being the ‘nation’ – while the referee
is expected to, and in the best of cases does, represent universalism or,
MUP_Torbion_10_Ch10 22/9/03, 3:56 pm262
263Where is Europe heading?
say, the UN. The British television commentator in a match between
England and, say, Germany is supposed to be both celebrating English
goals yet commenting fairly on the performance of the two teams rather
than disparaging the foreigners.
Anyone doubting the force of nationalism would presumably have
changed their mind in watching the 1998 World Cup in football, with a
Brazil in mourning after the defeat in the final against France. Up to a
million people filled the Champs Elysées the day after to salute their
players. Yet anyone who would equate this with condescension for
opponents – traditionally the reverse side of nationalism – would
probably be wrong. Television showed the role of chance in the game,
the unlucky bounces, the dubious penalties or offsides awarded or not
awarded. It also displayed the agony, real or faked, of felled players,
showing all to be real or false sinners or sufferers as the case may be, but
above all as humans in struggle, jubilation, grief and comradeship, who
were exhibiting fair play and even friendship across teams. An example
was when the Korean and Turkish teams ran hand in hand around the
football field with each other’s national flags after having fought it out
in the match for third place in the 2002 World Cup. In other words, they
acted as humans.33
In the media-focused world of today it may therefore become difficult
for any national leader, should they have wanted it, to depict members
of another nation as monsters or brutes, unlike in the old days when
countries marched to war. If anger among at least some countries can be
limited to a dispute over the rightfulness of a red card, and if nationalism
can be given a proper outlet through a goal scored, then football (and
sport in general) will have done world peace a service.
Since longing for the particular and the longing for the general are
both part and parcel of the human make-up, we cannot choose between
or blend them into something that meets all our needs. History becomes
a moral battleground between those fighting for universal principles,
unification and harmonisation of various kinds, and those struggling for
separation, or independence on ethnic or other grounds – in brief, for
the right to particularity. The French Revolution, and even more the
history of Marxism under Lenin and Stalin, show what can happen to
the rational, enlightened, universalistic approach to history when it
proceeds to the ‘liquidation’ of classes and nations for the ‘higher’
purpose of human brotherhood and the perfect world. Hitler’s nation-
alism, with its near obliteration of the Jews of Europe and the killing of
at least twenty million Soviet citizens and huge numbers of other nation-
alities, was on a similar scale of evil.
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G.K. Chesterton in his novel The Napoleon of Notting Hill, published
in 1904, looks eighty years into the future, into a drab, bored world
where democracy has ceased to function and general political apathy is
‘an assumed condition’. In London, an ordinary man is chosen to be
monarch, King Auberon. The King is whimsical and given to pranks,
one of them being to revive the local patriotism in the different London
boroughs. But one Adam Wayne, the Provost of Notting Hill, takes him
at his word. Dressed in a red robe and armed with a sword, his fanatical
stand to defend the honour of Notting Hill against other boroughs soon
has the city plunged into savage street warfare. Chesterton’s message
with The Napoleon of Notting Hill is that people must have values
worth dying for if life is to be worth living, however derisory those
values may appear. The thousands of young Britons who leave their
education or jobs to travel with, and fight for, their favourite football
team would presumably agree with Chesterton if they read him.
Still, the life of Britons, and of Europeans, today is on the whole
immeasurably less drab than in Chesterton’s day of smokestack indus-
trialism. The ghost of the Notting Hill Napoleon still manifests itself in
various ways, however. One of the most illustrative is what one might
call the ‘Hell’s Angels syndrome’. The motorcycle gang Hell’s Angels
(originally formed in California in the late 1940s) has spread to Europe,
where it now fights the Bandidos (created in Texas in the 1960s). In
otherwise peaceful Denmark, for example, this absurd warfare in the
1990s claimed several dead and wounded. Each gang has flags and other
‘national’ ensigns. Gangs with equally fancy names are more or less
affiliated with either. Drugs, beatings and large amounts of money are
involved, as are the quest for the ‘freedom of the road’, group identifi-
cation and opposition to others on the flimsiest of grounds. In Sweden,
too, these and other motorcycle gangs have been responsible for several
murders and the intimidation of witnesses and judges in trials.34
Chesterton presumably smiles, or rather weeps, in recognition in his
heaven, while the rest of us are left to reflect on human nature and folly.
Rarely were the front lines between nationalism, as here defined, and
internationalism clearer than in the city of Strasbourg in 1997. The
Front National, the extreme-Right party in France, held its national
congress in the city. On the one hand there were the speeches in the
Congress Centre, with their explicitly anti-immigrant and implicitly
racist, protectionist and ‘France-first’ messages. On the other there were
the mass demonstrations, with participants from all over France and
beyond outside the building, defending the valeurs républicaines, human
rights, democracy and other universal principles. The city administration
MUP_Torbion_10_Ch10 22/9/03, 3:56 pm264
265Where is Europe heading?
had placed murals with ‘Liberty, Fraternity, Equality’ in several languages
around the city.
It is to be feared that the battle in Europe between these two philo-
sophies will be a dominant theme in European politics in the years to
come. The Flemish Vlaams Blok in Belgium, the Northern League in
Italy and many similar parties in Central and Eastern Europe have
substantial followings. The aims of these parties differ. Some, such as the
Vlaams Blok and the Northern League mainly seek greater autonomy (or
even eventual independence) for Flanders and northern Italy, respectively.
Others want the redrawing of national borders to include kin minorities
now outside them.
Regional autonomy or independence movements exist in many
countries in Europe. They are also nationalistic – not for the existing
nation-state but for a desired region-state – whether they concern the
Basque country in Spain, Corsica in France or the north of Italy. In part
they represent a changing economic situation, in part history. In the era
of industrialisation and imperialism the resources of the whole nation –
a united Germany, Italy or United Kingdom – were needed to defend
borders in Europe and expand beyond the Continent, such as in Africa.
Today imperialism is gone and big countries often mean richer regions
having to pay more for poorer ones.
The Flemish – who since the Industrial Revolution have seen them-
selves as a working class subjugated and exploited by a ruling class of
Walloons – now have the upper hand economically and increasingly
want to see Flanders gain greater autonomy within Belgium, with some
even seeking independence. Language plays a role here and elsewhere, as
does history. Belgium is a relatively young country, formed uneasily
after the Napoleonic Wars as a common home for the Flemish-speaking
Flems and the French-speaking Walloons. However, language plays no
dividing role in Italy. Indeed, the Italian tongue was the major rationale
for Garibaldi’s successful unification of Italy in the nineteenth century.
Germany is younger as a nation than Belgium, yet there is no secession
movement in Germany, only quarrels between ‘Wessies’ and ‘Ossies’
after unification.
Whatever the situation, in several European Union countries the
nation-state is threatened both from below by regionalism and from
above by EU supranationalism.35 Perhaps this helps explain why some
member states want to push for greater powers for the EU Council of
Ministers (representing national governments) while trying to hold
down both the Commission (supranationalism) and the European Parli-
ament (where constituencies, as opposed to nations are represented).36
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Why have the UK and Germany been largely spared strong nationalist
movements? In the UK’s case, it may be the feeling that successive
governments ‘stood up’ to Brussels. Or it may be that the country’s
imperialist past and victory in two world wars make its people feel
proud of their country as it is. Or it may be British pragmatism, perhaps
impervious to grand theories of national superiority. Or is it the friendly
and civil social intercourse that is said to so inspire British society and
that impresses many foreign tourists? Is it that the sizeable minorities
from all around the world have been more successfully absorbed there
than in, say, France (even though recent riots by immigrants in several
towns in northern England would belie such a belief)?
In Germany’s case the extreme Right parties have never after Wolrld
War II gained more than a few percentage points in national elections.
But twice in this period they rose considerably in the polls. The first was
in the 1960s during the grosse Koalition (grand coalition) between the
Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU).
Presumably extremism flourishes when there is no major opposition to a
government majority. The second instance was in the early 1990s, when
hundreds of thousands of people from all over the world sought political
asylum in Germany, under cover of the constitution – adopted in 1949
in the wake of the Nazi experience – that guaranteed persons persecuted
on political grounds the right of asylum. Under much domestic and
international criticism, the Christian Democrat–Liberal government
under Helmut Kohl pushed through a corresponding change in the
constitution, restricting political asylum considerably. As a result the
extreme-Rightist vote receded to near-insignificance (even though it has
maintained some ground in the former East Germany, where it has
taken the form of a protest vote against alleged ‘Wessie’ neglect of the
new Länder).
Given the seeming perenniality of nationalism, there can be few more
urgent tasks than to find a European modus vivendi that keeps nation-
alist urges within bonds while permitting the universalist forces to keep
Europeans talking to and dealing with each other. Was de Gaulle’s
Europe des patries the right middle road? Has continued EU integration
through successive treaties from Maastricht to Laeken now gone so far
as to break that unspoken, perhaps unconscious, agreement between the
countries or even peoples of the European Union not to push integration
beyond a certain point, as public scepticism and negative referenda in
Denmark and Ireland would tend to suggest? However, can the
European bicycle of integration remain upright unless it moves forward?
Should it be equipped with a ‘kick stand’? But is it any fun peddling a
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bicycle that is not moving? Would a ‘standstill’ imposed on integration
not rapidly turn into its opposite, disintegration?
Christianity and Islam
Anyone who travelled across devastated Europe in 1648 must have
thought any reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants impossible.
Yet an evolution in thinking, combined with material progress, has
rendered such conflict generally unthinkable nowadays, other than in
Northern Ireland (where it is more social than religious in character). It
has even made most people in Europe (except in places like Northern
Ireland and parts of the Balkans) unaware of, or indifferent to, the
religion of their neighbours. However, intra-Christian reconciliation has
also been helped by the external challenges of secularism and other
religions, in particular the spread of Islam in Europe and elsewhere.
After all, why would Christians fight amongst themselves over doctrine
when Christianity itself may be under threat?
There are probably many reasons for the growing indifference to
religion in general and the Christian faith in particular in many countries
in Western Europe, including in bastions such as Ireland. There is less
fear of war affecting the Continent, even though terrorism and its
potential use of weapons of mass destruction have many people fearful
again; joblessness perhaps, but no starvation. Nature is better understood
and utilised by science, though far from mastered, as demonstrated by
the threat of global warming and increasing reports of drug-resistant
bacteria and viruses.
This does not prevent the possibility, of course, that Catholicism and
Protestantism may still compete for European souls,  nor that there may
still be philosophical differences between Catholic Southern Europe and
predominantly Protestant Northern Europe. Some in the Protestant
countries see the EU as principally of Catholic-socialist inspiration and
therefore suspect its motives – a contention belied by the fact that a
predominantly Protestant country such as Germany has been a driving
integrationist force within it. It is difficult, however, to imagine a more
‘a-religious’ undertaking than the EU, religion being an area upon which
it has never spoken a word (although a future EU constitution may make
some oblique reference to it) and which is fully outside its remit.37
Only in regard to Turkey, an EU candidate with a predominantly
Muslim population, have some EU politicians – prominent among them
the President of the EU Convention on the Future of Europe, Valéry
Giscard d’Estaing – ventured that it ought not to qualify for membership
MUP_Torbion_10_Ch10 22/9/03, 3:56 pm267
Destination Europe268
as the EU consists of only ‘Christian nations’. They thereby overlook the
fact of a growing Muslim population in heartland Europe. British Asians,
both Muslim and Hindu, are playing an increasing role in defining the
identity of the United Kingdom. And something similar is happening in
Germany, France and Italy, where many young people are excited by
Muslim, Turkish and Arab culture, whose synthesis with European and
North American youth culture is particularly visible in the rap and hip-
hop scene.38
Yet there is a void, a yearning – conscious or subconscious – for a
higher Being inside many people. It is as fundamental as the quest for the
competing psychological phenomena of separatism or universalism dis-
cussed above under ‘nationalism’. This is where sects like the Solar Temple
find their niches (or, in officially atheist China, the Falun Gong sect).
It is also where one expression of religion, Islamic fundamentalism,
may have found fertile ground, especially among Muslim immigrants in
and around the large cities of Western Europe. Unable or unwilling, as
the case may be, to integrate into the host societies, often jobless, linked
up by satellite dishes to the television programmes of their countries of
origin, some are choosing to adopt their idea of fundamental Islam.
Islamic fundamentalism seemingly shows a way out, by rejecting a
Western culture that they feel is rejecting them, and by holding out the
prospect of a future where God, Allah, is not relegated to a corner of
society, or the mind, but takes control of it. Islamic fundamentalism
must also be seen as a reaction against the failure of ‘Arab socialism’ in
the post-World War II period in countries like Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria
and Egypt to bring greater material wealth to their populations, and the
regimes becoming increasingly oppressive as a result.
There is a basic difference between Islam and Christianity (and indeed
earlier heathen beliefs in Europe). Christianity – starting with Jesus’
advice to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the
things that are God’s, and continuing with Thomas Aquinas – believes
that there are two sources of knowledge: divine revelation and human
reasoning. While the former is privileged, the latter is permitted and even
encouraged. This allowed philosophy, the humanities and eventually the
sciences to advance, including those dealing with government, econo-
mics and social affairs.
The British political philosopher Larry Siedentop sees Christianity as
enjoying certain distinct advantages when it comes to competing for
humanity’s souls. Christianity, he argues, is the only religion which
allows a truly ‘one-on-one’ relationship between God and the indivi-
dual, in what he terms its ‘deep individualism’ coupled with its
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‘universalism’ and its call for ‘moral equality’ and ‘equal liberty’ between
all humans. Christianity, he says, appeals to each person’s inner, outside
his or her family, clan or society. He sees this message of Christianity as
having, historically, eventually upended feudalism in medieval Europe
and as directly underlying the American constitution. While it has also
contributed to today’s, in his view, excessive individualism, consumerism
and ‘economism’ in politics – phenomena that he deplores, the appeal of
Christianity should not, he concludes, be underestimated.39
In the fundamentalist version of Islam, the purpose of the state and
government is to enable the individual Muslim to lead a good Muslim
life and to return society, and the whole of the Islamic world, to the
golden age of Mohammed. This has, over more recent centuries, led to a
stifling of independent thought, science and open societal discourse,
marking a departure from the early Middle Ages, when Arab scholars
from Spain and elsewhere played a major role in developing philosophy
and in transmitting the teachings of the ancient Greek and Roman philo-
sophers. The now prevailing doctrine casts a shadow over the Muslim
world. Fundamentalist regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia and to
some extent Iran try to reconcile an orthodox reading of the Koran with
the exigencies of a society that depends on economic and social develop-
ment for its survival. Democracy faces a difficult task when religion claims
to be not only God but also Caesar (a fact with which the Christian
world of the Inquisition was not unfamiliar, of course).
Many Western experts on Islamic fundamentalism argue that, despite
its undeniable efforts to recruit among immigrants in Western Europe, it
is basically defensive and, in addition, influences only a small fraction of
what is in fact a very diversified and splintered European Muslim
population. They see it as trying to avoid a ‘Westernisation’ of the
masses in the Islamic world that arrives via a satellite-transmitted, mass-
market, commercial, Hollywood-type of culture.40 Other observers see
the aggressiveness of Islamic fundamentalism as a revenge for long-
standing domination of the Arab world by Western powers, or as a
reaction against secular nationalism, such as in Egypt.41
 How much of a threat is Islamic fundamentalism to Europe? On the
one hand it may win over some people, such as amongst the jobless
young. The greater its following, the more it risks being perceived by
‘ordinary’ French, Germans, etc. as a menace, and the greater the rush to
parties like the Front National. On the other hand, Islamic fundamen-
talism would presumably find the going rather tough in trying to win
over anything more than a minority in Western Europe, even among
more receptive immigrants. Its very intolerance against deviations would
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likely prevent it from becoming a mass, unified movement, just as con-
flicts among (and within) Arab countries, say between Shiites and Sunnites,
permit outside powers to divide if not rule, as between Iran and Iraq
since the early 1980s. Moreover, it is difficult to see how any larger
number of Western women could embrace the fundamentalist variant of
a religion that casts them down from hard-earned improving legal and
social equality with men to ideological subjugation. The threat to
Europe from Islamic fundamentalism may well lie less in its spread than
in the popular and political reaction by those who feel threatened by it.
Demography: ageing in Europe, pressure from without
Another challenge to the ‘natives’ of Europe comes from migratory
pressure, both from other European countries and from outside the
Continent. Just as a television advertisement showing an attractive
woman slipping into a sports car on the Champs Elysées may, according
to some, ‘subvert’ an Islamic mind, female or male, so it may also attract
it to escape the pressure of poverty or oppression.
Western Europe has become a major destination for migrants from
many of the world’s poorest countries seeking refugee status or political
asylum. They come from both developing countries and from poor
countries in Europe itself. Some southern European countries such as
Greece, Italy and Spain, which for centuries had net emigration to the
New World and to Northern Europe, now experience major net immi-
gration. For example, hundreds of people risk their lives every month in
hazardous voyages across the Strait of Sicily to southern Italian islands
from nearby Tunisia, or from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar to
Spain – often paying small fortunes to traffickers. Countries in Central,
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, meanwhile, send migrants, mainly to
Western Europe. They also receive them, either from neighbouring coun-
tries following the freer migration climate after the fall of communism,
or from outside Europe. The Central, Eastern and South-Eastern parts
of Europe also serve as transits for migrants wanting to go further west.
The reasons for migration also include racial and religious intoler-
ance, wars, including civil wars, and deteriorating economic and political
conditions. During the first few decades after World War II migration
was only a trickle, largely explained by labour shortages in the 1960s in
a country like Germany. Today it has become a tide, which receiving
countries that may face high unemployment and extreme-Right parties
on the rise are doing their best to halt. The means are several: stricter
criteria for granting refugee or asylum status; speedier processing of
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pending requests; visa requirements vis-à-vis more countries; greater
policy co-ordination among European countries on migration and
asylum; and greater efforts to integrate foreign populations into national
life. All these measures have led to a sizeable reduction in legal migration
into Western Europe. However, illegal migration is considerable, with
statistics by definition uncertain. It is subjecting those who engage in it
to nightmarish underground lives in a new, unfamiliar setting – often
leading to crime, drug peddling and prostitution. It has also led to even
more xenophobia in receiving countries, as people attribute such
activities to foreigners as a group.
Economic development may well determine the outcome. If unemploy-
ment can be reduced in Western Europe through more rapid economic
growth, then the perceived threat from foreigners may be reduced. As
the countries in Central and Eastern Europe reach higher economic
growth, migratory pressure to the West may lessen. If a growing number
of developing countries in the South can continue to evolve, then this
will reduce migration to the North. The more developed countries in
Asia, Latin America and the Arab world already receive large numbers
of immigrant workers from poorer countries nearby or further away
(although the living and working conditions of the people concerned are
likely to be even worse than if they had gone to a European country). To
the extent that Europe wants to reduce immigration from distant lands,
it therefore has a strong interest in global economic development.
If Europeans instinctively tend to fear massive immigration, demo-
graphic facts may well in the not too distant future make them change
their stance. Falling birth rates are bringing about major changes in the
age structure of the populations in most countries. The ‘baby boomers’
of the 1940s and 1950s are still working, thus helping to support the
relatively smaller number of retired people. However, already by the
2010s, the baby boomers will have reached retirement age, the active
population will fall and the number of the very elderly – the over-
eighties – will rise sharply as people live longer. The age structure in
many countries will change from the classical pyramid – more younger
people at the base and fewer older ones at the top – to more of a
cylinder. If in 1960 the old-age dependency ratio – that is, the propor-
tion of those retired to those of working age – was about 15 per cent,
today it is about 20 per cent. By 2030 it is expected to be around 35 per
cent. By 2050, two active people will have to support each pensioner,
while today the burden can be shared among four.
This would pose less of an economic problem if it had not been for the
fact that most European countries – such as France and Germany – have
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relied on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ system for the payment of pensions. Present-
day workers pay for present-day pensioners. (The opposite system,
practised by a few, such as the United Kingdom, consists in having
future pensioners pay funds, mainly private, which are not touched by
others than themselves, and this only when they reach retirement.) ‘Pay-
as-you-go’ works well as long as the pyramid shape holds, but less so
with a cylinder-shaped population age structure.42 Pensions may have to
be reduced or taxes increased, or both, with unknown political
consequences. The young may refuse to pay and the old may all turn
into ardent defenders of their pension rights. Early retirement – now an
oft-used method to hold down unemployment – would most probably
have to be curtailed, while retirement age may have to go up. Financial
markets will be affected, as more savings will be called upon to finance
more and more time spent in retirement due to increased longevity.
Public health costs will rise, since older people have more health
problems than young people.43
However, one should be careful as regards the economic consequences.
The same forces which are now causing ‘downsizing’ and unemployment
– computerisation and automation (increasingly by robots) – could well
in future permit a smaller proportion of the population to support both
the elderly and themselves. To the extent they do not, immigration could
provide a way out and may in the process become more politically
palatable, especially if the immigrants can take up qualified jobs that
will add to the national income. In other words, people’s fear of what is
foreign may come to be weighed against that of an empty wallet.
The European Union’s ‘four freedoms’ – for people, goods, services and
capital – had in principle come true through the realisation of the Internal
Market (the ‘1992 project’) in the 1990s. The Economic and Monetary
Union, started in 1999 with the introduction of the single currency, at
least partly completed the process as far as capital was concerned, while
the Schengen Agreement did the same for people and goods.44
However, the weakness of Schengen was that, once illegal immigrants
– whose numbers had risen considerably by the 1990s and the early
2000s – were inside the Schengen area, it was difficult to prevent them
from moving to any other Schengen country. In the 1990s, various
efforts to arrive at a harmonised legislation on immigration and asylum
at EU level had failed. There was only the general commitment in the
1997 Amsterdam Treaty to introduce it by 2004.45
At the EU’s 1999 summit in Tampere, Finland, only a general plan to
reach harmonisation was agreed. Another three years were to pass until
the EU’s summit in Seville in 2002 stated the ambition to reach political
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agreement on all aspects regarding immigration and asylum by 2004.
This would include co-operation among police and border-control
authorities and exchange of information, and would also involve non-
EU sending and transit countries.46 The EU’s sudden activity was in part
explained by the success of the extreme-Right Front National candidate,
Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the French presidential election
in the spring of 2002 and by the rise of an anti-immigration party in the
parliamentary elections in the Netherlands shortly before. (Individual
EU countries such as the United Kingdom and Italy toughened their
immigration and asylum legislation at around this time, making har-
monised EU legislation more difficult to achieve.)
The EU’s ability successfully to integrate immigrants from its
periphery as true EU citizens will be one of its main challenges in the
years to come, not least because the EU will need a new supply of labour
to compensate for its low birth rates. However, can the EU absorb the
numbers required without in the meantime giving added fuel to
extremist, anti-foreigner parties? The alternative could be to try to
encourage higher birth rates through taxation policies and the like. In
many countries two bread-winners are necessary for a typical family to
make ends meet. Even so, many women feel they want to make a career
or at least to do ‘something useful’ and so delay the first child until they
are in their thirties. This leads to longer ‘inter-generation gaps’ and
hence to reduced birth rates, as also do fewer children per couple.
Globalisation
Today, more people, and more world regions, are part of the world
economy than ever before – the type of economy where money counts
(as opposed to a barter economy) and where the different parts are
related to each other through trade in products, services and through
investment. The process is often referred to as globalisation – an economic
and social process essentially driven by technology, especially in the
information and communications sector. Globalisation benefits especially
from falling costs of transport and communications, the volumes of data
that can be transmitted across the globe and the liberalising economic
policies pursued by governments both at national level and internation-
ally. The WTO is the main instrument for promoting globalisation in the
way it can best prosper, namely as a single, coherent system based on
increasingly open trade and worldwide rules.
However, it would be wrong to consider the WTO as such as an inde-
pendent, Machiavellian actor in this process, as many of those opposed
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to globalisation do. The WTO is simply a secretariat, trying to make its
nearly worldwide membership agree on proposals made by any country
or group of countries. As such, it depends entirely on the will of its
members, especially the two dominant economic powers, the EU and the
United States.
Trade liberalisation and investment can be pursued, delayed or halted,
depending on political choice. The nature of that choice depends on the
costs and benefits associated with free trade, in particular relating to
employment and living standards. If these are seen as not being lastingly
advanced through freer trade at worldwide level, the reaction will be a
new emphasis on regional trade groupings, such as the EU or NAFTA.
Already such a trend is noticeable. Protective tariffs may be introduced
against outside countries or trade groupings, on the argument that these
engage in dumping with the aid of state subsidies. Other reasons invoked
may be that they do not sufficiently safeguard minimum social and
environmental standards, workers’ rights, democracy and human rights.
The world community’s weighing of the costs and benefits of the
WTO’s system is illustrated both by the failure of its 1999 summit in
Seattle and by the, in the end, successful – but painful and ambiguously
worded – agreement on a Doha Development Agenda reached in Qatar
in 2001. Paradoxically enough, developing countries are today the
WTO’s main supporters, as they try to gain better access for their
textiles, agricultural commodities and raw materials to the markets of
the world’s richer countries. The latter for their part need the WTO for
their sales of many advanced products and services, and for the
protection of intellectual property rights as they relate, for instance, to
computer software and music. It is only the awareness of the cost of
protectionism and of any breakdown in the world’s trading system that
keeps both groups, so far, prepared to accept the cost of further market
openings, thereby permitting globalisation to continue.
Modern information and communications technologies open up
daunting vistas to humankind. It is expected that internet access via
mobile phones and computers will rise from 2.5 per cent in 2002 to 30
per cent by 2010.47 Business is profiting from this development. There is
hardly any barrier any longer between buyers and sellers. The former
can, at the push of a button, find the particular product or service they
are looking for at the best possible price. Competition among sellers will
increase, reducing inflationary pressure. Large sums are being saved
through the large-scale avoidance of middlemen. Instant information
can be had through increasingly refined software relating to inventory,
sales projections and so forth.
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Globalisation has doubtless increased overall global wealth. Many
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa
have shown impressive growth rates over decades thanks to it,
permitting large parts of their populations to lead better lives. However,
it is also leaving many people and countries behind. It uproots millions,
forcing them to move from countryside to city in search of a precarious
existence, after the local agriculture cannot compete against imports,
often subsidised, from abroad. It smashes traditions without replacing
them with any new. Alongside the nouveaux riches of a rising entre-
preneurial class is a sub-prolitariat living in shanty towns around
increasingly unmanageable mega-cities in Africa, South America and
Eurasia. The poor in Bombay are directly affected by decisions taken in
Wall Street or the City of London.48
It is on these sides of globalisation that its many detractors focus their
criticism. They see it as leading to unaccountable corporate control over
the world economy, the loss of workers’ rights in the global market-
place, and austerity-oriented policies of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund in their lending to developing countries,
leading to increased poverty, environmental degradation and the destruc-
tion of local cultures.
The violent protests against globalisation in Seattle in 1999, Prague in
2000, Göteborg and Genoa in 2001 may in the main have been the work
of professional rioters, but many thousands of peaceful protesters joined
in the demonstrations on behalf of hundreds of non-governmental
organisations with widely different agendas. Apprehension is spreading
to many policy-makers, especially in developing countries and so-called
‘emerging economies’, for even countries that have followed globalisa-
tion’s precepts face economic difficulties.
If, however, globalisation were reversed – through, say, new trade
barriers, a breakdown in the multilateral trading system, restrictions in
the flow of capital and nationalisations of industry – then the economic
consequences could easily be catastrophic in the form of a worldwide
depression that would also hit Europe hard. In a manner of speaking,
globalisation has put the train of the world economy on a new track with
an unknown destination. Pulling the brakes could easily derail it. Jumping
off could kill you and, if not, will leave you in the middle of nowhere.49
It is too early to know the worldwide political, cultural and social
effects of globalisation. Sceptics foresee that it will exacerbate conflict
between civilisations as opposed to states.50 Others believe it will instead
erode differences between civilisations, making them more likely to
understand each other and so less likely to turn to conflict. An author
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such as Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree argues that
the struggle is between traditional societies of all sorts (symbolised by
the olive tree) and technological innovations that lead to globalisation
(symbolised by the luxury Lexus car). Governments risk losing control
over their nations’ destinies as they cannot opt out of globalisation since
it driven by technology. If such technology is the ‘hardware’ of global-
isation, it can only be used successfully if coupled with globalisation’s
‘software’, i.e. a well-educated workforce and the legal systems, trans-
parency and honesty that come with a functioning democracy.51
The role and future of the multinational enterprise
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are the main vehicles by which
globalisation takes place. They have existed for a long time, as has
indeed globalisation itself. What is new is the way they combine with
information and communications technologies to change the world
economy. Their antecedents were the trading companies. In earlier times
these were a driving force behind European colonialism. Their aim was
to collect raw materials or specially sought-after products such as gold,
silver, tea, porcelain or silk and take them back to the home country.
There these products could be sold at a profit, which was all the larger as
the companies could use slave labour or poorly paid workers in the
colonies and often enjoyed (crown-protected) monopolies at home.
During industrialisation, when the wealth of the home country was
increasingly seen as dependent on a steady supply of cheap raw materials,
such enterprises became the main expression of imperialism. As in
colonial times, however, sales in the colonies were secondary to those in
the mother country. The break with the old came in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, when a few companies – for example,
Nobel of Sweden in Germany, Bayer of Germany in the United States,
and Singer of the United States in Scotland – began to establish themselves
abroad for the purpose of building up markets. Foreign subsidiaries
were sought in order to overcome punitive tariff barriers, which were so
high as to render exports unprofitable. Often the companies gained
market advantages with patented products or processes. The United
Kingdom was the dominant foreign investor up until the end of World
War I. After that the United States took the leading role – its companies
having grown wealthy and more visionary as a result of a long experi-
ence with continent-wide operations.
Multinational enterprises could not really take off in the period
between the two world wars, as they had been able to do in the pre-
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World War I era, when the world was in many respects as ‘globalised’ as
it is today.52 Operations in different countries were rarely co-ordinated.
Tariffs were high. It was difficult to move capital across frontiers due to
exchange controls. Communication was slow. Cartels in oil, steel and
other sectors were not only tolerated but even encouraged by European
powers. They were seen as stabilising markets, even at an international
level. National economies had to be kept ‘pure’ – i.e. as free of foreign
capital as possible – and exports of capital were generally looked at with
suspicion, at least by the continental European powers. The aim was to
export as much, and import as little, as possible in true mercantilist
tradition. Trade agreements were mainly bilateral between countries,
and modified with each new ministerial meeting between the countries.
The result was a jungle of rules, in which few companies could expand
their foreign trade and investment. There followed the inflation of the
1920s, the depression and deflation of the 1930s, the currency instability
after the abandonment of the pound’s gold footing in the wake of World
War I, and the rise of totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and elsewhere.
World War II changed all that. After the war, US companies could
start expansion in Western Europe – first the United Kingdom and then
on the Continent. They were even encouraged to do so by various pro-
visions in the Marshall Plan (in particular that non-repatriated profits
would remain untaxed). Numerous factors contributed to this develop-
ment: lower labour costs in Europe than in the US; the need for recon-
struction; the rise in personal income in Western Europe permitting
companies to expand and new consumer markets to develop; greater
knowledge on the part of decision-makers about how economies work;
the rise of management studies, first in the US and then in Europe; a
steady increase in the supply of better educated people, filling higher
positions in companies; multilateral and ever-more open trade regimes
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; greater currency
certainty under the Bretton Woods system – with the dollar, linked to
gold, as the world’s anchor currency; strong defence needs due to the
Cold War, fuelling the rise of an ‘industrial–military complex’; and new
and quicker means of communication and transport.
For the first time MNEs could co-ordinate the activities of subsidiaries
in different countries. Knowledge became the primary engine behind the
growth of companies and national economies – as opposed to earlier
eras when access to physical labour, raw materials or the ability to mass-
produce manufactures had been decisive. Knowledge – first how to
produce things, but increasingly how to co-ordinate the knowledge and
efforts of others – became the most important factor behind growth.
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Paradoxically enough, the technological progress in communications
technology that served MNEs so well in the 1945–90 period has now
gone so far as to jeopardise the very existence of the traditional, major
MNE conglomerate. Before, the ‘proprietary knowledge’ of MNEs could
be kept inside the company walls with relative ease. New knowledge
could be added through expansion and the hiring of talent. Today,
however, communications are so easy, cheap and instantaneous that this
method is less successful. The internet makes it so much easier to ‘steal’
and share knowledge that the organisational cost of MNE expansion –
co-ordinating actions and making sure that information is not leaked to
competitors – may in many cases become too high to justify the benefits
of size alone. Those MNEs that tried to remain big and centralised –
such as IBM in the 1980s and early 1990s – faced major problems.
Those that decentralised almost to the point of being MNEs only in
name – such as today’s reformed IBM – have sometimes fared better,
even though the question then arises why the different operations should
come under one company.53
In future, MNEs are likely to have to go down this path, with the
possible exception of ‘vertically integrated’ industries such as oil com-
panies (well–pipeline–port–truck–petrol station). Decentralisation will
also become necessary in order to adapt products and services to more
local conditions. Boeings or Airbuses may only have one appearance
worldwide. However, more and more consumer goods, even cars, may
have to be different depending on the region. ‘Just-in-time’ production
(to minimise stocks) will be supplemented by computer-guided ‘just-in-
quantity’ production lines. More and more MNEs will loosen links with
subsidiaries, or shed them, and instead work with temporary partners
for each project. Knowledge will be sought on an equally ad hoc basis,
with outside consultants anywhere in the world being hired for
individual undertakings.
Europe in the world of the future
The five above-mentioned forces – nationalism, terrorism, religion,
demography and globalisation – are of course not the only ones likely to
have an effect on the evolution of Europe over the coming years and
decades. Many others could have been raised, such as AIDS and global
warming, but they belong in a different book.
While it is difficult to predict particular developments in the coming
decade, it is less so to foresee general world trends to which Europeans
will have to adapt. The world in 2015 is expected to have a population
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of some 7.2 billion people, up from slightly over six billion in 2002.
More than 95 per cent of the increase will be in the developing countries
(although birth rates are going down there, too), whereas Europe’s
population will decrease.
The risk of war among developed countries is low. Most conflicts are
likely to be small-scale internal upheavals due to religious, ethnic,
economic or political discord. However, terrorism could provoke more
important international conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan,
or between the US (or a US-led coalition) against a country of the ‘axis
of evil’ type, or even against a terrorist group not based in any one
country. They are likely to become more lethal with the arrival of weapons
of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical), longer-range
missile delivery systems and other technologies.
Transnational criminal organisations are expected to grow and become
increasingly skilful at exploiting the global spread of sophisticated
information, financial and transportation networks. They will try to
corrupt leaders of unstable, economically vulnerable or failing countries,
infiltrate banks and businesses in difficulties and co-operate with insur-
gent political movements to control sizeable geographical areas. They
will earn their money from trafficking in human beings, narcotics,
racketeering, the smuggling of toxic materials, hazardous wastes, illicit
arms, military technologies and contraband.
There is likely to be dynamic economic growth, especially in the so-
called emerging markets, such as China and India. Globalisation will
lead to more international trade and hence interdependency among
countries. This could contribute to greater overall international stability.
However, some countries may not be able to join fully in this develop-
ment, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin
America, Central Asia, the Caucasus and even in South-Eastern Europe.
Income gaps in countries are expected to widen and large regions will be
left behind.
Environmental problems will persist and sometimes worsen. With increas-
ing land use, the already significant degradation of arable land will
continue. Water will become even more of a scarcity in large parts of the
world. More tropical forests will be cut down and greenhouse gas emissions
will increase substantially, potentially worsening any ‘global warming’.
In such a world, Europe will have to help others, as well as itself. It
will have to invest in technology, in public education and in broader
participation in government to include increasingly influential actors,
such as non-governmental organisations. Europe will also have to be on
its guard against both primitive and precision-guided weapons threaten-
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ing from other world regions, by developing counteracting technology
of the missile-defence type, as well as intelligence, military and diplo-
matic capabilities. Other threats are weapons of mass destruction
planted by terrorists in European cities or against nuclear plants. Europe
will also have to co-operate more closely with others on a global scale,
to counter the many economic, financial, environmental, criminal,
security and other threats mentioned.
Europe’s choice of its future
The European Union is, at present, the most important vehicle for
European unification. It forms an essential framework for continued
peace and development in Europe. It provides direction for economic
and political reform in the many countries in Central, Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe which prepare or hope to join it. If unification
succeeds – say, in the form of a functioning EU federation – it will be a
remarkable feat, for it would be in the absence, or at least fading
presence, of the many elements that brought about West European
integration in the first few decades after the World War II.
If, however, the peoples of the EU were to say ‘no’ to federation before
or after it has come about – as expressed through the rise of ‘Euro-
phobic’ parties in member states or major political divisions as regards
further integration – then Europeans will have to think of an alternative,
which, for want of a better name, could be called ‘good-neighbourliness’.
They would be close to one another, but not formally unite in a
federation. They would trade, invest and move freely about as far as
each country would want and permit. Time could be expected to take
care of the rest – with the present degree of international contact and
means of communication signifying that the process would be unlikely
to lead to anything but further rapprochement. Countries would follow
different courses as they saw fit, for others to emulate or avoid. With an
outside threat perceived, joint defence would come into play, via NATO
or with Europe acting on its own.
There are two problems with such a more timid outcome. As one
observer puts it:
Of course, most of those … who would resist deeper supranational integration of
the federal type, and are content with intergovernmental co-operation, would
not welcome disintegration. But a shallow Europe, held together only by concer-
tation among diplomats, would be unable to avoid sporadic disunity that might
deteriorate eventually into renewed conflict. In such circumstances, national
sovereignty preciously preserved would be practically useless.54
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The second difficulty with a status quo solution to the question of
further European integration has to do with its lack of adventure, of
mission, of direction, of vision. People need goals, and simply keeping
the same level of inter-country integration, being content with what has
been achieved, is for many not sufficiently inspirational. If the sails do
not billow, the rudder cannot steer. Hence the quest for integration as
the way to find a new driving force, a new purpose, especially in a world
of fiercer and fiercer competition and new threats.
Whatever choice Europeans make, there is nothing deterministic
about it, as Europe’s own history since World War II has taught us.
Europe’s most noble task will be to believe in its own capacity for
change, while preserving democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Democracy is slow, but precisely because of this, it has time to adjust its
course. A snail has more time to adjust than a speeding hare. Moreover,
wherever democracy goes, it knows it has the people with it – even those
who are in the minority – and that is half the success of any national or
federal venture. Democracy – a healthy, uncorrupted democracy where
debate is free, a multitude of opinions can come to the fore and corrup-
tion and crime are nipped in the bud – is also the best way to prevent the
rise of usurpers and tyrants.
There are probably Hitlers, Stalins and Milosevices all around us.
However, they – unknown to us and probably also to themselves – will
remain only potential tyrants and unable to start their wars and oppress-
ion as long as democracy remains strong. They will not be able to
impose their obsessions or complexes on the rest of us. And their
butchers – the Dzierzynskis, the Berias, the Himmlers and the Fouchés –
will be unable to take up their gruesome profession. There may be fewer
spectacular pages in history books this way but, more importantly, there
will be fewer people suffering. As Montesquieu put it: ‘Happy the people
whose annals are blank in the history books’.55
Europe’s annals have been anything but blank. We must then seek
comfort in a more recent thinker, the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y
Gasset. In his book Toward a Philosophy of History – published in
1941, the darkest year of World War II – he said: ‘Man’s real treasure is
the treasure of his mistakes, piled up stone by stone since thousands of
years’.56 Europe has suffered enough. It must surely by now have learnt
enough.
MUP_Torbion_10_Ch10 22/9/03, 3:56 pm281
Destination Europe282
Notes
1 Kissinger (1973, p. 1).
2 The Bonn Accord on Afghanistan was remarkable for the number of coun-
tries contributing to it or approving of its results. They included, in addition
to the NATO countries, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and India.
3 The conflict in the Chechen Republic (Russian Federation) – erupting in
1994 and halted via a fragile peace agreement between 1996 and 1999 – had
not been resolved, in spite of the fact that Russian troops had gained control
over most of the territory and Moscow exercised direct administration since
2001. Some 200,000 refugees had fled to neighbouring republics and about
5,000 Russian soldiers and an unknown number of Chechen insurgents had
died since 1999 alone. Chechen terrorists seized a theatre in downtown
Moscow in 2002 and took some 800 people hostage. In the ensuing attempt
to liberate the hostages, 129 of them died along with the terrorists. A bomb
attack by Chechen terrorists against the central administration building in
Grozny shortly afterwards claimed over fifty lives. A referendum in Chechnya
on a constitution for Chechen autonomy within the Russian Federation was
held in 2003, with an overwhelming majority voting in favour. It was not
certain, however, that the result would translate into an end to the hostilities.
4 See, for example Hirschmann (2001, pp. 7–15).
5 The League of Nations – established in 1919 and dissolved in 1946 follow-
ing the creation of the United Nations and the League’s failure to prevent
World War II – nevertheless represented a noble idea and the beginnings of
an international order, the main lines of which were to be followed after
1945 by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the Council of
Europe and others. As MacMillan (2000, p. 85) writes: ‘The League did
represent something very important: both a recognition of the changes that
had already taken place in national relations [as a result of World War I]
and a bet placed on the future … Of course power still counted, of course
governments looked out for their countries, but what that meant had changed
… Now war was a cost to all players, as the Great War proved. National
interests were furthered better by peace, which allowed trade and industry
to flourish. And the nation itself was something different, no longer
embodied by the monarch or a small elite but increasingly constituted by the
people themselves.’ If the United States had joined the League – as did its
successors after World War II – that conflict might never have occurred.
6 Von Loringhoven (1998, pp. 13–19) sees ‘sub-regional’ co-operation in Europe
as important in at least three respects: it accompanies and facilitates EU and
NATO enlargement; it provides ‘soft security’ by promoting co-operation in
practical fields; and it furthers democratisation by involving local and non-
governmental actors. He considers the strengthening of sub-regional co-
operation particularly important in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
7 There are numerous examples of economic rivalry between the EU as such
and the US that could spill over into the political domain. They include trade
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issues within the World Trade Organisation and EU insistence that the US
negotiate with it as representing all EU members, rather than deal with them
individually, in areas such as air connections and the inspection of ship
cargoes to the US to check for the presence of weapons of mass destruction.
Given the extent of transatlantic economic relations, these differences are
not likely, however, to lead to major political friction. Conversely, political
friction, such as over the Iraq conflict in 2003, could well affect economic
relations via consumer boycotts and investment that avoided certain countries
considered to be in the ‘opposite camp’. Again, however, any such action is
also likely to hurt employment in the home economy due to the pronounced
intertwinement among developed economies.
8 Moravcsik (1998, pp. 407–8).
9 Jakobson (1994, p. 314). Translation from the German original.
10 There are major official efforts to have larger numbers of Germans learn French
and more French learn German, but they are frustrated by the growing role
of English. There is perhaps also a general difficulty for a Latin and a German
culture fully to understand each other, in spite of there being a mutual
attraction between the two, as reflected for instance in the number of tourists
in both directions. Furthermore, France’s perceived ‘universal civilising
mission’, born out of the French Revolution, contrasts with Germany’s greater
emphasis on its own national identity and cohesion and on finding its proper
place in Europe. Another irritant has been France’s relative comfort with a
certain protectionism, as opposed to Germany’s more free-trading instincts.
11 Pedersen (1998, pp. 196–204) goes so far as to call the France–Germany
tandem ‘Europe’s co-operative hegemon’, with France granting Germany
indirect primacy in the economic-monetary sphere and Germany letting
France lead in the security and defence areas: ‘The most important reason
for the survival of Franco-German collaboration in the post-Cold War era is
… Germany’s offering France a share in its evolving regional hegemony and
the opportunities for regional hegemonic rule which such a continental
leadership offers both countries’.
12 The Eurocorps, headquartered in Strasbourg, was established in 1992 following
the establishment, in 1988, of a Franco-German Joint Security and Defence
Council on the initiative of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French
President François Mitterrand. Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain soon joined
France and Germany as members. Eurocorps is integrated into the NATO
military command structure and is composed of 65,000 troops stationed on
the territory of the member countries for rapid dispatch in the event of a crisis.
It has 800 tanks, 1,700 armoured vehicles and 500 artillery at its disposal.
13 Fouquet (2000, pp. 9–10), translation from the French original. One is
reminded of the lament of the early twentieth-century French statesmen Georges
Clemenceau, who said that: ‘There are always twenty million Germans too
many’ (‘Il y a toujours vingt millions d’Allemands de trop’).
14 The sophisticated love–hate relationship between the UK and France has
given rise to a considerable literature. The two nations seem at the same time
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to admire and disparage their cultural differences, while having more in
common at a more fundamental level. Any aspiring Briton must know at
least some French. Yet the British feel a little superior to the French, as if the
perceived relative disorder of French political and civic life, the alleged
carelessness of French drivers or French ‘amour’ were national character-
istics and a cause for amusement. The French, by contrast, do not look
down on the British. They often secretly admire them for taking the contrary
viewpoint in, say, the EU, even as they may criticise them for not toeing the
line.
15 German–British relations have also been helped by the fact that the Germans
have more readily accepted the domination of the English language in Europe
and the world. German is of course much closer linguistically to its Germanic
neighbour English than is Latin-based French. English words – whether or
not they exist in English, such as the German word for a mobile phone (Handy)
– invade the German language, and the Germans (except the linguistic
purists) readily take to them. No doubt German, because it is a Germanic
language like English, will be able better to incorporate the onslaught of
English than, say French or Italian. Since Germany, unlike France, does not
have any universal ambitions for its language, it is not likely, either, to have
the same fierce opposition to English as France. Something more than
language is afoot, however. On many issues the Germans and the British
seem to understand each other better than they do the French, who may at
times seem to them a little overbearing and as having ulterior designs for
France, as opposed to the EU as a whole. There may be a cultural-linguistic
reason for this, a Latin–Germanic divide, so to speak. However, perhaps also
a more decentralised view of things in federal Germany and ‘devolutionised’
the UK than in comparatively centralised France can explain this.
16 Russia has concluded an agreement with Turkey to lay a pipeline under the
Black Sea to deliver close to twenty billion cubic meters of gas annually,
covering more than half of Turkey’s needs and enhancing Moscow’s influ-
ence in the country. Russia is also pressing Azerbaijan to have the latter’s oil
go through Russian pipelines and ports. Russia’s military campaign in
Chechnya must also be seen within an energy context, since a granting of
Chechen independence would mean losing an important oil supply and
transit area. Furthermore, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – which together
have oil and gas reserves equivalent to those of Saudi Arabia – are receiving
assistance from Moscow to fight Islamic fundamentalism and could easily
draw closer to Russia and thereby increase the latter’s energy leverage over
Europe.
17 There is no US government encouragement, let alone financial support, for
MacDonald’s, say, to set up a (franchise) store on the Champs-Elysées, or
for Disneyworld to build an amusement park in Japan. The only argument
could be that the US supports free trade and investment through the WTO
and other fora, and that this facilitates US multinationals to invest abroad.
However, it is difficult to fight against that when all countries – including
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developing nations playing host to multinationals – seem to support such
WTO principles.
18 The rest of the world often does not realise that US difficulties in following
international initiatives derive from the country’s division of powers, especially
between the administration and the Congress. Thus, even if the US adminis-
tration had wished, say, to abolish the death penalty, it could only do so at
federal, not state, level. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change would have
met insuperable opposition on Capitol Hill, as would efforts in the early
2000s to have the US Senate ratify the convention for the establishment of
an International Criminal Court. In a parliamentary democracy of the
European type, by contrast, a government by definition has a (more or less
secure) majority also in parliament, including for the ratification of treaties.
19 May (1992, pp. 106–7) sees at least two strands in US foreign and security
policy: Jefferson’s call for an ‘empire of liberty’, by which Americans
‘thought of their nation as destined to be a great empire, but not on the
European or Roman model. The United States would not acquire and rule
colonies’, but rather provide an example through its own political system
and thereby enhance its own security. The spread of the ‘American system’
constituted the second strand of thought, by which the United States would
build relations with other countries through the ‘natural affinity of republics
and the natural unity of states’. Both strands have informed US foreign
policy, also in regard to Europe, up until the present day.
20 Kaplan (2002, p. 148).
21 The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1244 of 1999 reaffirmed the sover-
eignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo but indirectly left
the region’s future open and entrusted its management to a UN Interim
Administration.
22 A study by UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), the OSCE and the
United Nations High Commisssioner for Human Rights published in 2002,
drew a particularly sombre picture of the human trafficking situation in the
region. Entitled Trafficking in Human Beings in South-Eastern Europe, the
study said that an estimated 80 per cent of the victims of human trafficking
in Albania are under the age of eighteen. The price for a prostitute in Romania
was reported to be between €50 and €200 and in Kosovo between €700 and
€2,500. The study called for clear human rights standards to assist the
victims and equally clear legislation against human trafficking in national law.
23 The disappearance of Yugoslavia – a state founded after World War I that
saw its various parts secede during the 1990s, leaving in the end only Serbia
and Montenegro – marked the end of the effort to unite the ‘South Slav’
nationalities under a single roof. The ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ declared in
2003 came about mainly as a result of European Union pressure. It did not
have a capital city, only an administrative centre, Belgrade; nor did it have a
common central bank or currency, as Serbia used the dinar and Montenegro
the euro. After three years, either side would be entitled to hold a
referendum on whether it wanted to gain independence.
MUP_Torbion_10_Ch10 22/9/03, 3:56 pm285
Destination Europe286
24 In 2002 NATO decided to reduce, by mid–2003, its forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from 19,000 to 12,000 troops and in Kosovo from 38,000 to
33,000 troops. The EU took over responsibility from the UN for training
and supervising Bosnian police forces in 2003 and could be expected soon
also to take over peacekeeping duties from NATO. In the same year NATO
handed over to the EU the peacekeeping in the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’, in a first manifestation of the EU’s emerging European Security
and Defence Policy.
25 Richard Holbrooke, the chief US negotiator for peace in Bosnia in the 1990s,
in his foreword to Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919: Six Months that
Changed the World, wrote: ‘As our American negotiating team shuttled
around the Balkans in the fall of 1995 trying to end the war in Bosnia, the
Versailles Treaty was not far from my mind. Reading excerpts from Harold
Nicolson’s Peacemaking 1919, we joked that our goal was to undo Woodrow
Wilson’s legacy. When we forced the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to come together in Dayton, Ohio, in Novem-
ber 1995 and negotiate the end of the war, we were, in effect, burying
another part of Versailles’ (MacMillan, p. x).
26 Oil (proven and possible) reserve estimates for the Caspian Sea region range
from 30 billion to 200 billion barrels. Industry analysts often use a middle
range figure of 90 billion barrels, similar to the estimated reserves of China
and Mexico (Forsythe, 1996).
27 Separatist movements gained new strength in the Caucasus region in the early
1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the south Caucasus,
intense fighting broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenians in Nagorno
Karabach, a region of Azerbaijan predominantly populated by ethnic Armen-
ians, before a ceasefire could be established in 1994 with international
assistance. Fighting also broke out in Georgia when two regions, Abkhasia
and South Ossetia, sought independence. Ceasefires were reached here also.
Common to all these conflicts is that they have not as yet found a political
solution. Tens of thousands of people were killed and hundreds of thousands
were displaced and still remain so.
28 The possible effects of a Chinese–Russian rapprochement are complex and
multiple. It may increase pressure on North Korea to negotiate an end to the
Korean War and permit nuclear inspection. It could also increase Chinese pressure
on Taiwan, push Japan closer to the United States and Russia and assist
Japanese investment in Siberia by promoting a more stable political environment.
29 From ‘The county of Tron’, in Selected Articles by Bulgarian author Stoyan
Chilingirov (available only in Bulgarian).
30 By way of example, over two million Hungarian speakers live outside Hungary’s
borders – in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania (Transylvania), Ukraine,
Serbia and Montenegro, not to speak of North America and Australia. Over
thirty-two million Russians live outside Russia’s borders in fourteen coun-
tries formerly belonging to the Soviet Union. (Source: ‘Britannica world data’,
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999 Year Book.)
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31 Pfaff (1993, p. 13).
32 As related in Pfaff (1993, pp. 53–4).
33 The 2002 Football World Cup had many political overtones. Korea  reach-
ing the semi-finals was reported to have impressed the North Koreans, perhaps
bringing reunification between the two countries closer. Many Americans
were concerned that the unexpectedly strong performance of the US team
would expose the US as trying to dominate the world in yet another domain.
It was remarkable to see how the world came together during the month-
long tournament, with teams from all corners of the globe meeting each
other in friendly competition and permitting billions of people to see that
any differences between humans are insignificant when compared with their
similarities. However, football can also lead to different feelings. One only
has to think of the frequent hooligans’ riots after games and the 1969
Hondura–El Salvador ‘Futbàl War’, which was provoked by a controversial
match between the two countries.
34 In a first ever joint publication on 30 November 1999, four major Swedish
dailies (Dagens Nyheter, Aftonbladet, Svenska Dagbladet and Expressen)
argued that there was close co-operation between neo-Nazi groups and
motorcycle gangs; that every third prosecutor had been forced to abandon
cases after intimidation and threats; and that nine out of ten policemen said
that the threat to the rule of law was increasing, with many admitting that
they dared not apprehend certain suspected criminals out of fear of retaliation.
35 De Winter (1998, p. 221) maintains that: ‘[First,] European integration weakens
the national state “from above”, as many competences pass to “Brussels”.
Second, following the setting up of the Internal Market, the European Union
developed a large number of programmes at the regional level. At the same
time, in several countries, the unitary state was weakened “from below”
through the process of federalisation (Belgium, and Italy in the future?), the
granting of autonomy to specific communities (Spain) and devolution
(France). Hence, in relative terms, the regional level gained in importance as
a policy level vis-à-vis the unitary state … Independist parties hope that the
decline of decision-making relevance of the state will facilitate its demise.’
36 The EU actively supports transfrontier co-operation among its member
states, where about 10 per cent live in border regions and roughly half a
million cross borders daily to go to work. The so-called ‘Interreg’ pro-
gramme within the EU’s Agenda 2000 foresees spending close to €5 billion
on cross-border co-operation between 2000 and 2006, some of it with EU
candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
37 One difference may be, for instance, in the approach to EU agreements,
where Protestant nations are reported to hesitate for a long time before
signing but then to do their best to live up to them afterwards. By contrast,
Catholic nations are said to sign more readily but then be more easy-going
about implementation. The Swedish journalist von Sydow reports specula-
tion among EU civil servants in Brussels, to the effect that Catholics are
supposed to like legal frameworks, including constitutions, when Protestants
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prefer informal negotiations; that Catholics have an aversion to free markets
where Protestants like them and see them as the EU’s raison d’être; that
Catholics are centralists and have an aversion to decentralisation, whereas
Protestants are worried about a resurgence of a ‘Roman Empire’ and prefer
the nation state (von Sydow, 1999, pp. 15–22).
38 It is also often forgotten that Muslims carried the torch of Greek and Roman
learning during Europe’s Dark Ages, eventually helping to bring Europe out
of a period of obscurantism and furthering its coming together.
39 Siedentop (2000, Ch. 10).
40 One is indeed left to wonder what goes on in the mind of a woman in, say,
Saudi Arabia who sees how a super-model like Michelle Pfeiffer lectures and
seduces a glamorous Robert Redford in between plane trips and television
shows as in the film Up Close and Personal – while the woman in question
herself cannot venture outside unless veiled and cannot in any way help shape
the society in which she lives except in the home and among the family,
where her influence may be considerable. Similarly, the film Titanic, which
may have been seen by most of mankind, has a young woman in luxury class
abandon her arranged husband in favour of a charming young third-class
passenger who, aside from his Hollywood idol looks, has nothing to offer
but his love. How will that film, and others like it, affect world history by
modifying perceptions or cultural patterns? Presumably, many people in the
more strict Muslim countries will become slightly schizophrenic as they try
to reconcile their strict, absolute principles with the values, or lack thereof,
beamed to them by all dominant Western media.
41 Tibi (1997, pp. 31–46) believes that today’s Islam is engaged in a desperate
battle to fight the cultural dimension of (Western) modernity, while readily
accepting the scientific-technological part. He sees the trauma of trying to
‘de-Westernise’ modernity through such ‘partial modernisation’ – i.e. ‘dividing
the indivisible’ – as underlying much of present Islamic fundamentalism.
42 Privately placed payments for future pensions will, however, depend on the
performance of the funds in which they have been invested, a not entirely
reassuring prospect in view of the numerous corporate scandals in recent
times and the fall in stock prices they provoked.
43 The European Union’s population is projected to fall from its present 375
million to 330 million by 2050. Italy, for example, is expected to lose 28 per
cent of its population by that time, while in Spain 43 per cent of its popu-
lation is forecast to be older than sixty, up from 22 per cent today. (Source:
United Nations Population Division.) The working-age population in the
EU is foreseen to decline by at least 2.15 million people between 2005 and
2015, but only 1.25 million new working-age citizens will be available to
take their place. Fewer people means that unemployment will come down,
but also that wage-led inflation may go up. The euro – assuming it by that
time encompasses many more countries – could be expected to increase
labour mobility in an even more integrated EU. Coomans (1998, pp. 5–28),
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with whom these figures originate, in this situation expects massive labour
movements to more expansive regions, also from Central and Eastern
Europe, which he sees as a major workforce pool in tomorrow’s Europe.
Even so, birth rates there are also low.
44 The European Commission in 2002 reported mixed progress on the implemen-
tation of the EU’s Internal Market provisions. Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had an ‘implementation deficit’ of
less than 1.5 per cent, while for France, Greece and Portugal it was in excess
of 3 per cent. For some countries the deficit was indeed growing due to new
directives being adopted.
45 The Amsterdam Treaty committed the EU to a harmonised EU legislation on
immigration and asylum by 2004 via the ‘qualifying majority’ decision-
making procedure in the Council of Ministers. However, Germany, at the
EU summit in Nice in December 2000, refused to yield its veto right in the
area of asylum and immigration, arguing that its inner social cohesion was
at stake if it was not left to manage its own immigration policies. Germany
in 2000 had 5.5 million immigrants, with some 300,000 arriving each year.
The country received 320,000 refugees during the war in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and 200,000 following the Kosovo conflict, even though many have
since returned to their regions of origin.
46 In 2002 the EU agreed on a directive (the so-called ‘Dublin II’ Agreement,
following an earlier Dublin Convention on First Asylum), stating that a country
where an asylum-seeker first entered the EU would remain responsible for
examining his or her request, even if that person subsequently moved to
another EU member state. A new centralised data system, Eurodac, would
use fingerprints to trace the person’s movements within the EU.
47 Estimate by Manuel Castells, Professor of Sociology at the University of
California and author of the trilogy The Information Age: Economy, Society
and Culture, as reported in Kaplan (2002, p. 5).
48 Coffee is an example. Coffee consumption increases steadily around the
world. When at first prices paid to the coffee farmers in developing countries
rose in response to heightened demand, producers in many countries which
had not traditionally grown the crop began doing so, causing global pro-
duction to rise and prices to fall to lower and lower levels. As the preference
for better coffee quality rose in richer countries (a wealth effect sometimes
referred to as the ‘cappuccino effect’), millions of smaller coffee producers
were unable to adapt and had to abandon production. With few outlets for
other crops remaining, due not least to subsidies for agricultural exports
from rich countries, their future looked bleak. Neither the general public
nor prospering roasting companies seemed to pay much attention to this
example of globalisation’s downside aspects.
49 There is also the related risk of generalised deflation. If inflation – con-
sidered the main threat during much of the post-World War II era – is ‘too
much money chasing too few goods’, deflation can be said to be ‘too many
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goods chasing too little money’. It is a process in which the prices of products
(and services) tumble along with corporate profits, when there is suddenly
not enough demand to absorb the amounts produced. Price deflation
became a fact in several OECD countries in the early 2000s, most notably in
Japan. In factories around the world robots are working twenty-four hours
a day (some of them producing new robots). This may pose a problem for
the future of manual labour, first in industrial production and then in lower-
level services, where robots already clean cars and rooms. (However, other
services where tasks are more complex or demand a relationship with the
customer may flourish, such as in restaurants, personal care and gardening.)
If companies begin to undercut each other severely in order to sell, inter-
national tensions and protectionism could rise as certain countries would be
faced with rising trade deficits. Eroded corporate profit margins could trigger
new lay-offs in order to reduce costs, while higher unemployment could
impact on consumer spending, not only among those affected spending less,
but also those who fear they may be next in line. Such a ‘glut world economy’
would be difficult to overcome.
50 Huntington (1993, p. 25), one of the main proponents of this theory, sees the
‘clash of civilisations’ that he expects will shape the world as being especially
between the ‘Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,
Latin American, and possibly African’. Since Europe encompasses at least
two of these, its role in such a ‘clash’ would seem uncertain. Park (1997,
p. 124), citing various scholars, argues that ‘modern economic globalisation
is entirely consistent with nationalism’, especially since ‘nationalism
originally was able to spread only because a degree of globalisation already
existed. The communications revolution also contributes to nationalism,
since it leads to the growing perception of political and economic inequali-
ties between ethnic groups … There is also a global “demonstration effect”,
in which the example of one successful ethnic nationalism stimulates the
claims of another.’
51 Friedman (2000).
52 See, for instance, Wolf (2001, pp. 178–90). Wolf observes that the portion
of world production traded on global markets is not much higher today than
it was in the years leading up to World War I. International mobility of
labour was clearly higher at the time. For instance, the United States increased
its population in the 1890s by 9 per cent due to immigration. International
capital flows were also considerable in the nineteenth and early twentieth
century. In the case of the UK, it averaged 4.6 per cent of GDP between
1870 and 1913, a level unparalleled in any country in today’s world.
53 See e.g. Buckley and Casson (1991, pp. 102–13).
54 Duff (1997, p. 3).
55 Attributed to Montesquieu by Thomas Carlyle in his History of Frederick
the Great, 1858–65.
56 As related in Kaplan (2002, p. xvii).
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Appendix: seminal events since 1945
1944
Bretton Woods Conference establishes International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (later World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund
1945
Yalta Conference of post-World War II world order
End of World War II in Europe; 0ccupation of Germany by the four victorious
powers (the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States)
Potsdam Conference on the future of Germany
The US explodes nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki; End of World
War II in Asia
Founding of the United Nations (UN)
1947
Announcement of the Marshall Plan to assist European recovery
The Soviet Union declines participation in Marshall Plan (and obliges countries
in its ‘sphere of influence’ in Central and Eastern Europe to do the same)
Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) formed under Soviet auspices to
promote communism internationally
1948
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) enters into force
Communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia
Brussels Treaty (on West European defence) signed
Congress of Europe held (in The Hague)
Currency reform in the US, British and French occupation zones in Germany
(and Berlin)
Soviet blockade of the western sectors of Berlin (lifted in May 1949)
1949
Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) established under Soviet
leadership to promote economic integration in Central and East European
countries under its influence
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North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) on collective defence signed
Council of Europe founded
Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) following the
end of military occupation of the US, British and French zones.
Founding of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
The Soviet Union detonates atom bomb, ending US nuclear monopoly
Chinese civil war ends in victory for communist side
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg form Benelux Economic Union
1950
Schuman Plan for European co-operation on coal and steel presented
Korean war starts
1951
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) founded (Belgium, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands)
1952
European Defence Community signed (project abandoned in 1954)
1953
Stalin dies (leading to reduced East–West tension)
The Soviet Union proposes German unification (rejected by Western powers)
Worker uprising in East Berlin (suppressed by the Soviet Union and the East
German regime)
Korean war ends (leading to further reduction in East–West tension)
1954
French National Assembly turns down proposed European Defence Community
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu falls, eventually leading to French withdrawal
from Indo-China
1955
Austrian State Treaty enters into force (re-establishes sovereignty and foresees
neutrality and the withdrawal of foreign troops)
Western European Union (WEU) established
Federal Republic of Germany gains sovereignty; joins NATO
Warsaw Pact founded
Messina Conference on a future European Economic Community (EEC) held
(Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the UK; British withdrawal from the negotiations in
November 1955)
Soviet–West German relations formalised
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1956
Khrushchev criticises Stalin at Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Community
Party (‘de-Stalinisation’ and reduced tension with the West follow)
Worker unrest in Poland
Hungarian revolt against communist regime and Soviet domination (suppressed
by the Soviet Union, acting via Warsaw Pact forces, in November)
Suez crisis
1957
European Economic Community and Euratom Treaties (‘Rome Treaties’) signed
Sputnik satellite launched by the Soviet Union
1958
European Economic Community and Euratom Treaties enter into force
European Industrial Free Trade Area (to include the EEC) proposed by the UK
(rejected by France)
1960
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) enters into force (Austria, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK)
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established
1961
Berlin crisis
Berlin Wall is built




France and Germany sign Friendship Treaty
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty concluded between the US and the Soviet Union (for-
bidding atmospheric, outer space and underwater testing)
1964
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) signed between the Soviet Union and
the US (limiting strategic nuclear weapons)
1965
The US bombs North Vietnam; begins major military escalation in South Vietnam
1968
‘1968’ youth rebellion in France and elsewhere
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Prague Spring, marking a Czechoslovak effort at political and economic reform
(suppressed by the Soviet Union, acting via Warsaw Pact forces, in August)
1969
West German Ostpolitik begins, to improve relations with the Soviet Union and
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
The UK, Denmark and Ireland open accession negotiations with the EEC
1970
EEC Werner Committee presents plan for economic and monetary union by
1980 (project abandoned in 1974)
Renewed Polish unrest against communist regime
1971
The US severs the connection between the dollar and gold
1972
Norway popular referendum rejects EEC membership
SALT I between the Soviet Union and the US ratified, including Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) establish formal relations
1973
The UK, Denmark and Ireland join the EEC
Paris Agreement marks beginning of US military withdrawal from Vietnam
OPEC raises oil prices, contributing to (first) oil crisis
1975
North Vietnamese troops conquer Saigon (leads to a united Vietnam in 1976)
Helsinki Final Act signed; Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE) established (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) as from 1995)
1979
European Monetary System (EMS) formed within the EEC
SALT II signed (never entered into force)
Second oil crisis
The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan (withdrawal in 1989)
1980
Solidarnosc (‘Solidarity’) self-governing trade union founded in Poland
1981
Greece joins the EEC
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Polish government under General Jaruzelski imposes martial law; suppresses
popular unrest
1985
Mikhail Gorbachev appointed Secretary General of the Community Party of the
Soviet Union; initiates reform
Height of NATO–Warsaw Pact ‘medium-range missile crisis’ (leading to nego-
tiations and an agreement, in 1987, to dismantle such weapons in Europe)
1986
Portugal and Spain join the EEC
GATT negotiations for a Uruguay Round start (completed in 1994 and leading,
in 1995, to the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
1987
Single European Act of the European Community (EC) enters into force
(initiates quest to complete the EC Internal Market by 1993 (‘1992 project’)





Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty concluded, leading to considerable
reduction in such forces on all sides
German unification
1991
Kuwait is liberated from Iraqi occupation by US-led international coalition
Warsaw Pact dissolved
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declare independence
Break-up of Yugoslavia begins; declarations of independence by Croatia, Slovenia
and Macedonia (subsequently named the ‘former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia’) and by Bosnia (in 1992); fighting erupts between Yugoslav and Sloven-
ian forces and between Yugoslav and Croatian forces
The Soviet Union is dissolved
1992
EU Treaty on European Union (‘Maastricht Treaty’) signed (includes a timetable
for reaching Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1999 at the latest and
a commitment to the shaping of a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development established
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina announces wish to join Yugoslavia
Fighting erupts in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Danish popular referendum rejects the Maastricht Treaty, preventing its entry
into force
France in a popular referendum narrowly approves the Maastricht Treaty
1993
The European Union’s Internal Market (‘1992 project’) enters into force
EU Schengen Agreement (free circulation of people) enters into force
Danish popular referendum approves (amended) Maastricht Treaty
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System collapses
UN-mandated economic embargo against Yugoslavia
1994
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme launched by NATO, with wide Euro-
pean participation
‘Euroagreements’ between the EU and several countries in Central and Eastern
Europe concluded
European Economic Area Agreement enters into force, closely associating five
EFTA countries (Austria, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Sweden) with
the EU Internal Market
Conflict erupts in Chechnya (Russian Federation) between Chechen rebels and
Russian forces (peace agreement reached in 1996)
1995
Austria, Finland and Sweden join the EU
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) created (succeed-
ing the CSCE)
Fighting continues in Croatia (Krajina) and in the western part of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Dayton Agreement brings an end to hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
establishes NATO contingent in Bosnia
1996
Russia joins the Council of Europe
1997
NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security
signed
EU Amsterdam Treaty signed (prepares for envisaged ‘small bang’ (six countries)
EU enlargement)
Stability and Growth Pact concluded to strengthen the EU’s EMU
NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council established
1999
The EU’s EMU enters into force (non-physical introduction of the euro)
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland join NATO
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EU Berlin Summit agrees on (limited) reform of various policies (Agenda 2000)
European Commission resigns, setting off an institutional crisis in the EU
NATO attacks Yugoslavia over Kosovo (peace settlement reached in June)
Defence Capability Initiative to bolster European defence capabilities agreed at
NATO Washington Summit
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe launched
Renewed fighting erupts in Chechnya (Russian Federation) between Chechen
rebels and Russian forces
EU Helsinki Summit agrees on the principle of ‘big bang’ (thirteen candidate
countries) enlargement  and on the formation of a Rapid Reaction Force by
2003 as part of the European Security and Defence Policy
2000
EU diplomatic isolation of Austria over the ‘Haider affair’ (ends in October 2000)
EU Nice Summit modifies the EU’s decision-making process to prepare for
enlargement; arranges for ‘flexible integration’
2001
Plan to build a Ballistic Missile Defence announced by the US
Irish popular referendum rejects EU Nice Treaty, preventing its entry into force
The US announces readiness for ‘big bang’ NATO enlargement
Terrorist attacks on the US (‘September 11’)
NATO activates its Article 5 on collective defence against the perpetrators of
September 11
US-led coalition attacks Afghanistan; deposes Taliban regime
UN-sponsored Bonn Accord paves the way for new Afghan government
World Trade Organisation concludes the Doha Development Agenda on new
trade negotiations
2002
Issuing of euro notes and coins, as part of the EMU
President Bush assails ‘axis of evil’ countries
EU Convention on the Future of Europe starts its work and presents elements
for a future EU constitution
The US and Russia abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Treaty of Moscow on further cuts in nuclear missiles signed between the US and
Russia
NATO–Russia Council created, giving Russia an ‘equal partnership’ role in
certain (non-core) NATO areas
EU Nice Treaty approved in second Irish popular referendum, permitting its
entry into force
NATO Prague Summit invites seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe to
join in 2004, bringing membership to twenty-six
EU Copenhagen Summit invites ten countries in Central, Eastern and Southern
Europe to join in 2004, bringing membership to twenty-five
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2003
International crisis worsens over presumed weapons of mass destruction in
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, leading to invasion by US, British and Australian
forces (supported by those of other nations)
Looming internationl crisis over North Korea’s nuclear programme
MUP_Torbion_11_Appen 22/9/03, 2:00 pm298
References 299
References
Allison, G. and Zelikow, P., 1999, Essence of Decision – Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Longman, New York.
Alting von Geusau, F. A. M., 1992, Beyond Containment and Division –Western
Co-operation from a Post-Totalitarian Perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Dordrecht.
Amtenbrink, F., 1999, ‘The European Central Bank – democratically elected or
unconstrained?’, Nederlands Juristenblad, No. 2.
Ash, G., 1993, Im Namen Europas: Deutschland und die geteilte Kontinent,
Carl Hanser Verlag, Munich.
Baun, M. J., 1996, An Imperfect Union – The Maastricht Treaty and the New
Politics of European Integration, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Bideleux, R., 1996, ‘The Comecon experiment’, in R. Bideleux and R. Taylor (eds),
European Integration and Disintegration, Routledge, London and New York.
Bohlen, C. E., 1973, Witness to History. 1929-1969, Norton, New York.
Brown, A., 2000, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev: systemic transformer’, in M. Westlake
(ed.), Leaders in Transition, Macmillan, London.
Brugmans, H., 1965, L’idée européenne 1918–1965, De Tempel, Tempelhof,
Bruges.
Buckley, P. J. and Casson, M., 1991, The Future of the Multinational Enter-
prise, Macmillan, London.
Busschaert, J., 1998, Significance of a Regional Integration Project: The Case of
Benelux, Institut d’études européennes, IEE-Documents, No. 8.
Coomans, G., 1998, ‘L’emploi en Europe en 2005’, Futuribles, No. 234,
September.
Craft, S., Redmond, J., Wyn Rees, G., and Webber, M., 1999, The Enlargement
of Europe, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Csernatony, G. von, 1973, Le Plan Marshall et le redressement économique de
l’Allemagne, Imprimerie Vandoise, Lausanne.
Deighton, A. and Runacle, E., 1998, ‘The Western European Union 1948–1998:
From the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam’, Studia Diplomatica,
Vol. 51, Nos 1 and 2.
Denman, M. J., 1996, The Origins and Development of the European Union
1945–1995, Routledge, London and New York.
MUP_Torbion_12_Biblio 22/9/03, 2:01 pm299
References300
Drucker, P. F., 1993, Post-Capitalist Society, Harper Collins, London.
Duff, A., 1997, Reforming the European Union, Federal Trust, London.
Ellwood, D. W., 1992, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and
Postwar Reconstruction, Longman, London and New York.
Engstrom, H. (ed.), 2000, Socialist Songbook, http://engstrom.best.vwh.net/
songbook/preface.html
Erhard, L., 1963, The Economics of Success, Thames and Hudson, London.
Featherstone, K., 1994, ‘Jean Monnet and the ‘democratic deficit’ in the
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2.
Forsythe, R., 1996, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
Adolphi Paper 300, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Fouquet, C., 2000, Délires et défaites – une histoire intellectuelle de l’exception
française, Albin Michel, Paris.
Fowkes, B., 1997, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union, St. Martin’s Press,
New York.
Friedman, Thomas, L., 2000, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, New York.
Fukuyama, F., 1993, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books,
London.
Gillingham, J., 1991, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe: The Germans and
the French From Ruhr Conflict to European Community, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Gimbel, J., 1968, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the
Military, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.
Gladwyn, H. M. G. J., 1969 de Gaulle’s Europe or Why the General Says No,
Secker and Warburg, London.
Greenwood, J., 1998, ‘Regulating lobbying in the European Union’, Parliamen-
tary Affairs – A Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 51, No. 4, October.
Grosser, A., 1980, The Western Alliance, Continuum, New York.
Guéhenno, J. M., 1998-99, ‘The impact of globalisation on strategy’, Survival,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter.
Hirchmann, K., 2001, ‘Terrorismus in neuen Dimensionen’, Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, Bonn (B51/2001).
Huntington, S., 1993, ‘The clash of civilisations’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3.
Hurlburt, H., 1995, ‘Russia, the OSCE and European security architecture’,
Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 2.
Jakobson, M., 1994, ‘Frieden und Stabilität – eine Fata Morgana’, Europa-Archiv:
Zeitschrift für internationale Politik, Vol. 49.
Jones, J. M., 1955, The Fifteen Weeks: February 21–June 5, 1947, Viking Press,
New York.
Kagan, R., 2002, ‘Power and weakness’, Policy Review, June/July.
Kaplan, R. D., 2002, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos,
Random House, New York.
Kapteyn, P., 1996, The Stateless Market – the European Dilemma of Integra-
tion and Civilisation, Routledge, London.
MUP_Torbion_12_Biblio 22/9/03, 2:01 pm300
References 301
Keersbergen, K. van and Verbeek, B., 1994, ‘The policy of subsidiarity in the
European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2.
Kennan, G. F., 1972, Memoirs, 1950-1963, Vol. II, Little, Brown, Boston and
Toronto.
Kennedy, P., 1987, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House,
New York.
Keynes, J. M., 1920, Economic Consequences of Peace, Macmillan Press, London.
Kissinger, H., 1973, A World Restored, Gollancz, London.
Kissinger, H., 1994, Diplomacy, Simon and Schuster, London.
Knischewski, G., 1996, ‘Post-war national identity in Germany’, in B. Jenkins
and S. A. Sofos (eds), Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, Rout-
ledge, London and New York.
Leffler, M. P., 1992, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.
Loringhoven, F. von, 1998, ‘Regionale Zusammenarbeit: Brücken im Zusammen-
wachsenden Europa’, Aussenpolitik (German Foreign Affairs Review), Vol.
49, No. 3.
Luif, P., 1995, On the Road to Brussels – The Political Dimension of Austria’s
Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to the European Union, The Austrian
Institute for International Affairs, Vienna.
MacMillan, M., 2002, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World,
Random House, New York.
Malmborg, M. af, 1994, Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten – Sverige och den väst-
europeiska integrationen 1945-1959 (Sweden and West European Integration,
1945–1959), Lund University Press, Lund, Sweden.
Mastny, V., 1998, The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the
End of the Cold War, Working Paper 23, Cold War International History
Project, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC.
May, E. R., 1992, ‘National security in American history’, in G. Allison and F.
Treverton (eds), Rethinking America’s Security – Beyond Cold War to New
World Order, W. W. Norton and Co., New York and London.
McCullough, D., 1992, Truman, Simon and Schuster, New York.
Milward, A.S., 2000, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Routledge,
London and New York.
Moravcsik, A., 1998, ‘The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power
From Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, New York.
Naumann, K., 2002, Frieden – der noch nicht erfüllte Auftrag, Mittler, Hamburg.
Neuhold, C., 2000, ‘Into the New Millennium: The Evolution of the European
Parliament from Consultative Assembly to Co-legislator’, Eiposcope, No. 1.
Nicoll, W. and Salmon, T. C., 1990, Understanding the European Community,
Philip Allan, New York.
Oxford English Dictionary, 1933, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Park, A., 1997, ‘Theories of post-communist nationalism’, in D. Carlton and P.
Ingram (eds), The Search for Stability in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc,
Ashgate, Aldershot.
MUP_Torbion_12_Biblio 22/9/03, 2:01 pm301
References302
Parkinson, C. N., 1957, Parkinson’s Law, Penguin Books, London.
Pedersen, T., 1998, Germany, France and the Integration of Europe, Pinter,
London and New York.
Pfaff, W., 1993, The Wrath of Nations, Touchstone, New York.
Ross, G. (ed.), 1984, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin. British Documents on
Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941–1945, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rühle, H., 2000, ‘Und ewig schrumpft die Bundeswehr – der ‘Partner in leader-
ship’ als NATO-Schlusslicht’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 7 January.
Sassoon, D., 1997, Looking Left: European Socialism After the Cold War, I.B.
Tauris Publishers (in association with the Gramski Foundation, Rome),
London and New York.
Servan Schreiber, J. J., 1968, The American Challenge, Hamish Hamilton, London.
Shaw, J., 1998, ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: challenges of flexibility and legiti-
macy’, European Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, March.
Shawcross, W., 2000, Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a
World of Endless Conflict, Simon and Schuster, London.
Shonfield, A., 1973, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, Allen Lane,
London.
Siedentop, L., 2000, Democracy in Europe, Penguin Books, London.
Swann, D., 1995, The Economics of the Common Market, Penguin Books, London.
Sydow, E. von, 1999, När Luther kom till Bryssel, Bokförlaget Arena, Smedje-
backen, Sweden.
Talbott, S., 1979, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, Harper & Row, New
York and London.
Tibi, B., 1997, Il fondamentalismo religioso, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin.
Toulemon, R., 1998, ‘For a democratic Europe’, in M. Westlake (ed.), The
European Union Beyond Amsterdam, Routledge, London and New York.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2000, Economic Survey of
Europe, No. 1.
Urwin, D. W., 1991, The Community of Europe, Longman, London and New
York.
Vanthoor, W. F. V., 1996, European Monetary Union Since 1848 – A Political
and Historical Analysis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Weiler, J., 1997, ‘Legitimacy and democracy of union governance’, in G. Edwards
and A. Pijpers (eds), The Politics of European Treaty Reform: The 1996 Inter-
governmental Conference and Beyond, Pinter, London and Washington.
Westlake, M., 1998, ‘Maastricht, Edinburgh, Amsterdam: the ‘end of the begin-
ning’, in V. Deckmyn and I. Thomson (eds), Openness and Transparency in
the European Union, The European Institute of Public Administration, Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands.
Westlake, M. (ed.), 2000, Leaders in Transition, Macmillan, London.
Winter, L. de, in L. de Winter and H. Türsan (eds), 1998, Regionalist Parties in
Western Europe, Routledge, London and New York.
Wolf, M., 2001, ‘Will the nation-state survive globalisation?’, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 80, No. 1.




ABM Treaty see SALT, Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty
Acheson, Dean 11n.9
ACP countries (African, Caribbean, Pacific)
109, 222, 233n.44
Cotonou Agreement 123n.5
Lomé Conventions 123n.5, 222
Yaoundé Convention 123n.5
acquis communautaire see under EU
Adenauer, Konrad 25, 30n.15, 44n.5, 247
Aegean Sea 211, 231n.34
Afghanistan 53, 54, 65, 67n.3, 178, 182,
238, 258
Africa Action Plan 240
ageing see demography
Agenda 2000 see under EU
Ahtisari, Marty 231n.32
Air France 134, 221
Al Qaeda 67n.3, 182, 238, 239, 241
Alaska 187n.17
Albania 115, 173, 176, 188n.24, 255, 259
Allied Control Council 5
Allied Force (operation) 173
Allied High Commission 12n.14
Alsace 95
Amato, Giulio 229n.26
Amsterdam Summit 190, 191–2, 212
Amsterdam Treaty see under EU
Andropov, Yuri 57
Angola 15, 49, 186n.12
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty see under SALT










Atlantic Alliance see NATO




Austria 13, 14, 34, 63, 83–5 passim, 99,
106, 110, 128, 141, 193, 197, 198,
209–10, 212, 227n.11, 231n.30
referendum (EU) 106–7
State Treaty 21, 107, 231nn.30 and 31
Austria-Hungary 3
Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs) 209–10
Austrian–Italian war 166n.34





Austrian State Treaty see under Austria
axis of evil 182, 239, 279
Axis powers 9
Azerbaijan 179, 257, 258, 284n.16, 286n.27
Nagorno Karabach 286n.27
Balkans 211, 216, 237, 243, 254–7, 259,
267
Ballistic Missile Defence 177, 181, 187nn.17
and 18
banana issue 222, 233n.44
Banat 259
Bandidos 264
Bank of England 144, 238
Bank of Japan 238
Barcelona process 243
Basque country 265
Note: ‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page; references to CAP,
ECSC, EEC and EMU are listed separately from EU.
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm303
Index304
Bayer 276
Belarus 102, 115, 123n.7, 188n.23
Belgium 9, 17, 18, 28n.7, 127, 131, 141,




Benelux (customs) union 17, 28n.7, 127, 243
Berlin 7, 9, 13
Berlin crises 7–8, 31, 32–3, 248
Berlin Summit see under EU
Berlin (East) uprising 25, 27
Berlin Wall 31, 33, 47, 67, 69n.13, 71, 72,
79, 85, 120
big bang (enlargements) see under EU and
NATO
Bilateral I agreement (EU–Switzerland) 216
Bilateral II agreement (EU–Switzerland) 217
bin Laden, Osama 67n.3, 238
Black Sea Fleet 184n.6
Black Sea region 284n.16
Blair, Tony 159, 202, 225n.2
Blue Europe see EU, fisheries policy
Bonn Accord on Afghanistan 239, 282n.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 92, 93, 100, 112,
113, 174, 182, 184n.3, 185n.10, 194,
249, 255–7 passim, 260, 286n.24
Muslim-Croatian Federation 92, 112
Serb Republic (Republica Srpska) 92,
112, 256
Brandt, Willy 32, 37
breathing budget 164n.22
Bretton Woods institutions 6, 7, 64, 277
International Monetary Fund 6, 73, 80,
96n.5, 101, 275
World Bank 6, 73, 80, 216, 233n.44,
255, 275
Brezhnev doctrine 43, 44n.8, 53
British Airways 134
Bruntland, Gro Harlem 109
Brussels Treaty 9, 12n.16, 21
bubble economy 78
budget (EU) see under EU
Bulganin, Nikolay 25
Bulgaria 7, 82, 115, 170, 176, 179, 191,







Bush, George W. 57, 68n.6, 176–8 passim,
181, 185n.11, 186n.16, 188n.27, 239
Caetano, Marcello José 49
California 145, 147
Canada 6, 7, 21, 105, 110, 178, 196, 219,
240
CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 23, 31,
32, 38, 39, 42, 50, 51, 59–60, 83, 95,
117, 136, 147, 191, 193, 217–19,




direct payment 231n.38, 232n.40
import levies 231n.38
income support 217
Luxembourg compromise 33–4, 43n.2








subsidies 218, 231n.38, 232nn.39 and 41
capitalism 74
Cardiff process 234n.46
Carter, Jimmy 43n.4, 52
Caspian Sea region 179, 211, 237, 257,
286n.26
Catholicism 267, 287n.37
Caucasus region 211, 237, 257, 286n.27
Ceausescu, Nicolae 72
censure motion 135
Central Asia 54, 175, 178, 211, 251
CFE Treaty see Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty
CFSP see EU, Common Foreign and Security
Policy
Charter 77 43
Charter of a Distinctive Partnership 172,
184n.6
Charter of Competencies 202
Charter of Fundamental Rights 199, 203,
232n.42
Charter of Partnership (US–Baltic states)
176
Chechnya see under Russia
Chernenko, Konstantin 57
Chesterton, Gilbert Keith 264
Chevènement, Jean-Pierre 202
Chilingirov, Stoyan 259
China (People’s Republic of) 4, 14, 48, 53,
54, 74, 75, 80, 175, 177, 240, 257,
258, 279, 286n.28
Chiquita 233n.44




Churchill, Winston 4, 10n.6, 16, 28n.5
Zurich speech 16, 28n.5
CIS see Community of Independent States
citizenship see EU
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm304
Index 305
Civil War (American) 145, 230n.28
Clausewitz, Carl von 183
Clemenceau, Georges 283n.13
Clifford, Clark 11n.9
coalition of the willing 180, 182, 244
Cockfield, Lord 60
co-decision procedure see under EU
coffee 289n.48
cohesion countries 219
Cohesion Fund see under EU
Cold War 1, 46, 48, 73, 80, 171, 175, 178,
181, 211, 239, 243, 246, 250, 277




Comecon see Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance
Cominform 7
Committee of Ministers see Council of
Europe
Committee of Permanent Representatives
131, 160n.3
Committee of the Regions 87, 132
Common Agricultural Policy (EU) see CAP
Common Assembly see under ECSC
common customs tariff see Common
External Tariff Policy
common defence policy 88, 89
common European home 66
Common External Tariff Policy 51, 61
Common Foreign and Security Policy see
under EU
common market 18, 52, 59
Commonwealth 34, 59
Commonwealth Preference System 34
communism 73, 74, 76
Communist Party 25, 58, 69n.13
Community of Independent States 96n.6,
101
Community preference 51
competitive devaluation 63, 85
compromiso storico 49
Comte, Auguste 260
Concert of Europe 45n.9
Confederation (American) 144
Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe (CSCE) 37, 43, 73, 80, 93,
110
Congress of Berlin 262
Congress of Europe 16
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of Europe 123n.6
Congress of the Peoples of Europe 207
Congress of Vienna 2, 262
consultation procedure 131
Consultative Assembly see Council of
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly
containment policy 26, 50
Convention on the Future of Europe 130,
190, 205–8
Conventional Arms Control Treaty see
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 81,
97n.7, 99, 185n.7, 244
convergence see under EMU
co-operation procedure see under EU
Copenhagen accession criteria 194, 215
Copenhagen summits see under EU
COR see EU, Committee of the Regions
cordon sanitaire 25, 26





Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(Comecon) 8, 10, 12n.15
Council for North Atlantic Co-operation
184n.5
Council of Europe 13, 16, 17, 19, 65–6, 71,
73, 80, 95, 99, 110, 114–15, 116,
123nn.6 and 7, 127, 163n.16, 172,
174, 192, 212, 242–4, 251, 262,
282n.5
Committee of Ministers 16, 123n.6
Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe 123n.6
enlargement 114–15
European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms 123n.6,
163n.16, 262
European Court of Human Rights
123n.6, 163n.16
European Social Charter 42, 232n.42




Council of Ministers see under ECSC and
EU
Court of First Instance see EU, European








CSCE see Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe
Cuban missile crisis 31, 33, 35, 187n.18
Customs Union see under EU
cyber-terrorism 241
Cyprus 83, 111, 191, 194, 210, 211–13
passim, 215, 226n.7, 228n.16,
231n.34
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm305
Index306
Czech Republic 82, 100, 114, 115, 159, 169,




Prague coup d’état 7, 27
Prague spring 36, 37, 77
Dayton Agreements 100, 112–13, 185n.10,
286n.25
death penalty 212, 239, 253, 285n.18
de-colonisation 15
de-coupling see under CAP and NATO
deepening see under EU





democratic deficit see under EU
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea see
North Korea
democratic tradition 78
demography 148, 223–5, 237, 270–3,
288n.43
Denmark 17, 31, 34, 35, 38–42 passim,
44n.6, 88, 90, 94, 98n.13, 106, 127,
141, 151, 167n.42, 198, 212, 214,
264, 288n.44
referendum (EEC) 39
referendum (EMU) 88, 154, 159, 200
referendum (Treaty on European Union)
72, 94, 98n.13, 105
depreciation (currency) 145, 150, 153
de-Stalinisation 13, 25
détente 32, 37, 38, 54, 102, 175
deterrence 181
Dialogue on the Mediterranean 184n.5
direct payment 231n.38, 232n.40
dirigisme 21
Doha Development Agenda 218, 240, 274
Dole Foods 233n.44
domino effect 46, 48, 107
double containment 9
down-sizing 223, 235n.48, 272
Dublin Convention on first asylum 289n.46
Dublin II Agreement 289n.46
Dunkirk Treaty 9, 12n.16
EAPC see NATO, Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council
East Germany see German Democratic
Republic
East Prussia 10, 110, 214
Easter Marches 122
EBRD see European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
ECB see EMU
ECB Executive Board 152, 157, 167n.42
ECB Governing Council 167n.42
ECOFIN 152
Economic and Monetary Union see EMU
Economic Commission for Europe (UN-
ECE) 73, 80, 242–3
ECSC (European Coal and Steel
Community) 13, 18–19, 20, 24, 26,
27, 29n.8, 44n.5, 68n.9, 97n.11, 127,
201
Common Assembly 19, 20, 24, 131
Council of Ministers 19, 24, 27
Court of Justice 19, 24
High Authority 19, 24, 27, 29n.11,
30n.17, 33, 127, 133, 138, 162n.10
manifest crisis 27
Treaty of Paris 19
EDC see European Defence Community
EEA see European Economic Area
EEC (European Economic Community) 13,
17, 22, 26, 31–3 passim, 38, 42, 46,
51, 58, 97n.11, 127
enlargements 34–5, 38–9, 47–52; see also
under EU
Rome Treaty 23, 50, 60, 134
see also EU
EFTA (European Free Trade Association)
31, 34, 38, 42, 59, 71, 83, 97nn.8
and 9, 159, 222, 243
Stockholm Convention 34
EIB see EU, European Investment Bank
EMS see European Monetary System
EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) 31,
40–1, 63, 65, 71, 85, 87–9, 91,
97n.10, 99, 100, 118, 125, 128, 130,
141–60, 164nn.19 and 20, 165n.27




convergence 64, 65, 87, 100, 142, 149,
164n.19
early warning 157
enlargement reform (ECB) 167n.42
Executive Board (ECB) 152, 157, 167n.42
eurogroup 158
European Central Bank (ECB) 87–8, 90,
128, 141, 142, 151–60, 166nn.32, 35
and 36, 203, 238
European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) 87, 90, 151, 166n.32, 167n.42
eurotax 142
excessive deficit procedure 156, 157




five tests (UK) 167n.41
Governing Council (ECB) 167n.42
independence (ECB) 151–3
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm306
Index 307
inflation targeting 166n.36
ins 142, 159, 164n.21
locking (of currencies) 142, 160
monetary targeting 166n.36
opt-out 91, 225n.2
outs 154, 159, 164n.21
pre-ins 154, 164n.21
price stability 166n.36
pro-cyclical budgetary policies 156,
164n.23
retreat position 164n.20
snake in the tunnel 40
Stability and Growth Pact 136, 148, 153,
156, 157, 164n.22, 167n.38
stages before introduction 87–8
structural deficit 158, 164n.22
Werner Plan 40–1
EMS see European Monetary System
enlargement
Council of Europe see under Council of
Europe
European Union see under EU
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation see
under NATO
Erhard, Ludwig 44n.5
ESCB see EMU, European System of Central
Banks
ESDP see EU, European Security and
Defence Policy
Essen Summit 234n.46
Estonia 72, 82, 115, 170, 176, 179, 191,
194, 213–15 passim, 228n.16
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) 241
ethnic cleansing 173
Euratom 23, 68n.9, 97n.11
Rome Treaty 23
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
see under NATO
euro-communism 46, 48–9
Eurocorps 227n.10, 247, 283n.12







Europe des patries 95, 266
Europe of states 208
European Army 20
European Assembly see ECSC, Common
Assembly
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) 71, 96n.6
European Central Bank see under EMU
European Coal and Steel Community see
ECSC
European Community see EU
European Commission see EU, Commission
European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 123n.6,
163n.16, 262
European Co-operation Act 5
European Council (of the European
Community and the European Union)
see under EU
European Court of Auditors 219–20
European Court of First Instance 162n.12,
163n.13
European Court of Human Rights 123n.6,
163n.16
European Court of Justice see under EU
European Currency Unit (ECU) 39, 64
European Defence Community 13, 20, 21,
22, 44n.5
European Economic Area (EEA) 71, 83–5,
97nn.8 and 9, 106, 128, 216
bodies 97n.8
financial mechanism 84
European Economic Community see EEC
European Free Trade Association see EFTA
European Industrial Free Trade Area 43n.3
European Investment Bank (EIB) 82, 83,
96n.6
European Monetary System 63–5
European Movement 16, 17, 20, 22, 127
European Parliament see under EU
European Political Authority 20
European Political Community 13, 20, 21
European Political Co-operation 89
European Recovery Programme 5
European Regional Development Fund 83,
87
European Security and Defence Identity 172
European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) see under EU
European security architecture 99, 236, 242–
5, 247
European Social Charter 42, 232n.42
European System of Central Banks (ESCB)
see under EMU
European Union see EU
EU (European Union, including European
Community (EC); see separate entries
for CAP, ECSC, EEC and EMU)
68n.9, 71, 73, 79, 82, 86, 92, 96n.6,
97n.11, 99, 111, 116, 125–68, 174,
178, 180, 185n.11, 190–235, 237,
242–8 passim, 250, 252, 255, 262,
267, 282nn.5 and 6, 285n.23,
287n.35
acquis communautaire 128, 130, 131,
194, 212, 214, 215, 220, 221
Agenda 2000 117, 140, 193, 287n.36
Amsterdam Summit 190, 191–2, 212
Amsterdam Treaty 130, 132, 191, 200,
226n.6, 234n.46, 272, 289n.45
assent procedure 91
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm307
Index308
asylum policies 272–3
Berlin Summit 190, 191, 193–4, 218,
219
big bang (enlargement) 191, 213
budget 147, 165n.30, 193–4, 219
censure motion 135
citizenship 86
Charter of Competencies 202
Charter of Fundamental Rights 199, 203,
232n.42
co-decision procedure 87, 90, 91, 131,
160n.6
cohesion countries 219
Cohesion Fund 83, 88, 109, 216, 219
Commission (European) 24, 29n.11, 33,
38, 43n.2, 50, 60, 87, 94, 98n.12,
125–39 passim, 142, 152, 156–8
passim, 160n.6, 162nn.10, 12, 13 and
14, 163nn.15 and 18, 164nn.22 and
23, 165nn.24 and 29, 167n.40, 192,
195, 198–208 passim, 211, 214, 218–
21 passim, 225n.4, 226n.9, 229n.27,
231n.31, 232n.42, 233nn.44 and 45,
234n.46, 247, 265
Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) 131, 160n.3
Committee of the Regions (COR) 87, 132
Common Foreign and Security Policy 88,
94, 97n.11, 192
conciliation procedure 132
Congress of the Peoples of Europe 207
consultation procedure 131
Convention on the Future of Europe 130,
190, 205–8
co-operation procedure 91, 131
Copenhagen accession criteria 194, 215
Copenhagen Summit (1993) 215
Copenhagen Summit (2002) 191, 212, 215
Council of Ministers 20, 24, 33, 38, 40,
43n.2, 50, 68n.9, 87, 90, 125, 130–2
passim, 135, 137–41 passim, 156,
160n.6, 161nn.7 and 8, 190–2
passim, 195, 198–200 passim, 203–5
passim, 208, 221, 227n.12, 229n.27,
234n.46, 247, 265, 289n.45
Customs Union 23, 38, 211, 222
Dehaene Committee 226n.9
deepening 83, 97n.10, 111, 128, 192,
200, 214
democratic deficit 129–39, 163n.17, 203,
227n.12
ECOFIN (Ministers of Economy and
Finance) 152
enlargement 34–5, 38–9, 47–52, 105–10,
191, 194, 212–17, 225, 236, 245,





European Council 63, 68n.10, 85, 90,
126, 136, 165n.30, 207
European Court of Auditors 219–20
European Court of First Instance
162n.12, 163n.13
European Court of Justice 20, 87, 91,
133, 135, 138, 139, 162nn.12 and
14, 163n.15, 222, 229n.27
European Investment Bank (EIB) 82, 83,
96n.6
European Parliament 20, 86, 87, 90, 125,
130–3 passim, 135, 139–41 passim,
152, 160n.6, 161nn.7 and 8,
165n.24, 191, 195, 200–8 passim,
214, 215, 225n.3, 227n.12, 229n.27,
247, 265
European Regional Development Fund
83, 87
European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) 139, 195–7, 198, 227n.12,
228n.13, 248, 252, 286n.24
fisheries policy 39, 51, 94, 106, 109,
216, 222–3
flexibility 192, 199, 200
Foreign Secretary 208
four freedoms 51, 60, 272
fraud 219–20, 232n.41
Helsinki summit 190, 191, 194–8, 212,
213
High Representative for Security and
Foreign Policy 195, 203, 208,
228n.17
Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs)
85, 191, 194, 226n.9
Internal Market (1992 project) 47, 50,
60–1, 63, 65, 69nn.11 and 12, 83,
85–7 passim, 96, 98n.12, 106, 128,
143, 150, 165n.24, 211, 216, 220,
223, 229n.27, 232n.42, 272,
287n.35, 289n.44
Interreg programme 287n.36
justice and home affairs 89, 91, 97n.11




majority voting 191, 198–9, 200, 208,
229n.27
Nice Summit 190, 191, 198–201, 205,
211, 213, 231n.35, 232n.42, 247,
289n.45
Nice Treaty 137, 160, 190, 229n.18
ombudsman 87
own resources 43n.2, 52
Petersberg tasks 195
Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy
89, 91, 221, 232n.42
Rapid Reaction Force 177, 179, 180,
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm308
Index 309
190, 195–7, 227n.10, 228n.17, 247,
250, 252
regatta model (enlargement) 194
regional policies 193, 203, 219
Schengen Agreement 91, 106, 122n.3,
192, 214, 272
Seville Summit 167n.40, 272
subsidiarity principle 86, 91, 98n.12,
131, 205, 207, 209, 229n.27,
230n.28
subsidies 134, 162n.12, 221–2
Tampere Summit 225n.5, 272
transparency 139–40
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht
Treaty) 62, 68n.9, 71, 72, 85–91, 92,
93, 94–6, 97nn.10 and 11, 98n.13,
105, 111, 119, 126, 128, 132, 136,
159, 164n.20, 192, 201, 207, 225n.2,
226n.6, 231n.31, 232n.42, 245, 249
uniformity 220–1
veto power 132, 208
weighted voting 192, 198, 229n.18,
231n.35





excessive deficit procedure 156, 157
Exchange Rate Mechanism see under EMU
exit risk 149
Federal Constitutional Court 105
Federal Republic of Germany see Germany
Federal Reserve (US) 145, 166n.32, 167n.37,
238
Federalist Papers (US) 230n.28
financial mechanism 84
Finland 25, 39, 44n.6, 63, 83–5 passim, 88,
102, 106, 110, 128, 141, 155, 158,




fisheries policy see under EU
five tests (UK) see 167n.41
Flanders 265
flexibility
European Union 192, 199, 200
labour 146, 225
Florida 145
force de frappe 22
Foreign Secretary see EU
‘former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’
92, 93, 115, 169, 173, 176, 182,
188n.24, 194, 198, 255–7 passim,
259, 261, 286n.24
Fortress Europe 61, 63, 82
Fouquet, Claude 248
four freedoms 51, 60, 272
Four Power international control (Germany)
29n.9
four-power status (Berlin) 246
France 1, 3–9 passim, 10n.4, 11n.9, 13, 14,
17–23 passim, 26, 28nn.2 and 5, 33,
34, 41, 42, 46, 51, 57, 69n.12, 72,
94, 112, 117, 127, 129, 141, 142,
154–8 passim, 166n.34, 167n.40,
171, 183, 193, 195–201 passsim,
207, 209, 215, 218, 221, 225,
227n.10, 228n.13, 233n.45, 237,
240, 244–50 passim, 253, 261, 264,
265, 271, 283nn.10, 11, 12 and 14,
288n.44
Corsica 265




French Revolution 263, 283n.10
Friedman, Thomas 276
Friendship Treaty (France–Germany) 34,
246
Front National 165n.31, 209, 264, 269, 273
Frowein, Jochen 231n.32
Fukuyama, Francis 76





GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) 7, 15, 38, 51, 62, 74, 103, 277
de Gaulle, Charles 4, 5, 10n.4, 29n.14,
30n.17, 31, 34–5, 43n.3, 111, 247,
249, 266
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade see
GATT
General Electric 165n.24
Geneva Convention on the treatment of
prisoners of war 239
Georgia 179, 257, 258, 286n.27
Abkhasia 286n.27
South Ossetia 286n.27
German–Austrian Monetary Union 166n.34
German Democratic Republic 14, 25,
30n.16, 32, 37, 54, 72, 74, 245
German unification see under Germany
Germany 1, 3–10 passim, 11n.9, 12nn.14
and 16, 13–19 passim, 21, 23, 25, 26,
28nn.2 and 5, 29nn.9 and 12,
30n.16, 32, 35, 37, 44n.5, 46, 68n.7,
72, 74, 79–81 passim, 88, 92, 95,
98n.12, 100, 117, 127, 129, 131,
141, 142, 153–8 passim, 162nn.12
and 14, 166n.36, 171, 183, 184n.3,
193, 195–201 passim, 207, 214, 218,
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm309
Index310
219, 222, 225, 227n.10, 228n.13,
231n.30, 236, 237, 240, 244, 245–50
passim, 253, 265, 266, 271,





constitution (Grundgesetz) 27, 266
currency reform 7
Easter Marches 122




Länder 74, 81, 98n.12, 100, 117,
124n.9, 131, 134, 221, 266




unification 25, 81, 97nn.7 and 10, 245,
246
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 64, 202, 206,
229n.26, 267
globalisation 103–5, 237, 241, 253, 273–8,
279, 290n.50
Gorbachev, Mikhail 47, 58, 65–6, 68n.8,
69n.13, 76, 170, 245
Gosplan 161n.9
Greece 43, 46, 49–50, 69n.12, 127, 141,
156, 164n.19, 166n.34, 171, 184n.3,
198, 210–2 passim, 215, 219,




Group of Eight (G-8) 226n.8, 240
Group of Twenty-four (G-24) 82
Guantanamo naval base 239
Haider, Jörg 209, 230n.29
Haider affair 209–10, 231nn.31 and 32
three wise men 210, 231n.32
Hallstein doctrine 29n.12
Hamilton, Alexander 144, 230n.28
Havel, Vaclav 179
Hayes, Carlton J. 261
Hell’s Angels 264
Helsinki Final Act 32, 37, 43, 45n.9, 52, 55
Helsinki Summit see under EU
High Authority see under ECSC
High Representative for Security and Foreign
Policy see under EU







Howell of Guildford, Lord 204–5
human trafficking 279, 285n.22
Hungarian uprising 13, 25
Hungary 7, 32, 66, 67, 82, 100, 114, 115,
159, 169, 171, 172, 191, 194, 202,
213, 215, 228n.16, 246, 259,
286n.30
ICC see International Criminal Court
Iceland 42, 44n.6, 83–5 passim, 97n.9, 106,
122n.3, 196, 216, 233n.45
ICT see information and communications
technologies





independence (central bank) 151–3




technologies (ICT) 224, 274
ins 142, 159, 164n.21
Interim Agreement 43n.4
Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) see
under EU
intermediate-range ballistic missile crisis 47,
55–6, 248
Internal Market (1992 project) see under EU
International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation 188n.26
International Criminal Court (ICC) 182,
185n.11, 253, 285n.18
International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia 174, 185n.11, 255
international law (evolution) 174, 181
International Monetary Fund see under
Bretton Woods institutions




inter-war period 3, 9
Iran 48, 54, 239, 249, 257–8, 269, 282n.2
Iraq 48, 100, 158, 170, 183, 184n.3,
189n.30, 198, 208, 237, 239, 240,
244, 246, 248, 249, 252, 253, 282n.6
Ireland 6, 31, 35, 38, 40, 42, 106, 127, 141,
153–5 passim, 158, 197, 198, 200–1,
212, 215, 219, 224, 227n.11
referenda (Nice Treaty) 137, 190, 200–1




MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm310
Index 311
Israel 211
Italy 6–9 passim, 11n.9, 14, 17, 18, 21, 40,
42, 51, 69n.12, 141, 148, 153, 156,
158, 166n.34, 171, 183, 198, 199,
225, 229n.18, 231n.33, 233n.45,
250, 251, 253, 259, 265, 273,
288n.43
Jakobson, Max 246






John Paul II (Pope) 76
Joint Security and Defence Council 283n.12
Jospin, Lionel 165n.31, 203–4, 247
Juncker, Jean-Claude 179
justice and home affairs 89, 91, 97n.11
just-in-quantity production 278
just-in-time production 278
Kaliningrad see under Russia and Soviet
Union
Kaplan, Robert 254
Kazakhstan 102, 188n.23, 257, 258,
284n.16
Kennan, George 11n.8, 175
Kerr, Clark 11n.7
Keynes, John Maynard 10n.3
Keynesian policies 20, 42, 48, 118, 157,
159, 164n.22
KFOR (Kosovo Force) 255
Khrushchev, Nikita 13, 25, 32, 35
Kinks, The 69n.11
Kissinger, Henry 47, 236
Knowledge Revolution 28n.4, 277–8
Koestler, Arthur 262
Kohl, Helmut 97n.10, 266, 283n.12
Korean War 13, 21, 24, 286n.28




Kurdish question 210, 212
Kurile Islands 54
Kuwait 100, 189n.30, 249
Kyoto Protocol 253, 285n.18
Laeken Summit 191, 206
Länder see under Germany
languages issue 166n.33
Latin Monetary Union 149, 166n.34
Latvia 72, 82, 115, 170, 176, 179, 191, 194,
213–15 passim, 228n.16
Le Pen, Jean-Marie 165n.31, 273
League of Nations 171, 243, 282n.5
Lenin 73, 263
Liechtenstein 83–5 passim, 97n.9, 216
Lithuania 72, 82, 115, 170, 176, 179, 191,
194, 213–16 passim, 228n.16
locking (of currencies) 142, 160
Lomé Conventions 123n.5, 222
long telegram 11n.8
Luxembourg 9, 17, 18, 29n.28, 121, 127,
141, 198, 227n.10, 229n.18, 283n.12
Luxembourg compromise 33–4, 43n.2
Luxembourg process 234n.46
Luxembourg Summit 210
Maastricht Treaty see EU, Treaty on
European Union
Macedonia see ‘former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia’
Macmillan, Harold 30n.17
MAD see mutual assured destruction
mad cow disease 134
Madison, James 230n.28
Major, John 225n.2
majority voting see under EU
Malenkov, Georgy 25






MAP see NATO, Membership Action Plan
Marshall, George 5
Marshall Plan 1, 5–9 passim, 11nn.9, 10 and
12, 12, 14, 19, 71, 277
European Co-operation Act 5
European Recovery Programme 5
functioning 5–6
Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC) 6, 7, 11n.11, 19
Marx, Karl 73, 262
Marxism 263
May 1968 36
MBFR see Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction talks
MCA see CAP, Monetary Compensation
Amount
McCloy, John Jay 12n.14







Milosevic, Slobodan 173, 174, 184n.3,
185n.11, 255
mission civilisatrice 182, 283n.10
Mitteleuropa 80, 83
Mitterrand, François 56, 57, 68n.7, 95,
97n.10, 245, 283n.12
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm311
Index312
MNE see multinational enterprise
mobility (workforce) 145–6, 165n.29
Modrow, Hans 65
Molotov, Vyacheslav 12
Monetary Compensation Amount 44n.7
monetary targeting 166n.36
Monnet, Jean 18, 29n.11, 30n.17, 127,
162n.10, 201
Montenegro see Serbia and Montenegro;
Yugoslavia







multinational enterprise 74, 75, 105, 276–8
multiplier effect 6
Muslim-Croatian Federation 92, 112
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks
(MBFR) 102
mutual assured destruction (MAD) 26,
187n.18
NAFTA (North American Free Trade
Agreement) 105
Nagorno Karabach 286n.27
Napoleon (French Emperor) 213, 249–50,
261
Napoleonic Wars 2, 262, 265
National Security Strategy (US) 181,
188n.27
nationalism 15, 37, 53, 73, 92, 119, 237,
258–67, 290n.50
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)
1, 8, 9, 10, 19, 21, 22, 27, 34, 46, 47,
50, 55, 71, 73, 79, 81, 82, 99, 102,
111–13 passim, 116, 169–89, 190,
195, 196, 211–12, 213, 227n.11,
238–40 passim, 243, 244, 249, 251,
252, 255, 256, 282n.5, 286n.24
Allied Force (operation) 173
big bang (enlargement) 176
Charter of a Distinctive Partnership 172,
184n.6
coalition of the willing 180, 182, 244
Council for North Atlantic Co-operation
184n.5
de-coupling 22, 55, 56, 196, 197
Defence Capability Initiative 196
Dialogue on the Mediterranean 184n.5
enlargement 113–14, 169, 171–2, 175–6,
180, 183n.2, 184n.3, 188nn.24 and
25, 236, 244, 245, 249, 252
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) 172, 184n.5, 188n.25, 244
European Security and Defence Identity
172
inter-operability (EU-NATO) 196
KFOR (Kosovo Force) 255
Madrid Summit 171, 184nn.5 and 7
Membership Action Plan (MAP) 186n.15
NATO–Russia Council 170, 177, 178,
185n.7, 188n.22, 239, 244, 251
NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Co-operation and Security
172
NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
171, 188n.22
no-fly rule 113
North Atlantic Co-operation Council 82
North Atlantic Treaty 9, 113, 172,
183n.1, 184n.3, 189n.31, 238
northern strategy 180
out-of-area engagement 100, 113, 169,
178, 180
Partnership for Peace (PfP) 82, 99, 102,
110, 113, 184n.5, 186n.15, 188n.25,
244,
peacekeeping 169, 170, 178, 180, 182
peacemaking 169, 178, 180
Prague Capabilities Commitment 179







Washington Treaty see North Atlantic
Treaty above
NATO–Russia Council see under NATO
NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Co-operation and Security
172
NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
172, 188n.22
Nazism 262
near abroad 80, 101




new economy 155, 224
New International Economic Order 104
New World Order 7
New York (state) 145
New Zealand 219






NORDEK see Nordic Economic Union
Nordic Council 44n.6, 243
Nordic Economic Union 39, 44n.6
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm312
Index 313
North American Free Trade Agreement see
NAFTA
North Atlantic Co-operation Council 82
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation see
NATO




Norway 17, 34, 35, 39, 44n.6, 83–5 passim,
97n.9, 106, 121, 122n.3, 196, 216
referendum (EEC) 39
referendum (EU) 108–9
NSC 68 (US National Security Council
report) 28n.3
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 36
Nuremberg Declaration 247
occupation zones (Germany) 5, 7, 11n.12,
14
OECD see Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
OEEC see Marshall Plan, Organisation for
European Economic Co-operation
oil crises 32, 41, 42, 46, 47, 58, 223
ombudsman 87
OPEC see Organisation of Petroleum
Exporting Countries
Operation Desert Storm 79
optimal currency area 144
opt-outs 91, 225n.2
Oreja, Marcellino 231n.32
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) 11n.11,
19, 73, 80, 242–3
Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) see Marshall Plan
Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) 80, 93, 99, 110,
111, 116, 172, 242
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) 47, 104
Ortega y Gasset, José 281
OSCE see Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe
Ostpolitik 32, 37, 246
Ottoman Empire 72, 221
out-of-area engagement see under NATO
out-sourcing 223
own resources 43n.2, 52
Pakistan 53, 239, 257–8, 279, 282n.2





Versailles Treaty 4, 286n.25
Paris Summit 41
Parkinson’s Law 225n.4
Parliamentary Assembly see under Council
of Europe
Partial Nuclear Test Ban 36
Partnership for Peace see under NATO
pay-as-you-go pension system 148, 272
peace movements 55, 56
peaceful coexistence 32
peacekeeping see under NATO
peacemaking see under NATO
pensions 148, 272
people’s democracies 1





PfP see NATO, Partnership for Peace
phasing-in 218, 232n.40




Single European Act 60
Treaty on European Union 86–7, 89, 91
Pleven, René 19
Poland 4, 7, 10, 25, 26, 32, 37, 46, 54, 55,
68n.4, 82, 83, 100, 114, 115, 169,
171, 172, 191, 194, 202, 213–15




Portugal 15, 39, 43, 46, 49, 50–1, 64, 127,
141, 154–6 passim, 159, 167n.39,
198, 212, 215, 219, 231n.31,
233n.45, 288n.44
Potsdam Conference 5, 25, 179
Prague Capabilities Commitment 179
Prague coup d’état 7, 27
Prague spring 36, 37, 77
Prague Summit 170, 178–9, 215
pre-emption (attack, conflict) 181, 188n.28




problem of the UK budget 59–60
pro-cyclical budgetary policies 156, 164n.23
Prodi, Romano 139, 156, 163n.18, 166n.38,
203, 206, 226n.9, 229n.27
Productivity Revolution 28n.4




Putin, Vladimir 68n.6, 178
Qatar Summit 274
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm313
Index314
Rambouillet Agreement 185n.9
Rapid Reaction Force see EU
Rau, Johannes 203
Reagan, Ronald 57, 58, 62
reconciliation (French–German) 3, 5, 14, 171
Redford, Robert 288n.40
regatta model 194
Regional Development Fund (European) 83,
87
regional policies 193, 203, 219
renationalisation 218
Renault–Iveco merger 163n.15
Republic of Korea see South Korea




Rio Treaty on the Defense of the Western
Hemisphere 183n.1
rogue states 177, 181, 237, 239, 253
Romania 7, 72, 82, 115, 170, 171, 176, 179,




Rome Treaty see EEC; Euratom
Rotterdam 14
Rugova, Ibrahim 254
Ruhr area 14, 29n.9
Russia 3, 10, 66, 71, 72, 74, 77–9 passim,
99, 101, 102, 110, 115, 128, 175–6,
184n.4, 186n.13, 187n.19, 188n.20,
211, 213, 214, 216, 236, 237, 239,
240, 244, 249–52 passim, 257, 258,
282n.2, 284n.16, 286n.28
Chechnya 99, 111, 115–6, 124n.8, 257,
282n.3, 284n.16
Kaliningrad 10, 80, 110, 214, 216,
231n.37
near abroad (blizhnee zarubezhye) 80,
101
see also Soviet Union
Saar 18
Saddam Hussein 198, 240, 248, 249, 253
Saint-Germain Treaty 259
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira 49
SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty)
28n.3, 187n.18
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 43n.4, 170,
177, 187n.18, 239
Interim Agreement 43n.4
SALT I 36, 43n.4, 54, 187n.18
SALT II 54, 68n.6
Saxony 134, 162n.12
Scandinavian Monetary Union 166n.34
Scania 163n.15
Schengen Agreement see EU
Schmidt, Helmut 64, 202
Schröder, Gerhard 208
Schuman, Robert 18
Schuman Plan 18, 19, 29n.9
Schumpeter, Joseph 120
Seattle Summit 274
Security Council see under United Nations
September 11 see under terrorism
Serb Republic 92, 112, 256
Serbia and Montenegro 216, 255–7 passim,
285n.23, 286n.30
see also Yugoslavia
Servan Schreiber, Jean-Jacques 32, 34
set-aside 217
Seville Summit 167n.40, 272
Sèvres Treaty 259
Shakespeare, William 99
shock therapy 71, 77
Siedentop, Larry 205, 268
Sinatra doctrine 45n.8
Singer 276
Single European Act 60–2, 63, 65, 88, 90,
96, 128, 131
Single Market see EU, Internal Market
Slavonia 259
Slovakia 82, 115, 170, 176, 179, 191, 194,
213, 215, 228n.16, 286n.30
Slovenia 82, 91, 92, 102, 170, 171, 176,
179, 191, 194, 213, 215, 228n.16
snake in the tunnel 40
social contract 118
Social Protocol see EU, Protocol and
Agreement on Social Policy
socialist division of labour 8
Solidarnosc 54, 55
South Korea 14, 198
South Ossetia 286n.27
southern strategy 180
Soviet Union 1, 3–10 passim, 11nn.7 and 9,
12–15 passim, 21, 25–7 passim,
28n.3, 32, 34, 35, 37, 43, 43n.4,
45n.9, 46, 53, 57–8, 63, 65, 66,
68nn.4 and 6, 69n.13, 71, 72, 74–6
passim, 126, 177, 187n.18, 213, 214,
243, 286n.27
Communist Party 25, 58, 69n.13
Kaliningrad 10; see also under Russia
see also Russia
Spain 39, 43, 46, 49, 50–1, 64, 127, 131,
141, 154, 155, 157, 167n.39, 183,
184n.3, 193, 198, 199, 212, 215,
219, 224, 227n.10, 229n.18, 250,
251, 253, 265, 283n.12, 288n.43
Basque country 265
Sputnik 26
SS–20 intermediate range missile 55
St Malo Declaration 196
Stability and Growth Pact see under EMU
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 194,
216, 226n.8, 236
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm314
Index 315
stagflation 155




START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)
START I 68n.6, 99, 102
START II 68n.6, 103, 122n.2, 175, 177,
187n.18
START III 68n.6, 175
state breakdown 181
status quo significance 79, 111, 256, 261
Stockholm Convention 34
Strasbourg 264
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Treaty)
28n.3, 187n.18
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Treaty) see
START
Strategic Concept 170
Strategic Missile Defense 169
structural deficit 158, 164n.22
structural reform 62, 158
sub-regional co-operation 243, 282n.6
subsidiarity principle see under EU
subsidies see under CAP and EU
Suez crisis 13, 34
Sun-Tzu 254
Supreme Court (US) 230n.28
Sweden 6, 17, 34, 35, 39, 44n.6, 83–5
passim, 88, 102, 106, 107–8, 110,
118, 128, 141, 151, 167n.42, 193,
197, 198, 212, 214, 218, 227n.11,
264, 289n.44





Switzerland 34, 83, 85, 97n.9, 106, 121,
161n.8, 166n.34, 216–17




Tampere Summit 225n.5, 272
terrorism 129, 179, 181, 236–7, 238–42,
267, 279
September 11 129, 155, 169, 177, 178,
236, 238–41
TEU see EU, Treaty on European Union
Thatcher, Margaret 62, 136, 249
Third Reich 210, 230n.28, 231n.30
Thirty Years’ War 2
Thrace 259
three wise men 210, 231n.32
Titanic (film) 288n.40
Tito, Josip Broz 63
Titus Livius 125, 160n.1
tobacco advertising 137–8, 162n.14
de Tocqueville, Alexis 71
transition process (Central and Eastern
Europe) 74
Transylvania 259, 286n.30
Treaty of Moscow 68n.6, 122n.2, 170, 177,
178, 188n.21, 239
Treaty of Paris 19
Treaty on European Union see under EU
Trianon Treaty 259
troika presidency (EU) 202
Truman, Harry 10n.6, 11n.9, 46, 50
Turkey 50, 111, 171, 179, 183, 184n.3,
190, 191, 194–6 passim, 210–12,
213, 215, 226n.7, 228n.16, 231nn.34
and 35, 245, 257, 258, 260, 267,
284n.16
Turkmenistan 257–8 passim, 284n.16
Two German States Theory 25
two-track strategy 56
UK see United Kingdom
Ukraine 66, 102, 115, 172, 186n.14, 213,
251, 255, 259, 286n.30
Ulbricht, Walter 37
UN see United Nations
unemployment 116–17, 146, 223–5,
234n.46, 271, 288n.43, 289n.49
Cardiff process (EU) 234n.46
Cologne process (EU) 234n.46
Jobs Pact (EU) 234n.46
Luxembourg process (EU) 234n.46
uniformity (EU) 220–1
unilateralism 253
Unit of Account (EU) 64
United Kingdom 1, 3–9 passim, 14, 15, 17,
20–3 passim, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40,
59–60, 64, 88, 89, 95, 98n.12, 106,
127, 131, 138, 141, 151, 154, 159,
162n.14, 163n.16, 165n.27,
167nn.41 and 42, 183, 193, 195–9
passim, 212, 214, 218, 221, 224,
228n.13, 229n.27, 232n.42, 237,
240, 249, 250, 253, 266, 268, 272,




United Nations 7, 116, 127, 174, 231n.30,
282n.5
Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) 104
Economic Commission for Europe (UN-
ECE) 73, 80, 242–3
Security Council 4, 7, 173, 174, 180,
183, 184n.3, 185n.11, 186n.12,
189n.30, 198, 249, 285n.21
Universal Declaration on Human Rights
90
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm315
Index316
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) see United
Nations
United States 1, 3–8 passim, 11nn.8 and 12,
13, 19, 21, 22, 25–7 passim, 32, 34,
37, 43n.4, 45n.9, 53, 55, 67n.3,
68n.6, 75, 80, 102, 105, 110, 120,
125, 145–7, 165n.27, 171, 176, 177,
182, 183, 187n.18, 196, 211, 213,
219, 224, 228n.13, 233n.44,
234n.47, 237–40 passim, 248, 248–
50 passim, 252–4, 257, 258, 261,
282nn.5 and 6, 286n.28
United States of Europe 16, 28n.5, 208
universalism 262, 269
Up Close and Personal (film) 288n.40
Uruguay Round see under World Trade
Organisation




Versailles Treaty 4, 286n.25
vertical integration 278
veto power (EU) 132, 208
Victorian capitalism 3
Vienna Declaration 114
Vietnam war 31, 36, 37, 39, 42, 46, 48, 254






Warsaw Pact 10, 22, 54, 55, 69n.13, 71, 72,
81, 170, 171, 175, 176, 179
Washington, George 169, 183n.1
Washington consensus 96n.5
Washington Treaty see NATO, North
Atlantic Treaty
Watergate 254
weighted voting see under EU
Werner Plan 40–1
West Germany see Germany
Western European Union (WEU) 9, 21, 22,
25, 26, 56–7, 89, 93, 102, 116, 195,
227nn.11 and 12, 242
WEU see Western European Union
widening (enlargement) 83, 128, 200
Wilhelm II, German Emperor 3, 250
Wilson, Woodrow 286n.25
Wilsonian tradition 26
Wirtschaftswunder (German) 18, 29n.9
World Bank see under Bretton Woods
institutions
World Cups (football) 263, 287n.33
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 7, 74, 99,
103, 218, 222, 223, 233n.42, 240,
273–4, 282n.6




Uruguay Round 47, 62, 99, 103–5
WTO see World Trade Organisation
World War I 2, 3, 5, 26, 166n.34, 249, 259,
276, 277, 285n.23
World War II 1, 26, 129, 210, 214, 249,
277, 281, 282n.5
Yalta Conference 4, 5, 179, 216
Yaoundé Convention 123n.5
year zero 10n.4
Yeltsin, Boris 99, 101
Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of) 25, 48, 63,
72, 91–3 passim, 99, 113, 115, 169,
173–4, 185n.9, 194, 216, 249, 254,
255, 258–61 passim, 285nn.21 and
23
Kosovo 92, 93, 153, 169, 173–4, 182,
184nn.3 and 4, 185nn.8 and 9, 196,
216, 228n.15, 249, 254–7 passim,
259, 260, 285n.21, 286n.24
Montenegro 173, 216, 255–7 passim
see also Serbia and Montenegro
Zeitgeist 20
zero hour 1, 3, 10n.4
Zwischeneuropa 244
MUP_Torbion_13_Index 22/9/03, 2:29 pm316
